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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
FIRST SITTING 
Monday, 14th June 1976 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Opening of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session of the 
Assembly. 
2. Examination of Credentials. 
3. Election of the President of the Assembly. 
4. Election of the six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. 
5. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the First 
Part of the Session (Doe. 695). 
6. Ratification of action by the Presidential Committee 
(Does. 696, 698 and 699). 
7. Detente and security in Europe (PrtlBentation of and 
Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee 
and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doe. 703). 
8. Nomination of members to Committees. 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Sitting waa opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Grangier, Provisional Preside!nJ, in the Chair. 
1. Opening of the Session 
In accordance with Article Ill (a) of the 
Charter and Rules 2, 4, 5 and 17 of the Rules 
of Procedure, the Provisional President declared 
open the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session of the 
Assembly of Western European Union. 
2. Tributes 
The Provisional President paid tribute to the 
memory of Mr. Beyen, former Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, and to Mr. 
Piccioni and Mr. Legaret, former members of 
the Assembly of WEU. 
3. Address by the Provisional President 
The Provisional President addressed the 
.A!ssembly. 
4. Attendance Register 
The names of Representatives ,and Substitutes 
who signed the Register of Attendance are given 
in the Appendix. 
The Provisional President informed the 
Assembly that the Labour members of the United 
Kingdom Delegation who were members of the 
House of Commons were unable to participate 
in the First Part of the Session. 
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5. Examination of Credentials 
In accordance with Rule 6(2) of the Rules of 
ProcediUI'e, and subject to ratification by the 
Council of Europe, the Assembly Ull'animously 
ratified the credentials of Lord Hughes as a 
Substitute for the United Kingdom in place of 
Baroness Phillips, who had resigned. 
6. Election of the President of the Assembly 
One candidate only was proposed for the post 
of President, namely Mr. Nessler. 
Speaker : Mr. Leynen. 
The Assembly decided unanimously to dispense 
with a secret ballot and elected Mr. Nessler Presi-
dent of the Assembly by acclamation. 
On the invitation of the Provisional President, 
Mr. Nessler took the Chair. 
7. Address by the President of the Assembly 
The President addressed the Assembly. 
8. Election of the six Vice-Presidents of the 
Assembly 
The President informed the Assembly that five 
candidates were proposed for the six posts of 
Vice-President, namely: MM. Amrehn, Mart, de 
Niet, Sir John Rodgers and Mr. Tanghe. 
MINUTES 
Speaker: Mr. Leynen. 
The Assembly decided unanimously not to 
have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-
Presidents by acclamation and that the Vice-
Presidents should rank according to age, namely: 
Mr. de Niet, Sir John Rodgers, MM. Amrehn, 
Tanghe and Mart. 
The vice-presidency reserved for Italy re-
mained V'acant. 
9. Observers 
The President welcomed Mr. Belisle, member 
of the Canadian Senate, Mr. Roberts, member of 
the Canadian House of Commons, Mr. Guldberg 
and Mr Budtz, members of the Danish Folketing, 
Mr. Papapolitis and Mr. Tavlarios, members of 
the Greek Chamber of Deputies, Mr. Eidem, Mr . 
.&arvik and Mr. Thyness, members of the Nor-
wegian Storting, Mr. V asco da Gama Fernandes, 
President of the Portuguese Assembly, and Mr. 
Roseta, member of the Portuguese .Assembly. 
10. Adoption of the draft Order of Business 
for the First Part of the Session 
(Doe. 695) 
The Assembly adopted the draft Order of 
Business for the First Part of the Session. 
11. Ratification of action by the Presidential 
Committee 
(Does. 696, 698 and 699) 
In accordance with Rule 14(2) of the Rules of 
Procedure, the Assembly ratified unanimously 
the adoption by the Presidential Committee on 
12th January 1976 of the order on the organisa-
tion of a symposium on a European armaments 
FIRST SITTING 
policy, Document 696. (This Order will be 
published as No. 45) 1• 
The Assembly ratified by sitting and standing 
the adoption by the Presidential Committee on 
1st March 1976 of the resolution on European 
union and WEU, Documents 698 and 699. (This 
Resolution will be published as No. 59) 2• 
12. Detente and security in Europe 
(Presentation of the Report of the General Affairs 
Committee, Doe. 103) 
The Report of the General Affairs Committee 
was presented by Sir Frederic Bennett, Rappor-
teur. 
13. Address by Mr. Roberts, Observer from 
Canada 
Mr. Roberts, Observer from Canada, addressed 
the Assembly. 
14 . .Detente and security in Europe 
(Debate on the Report of the General Affairs 
Committee, Doe. 103) 
The Debate was opened. 
Speakers : MM. Kliesing, Critchley, Muller, 
Scholten, Mrs. von Bothmer, MM. Cermolacce, 
Guldberg (Observer from Denmark), Dankert. 
The Debate was adjourned. 
15. Nomination of members to Committees 
In accordance with Rules 39 and 42 bis of the 
Rules of Procedure, the AI!ISembly ratified the 
membership of the six Committees as follows : 
1. CoMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QuESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS (27 seats) 
Belgium: 
Members 
MM. Kempinaire 
Schugens 
Ta.nghe 
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AUernatea 
MM. Breyne 
Dequae 
Duvieusart 
1. See page 19. 
2. See page 20. 
MINUTES FIRST SITTING 
Members Alternates 
France: MM. Beauguitte MM. Delorme 
Bizet La Combe 
Boulloche Vadepied 
Menard de Montesquiou 
Riviere Schleiter 
Fed. Rep. of Germany : MM. Haase MM. Men de 
Klepsch Womer 
Lemmrich Schmidt 
Pawelczyk Ahrens 
Richter Buchner 
Italy: MM. Averardi MM. Artali 
Laforgia Bonaldi 
Pumilia Spora 
Rea le Magliano 
Vedovato La Rosa 
liuxembourg : Mr. Konen Mr. Spautz 
Netherlands : MM. Dankert MM. de Niet 
de Koster Piket 
Scholten Comelissen 
United Kingdom: MM. Buck Sir Harwood Harrison 
Critchley Lord Duncan-Sandys 
Hardy Lord Peddie 
Roper MM. Watkinson 
Urwin Whitehead 
2. GENERAL AFFAIRS CoMMITTEE (27 seats) 
Belgium: Mrs. Godinache-Lambert MM. de Bruyne 
MM. Leynen de Stexhe 
Van Hoeylandt Hulpiau 
France: MM. Brugnon MM. Forni 
Cermolacce Grussenmeyer 
Grangier Burckel 
Nessler Soustelle 
Peridier Weber 
Fed. Rep. of Germany: Mr. Amrehn MM. Dregger 
Mrs. von Bothmer Gessner 
MM. Mende Miiller 
Schmidt Schauble 
Sieglerschmidt Schwencke 
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MINUTES FIRST SITTING 
Members AUernates 
Italy: MM. Bettiol MM. Santalco 
Fioret Pecoraro 
Minnocci Cavezzali 
Preti Magliano 
Quilleri Treu 
Luxembourg : Mr. A bens Mr. Hengel 
Netherlands : MM. de Niet MM. Voogd 
Peijnenburg Reijnen 
Portheine de Koster 
United Kingdom: Sir Frederic Bennett MM. Page 
Mr. Mendelson Faulds 
Sir John Rodgers Channon 
MM. Steel McNamara 
Urwin Lewis 
3. CoMMITTEE oN SomNTIFIO, TECHNOLOGICAL AND AERosPACE QUESTIONS (21 seats) 
Belgium: MM. Adriaensens MM. Pla.sman 
de Stexhe de Bruyne 
France: MM. Boucheny MM. Bizet 
de Montesquiou Cemeau 
Schmitt La Combe 
Valleix Vitter 
Fed. Rep. of Germany: MM. Golter MM. Lemmrich 
Lenzer Klepsch 
Richter Ahrens 
Schwencke Wa.lther 
Italy: Mr. Mammi MM. Averardi 
Mrs. Catta.neo-Petrini Talamona 
MM. Pecoraro Ma.ncini 
Treu Leggieri 
Luxembourg : Mr. Mart Mr. Hengel 
Netherlands : MM. Comelissen MM. Portheine 
van Ooijen Waltmans 
United Kingdom : MM. Craigen MM. Hawkina 
Lewis Bagier 
Dr. Phipps Brown 
Mr. Warren Jessel 
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4. COMMITTEE ON BUDGETARY .AFFAIRS AND ADMINISTRATION (21 Beat8) 
MemberB AUernatea 
Belgium: MM. Dequae MM. Kempinaire 
de Bruyne Adriaensens 
France: MM. Depietri MM. Bourgeois 
Kauffmann Belin 
Croze Pignion 
Schleiter Schmitt 
Fed. Rep. of Germany: MM. Ahrens MM. Gessner 
Alber Kempfler 
Mrs. Wolf Walther 
Mr. Vohrer Wurbs 
Italy: MM. Castellucci Mr. Leggieri 
Moneti Mrs. Cattaneo-Petrini 
Prearo MM. Negrari 
Talamona Arfe 
Luxembourg : Mr. Hengel Mr. Margue 
N etkerland8 : MM. de Koster MM. Peijnenburg 
Waltmans Voogd 
United Kingdom : MM. Lewis Lord Beaumont of Whitley 
Page Mr. Grieve 
Lord Peddie Lord Wallace of Coslany 
Lord Selsdon Sir John Rodgers 
5. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PROCEDURE AND Pmv!LEGES (21 8eat8) 
Belgium: MM. Duvieusart Mr. Breyne 
Hulpiau Mrs. Godinache-Lambert 
France: MM. Cerneau MM. Nessler 
Burckel Peridier 
du Luart Roger 
Pignion Croze 
Fed. Rep. of Germany : MM. Alber MM. Lenzer 
Kempfler Golter 
Marquardt Buchner 
Schulte Pawelczyk 
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MINUTES FIRST SITTING 
Members AUernates 
Italy: MM. Coppola MM. Bologna 
Leggieri Reale 
Pica Farabegoli 
Preti Laforgia 
Luxembourg : Mr. Konen Mr. A bens 
Netherlands : MM. Voogd MM. Piket 
Scholten Comelissen 
United Kingdom : MM. Craigen Lord Hughes 
Grieve MM. Jessel 
Dr. Phipps Watkinson 
Mrs. Taylor Cordle 
6. COMMITTEE FOR RELATIONS WITH PARLIAMENTS (14 seats) 
Belgium: :MM. Schugens MM. Kempinaire 
Tang he Plasman 
France: MM. Delorme MM. Radius 
Jeambrun Riviere 
Fed. Rep. of Germany: MM. Enders Mrs. von Bothmer 
Miiller Mr. Alber 
Italy: Mrs. Miotti Carli MM. Pacini 
Mr. Zaffanella Bonaldi 
Luxembourg : MM. Hengel MM. Mart 
Spautz Konen 
Netherlands : MM. Peijnenburg MM. Schlingemann 
Stoffelen Voogd 
United Kingdom : MM. Farr MM. Hunt 
Mendelson Roper 
16. Date and time of the next Sitting 
The next Sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 15th June, at 10 a.m. 
The Sitting was closed at 6.05 p.m. 
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APPENDIX FIRST SITTING 
APPENDIX 
Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance 1 : 
Belgium 
MM. Hulpiau (Adriaensens) 
Dequa.e 
Kempina.ire 
Leynen 
Schugens 
de Stexhe 
de Bruyne (Ta.nghe) 
France 
MM. Burckel 
Delorme 
Gra.ngier 
Ka.uffmann 
de Montesquiou 
Peridier 
Radius 
Oermolacce (Roger) 
Schmitt 
Federal Republic of Germany 
Mrs. von Botkmer (Ahrens) 
MM. Alber 
Italy 
Klieaing (Amrehn) 
Enders 
Kempfler 
Sckiiuble (Lemmrich) 
Ma.rquardt 
Ma.ttick 
Mende 
Miiller 
Richter 
Schwencke 
Sieglerschmidt 
MM. Bologna. 
Vedovato 
Luxembourg 
Mr. Abens 
The following Representatives apologised for their absence : 
France 
MM. Boucheny 
Boulloche 
Brugnon 
Cemea.u 
Riviere 
Schleiter 
Va.lleix 
Vitter 
Federal Republic of Germany 
MM. Dregger 
Gessner 
Schmidt 
Vohrer 
Mrs. Wolf 
Italy 
MM. Avera.rdi 
Bettiol 
Coppola 
Fioret 
La.forgia. 
Leggieri 
Ma.mmi 
Minnocci 
Mrs. Miotti Ca.rli 
MM. Pecoraro 
Pica 
Preti 
Quilleri 
Tala.mona 
Treu 
Za.ffa.nella 
Netherlands 
MM. Pilcet (Comelissen) 
Da.nkert 
de Niet 
Portheine 
Scholten 
Stoffelen (V oogd) 
United Kingdom 
MM. Critchley 
Hawkins (Fa.rr) 
Grieve 
Warren (Hunt) 
Sir Frederic Bennett (Page) 
Lord Peddie 
Sir John Rodgers 
Lord Hugkes (Roper) 
Lord Beaumont of Whitley (Steel) 
Lord W allace of 00Bl4ny (Urwin) 
Luxembourg 
MM. Ma.rgue 
Mart 
Netherlands 
Mr. Reijnen 
United Kingdom 
MM. Brown 
Channon 
Lord Darling of Hillsborough 
MM. Faulds 
Hardy 
Lewis 
Mendelson 
Whitehead 
1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being 
given in brackets. 
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TEXTS ADOPTED FIRST SITTING 
ORDER 45 
on a symposium on a European armaments policy 
The Presidential Committee, 
Anxious to secure widespread recognition of the need for a European policy on the production and 
procurement of armaments ; 
Aware of the interest of such a symposium attended by members of parliament and experts; 
Noting the success of the colloquy on a civil and military aeronautical policy for Europe organised 
by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, 
INSTRUCTS 
The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to organise a symposium on a European 
armaments policy as set out in the explanatory memorandum of this order and to submit proposals to the 
Presidential Committee for approval, including the expenditure to be authorised and the list of persons 
to be invited. 
19 
TEXTS ADOI'TED FIRST SITTING 
RESOLUTION 59 
on European union and WEU 
The Assembly, 
Noting the decision by the nine member countries of the EEC to set up a. European union by 1980 
and to elect the European Parliament by universal suffrage a.s from 1978; 
Noting the report submitted by Mr. Leo Tindemans, Prime Minister of Belgium, to the members 
of the European Council in January 1976; 
Noting further that the modified Brussels Treaty is a.t present the only juridical basis for a European 
defence policy ; 
Considering that the development of the European union must not be an occasion for weakening 
the mutual commitments of the signatories of the modified Brussels Treaty ; 
Believing that continuing consultations between European countries on defence policy must be 
based on recognition of existing reciprocal obligations; 
Recalling that the WEU Assembly, established under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, 
is responsible for supervising the application of that treaty ; 
Considering that this Assembly cannot therefore entertain the transfer of its activities to another 
parliamentary assembly unless the latter has the right and obligation to supervise the application of the 
modified Brussels Treaty, 
INVITES THE EUROI'EAN CouNoiL 
I. To make certain that all the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty are respected in establishing 
the European union ; 
2. Not to infringe the rights of any WEU body unless its full responsibilities have been transferred 
by treaty to a body of the union ; 
3. To examine how to integrate WEU in the union rather than develop new institutions in fields in 
which WEU has legally-instituted responsibilities; 
4. To maintain a.t all events a. parliamentary assembly with statutory competence for all aspects of 
the application of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
20 
SECOND SITTING 
Tuesday, 15th June 1976 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Detente and security in Europe (Resumed Debate on 
the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on 
the draft R8C0'1'1111n8f1.ion, Doe. 703 and Amendments). 
2. Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council to the 
Assembly (Presentation by Mr. Destremau, Secretary of 
State for Foreign Aflairs of the French Republic, Chair-
man-in-Office of the Council, Does. 697 and 710) ; 
Application of the Brussels Treaty - Reply to the 
Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council ; Political 
activities of the Council- Reply to the Twenty-First 
Annual Report of the Council ; Scientific, technological 
and aerospace questions - Reply to the Twenty-First 
Annual Report of the Council (Presentation of and 
Joint Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments, of the General Aflairs Com-
mittee and of the Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recom-
mendations, Does. 700 and Amendments, 702 and 705). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the .Assembly, in the Ohair. 
1. Adoption of the Minutes 
The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous 
Sitting were agreed to. 
2. Attendance Register 
The names of Representatives and Substitutes 
who signed the Register of Attendance are given 
in the Appendix. 
3. Detente and security in Europe 
(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs 
Committee, Doe. 703 and Amendments) 
The Debate was resumed. 
Speakers: Mr. Mattick, Lord Peddie, Sir John 
Rodgers, MM. de Niet, Portheine. 
The Debate was adjourned. 
4. Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council 
to the Assembly 
(Presentation by Mr. Destremau, Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, 
Chairman·in·Offlce of the Council, Does 697 and 710) 
Application of the Brussels Treaty - Reply to 
the Twenty-First Annual Reportofthe Council 
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Political activities of the Council - Reply to 
the Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council 
Scientific, technological and aerospace 
questions - Reply to the Twenty-First Annual 
Report of the Council 
(Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of 
the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, 
of the General Affairs Committee and of the Com· 
mittee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendations, 
Does. 700 and Amendments, 702 and 70S) 
The Report of the Council to the Assembly 
was presented by Mr. Destremau, Secretary of 
State for Foreign Mfairs of the French Re-
public, Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
Mr. Destremau replied to questions put by 
MM. de Bruyne, Sieglersehmidt, Warren, Klie-
sing, Leynen, Mattick, Valleix, Cermolacce, 
Tanghe. 
The Report of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. 
Haase, Rapporteur. 
The Report of the General M:fairs Committee 
was presented by Mr. Peridier, Rapporteur. 
The Report of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions was 
presented by Mr. Richter, Rapporteur. 
The Joint Debate was opened. 
MINUTES 
Speakers : MM. de Montesquiou, de Brnyne. 
Mr. de Niet, Vice-President of the Assembly, 
took the Chair in place of Mr. Nessler. 
Speaker: Mr. Riviere. 
Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Chairman of the General 
Affairs Committee, replied to the speakers. 
Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, re-
sumed the Chair. 
The Joint Debate was closed. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft 
Recommendation in Document 700. 
An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. 
Haase: 
.At the end of the preamble to the draft recom-
mendation, add a new paragraph as follows : 
"Welcoming the Council's replies to Recom-
mendation 281 and to Written Question 167, 
and the assignment to the Standing Arma-
ments Committee of •a study of the situation of 
the armaments industry in the member coun-
tries,". 
The Amendment was agreed to. 
An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. 
Haase: 
In paragraph 2 of the operative text of the 
draft recommendation, before sub-paragraph (i) 
insert a sub-paragraph as follows: 
"(i) Include in annual reports, in addition to 
the present statement of the total level of 
British forces on the continent at 31st 
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December, a statement of the level of 
British forces on the mainland on that 
date, established in accordance with the 
Council's definition of the approved 
level ;". 
Sub-paragraphs (i), (ii) and (iii) become sub-
paragraphs (ii), (iii) and (iv). 
Speakers : MM. de Bruyne, Richter, Critchley. 
The Amendment was agreed to. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
Recommendation in Document 700, as amended. 
The draft Recommendation was agreed to 
unanimously. (This Recommendation will be pub-
lished as No. 285) 2 • 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
Recommendation in Document 702. 
The draft Recommendation was agreed to 
unanimously. (This Recommendation will be pub-
lished as No. 285) 2• 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
Recommendation in Document 705. 
The draft RecommendaJtion was agreed to 
unanimously. (This Recommendation will be pub-
lished as No. 286) 3• 
5. Date and time of the next Sitting 
The next Sitting was fixed for the same day 
at 3 p.m. 
The Sitting was closed at 12.50 p.m. 
1. See page 24. 
2. See page 25. 
3. See page 26. 
APPENDIX SECOND SITTING 
APPENDIX 
Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance 1 : 
Belgium 
MM. de Bruyne (Adriaensens) 
Dequa.e 
Leynen 
Schugens 
de Ste:xhe 
Tanghe 
France 
MM. La Oombe (Burckel) 
Pignion (Delorme) 
Kauffma.nn 
de Montesquiou 
Peridier 
Radius 
Riviere 
Oermolacce (Roger) 
Oroze (Schleiter) 
Schmitt 
Valleix 
Federal Republic of Germany 
MM. Ahrens 
Italy 
Alber 
Kliesing (Amrehn) 
Enders 
Gessner 
Kempfler 
Marquardt 
Mattick 
Men de 
Miiller 
Richter 
Haase (Schmidt) 
Schwencke 
Sieglerschmidt 
Vohrer 
MM. Bologna. 
Vedovato 
The following Representatives apologised for their absence : 
Belgium 
Mr. Kempinaire 
France 
MM. Boucheny 
Boulloche 
Brugnon 
Cemeau 
Grangier 
Vitter 
Federal Republic of Germany 
MM. Dregger 
Lemmrich 
Mrs. Wolf 
Italy 
MM. Averardi 
Bettiol 
Coppola 
Fioret 
La.forgia 
Leggieri 
Mammi 
Minnocci 
Mrs. Miotti Carli 
MM. Pecoraro 
Pica 
Preti 
Quilleri 
Talamona 
Treu 
Za:lfanella 
Luxembourg 
MM. Hengel (Abens) 
Spautz (Margue) 
Mart 
Netherlands 
MM. Dankert 
de Niet 
Portheine 
Schlingemann (Reijnen) 
Sto:lfelen 
United Kingdom 
MM. Critchley 
Grieve 
Wan-en (Hunt) 
Sir Frederic Bennett (Page) 
Lord Peddie 
Sir John Rodgers 
Lord Hughes (Roper) 
Lord Beaumont of Whitley (Steel) 
Lord Wallace of Ooslany (Urwin) 
Netherlands 
MM. Comelissen 
Scholten 
United Kingdom 
MM. Brown 
Cha.nnon 
Lord Darling of Hillsborough 
MM. Farr 
Faulds 
Hardy 
Lewis 
Mendelson 
Whitehead 
1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being 
given in brackets. 
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TEXTS ADOPTED SECOND SITTING 
RECOMMENDATION 284 
on the application of the Brussels Treaty -
reply to the twenty-first annual report of the Council 
The Assembly, 
Welcoming the continued prompt action by the Council which enabled the twenty-first annual report 
to be communicated by 4th March ; 
Believing that when the mutual defence obligations of the modified Brussels Treaty are effectively 
incorporated in a treaty on a European union controlling all its external defence and foreign policy, only 
then will the time have come to abrogate the arms control provisions of the treaty; 
Again congratulating the Agency for the Control of Armaments on the way in which it has carried 
out in difficult circumstances the regrettably still too-limited tasks assigned to it by the Council; 
Welcoming the Council's replies to Recommendation 281 and to Written Question 167, and the 
assignment to the Standing Armaments Committee of a study of the situation of the armaments industry 
in the member countries, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Apply each year the Secretary-General's new procedure for the prompt communication of the annual 
report; 
2. Ensure the application of the modified Brussels Treaty until such time as the mutual defence under-
takings are effectively incorporated in a treaty of European union, and meanwhile that it : 
(i) Include in annual reports, in addition to the present statement of the total level of British 
forces on the continent at 31st December, a statement of the level ofBritish forces on the main-
land on that date, established in accordance with the Council's definition of the approved level ; 
(ii) Include in annual reports a statement of the numbers of inspections carried out by the Agency 
for the Control of Armaments, both by category of installation and by country visited ; 
(iii) Include in the conclusion of the arms control chapter of the annual report a full and clear state-
ment of all those aspects of the arms control provisions of the Brussels Treaty which are not 
fully applied as it did in earlier years ; 
(iv) Continue to press for the entry into force of the convention for the due process of law signed 
on 14th December 1957 ; 
3. Report to the Assembly on the rt>le it envisages for the independent programme group. 
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TEXTS ADOPTED 
The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 285 
on the political activities of the Council -
reply to the twenty-first annual report of the Council 
Noting the twenty-first annual report of the Council; 
Recalling Resolutions 55 and 59 ; 
SECOND SITTING 
Noting with satisfaction that the Council "makes no distinction between the Council of Western 
European Union meeting at ministerial level and the same Council meeting at the level of Permanent Repre-
sentatives" ; 
Recalling that the Council " is fully empowered to exercise the rights and duties ascribed to it in 
the treaty" as long as these rights and duties have not been transferred by treaty to another institution; 
Deploring that the Council meeting at the level of Permanent Representatives makes only excep-
tional use of its prerogatives ; 
Noting however that circumstances continue to make it essential to maintain procedure for consul-
tation between the Western European countries on matters affecting their security; 
Noting that the Council's refusal to reply to Written Questions 158, 159 and 160 and to hold a joint 
meeting with the General Affairs Committee in 1975 shows that the Council is shirking its responsibilities in 
respect of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty ; 
Recalling that the preamble to the modified Brussels Treaty commits its signatories to "preserve 
the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the constitutional traditions and the 
rule of law, which are their common heritage"; 
Recalling finally Recommendation 266 to which the Council gave only a very incomplete reply, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
I. Ensure the application of the modified Brussels Treaty by; 
(a) examining in which framework each question concerning European security should be discussed 
by the Seven ; 
(b) dealing effectively with the various problems raised by the application of the modified Brussels 
Treaty even when it meets at the level of Permanent Representatives ; 
(c) examining attentively the means whereby it may complement possible action by the Nine in 
defence matters, particularly in emergencies ; 
(d) illustrating how the Council's activities reflect the constantly-repeated statement by the Council 
and by the member countries that they attach the greatest importance to the full application 
of the modified Brussels Treaty ; 
2. Give the Assembly a precise reply to paragraph 3 of Recommendation 266 ; 
3. Report without hesitation in its communications to the Assembly on any differences between the 
positions adopted by its members, as it did in its reply to Recommendation 283; 
4. Consider, together with the other powers concerned, how it might follow the political consultations 
between the nine member countries of the EEC on the one hand and on the other, in view of the study it 
is undertaking on "the possibility that WEU might undertake additional work connected with the stan-
dardisation of armaments in Europe", the activities of the European programme group ; 
5. Should not invoke the possibility of members using national procedure in order to avoid replying 
to recommendations and written questions. 
TEXTS ADOPTED 
The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 286 
on scientific, technological and aerospace questions -
reply to the twenty-first annual report of the Council 
SECOND SITTING 
Appreciating the Council's interest in promoting technological collaboration in a European frame-
work; 
Regretting the absence of a medium- and long-term policy to encourage advanced technology pro-
grammes, although such a policy is necessary if Western European industry is to maintain a valid civil 
and military capability, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
Include in its twenty-second annual report on its activities guidelines for a long-term European 
policy in sectors of advanced technology such as space, aeronautics, aviation, nuclear reactors, computers 
and electronics, taking both civil and military aspects into consideration and indicating how effective 
decision-making machinery could be set up in Western Europe. 
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TIDRD SITTING 
Tuesday, 15th June 1976 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. European aeronautical policy - Guidelines emerging 
from the Colloquy on 2nd and 3rd February 1976 (Pre-
sentation of the Report of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions ; Address by 
Mr. Chabert, Minister of Communications of Belgium; 
Debate and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doe. 704). 
2. Detente and security in Europe (Resumed Debate on the 
Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the 
draft Recommendation, Doe. 703 and Amendments). 
3. Relations with Parliaments (Presentation of and Debate 
on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parlia-
ments, Doe. 706). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Tanghe, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Adoption of the Minutes 
The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous 
Sitting were agreed to. 
2. Attendance Register 
The names of Representatives and Substitutes 
who signed the Register of Attendance are given 
in the Appendix. 
3. European aeronautical policy - Guidelines 
emerging from the Colloquy on 2nd and 
3rd February 1976 
(Presentation of the Report of the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions ; 
Address by Mr. Chabert, Minister of Communications 
of Belgium ; Debate and Vote on the draft 
Recommendation, Doe. 704) 
The Report of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions was 
presented by MM. Richter, Valleix and Warren, 
Rapporteurs. 
Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, took 
the Cha~r in place of Mr. Tanghe, Vice-President 
of the Assembly. 
The Debate was opened. 
Mr. Cha;bert, Minister of Communications of 
Belgium, addressed the Assembly. 
Mr. Chabert replied to questions put by MM. 
Valleix, de Bruyne. 
27 
Speakers : MM. de Montesquiou, Portheine, de 
Bruyne, Schlingemann. 
MM. V alleix and Warren, Rapporteurs, and 
Mr. de Montesquiou, Chairman of the Committee, 
replied to the speakers. 
The Debate was closed. 
The vote on the draft Recommendation was 
postponed until the morning Sitting on Thurs-
day, 17th June, at 11.30 a.m. 
4. .Detente and security in Europe 
(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General 
Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft 
Recommendation, Doe. 703 and Amendments) 
The Debate was resumed. 
Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur, and Mr. 
Sieglerschmidt, Chairman of the Committee, 
replied to the speakers. 
The Debate was closed. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft 
Recommendation in Document 703. 
An Amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Sir 
Frederic Bennett : 
Leave out the draft recommendation in Docu-
ment 703 and insert a revised draft recom-
mendation as follows : 
"The Assembly, 
Affirming that true East-West detente oon be 
achieved only through substantial mutual, 
MINUTES 
balanced and controlled reductions in armaments 
by both blocs ; 
Considering the growing preponderance of 
troops and weapons on the side of the Soviet 
Union and its allies in Central and Northern 
Europe; 
Noting that the Soviet Union has up to now 
interpreted the cominitments entered into in the 
final act of the CSCE in a restrictive manner ; 
Regretting that no recent progress has been 
made in the SALT and MBFR negotiations ; 
Condemning the Soviet Union's policy to take 
advantage of crises outside Europe to strengthen 
its political position by direct or indirect military 
means; 
Concerned that in face of increasingly power-
ful Warsaw Pact forces the members of the 
Atlantic Alliance will no longer deploy sufficient 
strength to guarantee their continuing collective 
security; 
Noting that while the Soviet Union and its 
allies fail to accept the main implications of 
detente, as this concept is interpreted in the 
West, a relative reduction of military strength 
in Western Europe has occurred vis-a-vis the 
Soviet military threat ; 
Satisfied that matters emerging from the 
CSCE have played a large part in the Council's 
discussions in 1975 ; 
Considering that the application of the provi-
sions of the final act of the CSCE on the move-
ment of persons is one of the vital elements by 
which one can judge the Soviet Union's desire 
for detente ; 
Considering that there is still some rmcertainty 
about the operation of NATO in the event of 
some members of the Atlantic Alliance falling 
prey to subversion directly or indirectly sus-
tained by external military intervention ; 
Regretting that South Africa's widely condem-
ned racial policies and intervention provided a 
pretext, although unjustified, for massive Soviet 
and Cuban military intervention in Angola, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Examine regularly the consequooces of the 
CSCE; 
2. Inform the Assembly of any reported infringe-
ments of the provisions of the final act of the 
CSCE; 
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3. Examine how great an effort each member 
country has to make to maintain a continuing 
adequate balance to ensure peace with security ; 
4. Ensure that its members concert their views 
in the appropriate framework on any crisis 
arising outside Europe in order : 
(a) to avoid hasty action which might serve 
as a pretext for interference by the Soviet 
Union or its allies ; 
(b) to deter any further Soviet interference ; 
5. Report to the Assembly on any implications 
for Western Europe of developments in the poli-
tica~ economic and military balance in Europe 
ood the world ; 
6. Give timely consideration to the conditions in 
which the modified Brussels Treaty could be 
applied should one of the member countries fall 
prey to direct or indirect military intervention 
from outside." 
An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. 
Dankert, Mr. Richter and Lord Peddie : 
1. In paragraph 4 of the preamble to the draft 
recommendation, leave out "little or no" and 
insert "little or insufficient". 
2. Leave out paragraph 5 of the preamble and 
insert: 
"Condemning the Soviet Union's policy to 
take advootage of crises outside Europe to 
strengthen its political position by Inilitary 
means;". 
3. In paragraph 6 of the preamble, leave out "no 
longer" and insert "should". 
4. Leave out paragraph 7 of the preamble. 
5. Leave out paragraph 11 of the preamble and 
insert: 
"Regretting that South Africa's widely-
comdemned racial policies and later interven-
tion provided a pretext, although unjustified, 
for massive Soviet and ,Cuban military inter-
vention in Angola, ". 
6. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out "re-establish and". 
The substance of Parts 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 having 
been included in the new text subinitted by the 
Rapporteur, Mr. Dankert moved P.art 4 of 
Amendment No. 1. 
Speakers: Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Dankert, 
Sir Frederic Bennett. 
MINUTES 
Part 4 of Amendment No. 1 was withdrawn. 
An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Ra-
dius: 
In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation 
proper: 
(a) leave out "re-establish and"; 
(b) leave out "a secure balance between the 
forces of the two alliances in Central and 
Northern Europe" and insert "a sufficient 
ba}ance in order to ensure peace". 
The substance of Amendment No. 2 having 
been met, in part, by the new text submitted by 
the Rapporteur, Amendment No. 2 was with-
drawn. 
An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. 
Radius: 
At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recom-
mendation proper, leave out "direct or indirect". 
Speakers : Mr. Radius, Sir Frederic Bennett, 
Mr. Radius. 
Amendment No. 3 was withdrawn. 
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The vote on the revised draft Recommendation 
was postponed until the morning Sitting on 
Thursday, 17th June, at 11.30 a.m. 
5. Relations with Parliaments 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc.106) 
The Report of the Committee for Relations 
with Parliaments was presented by Mr. Delorme, 
Rapporteur. 
The Debate was opened. 
Speaker: Mr. Radius. 
The Debate was closed. 
The Assembly took note of the Report of the 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments. 
6. Date and time of the next Sitting 
The next Sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 
16th June, 'at 10 a.m. 
The Sitting was closed at 6.10 p.m. 
Al'l'ENDIX THIRD SITTING 
APPENDIX 
Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance 1 : 
Belgium 
MM. de Bruyne (Adriaensens) 
Leynen 
Schugens 
de Stexhe 
Tanghe 
France 
MM. Brugnon 
Delorme 
de Montesquiou 
Radius 
Oermolacce (Roger) 
Valleix 
Federal Republic of Germany 
MM. Ahrens 
Alber 
MM. Kliesing (Amrehn) 
Gessner 
Italy 
Kempfl.er 
Schauble (Lemmrich) 
Pawelczyk (Marquardt) 
Men de 
Richter 
Sieglerschmidt 
Vohrer 
Mr. Bologna 
Luxembourg 
MM. Margue 
Mart 
The following Representatives apologised for their absence : 
Belgium 
MM. Dequae 
Kempinaire 
France 
MM. Boucheny 
Boulloche 
Burckel 
Cerneau 
Gra.ngier 
Kauffmann 
Peridier 
Riviere 
Schleiter 
Schmitt 
Vitter 
Federal Republic of Germany 
MM. Dregger 
Enders 
Mattick 
MUller 
MM. Schmidt 
Schwencke 
Mrs. Wolf 
Italy 
MM. Averardi 
Bettiol 
Coppola 
Fioret 
Laforgia 
Leggieri 
Mammi 
Minnocci 
Mrs. Miotti Carli 
MM. Pecoraro 
Pica 
Preti 
Quilleri 
Tala.mona 
Treu 
Vedovato 
Zaffanella 
Netherlands 
MM. Dankert 
de Niet 
Portheine 
Schlingemann (Reijnen) 
Scholten 
United Kingdom 
MM. Buck (Channon) 
Critchley 
Grieve 
Warren (Hunt) 
Sir Frederic Ben nett (Page) 
Lord Peddie 
Lord Hughes (Roper) 
Lord Beaumont of Whitley (Steel) 
Luxembourg 
Mr. Abens 
Netherlands 
MM. Cornelissen 
Voogd 
United Kingdom 
Mr. Brown 
Lord Darling of Hillsborough 
MM. Farr 
Faulds 
Hardy 
Lewis 
Mendelson 
Sir John Rodgers 
MM. Urwin 
Whitehead 
1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being 
given in brackets. 
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FOURTH SITTING 
Wednesday, 16th June 1976 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU 
for the financial year 1976 (Presentation of and Debate 
on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration and Votes on the draft Opinion and 
draft Rooommendation, Doe. 701). 
2. Address by Mr. Schmidt, Parliamentary Secretary of 
State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
3. Security in the Mediterranean (Presentation of and 
Debate on the Reporl of the Committee on Deft/nee Ques-
tions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommen-
dation, Does. 708 and Amendments and 712). 
4. Reserve forces (Presentation of and Debate on the Report 
of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, 
Doe. 707). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Sitting waa opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Mart, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Adoption of the Minutes 
The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous 
Sitting were agreed to. 
2. Attendance Register 
The names of Representatives and Substitutes 
who signed the Register of Attendance are 
given in the Appendix. 
3. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial 
organs of WEU for the financial year 1976 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
and Votes on the draft Opinion and draft 
Recommendation, Doe. 701) 
The Report of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration was presented by 
Lord Selsdon, Rapporteur. 
The Debate was opened. 
Speakers : MM. de Bruyne, Page. 
The Debate was closed. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
texts in Document 701. 
The draft Opinion on the budget of the 
ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 
1976 was agreed to unanimously. (This Opinion 
will be published as No. 23) ·\ 
I. See page 34. 
31 
The draft Recommendation on improving the 
status of WEU stJaff was agreed to unanimously. 
(This Recommendation will be published as No. 
287) 1 • 
4. Security in the Mediterranean 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report and 
supplementary Report of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments, Does. 708 and 
Amendments and 712) 
The Report and supplementary Report of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
were presented by Mr. Buck, Rapporteur. 
The Debate was opened. 
Speaker: Mr. Bologna. 
Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, took 
the Chair in place of Mr. ]!art, Vice-President 
of the Assembly. 
The Debate was adjourned. 
5. Address by Mr. Schmidt, Parliamentary 
Secretary of State (or Defence of the Federal 
Republic of Germany 
Mr. Sehmidt, Parliamentary Secretary of 
State for Defence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, addressed the Assembly. 
1. See page 35. 
MINUTES 
Mr. Schmidt repl~ed to questions put by MM. 
Critchley, Riviere, Richter, Mattick, Schwencke, 
Enders. 
6. Security in the Mediterranean 
(Resumed Debate on the Report and supplementary 
Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments, Does. 708 and Amendments and 712) 
The Debate was resumed. 
Speakers: MM. Riviere, Vasco da Gama Fer-
nandes (Observer from Portugal), Lord Peddie, 
MM. Radius, Vedovato. 
The Debate was adjourned. 
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7. Change in the Order of Business 
The President proposed that the votes post-
poned until Thursday, 17th June, at 11.30 a.m., 
should be brought forward to this afternoon fol-
lowing the conclusion of the debate on security 
in the Mediterranean. 
Speaker: Mr. Piket. 
The proposal was agreed to. 
8. Date and time of the next Sitting 
The next Sitting was fixed for the same day 
at 3 p.m. 
The Sitting was closed at 1.05 p.m. 
APPENDIX FOURTH SITTING 
APPENDIX 
Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance 1 : 
Belgium 
MM. de Bruyne (Adriaensens) 
Dequae 
Leynen 
Schugens 
Plasman (de Stexhe) 
Tanghe 
France 
MM. Burckel 
Kauffmann 
de Montesquiou 
Peridier 
Radius 
Riviere 
Oermolacce (Roger) 
Schleiter 
Schmitt 
Valleix 
Federal Republic of Germany 
MM. Ahrens 
Italy 
Alber 
Kliesing (Amrehn) 
Enders 
Kempfler 
Schiiuble (Lemmrich) 
Marquardt 
Mattick 
Richter 
Schwencke 
Sieglerschmidt 
Vohrer 
MM. Bologna. 
Vedovato 
Luxembourg 
MM. Abens 
Margue 
Mart 
The following Representatives apologised for their absence : 
Belgium 
Mr. Kempinaire 
France 
MM. Boucheny 
Boulloche 
Brugnon 
Cerneau 
Delorme 
Grangier 
Vitter 
Federal Republic of Germany 
MM. Dregger 
Gessner 
Men de 
MM. Muller 
Schmidt 
Mrs. Wolf 
Italy 
MM. Averardi 
Bettiol 
Coppola 
Fioret 
Laforgia 
Leggieri 
Mammi 
Minnocci 
Mrs. Miotti Carli 
MM. Pecoraro 
Pica 
Preti 
Netherlands 
MM. Piket (Cornelissen) 
de Niet 
Schlingemann (Reijnen) 
Scholten 
United Kingdom 
MM. Buck (Channon) 
Critchley 
Sir Frederic Bennett (Farr) 
Mr. Grieve 
Lord Selsdon (Hardy) 
MM. Warren (Hunt) 
Page 
Lord Peddie 
Sir John Rodgers 
Lord Hughes (Roper) 
Lord Beaumont of Whitley (Steel) 
Lord W allace of Ooslany (Urwin) 
MM. Quilleri 
Talamona 
Treu 
Zaffanella 
Netherlands 
MM. Dankert 
Portheine 
Voogd 
United Kingdom 
Mr. Brown 
Lord Darling of Hillsborough 
MM. Faulds 
Lewis 
Mendelson 
Whitehead 
I. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being 
given in brackets. 
33 
2- 11 
TEXTS ADOPTED 
The Assembly, 
OPINION 23 
on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU 
for the financial year 1976 
FOURTH SITTING 
Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union a.s a. whole the Council has 
complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter; 
Having taken note of the contents, 
Has no comments to make at this stage on the figures communicated. 
34 
TEXTS ADOPTED FOURTH SITTING 
RECOMMENDATION 287 
on improving the status of WEU staff 
The Assembly, 
Recalling Recommendations 250 and 265 ; 
Deploring the slow progress of work in the Co-ordinating Committee ; 
Regretting that the governments have still not introduced a pension scheme for all the co-ordinated 
organisations ; 
Regretting the governments' decision to abandon present procedure for adjusting salaries before 
introducing new procedure ; 
Noting the ensuing unrest among staff members of the co-ordinated organisations, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I. In the framework of the co-ordinated organisations: 
l. Endeavour to have the pension scheme brought into effect before the end of 1976, its provisions 
being applied as from the date of adoption of the regulations governing its application, but payment of 
pensions for retired officials still being made as from 1st January 1973; 
2. Ensure that the scheme includes all necessary guarantees, based inter alia on joint management 
for all the co-ordinated organisations in accordance with the principles set out in Recommendations 250 
and 265; 
3. Amend the Staff Rules to avoid the widow or orphans of an official suffering hardship through a break 
in income during the period preceding payment of the first arrears of the pension; 
4. Introduce procedure for salary reviews similar to practice in the European Communities ; 
5. Improve the speed and efficiency of co-ordination by tightening up procedure ; 
6. Change the system of indemnities for loss of job on the lines of regulations in the European Communi-
ties and in the meantime improve the pension rights of officials who have become redundant by adding to 
their entitlement the period for which an indemnity for loss of job is granted ; 
7. Make provision for a reinstallation allowance for officials terminating their service and who were 
granted an installation allowance at the time of recruitment, as is the case in the European Communities ; 
II. Ask the Public Administration Committee to transmit to the Assembly as soon as available its study 
on conditions for seconding national officials. 
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FIFrH SITTING 
Wednesday, 16th June 1976 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Security in the Mediterranean (Resumed Debate on the 
Report and supplementary Report of the Committee on 
Defence Qu68tions and Armaments and Vote on the draft 
Recommendation, Does. 708 and Amendments and 712). 
2. European aeronautical policy - Guidelines emerging 
from the Colloquy on 2nd and 3rd February 1976 (Vote 
on the draft Recommendation, Doe. 704). 
8. Detente and security in Europe (Vote on the rll'llised draft 
Recommendation, Doe. 703). 
4. Reserve forces (Pr68entation of and Debate on the Report 
of the Committee on Defence QUIJ8tiQ1UI and Armaments 
and Vote on the draft Recomrnendation, Doe. 707). 
5. Strategic mobility (PrllBentation of and Debate on the 
Report of the Committee on Defence QU68tions and Arma-
ments and Vote on the draft Order, Doe. 709). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Sitting wa8 opened at 3.10 p.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Adoption of the Minutes 
The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous 
Sitting were agreed to. 
2. Attendance Register 
The names of Representatives and Substitutes 
who signed the Register of Attendance are given 
in the Appendix. 
3. Security in the Mediterranean 
(Resumed Debate on the Report and supplementary 
Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, 
Does. 708 and Amendments and 712) 
The Debate was resumed. 
Speakers : MM. de Montesquiou, Thyness 
(Observer from Norway), Cermolacce, Papapoli-
tis (Observer from Greece), Kliesing, Budtz 
(Observer from Denmark), Piket, Valleix (on a 
point of order), Buck. 
The Assembly agreed that the words "Recom-
mends that the Council and member Govern-
ments" be replaced by the words "Recommends 
that the Counci!l and requests that the member 
Governments". 
The Debate was closed. 
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The Assembly proceeded to consider the dmft 
Recommendation in Documents 708 and 712. 
An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. 
Dankert, Mr. Sieglerschmidt and Lord Peddie : 
1. In paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft 
recommendation, leave out "if the Atlantic Alli-
ance weakened in its determination to defend 
its freedom". 
2. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the 
draft recommendation, leave out "freely-elected 
parliamentary democracies and the preparation 
of NATO contingency plans designed to meet any 
crisis" and insert "parliamentary democracy ·and 
human rights and the preparation of NATO 
contingency plans designed to meet any crisis 
in the treaty area". 
3. Leave out paragraph (iv) of the preamble to 
the draft recommendation. 
4. In paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft 
recommendation, leave out "announcement of 
free elections in Spain" and insert "signs of 
democratic developments in Spain". 
5. Leave out paragraph l(a) of the draft recom-
mendation proper and insert "by negotiating 
in due time with a democratic Spain the acees-
sion of that country to the North Atlantic 
Treaty". 
6. I"eave out paragraph l(d) of the draft recom-
mendation proper. 
7. Leave out paragraph 2(a) of the draft recom-
mendation proper. 
MINUTES 
8. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recom-
mendation proper. 
An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by MM. 
Radius, de Montesquiou, Burckel and Valleix. 
1. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft 
recommendation, leave out all the words after 
"Alliance". 
2. In paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft 
recommendation, leave out "appropriate" and 
replace "Iran associated with Alliance defence 
planning" with "Iran associated with the 
Alliance". 
3. Leave out paragraph 1(c) of the draft recom-
mendation proper and insert "by recognising the 
value of NATO military facilities located in 
several countries of the Mediterranean area". 
4. In paragraph 2(b) of the draft recommenda-
tion proper, leave out all the words after 
"detente" and insert "of any installation of new 
Soviet bases or similar facilities in the Mediter-
ranean area". 
An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Val-
leix and Mr. de Bruyne. 
In the draft recommendation, before the words 
"RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL AND MEMBER 
GOVERNMENTS", insert the following : 
"REcoMMENDs THAT THE CouNCIL 
(a) Examine regularly all questions relating 
to the security of Europe in the MediterraneMl 
and thus foster a rapprochement of political 
and strategic concepts underlying the defence 
of the different member countries of Western 
European Union in the Mediterrane111n basin; 
(b) Follow the evolution of the situation in 
Spain and examine the conditions and pos-
sibilities for that country joining Western 
European Union when its internal regime con-
forms with the principles on which the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty is based ;" 
The Assembly proceeded to consider Part 1 of 
Amendment No. 1. 
Speakers : MM. Sieglerschmidt, Buck. 
Part 1 of Amendment No. 1 was agreed to. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider Part 2 of 
Amendment No. 1 and Part 1 of Amendment 
No. 2. 
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Speakers : MM. Sieglerschmidt, Buck, Valleix, 
Piket, Buck, Kliesing, Sieglerschmidt, Lord Ped-
die, Mr. Buck. 
Part 1 of Amendment No. 2 was negatived. 
Part 2 of Amendment No. 1 was amended by 
leaving out the words "in the treaty area" and, 
as amended, was agreed to. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider Part 3 of 
Amendment No. 1. 
Speakers: MM. Buck, Sieglerschmidt, Lord 
Peddie, MM. Buck, Piket. 
Part 3 of Amendment No. 1 was agreed to. 
In consequence, Part 2 of Amendment No. 2 
fell. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider Part 4 
of Amendment No. 1. 
Speaker: Mr. Buck. 
Part 4 of Amendment No. 1 was agreed to. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider Amend-
ment No. 3. 
Speakers: MM. Valleix, Sieglerschmidt, Val-
leix, Buck, Valleix (on a point of order). 
The Amendment was amended by leaving out 
paragraph (b) and, as amended, was agreed to. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider Part 5 of 
Amendment No. 1. 
Speakers : MM. Sieglerschmidt, Buck. 
The Amendment was amended to read : "by 
negotiating with the Government of Spain that 
emerges from free elections the accession of that 
country to the North Atlantic Treaty, and an 
appropriate role for the Spanish armed forces;" 
and, as amended, was agreed to. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider Part 3 of 
Amendment No. 2. 
Speaker: Mr. Buck. 
Part 3 of Amendment No. 2 was agreed to. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider Part 6 
of Amendment No. 1. 
Speakers: Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Lord Peddie, 
Mr. Buck. 
Part 6 of Amendment No. 1 was withdrawn. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider Part 7 
of Amendment No. 1. 
Speakers : MM. Sieglerschmidt, Buck. 
Part 7 of Amendment No. 1 was agreed to. 
MINUTES 
The Assembly proceeded to consider Part 4 of 
Amendment No. 2. 
Speaker: Mr. Valleix. 
Part 4 of Amendment No. 2 was agreed to. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider Part 8 of 
Amendment No. 1. 
Speakers : MM. Sieglerschmidt, Buck. 
Part 8 of Amendment No. 1 was negatived. 
Mr. Buck proposed ·an oral amendment, in 
paragraph 3 of the operative text of the draft 
Recommendation to leave out "the European pro-
gramme group" and to insert "NATO". 
The oral Amendment was agreed to. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
Hecommendation in Documi:mts 708 and 712, as 
amended. 
The amended draft Recommendation was 
agreed to, note having been taken of the objec-
tion of Mr. Cermolacce. (This Recommendation 
will be published as No. 288) 1 • 
4. European aeronautical policy - Guidelines 
emerging from the Colloquy on 2nd and 
3rd February 1916 
(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doe. 704) 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
Recommendation in Document 704. 
The draft Recommendation was agreed to, note 
having been taken of the objection of Mr. Cer-
molacce. (This Recommendation will be published 
as No. 289) 2 • 
5. Detente and security in Europe 
(Vote on the revised draft Recommendation, Doe. 703) 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
Recommendation in Document 703, as revised. 
I. See page 40. 
2. See page 42. 
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Speakers : MM. Cermolacce, Delorme, Richter, 
Sir Frederic Bennett. 
The vote on the revised draft Recommendation 
was postponed until the morning Sitting on 
Thursday, 17th June, at about 11.30 a.m. 
6. Strategic mobility 
(Presentation of the Report of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the 
draft Order, Doe. 709) 
The Report of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. 
Duvieusart, Rapporteur. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
Order in Document 709. 
The draft Order was agreed to. (This Order 
will be published as No. 46) 1 • 
7. Reserve forces 
(Presentation of the Report of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the 
draft Recommendation, Doe. 707) 
The Report of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. 
Delorme, Rapporteur. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
Recommendation in Document 707. 
The draft Recommendation was ·agreed to. 
(This Recommendation will be published as 
No. 290) 2 • 
8. Date and time of the next Sitting 
The next Sitting was fixed for Thursday, 17th 
June, at 10 a.m. 
The Sitting was closed at 5.55 p.m. 
1. See page 44. 
2. See page 45. 
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RECOMMENDATION 288 
on security in the Mediterranean 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that the emergence of the Soviet Union as a world naval power presents the Soviet 
Government with new options for extending its influence ; 
(ii) Aware that the many political uncertainties and local disputes and conflicts that afflict both allied 
and non-aligned countries of the Mediterranean area present an ever-present danger of major conflict 
arising through miscalculation or escalation ; 
(iii) Calling for the broadening and strengthening of the Alliance based on parliamentary democracy 
and human rights and the preparation of NATO contingency plans designed to meet any crisis; 
(iv) Welcoming the advent of a freely-elected parliament in Portugal and the signs of democratic 
developments in Spain ; 
(v) Recalling and reaffirming its earlier recommendations for the correct application of the Montreux 
Convention to prohibit the passage of aircraft carriers through the Turkish Straits ; for the provision of 
diplomatic advice from the NATO international staff for NATO commanders; and for the NATO Gibraltar 
command to be transferred to the IBERLANT command, 
I. REcoMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
Examine regularly all questions relating to the security of Europe in the Mediterranean and thus 
foster a rapprochement of political and strategic concepts underlying the defence of the different member 
countries of Western European Union in the Mediterranean basin, 
Il. RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL AND REQUESTS THAT THE MEMBER GOVERNMENTS 
1. Call on the North Atlantic Council to broaden and strengthen the basis of the Alliance : 
(a) by negotiating with the Government of Spain that emerges from free elections the accession 
of that country to the North Atlantic Treaty, and an appropriate role for the Spanish armed 
forces; 
(b) by fostering the accession of Malta to the North Atlantic Treaty, should a Maltese Government 
so request, or the conclusion of bilateral defence arrangements between Malta and Italy; 
(c) by recognising the value of NATO military facilities located in several countries of the 
Mediterranean area ; 
(d) by more publicly identifying all the member countries and the Alliance as a whole with NATO 
defence arrangements in the Mediterranean area ; 
(e) by providing military assistance to modernise the armed forces of Portugal to enable them to 
play a new and more vital role in allied defence plans ; 
(/) by advising the Secretary-General to assign political advisers from his Political Affairs Division 
to all significant NATO military headquarters; 
(g) by transferring the Gibraltar Mediterranean Command from the Command of Allied Naval 
Forces Southern Europe to that of the Iberian Atlantic area ; 
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2. (a) Join with the other governments of the Alliance in making clear to the Soviet Union and to 
the country concerned the serious disadvantages for normal relations and detente of any installation of 
new Soviet bases or similar facilities in the Mediterranean area ; 
(b) Call on the North Atlantic Council to have full political and military contingency plans prepared 
to meet any of the foregoing eventualities, with no more secrecy than that required for their success ; 
3. Propose that NATO issue an annual defence white paper incorporating a joint assessment of the 
threat and statement of allied strategy, combined with separate chapters on national defence programmes. 
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The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 289 
on European aeronautical policy 
guidelines emerging from the colloquy 
on 2nd and 3rd February 1976 
FIFTH SITTING 
. Acknowledging the conclusions of the colloquy on a European aeronautical policy held in Toulouse 
on 2nd and 3rd February 1976 under the aegis of its Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aero-
space Questions ; 
Aware of the difficulties in the aeronautical industry, which employs 400,000 persons, and the air-
lines, and the threats to the very existence of these sectors which may have serious consequences for Europe's 
security and well-being; 
Convinced that without an affirmation of political determination the governments concerned will 
be unable to take joint action to safeguard t}>\s industry; 
Regretting that governments have not yet adopted a position on the action programme for the Euro-
pean aeronautical sector proposed by the Commission of the European Communities on 1st October 1975; 
Reiterating its regret that there is a risk of Eurocontrol being dismantled; 
Aware that the problems cannot be solved through protectionism and the creation of a closed Euro-
pean market; 
Advocating on the contrary an investigation of world markets and of possibilities of co-operation 
with the United States on a basis of equality and reciprocity and not as subcontractors, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Promote the creation in each member country concerned of a national aeronautical council associat-
ing, for instance, representatives of parliaments, ministries, manufacturers, airlines and trades unions under 
the cha.irmans:Hp of the appropriate government representative ; 
2. Invite the national aeronautical councils to form a European aeronautical council to ; 
(a) develop together with the Commission of the European Communities a European aeronautical 
manufacturing programme with a view to developing, producing and marketing large civil air-
craft; 
(b) arrange for joint financing for marketing these aircraft and study the possibilities of a European 
Import-Export Bank ; 
(c) ensure that Concorde remains in production and that Europe is able to benefit from the technical 
lead thus acquired ; 
(d) establish a civil aviation agency for Western Europe responsible for European airworthiness cer-
tification ; 
(e) develop in concert with the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) a joint policy for air 
transport and examine the possibilities of adopting a joint European position in negotiations 
between Western Europe and the rest of the world on problems such as landing rights and 
recognition of European airspace ; 
3. Create a study group to determine the military aircraft requirements of member countries in liai-
son with the Standing Armaments Committee ; 
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FURTHER RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
Urge the member States of Eurocontrol : 
4. To set themselves as a long-term aim in the future Eurocontrol convention, which will be applied as 
from 1983, the establishment of a joint agency for the control of air traffic networks, including major ter-
minal areas ; 
5. To standardise equipment and systems to the maximum for the sake of efficiency and economy and 
in particular make a joint study in the Eurocontrol agency of new systems to be brought into service as 
from 1985; 
6. To draw up a common industrial policy for applied electronics in these fields, giving priority, when 
calling for tenders, to industries in the member States of the Eurocontrol community, and maintain a joint 
investment budget in the future agency with a view to procuring the said equipment through the agency ; 
7. To make the maximum use of the Eurocontrol agency in the field of research and development and 
draw up a joint research and development programme to avoid duplication wherever possible. 
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ORDER 46 
on strategic mobility 
The Assembly, 
Noting that the armed forces of the Soviet Union enjoy worldwide strategic mobility based on 
a modern navy and a large air transport fleet, complete with bases and facilities acquired through 
political penetration of key countries in all the oceans of the world ; 
Aware that it is of vital importance to the security of Europe that the armed forces of a.]] 
countries of the Atlantic Alliance should have strategic mobility throughout the area of the Atlantic 
Alliance and to other areas where they exercise responsibilities, 
REQUESTS THE CoMMITTEE oN DEFENCE QuESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS 
To continue its study of the problems of strategic mobility and report at an early date. 
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RECOMMENDATION 290 
on reserve forces 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that improved organisation, recruitment and training of reserve forces would allow: 
(a) a considerable strengthening of the deterrent potential of the field forces of the European armies; 
(b) European defence to be based to a substantial extent on recourse to the widest possible mobi-
lisation of the people's energies in the event of attack ; 
(ii) Considering that the defence of Europe must not be based solely on nuclear deterrence and a 
modern and effective field force but must also be ensured by a people's deterrent, expressing the will of the 
peoples of Europe to remain responsible for their own destinies ; 
(iii) Aware of the importance of the role which reserves can play in strengthening the links between the 
European peoples and their armies, particularly in keeping public opinion better informed about the import-
ance of defence problems ; 
(iv) Underlining the financial advantages of forming large-scale reserves, as opposed to an equivalent 
active force, when the proportion of national budgets devoted to defence tends to remain constant or even 
diminish and when personnel costs linked with the maintenance of active forces are continuously increasing 
to the point of sometimes jeopardising the implementation of certain equipment programmes ; 
(v) Considering it necessary to harmonise the concepts which govern the organisation of reserves in 
Europe, in the framework of a common strategy for all the Western European States, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I. (a) Together with the member States of the Atlantic Alliance which are not members of WEU, 
specify the type of tasks entrusted to the various components of the European defence system : nuclear 
forces, combat forces, internal defence forces; 
(b) Consequently define requirements in respect of internal defence forces and combat forces with 
a view to harmonising the concepts of European States in this field ; 
2. To this end, set up a group of experts consisting of senior defence officials to study measures likely 
to develop the contribution by reserves to the internal defence of European territory and inter alia consider 
the possibility of : 
(a) increasing the number of reservists who could be called up for internal defence, particularly 
where there is no system of conscription ; 
(b) producing special equipment for reserves for interna.l defence forces, combining power, simplicity 
and robustness, and ensuring that it is made available immediately in the event of mobilisation ; 
(c) improving training of reserve officers responsible for commanding the units forming internal 
defence forces, such training to include on the one hand periods of training in active units and 
on the other hand periods of training together with reservists in the ranks ; 
(d) adapting compulsory military service, where this exists, to the requirements of internal defence 
and consequently provide for a short but intensive period of active service followed by a number 
of training periods at regular intervals ; 
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(e) organising internal defence forces on a territorial basis by aBSigning the necessary number of 
national servicemen and the essential reservists, according to their place of residence ; 
(/) paying reservists undergoing periods of training at an appropriate rate ; 
3. (a) Study measures likely to increase the availability and effectiveness of reserves for combat forces 
and inter alia seek means of improving the training of such reserves and the speed and efficiency of their 
mobilisation ; 
(b) Pay particular attention to the question of the time required for the mobilisation and 
immediate use of reserve units in the field forces ; 
4. Consider setting up a European defence college where those responsible for Europe's defence and 
reserve officers would discuss their experiences and endeavour to define joint principles which might govern 
the use of reserves in Europe. 
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SIXTH SITTING 
Thursday, 17th June 1976 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Address by Mr. van der Stoel, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands. 
2. Role of the Atlantic Alliance in the world today (Pre-
aentation of and Debate on the Report of the General 
Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, 
Doe. 711). 
3. Detente and security in Europe (Vote on the revised draft 
Recommendation, Doe. 703). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Sitting was opened at 10.06 a.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
l. Adoption of the Minutes 
The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous 
Sitting were agreed to. 
2. Attendance Register 
The names of Representatives and Substitutes 
who signed the Register of Attendance are given 
in the Appendix. 
3. Address by Mr. van der Stoel, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 
Mr. van der Stoel, Minister for Foreign Affairs 
of the Netherlands, addressed the Assembly. 
Mr. V'an der Stoel replied to questions put by 
MM. I.Jeynen, de Montesquiou, Radius, de 
Bruyne, Sieglerschmidt, Mattick, Richter. 
4. R6le of the Atlantic Alliance in the world 
today 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the 
General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft 
Recommendation, Doe. 111) 
The Report of the General Affairs Committee 
was presented by Mr. de Niet, Rapporteur. 
The Debate was opened. 
Speakers : Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Critchley. 
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Mr. de Niet, Rapporteur, and Mr. Si-egler-
schmidt, Chairman of the Committee, replied to 
the speakers. 
The Debate was closed. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft 
Recommendation in Document 711. 
Speakers : Mr. Richter, Lord Peddie, MM. 
Leynen, Radius, Grieve, Richter, Sieglerschmidt, 
Sir Frederic Bennett. 
In the absence of a quorum, the vote was post-
poned until the next Sitting. 
5. Detente and security in Europe 
(Vote on the revised draft Recommendation, Doc.103) 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
Recommendation in Document 703, as revised. 
In the abse!nce of a quorum, the vote was post-
poned until the nex.t Sitting. 
6. Address by Mr. Roseta, Observer from 
Portugal 
Mr. Roseta, Observer from Portugal, addressed 
the Assembly. 
7. Adjournment of the Session 
The President adjourned the Twenty-Second 
Ordinary Session of the Assembly. 
The Sitting was closed at 12.15 p.m. 
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Belgium 
MM. de Bruyne (Dequae) 
Leynen 
France 
MM. Brugnon 
Delorme 
Kauffmann 
de Montesquiou 
Peridier 
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Oermolacce (Roger) 
Soustelle (Vitter) 
Federal Republic of Germany 
MM. Alber 
Enders 
MM. Gessner 
Italy 
Pawelczyk (Marquardt) 
Mattick 
Richter 
Sieglerschmidt 
Mr. Bologna 
Luxembourg 
MM. Abens 
Margue 
Mart 
The following Representatives apologised for their absence: 
Belgium 
MM. Adriaensens 
Kempinaire 
Schugens 
de Stexhe 
Tanghe 
France 
MM. Boucheny 
Boulloche 
Burckel 
Cerneau 
Grangier 
Riviere 
Schleiter 
Schmitt 
Valleix 
Federal Republic of Germany 
MM. Ahrens 
Amrehn 
Dregger 
MM. Kempfl.er 
Lemmrich 
Mende 
MUller 
Schmidt 
Schwencke 
Vohrer 
Mrs. Wolf 
Italy 
MM. Averardi 
Bettiol 
Coppola 
Fioret 
La.forgia 
Leggieri 
Ma.mmi 
Minnocci 
Mrs. Miotti Carli 
MM. Pecora.ro 
Pica 
Preti 
Quilleri 
Netherlands 
MM. Piket (Cornelissen) 
de Niet 
United Kingdom 
MM. Critchley 
Hawkins (Farr) 
Grieve 
Sir Frederic Bennett (Page) 
Lord Peddie 
Lord Hughes (Roper) 
Lord Beaumont of Whitley (Steel) 
Lord W allace of Ooslany (Urwin) 
MM. Talamona 
Treu 
Vedovato 
Zaffanella 
Netherlands 
MM. Da.nkert 
Portheine 
Reijnen 
Scholten 
Voogd 
United Kingdom 
MM. Brown 
Channon 
Lord Darling of Hillsborough 
MM. Faulds 
Hardy 
Hunt 
Lewis 
Mendelson 
Sir John Rodgers 
Mr. Whitehead 
1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being 
given in brackets. 
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FIRST SITTING 
Monday, 14th June 1976 
SUMMARY 
1. Opening of the Session. 
2. Tributes. 
3. Addrees by the Provisional President. 
4. Attendance Register. 
5. Examination of Credentials. 
6. Election of the President of the Assembly. 
7. Address by the President of the ABBembly. 
8. Election of the six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Leynen, the President. 
9. Observers. 
10. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the First 
Part of the Session (Doe. 695). 
11. Ratification of action by the Presidential Committee 
(Does. 696, 698 and 699). 
12. Detente and security in Europe (Presentation of the 
Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doe. 703). 
Speakers : The President, Sir Frederic Bennett (Rappor-
teur). 
13. Address by Mr. Roberts, Observer from Canada. 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Roberts. 
14. Detente and security in Europe (Debate on the Report 
of the General Affairs Committee, Doe. 703). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Kliesing, Mr. Critchley, 
Mr. Miiller, Mr. Scholten, Mrs. von Bothmer, Mr. 
Cermola.cce, Mr. Guldberg (Obsen~er from Denmark), 
Mr. Dankert. 
15. Nomination of members to Committees. 
16. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting. 
The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Grangier, Provisional President, in the Chair. 
1. Opening of the Session 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The 
Sitting is open. 
In accordance with Article Ill (a) of the 
Charter and Rules 2, 4, 5 and 17 of the Rules 
of Procedure, I declare open the Twenty-Second 
Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western 
European Union. 
2. Tributes 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Ladies 
and Gentlemen, before following our tradition 
that the oldest member of this Assembly makes 
a speech at the beginning of each new session, 
it is my sorrowful duty to announce to you the 
recent deaths of three of our members who, 
each in his own way, played a prominent part 
in the work of this Assembly. (The Representa-
tives rose) 
J. W. Beyen died at the beginning of May. 
With him we lost a great European, comrade-
in-arms of de Gasperi, Spaak, Schuman and 
Adenauer. It was he who signed the modified 
Brussels Treaty on behalf of the Netherlands. 
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Attilio Piccioni passed away at the end of 
March. An eminent Italian parliamentarian and 
a convinced European, Attilio Piccioni was a 
member of the European Parliament as well as 
of this Assembly, in which he took an active part 
in the General Affairs Committee from 1959 
to 1962. 
Jean Legaret died, whilst still a comparatively 
young man, during the winter. A brilliant senior 
civil servant and influential parliamentarian, 
he played an important role, as Chairman of the 
Budget Committee from 1959 to 1962, in super-
intending the material arrangements for housing 
our Assembly in the Palais d'Iena. He will long 
be remembered by those who knew him, for his 
intelligence, his courtesy and his sense of 
humour. 
3. Address by the Provisional President 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- It is only 
because of my age that I find myself, albeit for 
a few brief moments in the Chair. I shall there-
fore refrain from taking unfair advantage of the 
honour which my years have bestowed on me. 
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The period covered by the last session of our 
Assembly had much to offer in the way of 
lessons to be drawn from matters concerning 
the defence of Europe. No one concerned for 
European security could fail to be struck by a 
number of world events which I think particu-
larly significant. 
The building-up of the Soviet navy and the 
high level of equipment recently achieved by the 
armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries 
would seem to be new factors liable to upset the 
balance of forces, upon which, hitherto, diplo-
matic relations between East and West, have 
depended. 
During the same period, the setting up of 
regimes based on Marxist ideology in South 
Vietnam and in Angola, and the progress made 
by these same political forces in numerous States 
throughout the world, in particular in Africa 
and in Southern Europe, have, in some people's 
eyes, weakened the credibility of American pro-
tection just at a time when the executive power 
was - and still is - going through a period 
of profound crisis in the country which is the 
surest, indeed the only, guarantee of western 
defence. And there is no sign that this crisis is 
simply a passing phase. 
The conclusion, with effects admittedly more 
apparent in theory than in practice, of the 
conference on security and eo-operation in 
Europe and, at the same time, the somewhat 
laboured progress of the SALT and MBFR 
negotiations on the reduction of forces, have 
served to bring home to a good many people 
Europe's actual and potential military weakness 
compared with the sizable forces lined up a:long 
its eastern marches. 
It is in this, to say the least, disturbing general 
context that Europe itself has recently had to 
deal with a number of specific questions of 
strategy : the commissioning by French army 
ground forces of the first Pluton tactical nuclear 
missiles has usefully underlined the size and 
complexity of the problems involved outside a 
European and Atlantic alliance in the siting 
and possible use of the various elements of the 
French nuclear deterrent. 
As for the political scene, the debate on Euro-
pean unity which preceded and followed publi-
cation of the Tindemans report has made people 
appreciate the stark problem of choosing the 
most suitable institutional framework for pro-
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moting a more specifically European defence 
effort. 
As for armaments, the manifold vicissitudes 
of the so-called "deal of the century" have clearly 
shown up Europe's failure to achieve joint 
production for its own requirements. Once again 
the low level of standardisation, or even of inter-
operability in the European partners' military 
equipment has been made manifest. 
Psychologically, the low morale of the armed 
forces of some of our countries basically indi-
cates, over and above certain material as well 
as democratic claims, a fundamental questioning 
of the utility and efficiency of defence as pre-
sently conceived by most of our States. 
By their very diversity, the various European 
and world phenomena brought to our notice over 
the past year tend, whether we like it or not 
- and a great many people, for many different 
reasons, do not -to put the question of Europe's 
defence back on the agenda. It is, indeed, becom-
ing more and more apparent that, in the last 
analysis, the driving force for the construction 
of Europe, and Europe's very existence, will 
depend on the answer to this question. 
The pace of Europe's construction will depend 
on the solution given to the problem of its 
defence. The obstructions encountered in areas 
essential for Europe's future, such as energy and 
the monetary system, by attempts to make head-
way towards European construction, are mostly 
occasioned by differences between France and 
its partners in their assessment of European and 
American interests. These diffel'enJCes of 
appraisal are fundamentally based on the real or 
fancied independence or dependence of each of 
the European States in respect of American 
protection. 
Europe's very existence could depend on the 
solution arrived at concerning this question of 
its defence. It cannot be repeated too often. 
Indeed, the American nuclear shield, which has 
until now enabled the gaps in the defence system 
of Western Europe to be filled, has, while 
remaining the basic element of deterrence in 
Europe, become more aleatory. Besides the 
weakening of the United States executive and 
the reinforcement of isolationist tendencies, 
which are, whether recognised or not, a recur-
rent phenomenon in American politics, we are 
forced to admit that the increased range of the 
nuclear vehicles of the two superpowers makes 
their national territories more directly vulnerable 
to the blows of any potential adversary. 
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At the same time it significantly reduces the 
usefulness for their own defence of foreign 
bases, especially air bases. On the other hand, 
the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons in 
the armies of the two superpowers enables the 
latter to be more flexible in wielding deterrence. 
The flexible response concept, moreover, dis-
quietingly reflects this trend. And Europe as an 
indispensable outpost for the security of the 
United States may be liable to become, in the 
event of a major and direct clrash of interests 
between the two superpowers, a testing ground 
for possible intentions and the degree of deter-
mination of each. 
However, the question of Europe's defence, 
which is vital for its future, raises two major 
problems. 
The first is a consequence of the imperatives 
of maintaining and developing the improvement 
in relations between Western and Eastern 
Europe. The normalisation and improvement of 
relations with Eastern Europe seem to have 
become - and nobody is going to complain 
about that - over and beyond the fluctuations 
of internal policy in each of our States, one 
of the most abiding and preponderant features 
of the foreign policy of most Western European 
countries. Now, any sabre-rattling reinforcement 
of European defence would run the risk of 
endangering the detente between East and West 
achieved so painfully, and even more painfully 
consolidated in Europe in recent years. 
The second major obstacle to reactivation of 
the idea of European defence stems from the 
French position which remains a special one 
within the Atlantic Alliance. France's defence 
is organised around a nuclear deterrent force, 
which would seem to imply a doctrine of its use 
and, consequently, a system of defence mainly 
organised on a national basis. For France's 
partners, the chief concern is to confirm the 
United States commitment towards Europe 
within the framework affording, in their view, 
the best guarantee, namely, the North Atlantic 
Treaty and its supporting organisation. 
The necessity of promoting a more broadly 
shared and effective defence would now seem to 
be just as imperative as the obstacles in the 
way appear to be insurmountable. This year, 
although a dark one for Europe, has nevertheless 
seen progress in some directions. 
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Aside from the institutional problem of the 
future of WEU, the considerations on defence 
in the Tindemans report go beyond conventional 
a priori thinking in the matter, and evince a 
pragmatism and realism that might gradually 
open up new paths. 
In the same spirit and as a part of the work 
of our Assembly, documents such as the Krieg 
report or the Leynen report seem to open the 
way to fresh thinking on the necessary comple-
mentarity that potentially exists between the 
European Communities and WEU, and between 
the Atlantic Alliance and WEU. 
In practical terms, the establishment of such 
a flexible institution as the independent Euro-
pean armaments group in Rome would seem to 
be might, if the experiment were persevered in 
and extended, enable decisive steps forward both 
in the standardisation of armaments and in 
balanced production of weaponry on both sides 
of the Atlantic. 
In practical terms, too, very recent develop-
ments in French military doctrine place new 
emphasis on the French Government's willing-
ness to reconcile its commitments under France's 
continued adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty 
with the special requirements arising from pos-
session of an independent nuclear deterrent. 
These are only straws in the wind. But we 
may hope that they will serve as a starting point 
for fresh thinking on the facts of European 
defence. May our debates, which have largely 
contributed to the adumbration of such a pro-
cess, enable it to be given further sustenance 
and amplification. May they help to dissuade our 
governments from clinging to the sterile a priori 
concepts which have so far paralysed any serious 
thinking about Europe's defence, and enable 
them to realise the importance of such thinking 
at a time when there are only very few ways 
open to us in our attempts to get Europe out 
of the deep rut into which it has fallen. That 
is the reasonably optimistic hope your Provi-
sional President would like to express at the 
outset of the twenty-second ordinary session of 
the Assembly of WEU. (Applause) 
4. Attendance Register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The 
names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting 
which have been notified to the President will 
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be published with the list of Representatives 
appended to the Minutes of Proceedings 1 • 
I have received a letter from Mr. Urwin, 
head of the United Kingdom Delegation, inform-
ing me that the Labour members of the delegation 
are, with the exception of three members of the 
House of Lords, unable to attend our session 
because of the present parliamentary situation 
at Westminster, and asking me to convey their 
apologies to the Assembly and the Committees of 
which they are members. 
5. Examination of Credentials 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- The next 
Order of the Day is the examination of creden-
tials. 
The list of Representatives and Substitutes 
attending the twenty-second ordinary session of 
the Assembly of Western European Union has 
been published in Notice No. 1. 
In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules 
of Procedure, all credentials have been attested 
by the statement of ratification communicated 
by the President of the Assembly of the Council 
of Europe, with the exception of the credentials 
of one Substitute from the United Kingdom, 
Lord Hughes, who has been appointed since the 
adjournment of the session of that Assembly. 
Our Assembly must now examine his creden-
tials in accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules 
of Procedure. 
The credentials of Lord Hughes are certified 
by the United Kingdom Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs, and no objection has been raised 
to them. 
If the Assembly is unanimous, it can ratify 
these credentials without prior reference to a 
Credentials Committee. 
Are there any objections to such ratifica-
tion L 
There are no objections. 
The credentials are ratified, subject to their 
subsequent ratification by the Assembly of the 
Council of Europe. 
1. See page 18. 
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Lord Hughes is therefore entitled to attend 
the twenty-second session of the Assembly of 
'Vestern European Union as a Substitute from 
the United Kingdom. 
I bid him heartily welcome. (Applause) 
6. Election of the President of the Assembly 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- The next 
Order of the Day is the election of the President 
of the Assembly. 
In accordance with the provisions of Rule 10 
of the Rules of Procedure, no Representative 
may stand as a candidate for the office of 
President unless his candidature has been spon-
sored by three or more Representatives. Repre-
sentatives who are members of a national 
government may not be members of the Bureau. 
Furthermore, Rule 7 (2) stipulates that Substi-
tutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the 
Assembly. 
I have received only one nomination, that of 
Mr. Edmond Nessler, Representative of France, 
duly sponsored in the form prescribed by the 
Rules of Procedure. 
I call Mr. Leynen. 
Mr. LEYNEN (Belgium) (Translation). - I 
am quite sure that the Assembly will be unani-
mous in re-electing by acclamation our dis-
tinguished outgoing President, Mr. Nessler. 
(Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mr. 
Leynen proposes that the Assembly should elect 
Mr. Nessler President by acclamation. 
Is there any objection to Mr. Nessler's can-
didature L 
I note that the Assembly is unanimous. I 
therefore declare Mr. Nessler President of the 
Assembly of Western European Union, and I 
invite him to take the Chair. (Applause) 
(Mr. Nessler then took the Chair) 
7. Address by the President of the Assembly 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Before 
addressing you in my turn, Ladies and Gentle-
men, may I express my gratitude for this third 
renewal of the confidence you have placed in 
me. 
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Representatives of the Ministers, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, on this opening of our twenty-second 
session, there is little gratification to be derived 
from progress in the building of Europe. The 
political, economic and monetary union has been 
put off to the Greek Kalends. Although not 
entirely fruitless, consultations at the highest 
level have not produced a joint foreign policy. 
The highly successful Toulouse colloquy forced 
us to recognise continuing stubborn resistance 
to the establishment of a European aeronautical 
policy. There seeins to be no grand design to 
incite governments to overcome their differences. 
So Europe is not being made. Perhaps it is even 
falling apart. Have we no choice but to para-
phrase Bossuet: "Europe is dying, Europe is 
dead"? 
We may no doubt be able to find some excuses 
for not facing the facts. One is the election by 
direct universal suffrage of a European parlia-
mentary assembly of undefined responsibilities 
and resources, and liable to be greeted with 
indifference by the public and to transfer dom-
estic political differences to the European level. 
Another excuse is the gradual effacement of 
Europe before a will expressed overseas and 
itself uncertain and currently subject to severe 
electoral constraints. 
We have, however, tried to break the deadlock. 
In Rome, at the beginning of the year, the 
European members of the Atlantic Alliance met 
in order to set up a European programme group 
which, it is rumoured, would lay the foundations 
for European co-operation in the production and 
standardisation of certain military equipment. 
But this is only a temporary expedient. So 
long as the WEU Standing Armaments Com-
mittee is limited in its activities, there will be 
grounds for wondering about the reluctance and 
real motives of the partners in the Brussels 
Treaty, whose validity is nevertheless undis-
puted. 
We are in fact still deeply divided over the 
aiins of the Europe we intend to build. Some 
see it only as a fairly flexible association for 
defending trade interests : others as a union to 
be steadily strengthened until it becomes a 
federation with responsibilities in the monetary, 
diplomatic and military fields. Moreover, many 
of our countries, being unduly absorbed by 
domestic political problems and economic dif-
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ficulties, postpone major policy decisions and 
adopt a purely pragmatic approach. 
As time goes by, the significance of the Rome 
and Brussels agreements is becoming blurred. 
Are they just window-dressing, or do they 
represent a sincere agreement to safeguard the 
European heritage and, in particular, the exis-
tence of an industry in full expansion despite 
recent setbacksY 
The Standing Armaments Committee, in 
reviewing the possibilities and resources of the 
European armaments industry, can, through its 
studies, help to lay the foundations for a realistic 
approach to the uncommonly difficult problem 
posed by the definition of a European policy 
for co-operation in that field. At its very recent 
ministerial meeting in Brussels, the WEU Coun-
cil decided to entrust it with this new task. 
The Assembly, for its part, attaches the 
greatest importance to solving this problem and 
the Presidential Committee has therefore instruc-
ted the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments to arrange a symposium on the 
subject at the beginning of next year, which 
would be attended by representatives of the 
ministers concerned and the armaments indus-
tries. 
We trust that the Council, on its side, will 
be moved by a firm intention to achieve tangible 
results. It is time that it gave not only authorisa-
tion to act but the necessary impetus. 
Let us not be told that the governments are 
taking the action necessary for the defence of 
Europe elsewhere. We have not yet been able 
to discern any effective European defence con-
sultations in any framework whatever. What 
matters is not to show a preference for one 
institution or another, but to take action. 
Many theories have been put forward about 
the tasks which might be assigned to WEU, the 
European Community or Eurogroup. We are 
obliged to note that so far no concrete result 
has been recorded and that, juridically, there is 
only one framework : Western European Union, 
always prepared to carry out the tasks assigned 
to it by the treaties. 
But, the most urgent action needed today is 
to save our armaments industries' capability. To 
attain this goal, there is no need for in-depth 
agreement on the final aims of European co-
operation. More modest agreements may allow 
the essential measures to be taken. First, we must 
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save the European aeronautical industry, which 
has been severely affected by the crisis. Among 
the studies which might be entrusted to the 
Standing Armaments Committee, should not top 
priority be given to reviewing our countries' 
capabilities in the military aircraft area ~ Last 
year, four European countries chose an American 
aircraft in preference to a European aircraft 
of comparable price and quality. Another such 
decision would spell the end of Europe's ability 
to produce military aircraft. 
Tomorrow, the same problem will arise for 
the procurement of combat tanks. I do not 
think that this is a means of strengthening the 
Alliance's security. The work of the Standing 
Armaments Committee might help to avoid such 
mistakes by making governments pay greater 
attention to safeguarding an incomparable indus-
trial potential and to the need to employ it to 
the full. It would thus provide a foundation for 
joint action based on industrial realities and the 
political hopes of Europe. 
Those who drew up the treaties instituting 
the Council of Europe, WEU and the Common 
Market must be congratulated for having had 
the wisdom to link the governmental bodies to 
parliamentary assemblies. When governments 
drag their feet, parliamentarians become the 
watchdogs of the treaties. It is for them in their 
discussions to pinpoint the obstacles resulting 
from divided opinions and to give the govern-
ments political impetus by revealing through 
their work of conciliation and synthesis the broad 
lines of action which would allow partial results 
to be achieved, having due regard to differences 
over ends and means. 
In general, the European parliamentary 
assemblies are very critical about the present 
government inertia. To develop into a European 
union, the Common Market would need a com-
mon plan, which is now non-existent. 
The WEU Assembly believes that the circum-
stances call for concerted action by the European 
governments in defence matters. It will carry 
out the task assigned to it by the treaties, even 
if the governments fail to carry out theirs. 
We repeat this all the more emphatically 
since the desire for security is one of our com-
mon concerns. If there is a field in which it is 
possible to be genuinely European-minded, this 
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is surely it. This would help to shape an identity 
which is still too frequently called in question. 
I therefore urge the Assembly to pursue its 
work and action unswervingly, convinced as I am 
that it is, on its own level, helping to bring the 
peoples of our ancient continent closer together 
and strengthen world peace in a spirit of broad 
understanding. (Applause) 
8. Election of the six Vice-Presidents of the 
Assembly 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- The next 
Order of the Day is the election of the six Vice-
Presidents of the Assembly. Five candidatures 
have been presented in the prescribed form. In 
alphabetical order, the candidates are : Mr. 
Amrehn (Federal Republic of Germany), Mr. 
Mart (Luxembourg), Mr. de Niet (Netherlands), 
Sir John Rodgers (United Kingdom) and Mr. 
Tanghe (Belgium). 
Because of the forthcoming elections, the seat 
reserved for Italy will be filled at a later date. 
Mr. LEYNEN (Belgium) (Translation). - I 
propose that the Assembly should also re-elect 
the Vice-Presidents by acclamation. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I would 
point out that should the election be by acclama-
tion, the order of precedence of the Vice-
Presidents would be determined by their age. 
I invite the Assembly to re-elect the five Vice-
Presidents by acclamation, keeping open the seat 
reserved for Italy. 
Are there any objections to the candidatures 
submitted L 
I note that the Assembly is unanimous. 
I therefore declare elected as Vice-Presidents 
of the Assembly, in the following order of 
precedence: Mr. de Niet, Sir John Rodgers, 
Mr. Amrehn, Mr. Tanghe and Mr. Mart. 
9. Observers 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Several 
parliamentarians are doing us the honour of 
coming to take part in our proceedings as obser-
vers: Mr. Belisle, member of the Canadian 
Senate, and Mr. Roberts, member of the Cana-
dian House of Commons ; Mr. Guldberg, former 
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Minister for Foreign Affairs of Denmark and 
Mr. Budtz, both of them members of the Danish 
Folketing ; Mr. Papapolitis and Mr. Tavlarios, 
members of the Greek Chamber of Deputies ; 
Mr. Eidem, Mr. Aavik and Mr. Thyness, mem-
bers of the Norwegian Storting; Mr. Vasco da 
Gama Fernandes, President of the Assembly of 
the Portuguese Republic, and Mr. Roseta, a 
member of that Assembly. (Applause) 
To the applause with which you greeted our 
observers allow me, as President, to add my 
own feelings of friendliness and welcome. 
On behalf of the Assembly, I thank them for 
their kind acceptance of our invitation. We shall 
listen to them with the greatest interest, should 
they wish to speak on any of the subjects on the 
agenda. 
10. Adoption of the draft Order of Business 
for the First Part of the Session 
(Doe. 695) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- The next 
Order of the Day is the adoption of the draft 
Order of Business for the first part of the 
twenty-second ordinary session of the Assembly. 
This draft Order of Business is given in Docu-
ment 695 dated 12th June 1976. 
Before asking the Assembly to adopt the draft 
Order of Business, I call your attention to the 
Orders of the Day for the morning sitting on 
Thursday, 17th June, providing that a vote 
should be taken at 11.30 a.m. on the draft 
recommendations not yet voted upon by the 
Assembly. 
The Presidential Committee felt that, by fix-
ing beforehand a time for taking these votes, 
the greatest possible number of members of the 
Assembly should be able to be present. 
I would therefore urge the heads of delegation 
and chairmen of the political groups to do their 
best to ensure maximum participation by the 
members of their delegations and groups in the 
voting at 11.30 a.m. on Thursday. 
Are there any objections to the draft Order 
of Business given in Document 695 L 
The Order of Business for the first part of 
. the twenty-second ordinary session is adopted. 
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11. Ratification of action by the Presidential 
Committee 
(Does. 696, 698 and 699) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- The next 
Order of the Day is the ratification of action by 
the Presidential Committee. 
Under RUJle 14(2) of the Rules of Procedure, 
the Committee is empowered, in between sessions 
or part-sessions and subject to subsequent ratifi-
cation by the Assembly, to take all such measures 
as it considers necessary for the activities of the 
Assembly to be properly carried on. 
The first text to be ratified is Order 45 of 
12th January 1976, by which the Presidential 
Committee instructed the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments to organise a sympo-
sium on a European armaments policy. 
Document 696, which gives the text of the 
order, contains an explanatory memorandum. 
As the symposium is to be held in late 1976, 
the intervention of the Presidential Committee 
was necessary in order to allow the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments to make 
the necessary preparations. 
I invite the Assembly to ratify the order in 
Document 696. 
Is there any objection t.. 
Order 45 on a symposium on a European arma-
ments policy is accordingly ratified 1 • 
The second text submitted for ratification by 
the Assembly is Resolution 59 on European 
union and WEU adopted by the Presidential 
Committee on 1st March 1976 on a report by 
the General Affairs Committee, Document 698. 
Resolution 59 is given in Document 699. 
The Presidential Committee considered that 
the Assembly should not wait until the opening 
of the present session to make known to the 
European Assembly its attitude towards the 
proposals of the Tindemans report concerning 
European union and defence questions and, in 
particular, their implications for the statutory 
powers of the Assembly of WEU pursuant to 
Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
Resolution 59 on European union and WEU 
was therefore adopted on 1st March and sent 
1. See page 19. 
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by me to the members of the European Council. 
It is now submitted to the Assembly for ratifica-
tion. 
I ask the Assembly to ratify this resolution by 
sitting and standing. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and stand-
ing) 
Resolution 59 on European union and WEU 
is ratified 1. 
12. Detente and security in Europe 
(Presentation of the Report of the General Affairs 
Committee, Doe. 703) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- The next 
Order of the Day is the presentation of and 
debate on the report of the General Affairs 
Committee on detente and security in Europe 
and vote on the draft recommendation, Docu-
ment 703. 
Before calling the Rapporteur, I would ask 
members who wish to take part in the debate 
to add their names to the list of speakers, stating 
for how long they intend to speak. 
I call Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur of 
the General Affairs Committee. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom). 
- Mr. President, distinguished colleagues and 
delegates, as the first speaker from the hall, 
I should like to congratulate you, Mr. President, 
on your fully justified re-election, and I am 
honoured to be the first person to have the 
opportunity to give you a cordial welcome. 
When I was invited to be the Rapporteur for 
this subject, I was under no illusion about the 
difficulties. Not only is this a controversial poli-
tical subject, but, as the title detente and secu-
rity in Europe suggests, it is a subject which 
changes, if not from hour to hour, certainly 
from week to week and even more certainly 
from month to month. 
Because of changing developments, I decided, 
with the help of the secretariat and advice from 
my Chairman, to alter the report eight to ten 
times - irrespective of the political difficulties. 
l. See page 20. 
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Let me give three examples. When I was invited 
to be a Rapporteur on this subject, the future 
of Portugal - to whose observers I offer a 
cordial welcome - looked dark indeed. Since 
then an election has taken place and a further 
election, to be followed by the formation of a 
government, presumably by the majority party 
with or without coalition forces from other par-
ties, will shortly be held. 
What I originally intended to report on Por-
tugal has, happily, been outdated by events. Now 
that Portugal has established the desire to work 
out its own destiny along genuine pluralistic and 
democratic lines, I hope that the forces which 
have suffered a reverse will accept the clearly-
expressed verdict of the people of that country. 
When I was first invited to undertake this 
task, the future of Angola seemed uncertain, and 
even today we still cannot be sure what will be 
the outcome of the recent struggle in Angola, 
whi0h clearly has a bearing on security in 
Europe. We all deplore the continuing presence 
of foreign forces in that country, which should 
be left to work out its own destiny as other 
genuinely free countries. 
Speaking as a British member of parliament 
as well as your Rapporteur, I must say that I 
am delighted that the fruitless argument with 
Iceland, which had bedevilled much wider ques-
tions than fishing for many months, has now 
been resolved. I have expressed fears in the 
report. It was not able to be reprinted again. 
The agreement reached a few days ago makes 
the situation look a great deal brighter than 
when I made the report. 
These were among my difficulties in trying 
to present a report on a constantly-changing 
pattern of events. I hope that all members of the 
Assembly will accept that no one could have 
tried harder than I to keep the report up-to-date. 
There was another difficulty which I realised 
when I undertook this task. It was the impos-
sibility of one Rapporteur with an individual 
frame of mind producing in a report - as 
opposed to the recommendations - a foundation 
of thinking which was likely to receive unani-
mous support. There will always be those who 
believe that the Soviet menace is greater than 
some others believe. There are those who believe 
that, although there is a military threat, we 
should look more closely at other methods of 
defending ourselves. For instance, they suggest 
that social welfare and social advance should 
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be the predominant opposition vis-a-viS other 
methods of resistance against attack and sub-
version from abroad. 
I had to decide to which school of thought I 
belonged. I say without apology or hesitation 
that, although I am not the oldest member of the 
Assembly, I can recall the late 1930s and how 
the same arguments were being used about the 
degree, extent and scope of the military strength 
of another imperialist power. This was the 
subject of endless discussion, debate and argu-
ment in our own parliament. I did my modest bit 
during the war and I recall hearing precisely the 
same arguments when my father was in the 
House of Commons that I have heard during the 
Committee stages of this report. 
Some say that there is no parallel with the 
1930s. Others believe that the build-up of the 
largest military forces the world has ever seen 
at the disposal of one great power does not 
presage an attack on the western world or an 
attempt to dominate Western Europe in the 
same way that we suffered to our cost at the 
end of the 1930s. I make no apology for the fact 
that I have been unable to compromise with my 
belief, as opposed to the recommendations, 
expressed in my report - that we face a 
potential threat at least as great if not greater 
than we faced in the late 1930s. I should not have 
been able to present this report if I did not 
think that. If I am proved wrong by history, no 
one will be more delighted than I. 
However, in talking to an Assembly which is 
primarily concerned with defence, I have to 
accept the realities of the situation. 
I have had to accept the unanimous advice of 
our own chiefs-of-staff and defence ministers 
that, to obtain a reasonable defence posture 
which makes it unlikely that any aggressor will 
be able to launch an altogether successful con-
ventional attack, one needs an approximate ratio 
of only 1:3. This is the present NATO standard. 
Why, then, should another group of powers, 
which preaches that its interest lies only in 
defence, insist on trying to retain a ratio of 3:1 Y 
What must I conclude when I read that the 
Warsaw Pact countries are coming dangerously 
close to this ratio whilst continuing to proclaim 
a defence credibility Y 
There are those who point out that the Soviet 
Union must take into account Chinese aggres-
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sion. I am no expert in Sino-Russian problell1S, 
but I recently had the privilege of visiting and 
travelling widely in China and I know which 
way the Chinese would vote if they were 
represented in this Assembly. However, the 
figures I have given in this report, on the 
balance of naval, military and air forces, exclude 
completely the other Soviet forces ranged against 
China in the East. They comprise only those 
forces facing westwards. Were we ever to reach 
a situation of real rapprochement between 
Peking and Moscow, we should be in even greater 
danger than now. 
I gave an undertaking in the Committee that 
endorsed this report and recommendations which 
I repeat to-day - that the foundations of my 
thinking and my conclusions are mine and mine 
alone as Rapporteur. I feel I am entitled to 
assert this. None of my findings has emerged 
merely from my own individual thinking. They 
have come from consultations with authoritative 
sources in WEU countries, across the Atlantic 
and even further afield. I recently made a brief 
tour of Africa and I have already referred to my 
visit to China. Nor have these findings been 
lightly reached. They are the result of months 
of painstaking consultation. 
Although I have said that the report is mine 
and mine alone, I do not assume that I received 
anything like unanimous support for my 
findings within the Committee. Its members 
would agree that, apart from altering my 
thinking, I have altered a number of findings 
for which I was originally responsible because 
of what I considered very reasonable represen-
tations by senior members of that Committee, 
who perfectly properly admitted that the report 
was mine but felt that I had unduly emphasised 
or wrongly perceived this or that point. I do not 
think that I once disregarded a request to 
reconsider the matter made by a member of the 
Committee ; there are fifteen such sections and 
I accepted all the recommendations thereon 
which arose in the Committee. 
The report itself is therefore mine. The recom-
mendations which follow were accepted by a 
majority vote. I can recall only one occasion 
when I voted against. However, members of the 
Assembly may not necessarily accept the premise 
of the recommendations - that at present we 
are not in a position militarily to guarantee our 
own security. Although I believe it to be the case 
and the evidence submitted to me suggests it, in 
the same spirit of compromise that I showed 
throughout the Committee discussions I will have 
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another look at this to see whether we cannot 
obtain an even wider measure of agreement than 
was shown in the Committee when these deci-
sions were made. 
I can state that, whether or not we are in a 
position to guarantee our own security today, 
the rate of development of the Warsaw Pact 
forces and of the Soviet Union in particular 
means that, unless we reconsider our defences 
next year and the year after, no Rapporteur will 
be able to stand here and say that we are in a 
position to defend ourselves with a complete 
guarantee of security. Although there may be 
arguments today, therefore, unless we act dif-
ferently in the future and give defence matters 
a greater degree of attention, including stan-
dardisation and so on, we shall increasingly fall 
behind. 
All our governments accept this. Indeed the 
German Federal Government is itself taking 
steps to stabilise its own defence. The French, to 
their credit, have announced a very considerable 
increase in the effort they are devoting to their 
conventional forces, and the United States is 
doing likewise. 
I have not come here to play what I would 
call the "card game" of arguing which country 
does the most. There are so many different packs 
of cards one can use, whether one talks in terms 
of GNP, or per capita, or any other criterion. It 
has not been my task in a report entitled 
"Detente and security in Europe" to pick and 
choose between individual countries and to blame 
one or praise another. 
What I have done to the best of my ability is 
to depict the present situation, not altogether 
dark, as my final paragraphs show, as I truth-
fully see it, without garnishing, without political 
overtones, without prejudice. I look forward to 
hearing the comments on what I have found to 
be an exacting but very instructive task. 
I hope that it will not be too long before this 
Assembly, which is devoted to the defence of 
Europe, rather than spending time on the 
detailed substance of the report comes to appre-
ciate that at this moment we are entering a very 
dangerous era for western security and that it 
behoves all of us to ensure that we do not once 
again go through the endless tragedies which led 
to the conflagration of 1939. (Applause) 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I thank 
the Rapporteur. 
13. Address by Mr. Roberts, Observer from 
Canada 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Before 
calling the speakers who have put down their 
names for this debate, I venture to invite 
Mr. Roberts, a member of the Canadian Parlia-
ment, to deliver the address which he has 
prepared. As he has come from so far, I think 
we can extend him this courtesy and give him 
the privilege of a hearing before we proceed 
with this debate. 
Mr. Roberts, I invite you to come to the 
rostrum. (Applause) 
Mr. ROBERTS (Observer front Canada). -
If a mere observer may be permitted such a 
liberty, Mr. President, I should like at the outset 
to congratulate you, as the previous speaker has, 
on your election to the Chair of this Assembly. 
Canadian parliamentarians attended the 
annual session of Western European Union for 
the first time in 1974 and they found this direct 
and personal exposure to European thinking a 
most valuable and stimulating experience. This 
year we have come again to listen, but also, at 
your kind invitation, to speak on Canada's 
foreign policy. The Secretary of State for 
External Affairs in Canada, the Honourable 
Allan J. MacEachen, asked me to convey to you 
his regret that he was not able to come to Europe 
himself to deliver the statement. I must say that 
while it was of course regrettable, it at least 
affords me the pleasure of being able to come in 
his place and to speak on his behalf - a pri-
vilege and an honour. 
In formulating foreign policy, while assisted 
no doubt by experience, one inevitably tries to 
make a judgment of what lies ahead, and in 
mid-1976 it is not an easy task. The world is 
entering the last quarter of the twentieth 
century having existed through severe recessions, 
which have tested our economic and political 
institutions both at the national and inter-
national level. This economic crisis has given us 
a sharp reminder that the industrialised techno-
logical societies are still vulnerable to the ebb 
and flow of the international economy, and at 
the same time the situation has been more severe 
for the developing countries, most of which have 
been faced with a catastrophic increase in the 
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cost of their imports while suffering a sharp 
decline in their export earnings. 
Our experience recently has been painful but, 
if we learn from it, not without value. The 
weaknesses within the international financial 
and monetary machinery have been exposed, and 
we are now having to make changes in the 
institutiolliaJl arrangement:a which may have served 
us well in the past but which are now dated. We 
have seen, perhaps inevitably, the re-emergence 
of tendencies towards isolationism and protec-
tionism. However at this point governments have 
been reasonably successful in preventing those 
forces gaining the upper hand. 
(The speaker continued in French) 
(Translation). - Moreover, this criSIS has 
clearly shown us that there can be no purely 
national solution to problems whose magnitude 
and impact are international. Inflation and 
large-scale unemployment have not yet been 
defeated, though there are some signs of abate-
ment. Other pointers tell us a recovery is on the 
way in other sectors, but there will have to be 
concerted action to strengthen and consolidate it. 
The problems are complex and highly tech-
nical. It is not always easy to relate the recondite 
remarks of the economists to the everyday prob-
leniS we have to face as parliamentarians. What 
is more, decision-making will increasingly have 
to take account of not only national but also 
international considerations. The European 
Community and its members have a role of para-
mount importance to play in this respect. We 
Canadians are aware of the difficulties you have 
to face in harmonising your economic policies, 
and of the obstacles which you have to overcome 
to achieve greater unity. 
We have also been struck by the determination 
which you have shown over the years and which 
has led you not to give up any of the ground 
already gained and to persevere in your efforts 
to reach your objectives. We wish you success 
in this venture, and we feel confident that the 
Europeans will demonstrate their ability to 
advance together for the common good, without 
turning their backs on the outside world. 
But we want to do more than simply wish 
you success. Indeed, I have already pointed out 
the importance of concerted action to maintain 
the momentum of economic recovery. The 
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economic summit meeting of the Heads of State 
and Government at Rambouillet established an 
important link in that respect. Canada therefore 
readily accepted the invitation of the President 
of the United States to take part in the further 
meeting to be held at Puerto Rico on 27th and 
28th June of the seven major industrialised 
countries - Canada being one of them - to 
continue the process started at Rambouillet. 
Canada believes firmly that co-operation and 
close and continuous consultations among the 
main industrial nations, including ourselves, will 
be highly conducive to progress in a number of 
fields of common interest ; and we hope we may 
be able to play a part in that connection. 
Obviously, the medium chosen for framing and 
applying foreign policy varies from one country 
to another. Canada is a North American country, 
and our relations with the United States 
naturally assume special importance. While 
Canadian and United States interests sometimes 
diverge, we have nevertheless managed to 
establish excellent relations with one another 
based on mutual trust ·and a common determin-
ation. Although, geographically speaking, we 
are North Americans, we are nonetheless aware 
of the need to forge solid links with Europe. As 
our membership of NATO bears witness, we are 
also very much alive to the interdependence of 
security and prosperity in North America and 
in Europe, and to the need for establishing 
transatlantic links, in relation to the role that 
Canada has to play in the world. Moreover, 
Canada's economic relations with the Nine enable 
it to be less dependent upon the United States 
market. 
(The speaker continued in English) 
On the economic side, the European Economic 
Community is today the world's largest import 
market, accounting as it does for some 40 % of 
international trade. Canada, too, is an important 
world trading partner with almost one-fifth of 
our national product deriving from exports. 
Hence our economic links with the Nine are of 
great importance to us. 
It was those fundamental reasons, as well as 
a desire to reduce our vulnerability to the 
economic forces which could pull us too deeply 
and too completely into an integration with only 
the North American market, that led us to 
attempt to reach a balance in our external 
economic relations. For those reasons the Cana-
dian Government has for some time been pur-
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suing a policy of reasserting and expanding our 
relations with the European Community and its 
member States. Because there is a great deal of 
complementarity between the economies of 
Canada and those of the Western European 
countries, we believe that such development will 
be in our mutual interest. 
In pressing forward to give substance to this 
concept, Canada proposed to the European 
Economic Community the conclusion of a frame-
work agreement for commercial and economic 
co-operation. In making this proposal we based 
ourselves on certain considerations. The first 
is that Canada's economic links with Europe 
have not developed to the extent that would be 
justified by Europe's continuing, indeed, increas-
ing importance in the world, whether measured 
against its actual economic growth or in terms 
of its potential, or measured against its expand-
ing share of world trade. 
The second is that trade today is only one 
element in a complex network of economic inter-
action that embraces investment, technology, 
licensing, joint ventures and co-operation in third 
world markets. It was clear to us, therefore, that 
conscious action was required to create a basis 
for close, coherent and continuing industrial co-
operation with Europe if we were to expand and 
reach the full potential of Canada's own econ-
omic situation. 
As I am sure you know, negotiations on the 
framework agreement with the European Com-
munity concluded two weeks ago and the agreed 
text is now being submitted to respective govern-
ments for consideration and approval. We hope 
very strongly that the signature of this agree-
ment will take place soon. It is an event which 
will mark an important milestone in the relations 
between Canada and the Community. The agree-
ment will be successful only if it provides an 
impetus towards closer co-operation and if it is 
£o1lowed up not simply by governments but in 
the private sector, so that we shall be able to 
create and exploit development that will increase 
the level of economic exchanges between Canada 
and its European partners. 
Important as we expect this framework agree-
ment to be, we do not see our future relations 
with Europe exclusively in terms of the 
Community-Canada link. We intend to continue 
to develop our bilateral relations with European 
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countries, both inside and outside the Com-
munity. 
Another aspect of Canada's close involvement 
with Europe is our active participation in the 
East-West dialogue where, together with our 
allies, we are trying to draw the Soviet Union 
and the countries of Eastern Europe into a more 
civilised, open and constructive relationship with 
the West. It is perhaps at this point that my 
remarks join the report presented by Sir 
Frederic Bennett. 
An important development in this dialogue 
between East and West was the signing of the 
final act of the conference on security and 
co-operation in Europe. The Canadian Govern-
ment is committed fully to implement the provi-
sions of this document. While we recognise the 
importance of all sections of the final act, the 
part that reflects Canada's concerns most clearly 
is Basket Ill, in which State-to-State relations 
are in a sense secondary to the emphasis placed 
on person-to-person relations. This area includes 
such matters as the freer movement of people 
and ideas and particularly the reunification of 
families, a subject of direct concern to the many 
Canadians who have relatives in the Eastern 
European countries. 
Implementation of the Basket Ill texts will be 
for Canada one of the main indicators of the 
progress of detente and as a matter of policy we 
are concerned that the Soviet Union and the 
other East European countries shall live up to 
them. For us the Helsinki agreement is not 
simply a ratification of the past : it is a living 
commitment of obligations that we expect to see 
accepted and fulfilled. We will be following up 
next year at Belgrade the assessment of the 
progress made by all the participating States in 
implementing the agreement and looking for new 
ways to further the mutual understanding 
necessary for security and co-operation in 
Europe. 
At the same time, Canada shares the view of 
its European allies that in the face of increasing 
Warsaw Pact military strength a satisfactory 
dialogue with the East can be conducted only 
from a basis of western solidarity and the 
maintenance of adequate collective security 
arrangements. In this connection the Canadian 
Government announced last November a series of 
decisions which, among other things, provides for 
a substantial increase in capital expenditure for 
defence that will permit an extensive re-equip-
ment programme for the Canadian armed forces. 
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As a part of this programme, as you know, the 
Canadian Government has recently decided to 
enter into negotiations for the purchase of 128 
German Leopard tanks. 
(The speaker continued in French) 
(Translation). - However, Canada's interests 
are not limited to those conferred upon it by 
geographical proximity or historical and cultural 
links. Indeed, our foreign relations have a world-
wide character, and we engage in all kinds of 
activities in the four corners of the globe. 
Thus, in the Middle East and Cyprus, we are 
contributing to the peace-keeping operations 
conducted by the United Nations. In conformity 
with the role that has thus been entrusted to us in 
the Middle East, and with our policy, which 
recognises Israel's right to continued existence 
and the Palestinians' equally fundamental right 
to take part in discussions and negotiations 
affecting their future, we have adopted an 
objective attitude towards the conflict between 
Israel and the Arab States. If, as we believe will 
happen, Canada is given a two-year mandate to 
serve on the Security Council as from 1st 
January 1977, it will more than ever unite its 
efforts with those of the international community 
towards a settlement in the Middle East. 
We are also concerned with keeping the peace 
and other activities in Asia and the Pacific. We 
are actively engaged in this region with a view 
to extending our bilateral economic relations, 
especi3Jlly with Japan. We have privileged rela-
tions and consultations with the Japanese 
Government on a whole range of questions of 
foreign policy. 
Because of its geographical position and its 
strong economic influence, Japan is ideally 
placed to help in the economic development of 
Asia and the Pacific region, and supply a driving 
force for political stability. 
We have taken practical steps, including an 
offer of development aid, to maintain and sup-
port action by the Association of South-East 
Asian Nations, which we consider capable of 
encouraging stability in this rapidly-developing 
region of the world. 
(The speaker continued in English) 
I should now like to turn to UNCTAD IV, 
which was recently concluded in Nairobi. Canada 
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came to that conference determined to play a 
positive role in order to help bring about a 
constructive change in the international economic 
system, and thereby to reduce the gap between 
the rich and the poor nations. Together with 
delegations from the developed and the devel-
oping countries, the Canadian representative 
worked hard to find and enlarge the areas of 
common ground that could form the basis of 
resolutions. As you know, the deliberations were 
difficult and it is a considerable accomplishment 
that the process of accommodation was made to 
work, and that the necessary compromises were 
made that led to the adoption of a number of 
significant resolutions. 
The adoption by consensus of an integrated 
programme on commodities marks an important 
step forward and, in the Canadian view, consti-
tutes the major achievement of the conference. 
Other resolutions on the debt problems of 
developing countries and on trade liberalisation 
are also significant accomplishments. 
Thus, in the Canadian view, the results of 
UNCTAD IV are substantial and the conference 
as a whole marks an important stage in our 
efforts to reduce disparities between developed 
and developing countries. 
The outcome of UNCTAD IV should also have 
a beneficial effect on the ongoing discussions in 
Paris in the CIEC. The positive programme 
adopted in Nairobi, particularly in the field of 
commodities, should enable us in the CIEC to 
focus more closely on specific proposals for 
action. As eo-Chairman of the CIEC, Canada has 
a particular interest in the success of this unique 
venture which, in the second half of 1976, will 
be the main focus of the North-South dialogue. 
Before concluding, I should like to touch on 
one more subject of particular importance to 
Canada. The third United Nations Law of the 
Sea Conference, which has just concluded its 
fourth session in New York, made a good deal 
of progress in most areas of its mandate, but, as 
you know, no final agreement was reached. The 
New York negotiating text, however, reflects the 
great distances already travelled in the develop-
ment of revolutionary new concepts in inter-
national law. Some basic concepts that have 
endured for centuries are being changed rad-
ically because of a general conviction, which 
Canada shares, that they no longer reflect the 
needs of our times. The economic zone concept, 
which vests in the coastal State sovereign rights 
out to 200 miles over fisheries and mineral 
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resources, as well as jurisdiction for the preserv-
ation of the marine environment, is one such idea 
whose time has come and which is now firmly 
entrenched in the revised single negotiating text. 
The revised text also reaffirms the coastal 
State's sovereign rights over the resources of its 
continental shelf. Furthermore, it enshrines the 
innovative principle of the "common heritage of 
mankind", which will apply to the international 
seabed area beyond national jurisdiction. Canada 
has sought a provision to give the coastal State 
the right to apply particularly stringent 
measures to protect its marine environment from 
pollution in ice-covered areas of its economic 
zone, such as in Canada's arctic waters. At the 
next session of the Law of the Sea Conference, 
which will convene again in New York from 
2nd August to 17th September, Canada will be 
working actively to ensure that this session 
makes decisive progress on these issues, which 
remain unsolved. 
I have touched briefly on some aspects of 
Canada's external relations and I have tried to 
give some indication of the direction in which 
we are moving. But, as we all know, no foreign 
policy is wholly subject to the logic of design. 
Events create their own logic and their own 
inheritance which cannot be ignored. Thus, 
foreign policy must remain sufficiently flexible 
to take account of changing circumstances, but 
while flexibility is necessary, it does not relieve 
us of the obligation to establish our objectives 
and reach them in a reasonable way. 
It is for that reason that in this brief tour 
d'horizon I have touched on the main elements 
of Canada's foreign policy : our friendship with 
the United States; the importance that we attach 
to maintaining and strengthening our relations 
with Europe ; the importance of peace-keeping 
in the context of the United Nations; the 
importance that we place on the Helsinki agree-
ment ; the commitments into which countries 
have entered; and the importance that we attach 
to the Law of the Sea Conference and the 
deliberations of UNCTAD IV. These, whatever 
the immediate changing circumstances, will 
remain the basic concern of Europe. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. Roberts. In listening to our Canadian 
guests, who are so close to us in spirit, it feels 
as if the Atlantic Ocean is but a narrow sea. 
Thank you once again for your brilliant speech. 
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14. Detente and security in Europe 
(Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Com-
mittee, Doe. 703) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- We shall 
now take the debate on detente and security in 
Europe. 
I would mention that ten speakers have put 
their names down which shows the importance 
attached to Sir Frederic Bennett's report. 
In accordance with the prescribed procedure, I 
declare the list of speakers in the debate closed. 
I call Mr. Kliesing. 
Mr. KLIESING (Federal Republic of Ger-
many) (Translation).- Mr. President, I should 
like to open this Assembly's debate on detente 
and security in Europe by thanking Sir Frederic 
for his report and for the great deal of trouble 
he has taken over ,it. He, himself, referred a 
mDment ago to the difficulties that he encoun-
tered, and we are aH the more indebted to him 
fDr his efforts to oope with them. 
The main aim of the conference on security 
and co-operation in Europe was to improve 
security through measures to promote detente. 
The conclusion reached in the draft recommen-
dation that we are considering today, however, is 
that the Soviet Union's interpretation of what 
it has signed in the final act of the conference 
has so far been highly restrictive and that it is 
refusing to follow up the concept of detente, as 
we in the West understand it, with practical 
measures. 
The report and the draft recommendation do, 
in my opinion, constitute a realistic assessment 
of the effects of the Helsinki decisions so far. 
WEU is therefore associating itself with a view 
already expressed in such bodies as the Council 
of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly and the 
North Atlantic Assembly, but is not giving a 
final verdict. 
Why the effects of Helsinki have so far pro-
duced little substantial progress towards detente 
may best be answered objectively by pointing to 
the total contradiction between what the West 
and what the Soviet Union understand by 
detente. In his report Sir Frederic has, 
fortunately, given us a clear picture of this 
difference. I do not wish to repeat what he has 
said, but only to complement it with a few 
remarks on one political event that had not yet 
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occurred when Sir Frederic submitted his writ-
ten report. 
On 22nd May, the Soviet Government issued a 
statement which caused some excitement over the 
unusual way in which it was published. This was 
the twelve-point note - and we may certainly 
call it a note - which instead of being handed 
by one government to another was published by 
Tass for general information. It is clear from 
comments made since by the Soviet Government 
that the reason why this method of communi-
cation was adopted was that the note was in no 
way intended for the Government of the Federal 
Republic only but was considered to be addressed 
to the public in the whole of Germany and in the 
rest of Europe ; so it may be recommended to 
everyone for careful reading. 
The note expresses the expectations of the 
Soviet policy on Europe in the coming years, and 
at the same time sounds a warning lest these 
expectations should not be fulfilled. In the note 
the Soviet Government includes a reference, in 
its own familiar manner, to the problem of 
detente. Because of the exceptional importance 
attaching to this publication by Tass, I should 
like, Mr. President, to draw the Assembly's 
attention to those parts of the text that concern 
the Soviet concept of detente. Let me quote 
from the note : 
"The relaxation of tension does not and cannot 
mean a freezing of the objective processes of 
historical development. It is not a green light 
for corrupt regimes. It gives no freedom or 
right to suppress the just struggle of the 
peoples for their national liberation. It does 
not remove the need for social transforma-
tions." 
This, therefore, shows what, in the Soviet view, 
detente is not. A few lines later, the note then 
tells us what, in the Soviet opinion, detente does 
mean. To quote verbatim : 
"The point of relaxation of tension is, first 
of all, to exclude the use of force or the threat 
of force in disputes and conflicts between 
States." 
This interpretation of the term detente is there-
fore a highly restrictive one, according to which 
the Soviet side sees detente merely as a renun-
ciation of military conflict, with the Soviet 
Union continuing fully to claim the right to 
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undermine and destroy the internal structures of 
such States as are not minded to adapt to the 
communist system. This is readily apparent from 
a sentence in the Soviet note which is prefixed 
to the Soviet definition of detente referred to 
above as a kind of thesis. This runs as follows, 
and I quote: 
"All this experience demonstrates that it is the 
policy of peaceful coexistence that, as V.I. 
Lenin noted, is 'the only correct way out' 
[I repeat, the only correct way out,] of the 
difficulties, chaos and danger of war." 
In other words, anyone who does not accept the 
doctrine of peaceful coexistence in the Leninist 
meaning of the phrase is an enemy of detente 
and of peace. So as to bring home to the people 
of Europe the seriousness of this warning, the 
last sentence of the note states - I quote once 
again: 
"Today, just as in the past, facing the people 
of the Federal Republic of Germany, just as 
any other European nation, is the cardinal 
question of where it is going to direct its 
energy, on what side of the scales it will put 
its weight - that of peace or that of war." 
After what I have just said about the claim that 
Lenin's doctrine alone is the right one, this 
sentence, following the demands outlined in the 
note, raises it in my opinion to the level of an 
ultimatum, since it is no less than a scarcely 
veiled threat. 
If we compare this with earlier Soviet policy, 
we come to the following conclusion - nothing 
in the objectives of Soviet policy has altered, 
nor can any kind of change be expected. The 
policy of peaceful coexistence is no more than 
an attempt to achieve the aim of communist 
domination in Europe, if possible without resort 
to military means. In other words, the policy 
of peaceful coexistence is only a continuation of 
the cold war by different means. 
These means include, in particular, the 
encouragement of anti-democratic communist 
forces in free democracies and attempts to discre-
dit those democratic forces that repel attack by 
the enemies of democracy. Mr. President, I have 
good reasons for saying this, belonging as I do 
to the generation which, as young democrats, 
tried actively in the years between 1930 and 1933 
to defend and save the democratic ideals of the 
W eimar Republic. At that time I, as a young 
politician, saw how the enemies of democracy 
attempted - successfully - to undermine and 
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destroy our democratic, established State by 
working more and more enemies of democracy 
into the administration. Today we are faced with 
a similar attempt - once again the enemies 
of democracy, this time the communists, are 
making an attempt to invade the ranks of our 
institutions and so gain influence over the 
machinery of the State. Our people and the 
people of Europe have had to pay so dearly 
for the fall of the first democracy in Germany 
that we do not want our second democracy to 
suffer the same fate. We are defending our 
free, democratic State. 
We are therefore all the more inclined to take 
amiss any attempts at international level to 
hamper us, by false recriminations and insinua-
tions, in our defence of democracy. I would ask 
all those who gympathise with ploys of this kind 
to stop for a moment and think whom they are 
really helping. It can hardly serve the interests 
of democratic politicians to decry German 
democrats when they defend freedom and demo-
cracy ; it should rather be the unanimous wish 
of all democrats in Europe to form a common 
front against those who are once again trying 
to destroy our democratic institutions. 
Thank you, Mr. President. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Critchley. 
Mr. CRITCHLEY (United Kingdom). - I 
begin by congratulating you, Mr. President, on 
your re-election, and I congratulate Sir Frederic 
on a characteristically robust and well-thought-
out report. 
There are three roads which might conceivably 
lead towards the unity of Europe. The first is 
unity through conquest, which has been tried 
comparatively recently and which, fortunately, 
failed. Secondly, there may be unity through 
economics which is, at present, the whole thrust 
of the Common Market experiment and idea. 
Thirdly, there is the possibility of unity through 
the threat of a common enemy. 
The enemy exists ; the enemy is Russia. Yet 
the alliance with America and our protection 
by America have succeeded in reducing our 
perception of the threat in Europe. Europe has 
preferred its security to its independence 
because, for the past quarter of a century, Eur-
ope has been an American military protectorate. 
3 - 11 
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European defence has been the gift of the United 
States, just as Europe's prosperity has come 
to depend upon free access to raw materials -
a system long sustained by United States power. 
For a long time Europe has enjoyed a com-
fortable dependence upon the United States. The 
theme of my short speech is that this dependence 
will become increasingly uncomfortable. 
Three new features have contributed to Euro-
pean unease. First the United States has moved 
towards an understanding with the USSR and 
a mutual acceptance of the status quo established 
in Europe - the division of Europe itself. 
Secondly, there is the slow collapse of the western 
monetary system. In response Europe has tried 
to build a European monetary union which 
would reflect the commercial flavour and 
strength of Europe. Thirdly, the United States' 
Middle East policies resulted in the oil embargo, 
which seriously threatened both Europe's pros-
perity and its politics. 
We are experiencing the end of the post-war 
system. As the United States' military strength 
and power and its faiLing commitment are seen 
to weaken, Europe must, sooner or later, be faced 
with alternatives. 
The first is that Europe will decline into a 
less comfortable dependence on or subordination 
to one side or other of the superpowers. It could 
become Finlandised as a Soviet dependency or 
become another Canada or Mexico. The second is 
that Europe, its vital interests no longer the 
exclusive concern of the United States, may 
begin to rebuild and strengthen its unity and 
independence. So robust a reaction would be 
rational and logical for a European bloc and 
would be the natural response of middle-ranking 
European States faced with a fragmenting world 
order. 
Which of these courses appears more likely ? 
There is evidence in favour of both. First, if we 
are gloomy about the prospects for Europe, there 
is little leadership in the West and virtually 
none in Europe. There is a comfortable reliance 
in Europe upon the theory of convergence. The 
only trouble is that we are converging more 
rapidly than they are. 
There are also in Europe itself the conse-
quences of the social revolution which has taken 
place since the end of the war. The old elites 
have largely vanished; the newly rich have 
become Americanised Europeans but with none 
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of that wish for involvement in politics which is 
so characteristic of the Americans thelllSelves. In 
short, the two world wars and the events follow-
ing on them have sapped the political will of 
Europe. 
If, however, one wishes to be optimistic, there 
is evidence to support this view too. The Germans 
are to increase their armed forces ; the Federal 
Republic enjoys considerable prosperity and a 
marvellous stability. As significant and perhaps 
even more interesting are the changes announced 
in French defence policy, by which France is to 
increase its defence spending and to adopt the 
Alliance strategy of a flexible response. Yet even 
this optimistic picture of France and Germany 
being prepared to do more is spoilt by the 
example of my own country where the Labour 
Government will allot to defence only the 
priority permitted by a large and vociferous 
neutralist left wing. 
The lesson of all this is surely that if Europe 
wishes to become independent, it must dispose 
of a sufficiency of armed forces. Only in this 
way shall we encourage the United States to 
remain committed to our common defence. A 
weak Europe will inevitably lead to an American 
withdrawal, a nightmare prospect which we in 
Europe wish to avoid. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Miiller. 
Mr. MtJLLER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, I should like to begin by thanking 
Sir Frederic Bennett most heartily for his report 
and I would like, too, to add to my thanks some-
thing whi<Ch is not usuaJJy included in the thanks 
given to a Rapporteur, but which personaLly at 
least I would like to &y very definitely about this 
report. It is not always that one can agree 100 % 
with a report. Sometimes the percentage of agree-
ment with a report falls we1l short of this. But 
in the case of Sir Frederic's report, I can say 
that what he has said is 100 % the expression of 
my own views. 
Karl Marx says somewhere in "The civil war 
in France" that certain events in history occur 
twice over. I think we are today seeing develop-
ments which show only too well that this is not 
entirely wrong. When we look back - and the 
Rapporteur expressly refers to this in his report 
- to the days before the second world war, we 
66 
FIRST SITTING 
realise that it was a similar political situation 
which led directly to that war. History has 
shown us that Hitler's policy from 1933 on was 
constant moves to test, stage by stage, the 
readiness of the democratic States to defend 
thelllSelves : the occupation of the Rhineland, the 
Saar problem, the problem of the Sudetenland 
and finally the Munich agreement. It was exactly 
this policy which later on, when the war was 
over, was described by the leader of the Hun-
garian communist party, Rakosi, in a lecture 
he gave to the party academy in Budapest, as 
"salami tactics". 
We remember how the Munich agreement was 
lauded as something that would give Europe 
"peace in our time". I cannot shake off the 
suspicion that similar eulogies spoken last year, 
following the conclusion of the CSCE conference 
in Helsinki, may well go down in history as 
rapidly as the words uttered in 1938. 
If we draw further parallels between now and 
the period before 1939, we find that then, too, 
there had been very clear statements of what the 
aggressive policy of national socialism meant. 
Even before the national socialists seized power 
in Germany, one had only to read what .Adolf 
Hitler had written in "Mein Kampf". I believe 
we can also re-read today what the long-term 
policy of world communism is, despite peaceful 
coexistence. 
If we look at the manual of scientific com-
munism, the official textbook of the communist 
party of the Soviet Union, published by a group 
of authors under Professor Afanasyev, who at 
the last congress of the communist party of the 
Soviet Union was elected to the Central Com-
mittee in recognition of his services, we will find 
that the policy of peaceful coexistence means 
"conquering the citadels of imperialism from 
within". Three WEU countries are included 
amongst the "citadels of imperialism" ; five 
countries are listed in all - Japan and the 
United States, France, the United Kingdom and 
the Federal Republic of Germany. 
In this manual of scientific communism, we 
are also told that the aim is, in this period of a 
policy of peaceful coexistence, to cut off the 
imperialists - meaning the non-communist 
camp - from access to the sources of raw 
materials. Bearing in mind the constant disturb-
ances in the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere, 
that is a point which should not be overlooked. 
We have had the example of Portugal, in con-
nection with which a communist paper in the 
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Federal Republic wrote that since 1935, since 
the Seventh Comintern Congress, the Portuguese 
communist party had systematically been 
pursuing a Trojan horse policy. 
Today that is also true for the policy that we 
are seeing everywhere in Europe. I am quite 
simply very sceptical of the independence which 
the communist parties of Italy and France enjoy 
vis-a-vis Moscow, however loudly they may keep 
on proclaiming it. How, for instance, could the 
Soviet Union allow funds to flow to Italy, and 
increase the subsidies for the communist party 
organ in Italy, Unita, fourfold in two years, if 
there were major differences of opinion ? 
One point in this connection, while we are 
talking of money, was referred to by the Rap-
porteur and is very obvious : we in the West are 
using the money which is earned here in the 
West, which is created by our industry and flows 
through our treasuries, to help strengthen the 
other side in its weaknesses. I am not referring 
solely to the fact that in East-West trade the 
Soviet Union has today a debit balance of 80,000 
million French francs, I am not referring simply 
to the existence of the trade agreements involved, 
I am also thinking, for instance, of the subsidised 
foodstuffs that the European Economic Com-
munity is supplying to the eastern bloc on 
particularly favourable terms. I am glad to see 
that the report and the draft recommendation 
urge that we should put an end to this policy of 
financing the opponent, for our opponent could 
of course expand his armaments a little less, and 
build more tractors instead of more tanks, so as 
to overcome his agricultural problems. 
I also attach importance to the statement that 
the question of morale is affecting us in the 
West too. In other words, peace and a policy of 
detente have also become a question of morale. 
We no longer have the morale that is needed for 
us to resist what is threatening us. We think too 
much in terms of our standard of living, we are 
too busy chasing the standard of living and are 
no longer able to see what is needed if we are 
to defend our freedom in the long term. 
The Rapporteur has very rightly pointed out 
that the mass media and what is called "public 
opinion" play a quite decisive rOle. Again and 
again we find ourselves exposed to campaigns of 
dis-information started by the KGB. It is both 
the weakness and the strength of our system, the 
strength of our liberal social structure but its 
67 
FIRST SITTING 
weakness too, that the mass media can often be 
misused to serve the other side and to help to 
aggravate the divisions between the countries 
of the West. 
Mr. Kliesing has drawn attention to the 
particular situation in such matters as the so-
called exclusion from certain occupations or the 
defence of democracy. Other examples could be 
given, it could be pointed out that, as has 
recently been proved, there was some twenty 
years ago a campaign in the Federal Republic 
to desecrate Jewish cemeteries and deface them 
with Nazi slogans. It turned out that here too 
the KGB had had a finger in the pie. The KGB 
knew that such behaviour would inevitably evoke 
reaction on the part of the other countries in 
the West. 
Again and again, too, we find that there are 
complaints in the West about violations of 
human rights, violations which undoubtedly 
occur even in non-communist countries, but 
certainly not on the same scale as in the com-
munist countries. Where, in these days of detente, 
are the complaints, the constant and cogent com-
plaints against such things as the automatic kil-
lers installed along the frontier between the 
GDR and the Federal Republic? 
Our Rapporteur has stressed another point 
which I too would like to mention, and to which 
I want to give my express support. He has 
pointed out that one sure reason why the con-
clusions of the Helsinki conference have turned 
out as they have is that they were the result of 
rapid, overhasty negotiations. It is not merely in 
the CSCE that we have had this sort of experi-
ence, it has been the same with many attempts 
to apply the policy of detente at national level. 
It has been seen that the East can always count 
on the West giving way if the negotiations last 
for more than a certain time and if the pressure 
of the mass media for some measure of detente 
on certain issues leads the West to sign too soon 
instead of perhaps keeping the negotiations 
going longer and using tougher methods. 
Today we see the situation in a different light, 
though in fact the situation remains unchanged. 
Mr. Kliesing has rightly made this point- the 
situation today is just the same as it was after 
1945. 
Let us not forget that the institution in which 
we are meeting today is itself a reaction to what 
happened in the States of the eastern bloc in 
1945, just as the setting up of NATO in 1949 
was a result of a trend apparent since 1945 in 
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Poland, in Czechoslovakia, in Hungary and in 
other countries of the eastern bloc. In those days 
people talked about the cold war. The time of the 
cold war is, thank goodness, past - so they say. 
The way we see the situation has changed, Ladies 
and Gentlemen, but the facts of the situation 
are just as they were before. The cold war had 
an ugly face ; peaceful coexistence is a smiling 
mask. But behind this mask lurks the end of our 
freedom unless we look at the facts in the same 
down-to-earth way as our Rapporteur. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Scholten. 
Mr. SCHOLTEN (Netherlands) (Translation). 
- First of all, Mr. President, I would like to 
offer my congratulations on your re-election to 
the presidency. 
I have read Sir Frederic Bennett's report with 
a great deal of interest. The picture he gives of 
the present state of international consultation on 
security matters leaves little scope for optimism. 
I share his view that present developments leave 
a lot to be desired, and give us cause for concern. 
This does not mean, however, that I can agree 
with everything the report says. 
We must in particular be careful not to paint 
the situation in unnecessarily sombre tones. This 
could bring the population of Western Europe 
to despondency and defeatism, with all the con-
sequences that would involve. 
It is now almost a year since the thirty-five 
European leaders set their signatures in Hel-
sinki to the final act of the conference on 
security and co-operation in Europe. 
In that final act it was agreed that the extent 
to which it had been complied with would be 
examined during an evaluation conference to be 
held in 1977 in Belgrade. I believe that we must 
be very careful indeed in making an interim 
assessment of the policy of detente, certainly if 
we seek to link direct consequences with this 
policy. There is every sign that the West's 
expectations about a follow-up to the European 
security conference were pitched too high. There 
have, however, been one or two results, even if 
they do not go all that far. The text of the final 
act has been published in all the countries of 
Eastern Europe. More flexibility has been 
apparent in the treatment of foreign journalists, 
although a more liberal policy is much to be 
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desired. As part of the confidence-building 
measures, Soviet military manoeuvres have been 
announced in advance, and NATO observers 
have been admitted to watch them. 
There are two main problems I would like 
briefly to discuss in connection with detente as 
it stands today. 
First of all there is the growth in the arma-
ments industry in the Soviet Union, accompanied 
by stagnation in international negotiations in the 
MBFR and SALT talks, stemming basically from 
mutual suspicion. This situation demands all the 
more urgently that the western allies should 
hold firm to the agreements they have made 
with each other. We need to keep a close and 
critical watch on the expansion of the Warsaw 
Pact forces ; but I do wonder, for a variety of 
reasons, whether this vigilance must auto-
matically mean an increase in NATO armaments. 
I believe that Sir Frederic Bennett's report is 
too emphatic on this point, and I shall return 
to this in a moment. 
There is a second point to which I would like 
to call the Assembly's attention. The Russian 
dissident Mr. Amalrik has said that the danger 
of war can be avoided only by changing the 
Soviet system from a closed to an open system. 
Until that has happened, the West will always 
- even with a mutual reduction in the growth 
of armaments - run the risk of sudden attack. 
This seems to me a perfectly sound statement, 
Mr. President. We can perhaps start from the 
assumption that the eastern bloc is quite able 
to start a war, but for various reasons does not 
have the political will to do so. But in a system 
where power is in the hands of a few men, this 
can change very rapidly. This calls for vigilance 
but it also calls for an all-out effort to influenc~ 
the system itself from without. For doing this 
the agreements arrived at in the security con-
ference's third basket have their importance. I 
have already mentioned that in this respect there 
have been a number of positive results, though 
of course I freely admit, too, that there is still 
a great deal of serious discrimination in the 
Soviet Union, and that the Soviet Union remains 
dangerous. Infringement of fundamental human 
rights is a commonplace there, and the treatment 
of the members of Amnesty International and 
the Jewish minority are two clear examples of 
this. 
Yet despite this we cannot reject detente. The 
abandoning of any attempt at detente, as some 
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people suggest, does, I am quite convinced, 
involve enormous risks. The Soviet Union will 
realise that it will have to do more about the 
third basket, and that the West will be taking 
the third basket as an acid test for further 
detente. It would perhaps be well in this Assem-
bly to make it plain that we shall hold the 
eastern bloc to the contents of the whole of the 
final act. 
It would not be sensible, however, to make 
further statements now, particularly about sanc-
tions if the Helsinki undertakings are not 
honoured, or not honoured enough. Let us not 
make difficulties for Belgrade in advance. 
To sum up this point, I would say that we 
must be vigilant but also very prudent in keeping 
an eye on the developments that bring about a 
disturbance in the balance of forces. I would say, 
too, that we must be careful about commenting 
scathingly on the handful of measures that have 
been taken in the eastern bloc countries. 
I call on Sir Frederic to amend his recommen-
dation ; the sixth and seventh paragraphs of the 
preamble, in particular, seem to me to be too 
outspoken. I do not share the view that the 
members of the Atlantic Alliance have not 
enough strength to guarantee collective security, 
while I think it is unreasonable to talk about 
reducing military forces in Western Europe. In 
this connection I have very real objections to 
the third paragraph of the recommendation, 
especially against the word "re-established", and 
I hope Sir Frederic will give thought to changing 
his recommendation. Our policy should be 
directed towards maintaining our armaments at 
an adequate level, at the same time striving for 
detente in the spirit of Helsinki. 
There is another thing that is no less important 
and which up to now I have not heard mentioned 
in the debate. In our internal policies we should 
combat the causes of the growing sympathy there 
is in Western Europe for marxism and com-
munism. This is clearest in Italy, but the same 
thing is also going on in other countries. We can 
only combat communism in Western Europe if 
we achieve a more just society. Anyone who 
thinks that he can ensure freedom by putting 
an excessive stress on weaponry will find that 
his freedom is being lost. The chances of success 
lie, I am certain, only in a proper balance. 
Building good homes that everyone can afford to 
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buy is for everyone in Western Europe just as 
important as building warships and tanks. By 
adopting such a policy we can combat com-
munism from within, at the same time trying to 
keep our defence within certain limits. 
This applies particularly to our attitude 
towards Africa. Why is it that a number of 
earlier colonial territories in Africa turn so often 
towards Moscow or Pekin 1 One reason is that 
these people have very often had no support at 
all from the West in their struggle for freedom 
and independence. 
The same sort of thing now threatens in the 
Republic of South Africa. Very rightly Sir 
Frederic Bennett, in his draft recommendation, 
mentions the general condemnation of South 
Africa's racial policies. In South Africa funda-
mental human rights are systematically violated, 
while that country refuses to sign the non-
proliferation treaty. In these circumstances, we 
in the West must not strengthen the authorities 
in Pretoria by supplying them with nuclear 
equipment that would lower the military nuclear 
threshold in South Africa and reinforce South 
Africa's position of power over the rest of Africa 
and the black majority in its own population. 
The Dutch Parliament has, by a majority vote, 
rejected any responsibility on the part of the 
Dutch Government for supplying nuclear 
reactors for building nuclear power stations in 
South Africa. In the United States, too, there is 
growing opposition to deliveries of such equip-
ment. 
Now there is a danger that a French company, 
with the support of the French Government, is 
going to build these nuclear power stations. I 
think this is a very sad business, which is going 
to strengthen many Africans in their view that 
no justice can be expected from Western Europe 
in overcoming the inhumane policy of apartheid. 
I urge my French colleagues to oppose this, 
not only because by following a policy of this 
kind we shall be indirectly helping the com-
munist cause, but most of all because the oppres-
sed black majority in South Africa has a right 
to freedom and human dignity and thus a right 
to our sympathy and support. 
If anyone wants to be really credible in calling 
for adequate military strength for the West, he 
will have at the same time to work just as 
strenuously for freedom and social justice in 
Europe and elsewhere. Only ideals and moral 
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values, only strength and authority supported by 
the basis of national and international society 
have, I believe, any prospect for the future. 
(Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mrs. von Bothmer. 
Mrs. von BOTHMER (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, 
Gentlemen. I wish to make only a few brief com-
ments on Sir Frederic's report. If I were to say 
everything that I feel could be said on this 
matter it would hold up the debate for too long. 
And anyhow, we have had a number of reactions 
already. 
I find the report quite one-sided and negative. 
It reaches unplumbed depths of helplessness and 
is mesmerised by communism. I am convinced 
that we arc failing in our difficult task of doing 
something more than merely talking about 
detente and security in Europe if, delving back 
into the past without making allowances for dif-
ferences of emphasis, we do not recognise the 
fact that treaties have been made and are having 
consequences. 
The reduction in Europe's national defence 
budgets is not simply the result of an economic 
crisis. Even before the crisis there was some 
weariness about maintaining defence budgets at 
a certain level. Yet people are, on the one hand, 
mesmerised by the rise in the armed strength of 
the USSR and, on the other, ready to chide or 
praise the United States - depending on their 
attitudes. This is an illogical attitude for which 
we all share the blame, or in which we take a 
part, since military co-operation in Europe has 
remained a patchwork, and it need not have been 
so. The recent economic crisis is not the only 
reason. 
Here, I should like to mention briefly what 
the Federal German Minister of Defence, Mr. 
Leber, said at the NATO conference. Taking 
issue with the others present, he said that it was 
not enough always to talk of the threat presented 
by communism, but that people must be made to 
see that this threat cannot be met with like 
means. The tanks massed on the eastern side 
should be countered not with a similar array of 
tanks, but with modern defensive weaponry, thus 
showing clearly that NATO is a defensive 
alliance, with defence as its object. I believe that 
this is right, it is also well worth noting, for the 
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point is gradually being forgotten in the escala-
tion of armaments. 
The USSR, for example, is not the only power 
to intervene in the Middle East. The United 
States has done likewise. Whether one holds this 
against both of them as a mistake or whether one 
says they helped and that was a good thing, 
depends on where one happens to stand 
politically. In our country we view with 
scepticism all these cases of intervention with 
arms supplies. That is our political view of the 
matter. To be fair, we must also mention that 
substantial quantities of weapons have also been 
sent to the Middle East by a third party. 
In this case, therefore, as in many others, it 
cannot be said that the Russians are complete 
masters of the situation. I find that it is an all 
too simplistic view of the world to present public 
enemy No. 1 as the ubiquitous and the only 
agitator and to act as if there were no treaties 
at all with the USSR and as if the USSR for 
its part were not also subject to certain con-
straints, imposed on it by the law of action. 
Soviet intervention in Angola is not what we 
understand by detente. It has already been said 
in this Assembly by various speakers - and I 
agree with them - that detente evidently means 
something rather different to the USSR than 
it does to us. However, some of the blame for 
the Soviet intervention in Angola rests with us, 
with NATO. During all the years that Portugal 
was waging a cruel and merciless war in its 
African colonies, NATO stood by and watched. 
Indeed, nearly all the NATO countries even sup-
plied arms for this, each in accordance with its 
treaties with Portugal. Germany stopped send-
ing arms as soon as it realised that Portugal was 
not abiding by agreements on where the arms 
would be used. Be that as it may, none of the 
member countries made any serious attempt to 
stop Portugal in this disastrous war. And now, 
of course, it is we who are in part responsible 
for the fact that eventually others intervened in 
this desperate war of liberation, when it was 
already well advanced. 
It is my opinion that the CSCE was concluded 
neither hastily nor without due consideration. 
This Sir Frederic knows, as I had already expres-
sed this view when I introduced my report last 
year, and he contested it. All right, that is his 
opinion. But I can only repeat what I said then 
in my report. In the long run, there is no 
alternative to coexistence - for either side. 
Alone and left to itself the USSR and its agita-
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tion throughout the world cannot survive 
without the West. It is in my opinion here that 
we must seek to carry through our political task, 
and not in some cold war game. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Cermolacce. 
Mr. CERMOLACCE (France) (Translation). 
- Sir Frederic Bennett's report has the great 
merit of not disguising its author's aims. The 
theme of the "Soviet threat" runs through it like 
a connecting thread. The reasons he gives are the 
growing militarisation of the USSR, the pre-
ponderance in men and arms of the Warsaw Pact 
and the pursuit of an expansionist imperialistic 
policy by the Soviet Union. 
According to this argument, the Rapporteur 
warns the western countries against what he calls 
the "illusions" of detente. 
How does Sir Frederic Bennett prove that 
these "expansionist aims" of the USSR exist Y 
Quite simply by affirming that the Soviet Union 
is responsible for the political, social and 
economic crisis currently affecting the capitalist 
world, and that all the popular movements of 
protest and struggle against this crisis are to be 
laid at its door. 
In Sir Frederic Bennett's view, if the Italian 
and French voters bring communists into the 
government, if the people of Britain call for a 
cutback in military expenditure, if the govern-
ment of Juan Carlos wavers in Spain, it is all 
because of the Soviet Union. Why does he paint 
such a picture of a Soviet threat if not to exhort 
the western countries to increase their military 
expenditure? 
One of the reasons for proceeding in this man-
ner is given in the NATO Review of October 
1975: 
"There is a tendency in all democratic societies 
to make the enemy look 10 feet tall in order to 
get next year's budget approved." 
However, what is at stake, goes beyond any 
mere increase in military credits. 
The "Soviet threat" bogy enables the prepa-
rations for setting up a European defence to be 
justified and covered up - which is the real 
raison d'etre of WEU. It is the military variant 
of anti-sovietism, and its continued use serves to 
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remind us that anti-sovietism is truly the main-
spring of the Atlantic pact. 
For the French Government, the Soviet threat 
serves to justify the policy of rejoining NATO 
and giving up national independence and makes 
its armaments policy more palatable : it explains 
the repeated refusals by that country to parti-
cipate in conferences or to sign treaties on dis-
armament. 
Besides, the absolute superiority of the 
Warsaw Pact countries is a myth. Of course, the 
military forces under their command have to 
meet new demands. But whereas the report takes 
into account the development of Soviet military 
forces, it maintains a discreet silence on parallel 
improvements in NATO. 
Let us take a few examples. While the report 
emphasises Sir Peter Hill-Norton's speech to the 
Atlantic Pact Ministers of Defence in December 
1975 pointing to a marked increase in the 
logistics of the Warsaw Pact forces, it said 
nothing about the increased western potential. 
The Eurogroup communique of lOth December 
1975 tel1s us a little more : a new sub-group, 
Eurostructure, was set up in 1974. This has 
"helped to produce more responsive command 
and control arrangements for ground forces to 
enable transfer to NATO control in an emergency 
to take place earlier and more simply". 
Similarly, at an interview on current affairs, 
the Minister of Defence of Western Germany, 
speaking of the strengthening of the Warsaw 
Pact countries, said : 
"But the West, for its part, has not been 
marking time. Our armies have been moder-
nised and adapted to the changes which have 
taken place. I think the West can stay as 
tranquil as it was a few years ago." 
These are, as you see, arguments which are, 
to say the least, specious. 
The report is equally silent about the increased 
military expenditures of the countries of the 
Atlantic Pact. For 1976, the United States 
military budget is $101,000 million, or 29 % of 
the Federal budget. The increase over the preced-
ing year is around 8 %. As for the Eurogroup 
countries, their military expenditures rose by 
$5,500 million in 1975, which, according to the 
Eurogroup communique of lOth December 1975, 
more than offset inflation. 
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The communique adds that further defence 
budget increases by member States are foreseen 
for 1976. Similarly, the disproportion often 
alleged to exist between the forces at the disposal 
of the two alliances is sheer imagination. The 
global figures given by the Institute for Strate-
gic Studies in London afford ample proof of 
this. 
Even more eloquently than the figures for the 
various military budgets, recent events in the 
international arena show where the threat really 
comes from: imperialist intervention in Viet-
nam, support of Pinochet's fascist regime, the 
temptation of Mr. Giscard's government to 
station Pluton nuclear-headed tactical missiles 
on the territory of the German Federal Republic 
against the socialist countries, the United States 
marine manoeuvres in Provence as a rehearsal 
to a possible military intervention in the Middle 
East. 
Add to that corruption : the bribes paid by 
Lockheed and other armaments manufacturers 
are but a few examples : and then there are the 
scandals which have splashed the reputations of 
certain European political parties and bear the 
mark of the virulent anti-communism which 
animates imperialism. 
Actually, the myth of the Soviet threat to the 
West serves to cover up the narrowly selfish 
interests of insignificant groups in the capitalist 
countries, groups which dream of torpedoing 
international detente, bringi.ng the world back 
to the cold war period and giving fresh impetus 
to the arms race, thus filling the coffers of the 
multinational companies and other arms manu-
facturers at the expense of the social budgets 
which have already been trimmed so severely. 
Behind the myth of a Soviet threat lurk the 
opponents of mutually-advantageous co-operation 
between States with different social systems 
which are afraid of peaceful confrontation. 
In these circumstances we shall not approve 
the recommendation tabled. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Guldberg, observer from Denmark, member 
of the Folketing. 
Mr. GULDBERG (Observer from Denmark) 
(Translation).- I should first like to thank you 
for giving me an opportunity, although I am 
only here as an observer, of making a few 
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remarks which are, I believe, pertinent to the 
subject under discussion. 
I listened with great interest to the speech of 
our Canadian friend and with no less interest to 
the last speaker. 
When, as a Dane, I heard what the Canadian 
representative told us, I said to myself : "Lucky 
people!" Canada covers about one-third of the 
arctic territories, my own country represents the 
second third and there is no need to say who 
accounts for the other third. 
I represent a small Nordic nation of five mil-
lion scattered inhabitants having to contend with 
nearly all the economic problems known in the 
world. So I find it very hard to accept that the 
country I represent should be regarded as negli-
gible. 
Availing myself of the opportunity given me 
to take the floor here, I venture to say that for 
the time being we are living through a period 
in which basic changes are occurring in the 
organisations that deal with co-operation in the 
economic field and that of security policy. It is 
perhaps premature to enter into detailed argu-
ments about whether such union will be achieved 
in the framework of one or other of the existing 
organisations or institutions. 
There are sound political reasons for these 
changes not to be translated immediately into 
practical policies by the governments of the 
various countries. 
It is obvious that this period of change has 
both negative and positive aspects in relation to 
the common task of ensuring the security and 
defence of 1N estern Europe. 
Allow me to pass on to you briefly some of our 
current anxieties. 
The Helsinki conference has failed to relax the 
military and psychological pressure on Western 
Europe. In several countries including my own, 
people have realised that worldwide propaganda 
campaigns alter the balance of power more deci-
sively than more powerful local operations. We 
have observed this in some countries of Western 
Europe, but also in Asia and Africa. 
It also has to be admitted that Europe's ability 
to take decisions is sagging under the repercus-
sions of the oil crisis and the monetary situation. 
Once again, Mr. President, it is not difficult 
to explain why: national governments, particu-
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larly in election periods, are more concerned with 
their domestic policy than with the delicate 
decision-making in foreign policy. 
The negative aspects I have mentioned should 
not make us lose sight of the positive aspects, 
which we should endeavour to put to good use. 
I am one of those people who consider that 
. political and economic co-operation can only 
develop where there is a closer alignment of the 
security policies of the countries concerned. This 
also implies a clarification of Western Europe's 
relations with the United States. 
Everywhere we come up against the same 
problem, whether in resolving Western Europe's 
common monetary difficulties, which means in 
pr&ctice creating a monetary unit in a world 
system of floating currencies, or in resolving our 
social and employment problems without doing 
so at the expense of the developing countries. 
The agenda of this meeting provides some 
glaring instances in the industrialisation field. 
Western Europe's attitude towards defence and 
security has wavered between dislike of American 
domination and fear of having to make shift for 
ourselves unaided. 
The dualism mentioned in this connection is 
really no longer in any way justified. It will take 
some time for the governments of the various 
countries to draw the necessary consequences, for 
of course they cannot alter their policies from 
one day to the next in such important areas. 
Still, it would be preferable if they were able to 
recognise that fresh attitudes may also be the 
logical consequences of previous positions. 
Nevertheless I believe that conditions else-
where have removed some of the main grounds 
for differences of opinion in Western Europe 
on this score, and that we are approximating to 
a mean proportional - in other words, a 
balance between particular European co-
operation in the spheres of economic, monetary 
and security policy areas, which is one of the 
essential prerequisites, and maintaining the 
special relationship with the United States, based 
on a shared conception of political and personal 
freedom and a common idea of what is to be 
defended. 
Certainly, these problems form the subject of 
discussion in a great many international organi-
sations and institutions. I am thinking of Euro-
pean union and Western European Union, the 
3*- u 
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North Atlantic Treaty and special military co-
operation under it, and special co-operation in 
Eurogroup. It does not seem very practical, may 
prompt a desire to rationalise, and may even 
create competition among these organisations 
which are all really working towards the same 
ends. 
I believe, however, that we ~hall best serve the 
common cause by leaving each country's political 
development to draw the consequences of changes 
applied at the base ; and I am convinced that the 
problem of how to organise co-operation in the 
field of security policy will not be difficult to 
resolve, if the proper foundations are laid in the 
different countries. 
In conclusion, I should like to stress that these 
views, which I am grateful to you for allowing 
me to express, do not reflect a passive attitude 
or the idea that there is plenty of time to spare. 
I personally believe that the most urgent matter 
is for the nine countries of the European Com-
munity to strengthen and consolidate their 
existing co-operation through the development of 
industrial co-operation, including the military 
sector, and co-operation in short-term economic 
policy, so as to enable the member countries to 
freeze their floating exchange rates to form a 
firm basis for their economic and security policy. 
As an observer, Mr. President, I cannot speak 
to the subject under discussion, nor am I entitled 
to vote, but I trust I have been able to put across 
to you the point of view of the world I belong 
to. The general philosophy of the report you are 
discussing very closely corresponds to the fears 
which we feel in our country, due to a sort of 
inverted aggressiveness. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). In 
accordance with the prescribed procedure, I shall 
call Mr. Dankert. It will then be 6 p.m., and we 
shall have to suspend this debate and resume it 
tomorrow morning. In fact, there are still three 
speakers on the list : Mr. Mattick, Lord Peddie 
and Sir John Rodgers ; and before the address 
to be given by the Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council, Mr. Destremau, tomorrow morning, we 
shall have to take the amendments. So our debate 
will have been very wide-ranging and complete. 
But, I repeat, I think it advisable to adjourn 
this dEl]:late until tomorrow morning, so as to 
allow participants to speak for as long as they 
like - despite the fact that, when they tell me 
how long they want, they always overrun their 
time. 
I call Mr. Dankert. 
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impulse on reading Sir Frederic Bennett's very 
depressing report was to join the Dutch com-
munist party and await the arrival of the com-
munist liberators but, to my great regret, the 
Dutch communists and the communist liberators 
seem not to be on good terms. I decided, there-
fore, to take a closer look at the report. 
I have never seen so much mention of the cold 
war in so few pages. I am also astonished that 
the General Affairs Committee has presented a 
report which touches on so much of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments' 
sphere. I shall not talk about the explanatory 
memorandum and I shall refer to it only insofar 
as it is relevant to the draft recommendation, on 
which I should like to say a few words and to 
which I have proposed a few amendments. 
The draft recommendation asks the Assembly 
to note "that the Soviet Union has up to now 
interpreted the commitments entered into in the 
final act of the CSCE in a restricted manner ... ". 
I shall not dispute the accuracy of that state-
ment, yet I cannot help recalling that this 
Assembly is composed of the same members as 
those who represent our seven countries in the 
Council of Europe. In that Assembly a few 
weeks ago exactly the same members as represent 
their countries here said that it was too early 
to judge, that we should await the outcome of the 
Belgrade conference and, without making any 
pronouncement, carefully note what is happening 
in the implementation of the CSCE - as our 
Ministers do - so that in a few months' time it 
will be possible to formulate a more definite 
attitude towards it. Yet here we are saying that 
the Soviet Union is acting in a restrictive man-
ner. This may be so, but it is too early to tell. 
The draft recommendation also says that the 
Assembly regrets "that in three years little or no 
progress has been made in the SALT and MBFR 
negotiations ... ". 
I would say and the Americans say that the 
main problem in the SALT talks is the Cruise 
missile, and the Cruise missile is not a Russian 
but an American invention. It is an important 
missile for the possible solutions to European 
tactical problems. Solutions on the use of Cruise 
missiles should be found, and it seems that in the 
air force role these solutions are under way. 
However, judging :from the draft recommen-
dation and Sir Frederic's report, one would 
think that those damn devil Russians had 
invented something to blow up the SALT nego-
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tiations. That is not exactly the case. The same 
story could be told about MBFR. 
I dispute many of the figures in Sir Frederic's 
explanatory memorandum. They were disputed 
not only by the Military Balance - or the 
strategic survey - but by his own Minister of 
Defence at Oslo and by Mr. Schlesinger while 
he was the United States Secretary of Defence 
as well. From year to year he included in his 
reports to Congress for the fiscal year - I do 
not know how many times - the view that there 
was a reasonable balance in Europe, that there 
was no great discrepancy between East and 
West, that even if in one area the Soviet Union 
had a big lead, in another the western countries 
had the edge. 
If one is asked why no progress has been made 
with our MBFR negotiations, one must ask 
whose responsibility it is. I cannot dispute that 
there is a basic difference of principle in the 
MBFR negotiations. The West declares it unac-
ceptable that the Soviet Union tries to impose 
national ceilings. I think it is unacceptable -
and in this Western European Union Assembly 
it should be said very loudly that it is unac-
ceptable - that Western Germany is discrimi-
nated against vis-a-vis other major European 
countries. The Soviet Union's basic position on 
MBFR is basically unacceptable. But one has to 
ask whether the positions of both parties are 
acceptable. One has to see whether we in the 
West should ask for a common ceiling. 
I doubt whether it is realistic and reasonable 
to ask for common ceilings in the MBFR discus-
sions for the couple of countries concerned. It is 
unrealistic because we maintain - and Sir 
Frederic is among the foremost exponents of 
this view - that the Soviet Union still has a 
kind of Eastern European empire in which it 
uses occupation forces, and it is difficult to 
equate those occupation forces with the forces 
we need for the defence of the West. 
It is said that we are anxious because the 
Soviets and their allies are still taking advantage 
of the crisis outside Europe to strengthen their 
political, economic and military position in the 
world. I thought it was a normal power game 
between two big powers that they tried to 
strengthen their political and economic positions. 
When I was, as a member of the NATO sub-
committee on detente, in the United States with 
some of the members here today we were told 
that the United States accepted that the Soviet 
Union was trying to achieve a superpower status 
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comparable with the superpower status of the 
United States. 
From that flow certain consequences. We 
should accept and try to guide the efforts of the 
Soviet Union to achieve political and economic 
parity in the world. The only thing we should 
not accept is that it may do it by military means. 
We can condemn military intervention in AngoLa, 
but it is too far-reaching to condemn also the 
Soviet Union's efforts to strengthen its influence 
by political and economic means. 
When one considers United States activities in 
the Mediterranean in the last few months or 
years and the decreasing influence of the Soviet 
Union on Egypt and, in the last few months, the 
changing position of Syria, only a few weeks ago 
a big pawn of the Soviet Union in the Middle 
East, but now in a very difficult position in its 
relations with the Soviet Union, one cannot 
maintain that only the Soviet Union is a winner. 
The United States too, wins. The world position 
is less dramatic than Sir Frederic suggests. 
But that is not the worst of it. In the next 
paragraph of the draft recommendation Sir 
Frederic goes further still. He says that, in view 
of the size of the Warsaw Pact forces, the 
members of the Atlantic Alliance no longer 
deploy sufficient strength to guarantee their col-
lective security. He goes on to note that while 
the Soviet Union and its allies have failed to 
accept the main implications of detente as it is 
conceived and interpreted in the West, a reduc-
tion of military strength has occurred in 
Western Europe without a l€&'3en.ing of the 
Soviet military threat. The figures of which Sir 
Frederic tries to convince us are absolutely false. 
They are absolutely false in the sense that in 
the MBFR talks governments are not negotiating 
on the basis of Central Europe strengths of 
895,000 Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops as 
against 575,000 NATO troops. That excludes at 
least two French divisions in Germany. I will 
not go into the very interesting new develop-
ment in French strategy for perhaps in a year's 
time we shall know a little more about what is 
behind it. Those elements have to be taken into 
account. If we look into the figures we come to 
very different conclusions from the 3:1 figures 
that Sir Frederic is trying to make us believe. 
Defensively - that is the only stance we should 
consider, for we are not intending to conquer the 
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Soviet Union - the present ratio of forces is 
acceptable. Mr. Schlesinger has said so, contrary 
to what is cited in Sir Frederic's report. Our 
NATO ministers have said so. The only qualifi-
cation is that by reductions we should not 
diminish our security. There should not be one-
sided reductions. 
I would conclude, if I were an American 
looking into the considerations of the recommen-
dation, that it would be very wise to withdraw 
from Western Europe so as not to be drawn into 
the disasters when the Russians are coming. 
Sir Frederic's approach is demoralising public 
opinion without facts being available to support 
such an attitude. It is stupid for Western Euro-
pean Union to see it in such strong terms and 
to accept recommendations of this kind. 
The preamble to the final part of the draft 
recommendation regrets that South Africa's 
widely condemned racial policies provided a 
pretext to justify Soviet and Cuban intervention. 
I condemn the intervention of the Soviet Union 
and Cuba in Angola, but to formulate such 
condemnation in the way in which it has been 
formulated in this draft recommendation is 
slightly hypocritical, because there has been 
South African involvement in Angola - and 
very heavy involvement. The Cubans have acted 
as military advisers to the liberation movement 
- MPLA - for many years. They have done so 
as part of a fight against the colonial Portuguese 
regime, a regime supported by most of the 
western countries. 
Even if there have been some humanitarian 
noises from the Netherlands and Scandinavian 
countries, we. have never made any real effort 
to support the liberation movements. The Cubans 
were there, and they did. They have always been 
there in hundreds, but they came in thousands 
only when there was a South African armoured 
column marching up in November 1975 to the 
Benguela railway, and higher up in order to cut 
off Luanda. I will not justify Russian or Cuban 
intervention but one has to see the consequential 
effects of other actions. 
The only action that Western Europeans 
should take about the regime in Angola is to try 
to correct our errors of the past and to establish 
ties in such a way that there is no Russian 
predominance there. If I were an Angolan and 
a member of the Angolan anti-colonial movement, 
I think that I should have good reasons to sup-
port Soviet influence in Angola. It is a pity that 
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it has gone that way, but that is not the fault 
of the Angolans. It is not, in the first place, the 
fault of the Soviet Union. It is basically our own 
fault. 
Paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation says 
that we have to re-establish a secure balance. 
That means that Sir Frederic and his General 
Affairs Committee admit that there is not a 
balance at the moment and that we are inviting 
the Soviet Union to come in simply because of 
that. Our ministers proclaim all the time that 
we should maintain a balance. That is a sensible 
policy, because, apart from military possibilities, 
politically it is wise to maintain a secure balance, 
but as long as Sir Frederic does not prove by 
facts, :00d he has not done so, that there is a 
disrupted balance which we have to re-establish, 
we should not say in the resolutions of our 
Assembly that such a balance does not exist. 
It would be good for this Assembly to come 
back to reality and not to be unduly pessimistic. 
We shou:lrl draft our recommendation with the 
sense of reality that our governments have 
displayed so far and rthart I would hope this 
Assembly can display. ThaJt is why the amend-
ments have been put forward. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Some 
amendments have been tabled. 
As I said, I am adjourning the debate on Sir 
Frederic Bennett's report. This is of such inter-
est, if only by being so controversial, that there 
are still five speakers on the list, not counting 
those who may put their names down later on 
to support or oppose the amendments. We shall 
therefore resume this debate tomorrow morning. 
15. Nomination of members to Committees 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- The next 
Order of the Day is the nomination of members 
to Committees. 
The candidatures for the six Committees of 
the Assembly have been published in an appendix 
to Notice No. 1 which has been distributed. 
In accordance with the provisions of Rule 
39 (6) and Rule 42 bis (2) of the Rules of Pro-
cedure, these candidatures are submitted to the 
Assembly. 
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Are there any objections to the candidatures 
submitted L 
There are no objections 
The candidatures for Committees are ratified. 
The Committees of the Assembly are thus 
constituted. 
16. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the 
next Sitting 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- I propose 
that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting 
tomorrow morning, Tuesday 15th June, at 
10 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day : 
1. Detente and security in Europe (Resumed 
Debate on the Report of the General 
Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft 
Recommendation, Document 703 and 
Amendments). 
2. Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council 
to the Assembly (Presentation by Mr. 
Destremau, Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs of the French Republic, Chairman-
in-Office of the Council, Documents 697 
and 710) ; 
Application of the Brussels Treaty -
Reply to the Twenty-First Annual Report 
of the Council ; Political activities of the 
Council - Reply to the Twenty-First 
Annual Report of the Council ; Scientific, 
technological and aerospace questions -
Reply to the Twenty-First Annual Report 
of the Council (Presentation of and Joint 
Debate on the Reports of the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments, of 
the General Affairs Committee and of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft 
Recommendations, Documents 700 and 
Amendments, 702 and 705). 
Are there any objections L 
The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting 
are therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak L. 
The Sitting is closed. 
(The Sitting was closed at 6.05 p.m.) 
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Mr. Sieglerschmidt (Chairman of the General Affairs 
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5. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting. 
The Sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The 
Sitting is open. 
1. Adoption of the Minutes 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). In 
accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of 
Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the 
previous Sitting have been distribu.OOd. 
Are there any comments L 
The Minutes are agreed to. 
2. Attendance Register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- The names 
of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which 
have been notified to the President will be 
published with the list of Representatives 
appended to the Minutes of Proceedings 1 • 
1. See page 23. 
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3. Detente and security in Europe 
(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs 
Committee, Doe. 703 and Amendments) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The 
first Order of the Day is the resumed debate 
on the report of the General Affairs Committee 
on detente and security in Europe and vote 
on the draft recommendation, Document 703 
and Amendments. 
In view of the fact that at 10.30 we shall be 
receiving the Chairman-in-Office of the Council 
of WEU, I must ask speakers not to over-J."\lll 
their time, so that we may get through the list 
of speakers and go on to the debate on the 
amendments following Mr. Destremau's presenta-
tion and the traditional questions he will be 
asked. 
I call Mr. Mattick. 
Mr. MATTICK (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, the presentation of the report now 
being debated and the debate yesterday in this 
Assembly were characterised by a largely 
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defensive attitude which is to be found in the 
report and was in addition supported by many 
of those who took part in the debate. The aims 
of Soviet communism were gone into one by one 
and there was talk of demobilisation in Europe. 
What I have been wondering all along is 
whether the Soviet Union is the only side with 
an offensive strategy Y Does the Rapporteur 
consider that the West has no offensive policy 
at all ? Does our fight for democracy, quality 
of life and security not amount to an offensive 
position which in this context counters the 
Soviet position ? Was support for the democrats 
in Portugal not an offensive policy by the West 
that was crowned with success? I get the impres-
sion that some of the bourgeois elements in this 
Europe of ours no longer know where they stand 
and are ready to capitulate. 
In this Assembly the CSCE has been. compared 
with Munich in 1938. A fellow member of the 
same age as myself made this comparison. May 
I just remind you that Munich in 1938 bore the 
stamp of failure, failure by Europe and its 
friends to act again.<Jt Nazi fascism between 1933 
and 1938. Hitler tore up the Versailles Treaty ; 
the western powers made no move. Hitler 
marched into the Rhineland ; his opponents 
made no move. Hitler organised rearmament on 
an unbelievably gigantic scale, while the British 
Labour Party were all the time fighting for 
disarmament and claiming that they really should 
not have to listen to any nonsense about Hitler. 
The result of this good opinion - or rather, 
wrong opinion of Hitler, was that the western 
allies, the former guarantors of the Versailles 
'l'reaty, had to look on helplessly when Hitler 
marched into Austria in 1938. The United States 
stood aloof. Munich was a capitulation of weak-
ness, since the powers who subsequently had 
to band together against Hitler were in no way 
equipped to come through the struggle or even 
to use against Hitler the same kind of blackmail 
that he was using against them. 
How, if we think politicaHy and if we have 
learned anything from history - as ~ after 
all believe we have done - how, I ask, can we 
compare the CSCE with Munich withowt looking 
irTesponsible, without being seen to mislead 
public opinion Y We should at least ourselves 
believe what we say. 
How do things now differ from 1938 ? There 
is NATO, which aims at being in military terms 
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sufficiently on a par with the enemy, in this 
case the Soviet Union and the eastern bloc, and 
consequently at offering such a measure of 
security that no unilateral blackmail is possible. 
We are concerned with the balance of forces and 
all genuine statements on the true position and 
quality of armaments and military strength, all 
true figures from our governments clearly 
indicate that the bleats about the dangerous 
superiority of the Soviet Union and Soviet bloc 
are wrong. NATO as a whole is working well. 
We know that the Americans have budgeted 
more for security this year than last, and 
Germany itself, too, has fulfilled all its obliga-
tions. America and Europe have jointly, in 
NATO, founded their policies on military 
security. 
Then, in 1967, we took on a further task in 
the Harmel report, After outlining the situa-
tion, the report says: 
"Under these conditions, the allies will 
maintain as necessary a suitable military 
capability to assure the balance of forces 
thereby creating a climate of stability, 
security and confidence. 
In this climate the Alliance can carry out its 
second function, to pursue the search for pro-
gress towards a more stable relationship in 
which the underlying political issues cam. be 
solved. Military security and a policy of 
detente are not contradictory but comple-
mentary. Collective defence is a stabilising 
factor in world politics." 
Has all this slipped our memory ? Or why do 
Sir Frederic and some of my other friends in 
the House want to put us psychologically on the 
defensive, a position which is not justified by 
the facts and which we have no reason to adopt Y 
The President has referred to the briefness 
of the time at our disposal ; I, too, will therefore 
keep my comments brief on this question. I shall 
not give you figures, but I feel I should set out 
these facts to counter the things that ~re said 
at certain points in the discussion yesterday. I 
would caution against regarding this defensive 
position as a factor that will contribute to 
recovery, or as likely to produce a shake-up. 
Why, then ? Has the CSCE not, after all, been 
an offensive position for the West, and is it 
not still so today ? 
Sir Frederic has mentioned Berlin. and has 
informed us that, before writing the report, he 
travelled widely. Did Sir Frederic include both 
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Bast and West Berlin in his visits, did he speak 
to the people there, and did he notice the 
difference between then and now - before and 
after the CSCE, before and after the four-power 
agreement ~ Does he not know that the way people 
in Berlin think today, the way they live today is 
entirely changed ~ Did he not notice that in East 
Germany - not just in East Berlin - the 
millions of encounters with people from the other 
part of Germany are producing the fil'Sit signs 
that people are discussing the question of what 
Germany looks like, and what is to become of 
this Germany. If he has done all that, he cannot 
say that the position of West Berlin and rela-
tions between the two parts of Germany have 
worsened. He would inevitably have sensed that 
the leadership in the DDR and its socialist unity 
party have been running into great difficulties 
because of the four-power agreement and the 
Helsinki agreement, and that over there they 
still have to surmount these great difficuLties. 
If we look at what the CSCE has achieved 
now, at the end of ten months - the report is, 
of course, already two months old - and if we 
try and determine what has and what has not 
been happening in that period, we really camnot 
deny that certain things are moving, not as 
much as some might perhaps have hoped, not 
as much as many had suggested with perhaps 
deliberate intent to mislead so that they could 
later prove that nothing is as we fooled ourselves 
into believing it to be. But those who approached 
the proceedings with realistic and logical assump-
tions knew that particularly in fulfilling the 
commitments of the third basket, the Soviet 
Union and the eastern bloc may from time to 
time be not only showing unwillingness but also 
facing very many difficulties. 
I would warn people against promoting these 
defensive attitudes in the hopes of shaking up 
a few people, of rousing a few Dutchmen, to 
take a more active part in defence than they do 
now. Surely it would today be far more sensible 
to tell people the facts, to tell them that on the 
whole all is well with defenee, that there is a 
balance, and that we cannot be blackmailed if we 
do not weaken politically, than to present them 
what was said here yesterday about Helsinki 
and the four-power agreement and the position 
of NATO in this world-wide struggLe, with a 
swan-song of the West. 
These being my views, I cannot give this report 
my approval. To tinker around with it would 
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seem rather pointless, since it is fundamentally 
defensive and it contains no basis at all for 
an offensive attitude. Thank you. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Lord Peddie. 
Lord PEDDlE (United Kingdom).- We can 
congratulate Sir Frederic Bennett at least on 
delivering his message loudly and clearly. In 
unmistakable terms he has demonstrated his 
personal violent opposition if not to communism, 
at least to the Soviet system. We may deplore 
what many would regard as his abrasive 
language, but I accept the basic sentiments 
behind his comments - that preparedness is a 
basic element in western security. 
We must recognise the limited but important 
aims of detente - the commitment to free the 
world from war and encourage good relations 
over a wide area of social, cultural and economic 
interests. It is quite likely that, with a widening 
of the contacts in those areas, we may be 
making a substantial contribution towards lessen-
ing tension among powers. 
At the same time, we must not allow ourselves 
to be deluded into the belief that the acceptance 
of detente eliminates the fundamental differ-
ences between the objectives of the Soviet system 
and those of the West ; it merely obscures them. 
There is no doubt, in spite of the nice, kind 
comments from certain members of this Assem-
bly, that the Soviet Union has substantially 
increased its arms expenditure. Paragraph 11 
of this report states that Soviet expenditure 
on defence constitutes 10.6 % of its gross national 
product, and it goes on to confirm a statement 
made only a few days ago by the British defence 
minister which indicated that the overall expend-
iture of the Soviet Union was substantially in 
excess of the figure originally quoted in the 
report. This excessive expenditure may prove 
to be the West's secret weapon, because there 
is no doubt that the strain on the Soviet economy 
is beginning to show. 
My colleagues and I are not happy with a1l 
aspects of this report and we have tabled a 
number of amendments which we feel will 
strengthen the recommendations and eliminate 
some inaccuracies and misplaced emphasis. There 
are two serious inaccuracies : paragraph four of 
the preamble says that little or no progress has 
been made in the strategic arms limitatjon talks 
and paragraph six says that we no longer deploy 
sufficient strength. These statements cannot be 
substantiated. 
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I do not intend to argue in support of the 
amendments since Mr. Dankert has already done 
so very effectively. I am pleased, however, to 
learn that Sir Frederic Bennett and his calleagues 
have considered our amendments and feel 
sympathy with our proposals in general. 
I accept the basic message of this report, that 
there is no room for complacency about western 
defence. William Shakespeare has a message 
for both Sir Frederic and this Assembly : 
"Beware of entrance to a quarrel ; but, being in, 
bear't that th'opposed may beware of thee." 
Sir Frederic has sounded a warning, perhaps 
in too strident a tone, that could, unfortunately, 
be mistaken for panic. The Assembly will 
recognise, I am sure, that rational, confident 
and sophisticated preparedness is more likely to 
win respect and ensure security and peace for 
the West. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Sir John Rodgers. 
Sir John RODGERS (United Kingdom). -
I should first like to congratulate the Assembly 
on your re-€lection, Mr. President, and to con-
gratulate you personally. 
AB Vice-Chairman of the General Affairs 
Committee, I should like to congratulate Sir 
Frederic Bennett on this eminently careful 
report and on the immense amount of travel and 
work that he has put into it. We all realise that 
it will not gain the support of every member, 
that there are passages that are abrasive and that 
could be toned down. Nevertheless, we should 
thank him for its thought-provoking character. 
Developments in defence are occurring with 
such rapidity that it is not possible for statistics 
to carry any lasting significance, but the figures 
on the balance of military forces between NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact countries show a disturb-
ing trend. Undoubtedly these armaments are the 
product of policies made ten or even twenty 
years ago and we cannot therefore expect 
immediate or dramatic changes in Soviet policy, 
although I agree with Lord Peddie that the 
amount of money the Soviet Union is spending 
on its defence is causing stresses and strains 
that are not perhaps immediately obvious to us. 
Nevertheless, superiority of roughly 3:1 in all 
arms - be they soldiers, tanks, guns, aircraft, 
ships or submarines - should give us food for 
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thought. Why should Russi:a pursue a policy 
designed to achieve strategic weapon superiority 
and develop diverse offensive capability and 
increase these in such numbers that it is possible 
for Russia to support political objectives in 
distrunt areas like Angola and the Middle East, to 
say nothing of the Oape route or the Indian 
Ocean ? Soviet military strength is being pro-
gressively transformed into an ever more capable, 
ever more flexible and ever more responsive 
means of supporting globally expanding Soviet 
political objectives. 
Missile-carrying submarines are being launched 
at a rate of two every month. A new type, with 
more than 16 missiles with multiple warheads, 
is expected to appear. The Soviet submarine 
fleet is the largest in the world, with over 300 
wssels. Whatever the advantages accruing from 
our presence at the CSCE talks, it is undoubtedly 
true that these have not in any way led to a 
slackening in Russia's military build-up. 
We must not exaggerate Russian strength but 
we should be complete idiots to underestimwte it. 
Nations fear not so much that Russia is likely to 
embark on a belligerent course in Europe but 
that countries such as Yugoslavia, Italy, Greece, 
Turkey and others may be subjected to pressures 
from Russia, backed by military superiority, to 
bring about communist States in Europe, perhaps 
initially through the device of the popular: front, 
with the communists hiding behind the respect-
ability of the socialists. 
Everyone desires peaceful coexistence. No one 
seeks confrontation. Everyone wishes to s·ee a 
lowering of the tension which now, unfortunately, 
exists between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. 
Everyone wishes to build a safer and more secure 
world, free from the threat of war, and to 
encourage and facilitate more productive rela-
tions between governments and people. 
That is why the West entered into the CSCE 
talks. That is why I believe that we should 
explore every avenue to increase contacts 
between the eastern and western countries in 
Europe by trade, cultural and environmental 
co-operation, travel and tourism, and exchange of 
information. But we should look long and coolly 
at suggestions that we should support calls from 
the USSR for European talks on such subjects 
as energy and pollution of the environment. 
Certainly talks on these subjects should be held, 
but we should be careful not to support demands 
that might undermine the already existing Euro-
pean organisations, such as the Council of Europe 
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and the EEC Parliament, that have laboured 
already in these fields. 
Of course we must monitor and examine 
regularly the consequences of CSCE and report 
back at intervals. Of course we must examine 
how great an effort each country is making to 
maintain the balance of forces between East 
and West. 
We should be acutely aware, however, that this 
so-called detente will not resolve the ideological 
and political differences between communist and 
non-communist countries. We must be careful in 
our use of this word "detente". It is a French 
word that I understand to mean "the lowering of 
tension" - it is neither more nor less. I do not 
see why we should use this word in English. 
Detente is not in itself a policy. It merely means 
pursuing policies that should help us to create 
an international climate for better understanding 
between the two blocs and l·ead us to improved 
communications and co-operation. 
I had considerable sympathy and support for 
President Ford when he said that he did not 
wish to see the continued use of this word 
"detente", which the Soviet Union continues to 
use as if it were a definable policy. The capacity 
of the West to indulge in self-deception is pretty 
obvious, but we must have no illusions as to what 
the Soviet means by that word. The recent speech 
by Mr. Brezhnev to the recent Soviet party con-
ference is brutally frank. To the Soviet detente 
means continuation of their suzerainty over the 
satellite countries of Eastern Europe plus a right 
to try to overturn the governmental systems of 
the countries of the West by subversion and 
financial a.."lSistance. Mr. Brezhnev has made it 
crystal clear that he believes detente is indiv-
isible and does not stop at Europe. Indeed, as 
we have seen, it allows the Soviet to build up 
its bases in places such as Angola. 
The wave of spy arrests in the last few weeks 
in West Germany should remind us that, despite 
detente, communist countries, especially East 
Germany, are still intent on undermining the 
West's democratic system. Some people have 
estimated that there are more than 10,000 spies 
indulging in political and industrial espionage 
in West Germany. Subversion is a major weapon 
of the communist world. 
The consensus is that the Soviet Union has 
doubled its defence expenditure from between 
6 % and 8 % of its gross national produCit to 
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between 15% and 20 %. Our Rapporteur has 
used the figure of 10.6 %, but the figures which 
I have managed to obtain put it at far higher 
than that. The United States devotes around 6% 
to its defence budget, which, of course, is high, 
and is now increasing this figure. We have heard 
good news from France - that it is to spend 
20 % of its budget on defence, mainly on con-
ventional forces, and West Germany has increased 
its expenditure. 
But we must not take for granted that the 
world is- safe for democracy. 'Ve must be 
perpetually on our guard. That is why I hope 
that the majority of members of this Assembly 
will vote in support of the report and its recom-
mendations, subject to the amendments already 
tabled. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. de Niet. 
Mr. de NIE'l' (Netherlands). - I feel that I 
owe it to Sir Frederic Bennett to say a few 
words about his report and his draft recom-
mendations, because, although in Committee I 
did not object to the draft report, I reserved 
my vote for the plenary session, because in 
Committee there were many oral changes. But 
I am always in favour of having controversial 
reports and recommendations go to the plenary 
session. However, I belieV1e that the success of 
a report and draft recommendation depends on 
whether it is adopted unanimously. If it is, it is 
often, especially on strictly political subjects, 
because different things are read into it by 
different people, and that does not help political 
clarity. 
I have been shocked by Sir Frederic's com-
ments on this report. He has said that many of 
his statements are based on authoritative SQUrces. 
I do not know what those sources are, except 
that they are chiefs-of-staff. I remember a BBC 
production about Cuban missiles. If the chiefs-
of-staff had had their way, Armageddon would 
already be here. 
I believe also that his comparison with 1939 
is disastrous for his whole philosophy. If what 
he says is true, the millions and millions spent 
on NATO have been wasted. Chiefs-of-staff 
always have the only answer, as in Vietnam. 
The only cure for them is more money, weapons 
and armaments. I think, therefore, that his 
sources are rather one-sided. The threat of Nazi 
Germany was much greater and more disastrous 
than any threat we have now, because the Warsaw 
Pact is not just one monolithic block. 
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I see this report as part of the philosophy that 
totalitarianism from the right is always prefer-
able to totalitarianism from the left. For me 
they are the same. I do not like either and I have 
no illusions about either. I am terrified when I 
see who is against this whole philosophy and 
who is in favour, because I note that Sir Frederic 
Bennett is even glad of the way he was supported 
by Mr. Muller. That is quite enough for me. 
(Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Portheine. 
Mr. PORTHEINE (Netherlands) (Transla-
tion). - I am nonetheless glad that you have 
given me the floor, Mr. President, so that I can 
voice my reactions to a number of comments 
that have been made, some by my fellow-
countrymen. 
First of all there is Mr. Scholten, who has 
told us once again that it is important to contim.ue 
to believe in and give meaning to the spirit of 
Helsinki, though even he admits that the results 
from Helsinki are nothing to write home about. 
He has told us that we must do away with 
the causes that bring about imbalances. 
It is not quite clear how he sees that being 
done. It may be that he is thinking of a 
remodelling of our society in the socio-economic 
sphere, touching on fundamental points in our 
market economy system and on freedom of 
production by undertakings. 
If this were so, I would argue that I still see 
the carrying through of the communist system 
- particularly in the socio-economic and 
financial spheres - as a grave threat to our 
western democracy. Even if we can - and want 
to - keep our defence effort at a reasonable 
level, this is not I think the only thing that 
matters. Just as important, and inextricably 
bound up with this, is the defence of our socio-
economic and financial system. This was the 
standpoint I put to the authorities in America, 
and I am glad that our liberal friend and gues-t, 
the Danish ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr. 
Guldberg, said exactly the same thing here 
yesterday. 
It is not a question here of allowing the old 
liberal laissez-faire to continue - even the 
liberals have totally abandoned this. There has, 
of course, been a balanced evolution in that 
system, which I have already supported else-
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where. There are various examples that can be 
given, more particularly in the area of industrial 
democracy, but at heart the system remains 
unchanged and sets us apart from dogmatic 
socialist and communist attitudes. The nub of 
it is whether the State is to be all-powerful or 
whether the accent is still to be on the individual, 
with his potential and his imperfections. My 
very real fear is that with governments in which 
communists have a share the tendency will -
though little is clear about this, and it is some-
thing that is not often emphasised- be towards 
the former. 
In other words, if the Italian communists say 
they want to stay in NATO some people may be 
happy with this ; I am certainly not, because I 
do not know what is to happen in the other 
area. Is the ordinary person going to retain his 
opportunities for using his initiative, as he has 
in the economy we have known up to now, 
one we need to defend ? 
Mr. Scholten also spoke about the deal with 
South Africa for nuclear equipment, and said 
that a majority of the Dutch Parliament had 
voted against this. This is not entirely accurate. 
A motion - the Ter Beek motion - was passed 
in the Second Chamber of the States-General 
by a majority of one, and set certain conditions 
on deliveries and called for diplomatic talks. 
These have in fact since taken place. I believe 
that they not only brought good results in the 
foreign policy field, but also led to the inclusion 
in the draft contract of provisions satisfying 
the conditions set. 
There have been many others in the Nether-
lands who have been annoyed with our govern-
ment for having hesitated - solely on matters of 
credit guarantees, and nothing to do with export 
licences - ignoring the hopes that had been 
raised and losing an order that could have 
been of major importance for us from the 
viewpoint of jobs and of technology. Because 
we understand what international co-operation 
is about, we do not blame France for having 
seized the opportunity. 
For the rest, I will end by saying that I am 
broadly in agreement with Sir Frederic Bennett's 
repol't, and offer him my congratulations. 
4. Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council 
to the Assembly 
(Presentation by Mr. Destremau, Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, Chairman-
in-Office of the Council, Does. 697 and 710) 
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Application of the Brussels Treaty - Reply to 
the Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council 
Political activities of the Council - Reply to 
the Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council 
Scientific, technological and aerospace 
questions - Reply to the Twenty-First Annual 
Report of the Council 
(Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of 
the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, 
of the General Affairs Committee and of the Com-
mittee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendations, 
Does. 100 and Amendments, 102 and 705) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- The next 
Order of the Day is the presentation of the 
twenty-first annual report of the Council of 
WEU by Mr. Bernard Destremau, Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic 
and Chairman-in-Office of the Council of 
Ministers, Documents 697 and 710. 
After the presentation of this report and the 
Chairman of the Council's replies to the oral 
questions put by members of the Assembly, we 
shall hear the three Rapporteurs of the Com-
mittees of the Assembly who have prepared the 
replies to the annual report of the Council : Mr. 
Haase will present the report of the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments on the 
application of the Brussels Treaty, Document 
700 ; Mr. Peridier will present the report of 
the General Affairs Committee on the political 
activities of the Council, Document 702 ; 
Mr. Richter will present the report of the Com-
mittee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions, Document 705. 
Mr. Minister, you are no stranger to this 
rostrum ; you have boon a member of our 
Assembly, you have chaired one of its most 
important Committees ; and thereafter you have 
acted as spokesman for the French Government, 
following the many important ministerial duties 
assigned to you. 
Today, in your capacity aB ChaJrman-in-
Office of the Council of WEU, you will be 
speaking of the activities of the Council. 
You are aware of the great importance which 
the Assembly attaches to dialogue with the 
Council on the occasion of the presentation of 
its annual report. We are therefore looking 
forward with very great interest to your report. 
I would add, as I already mentioned in the 
speech I made here yesterday, that the Assembly 
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intends, because of present circumstances, inter-
nationally and especially in Europe, which I 
would not exactly describe as disturbing but 
rather confused, to be particularly demanding. 
It looks forward to hearing yoUT comments, which 
I am sure will be very well worth hearing, and 
I rather think our colleagues are going to give 
you a good grilling during question-time. I 
anticipate from this open debate some highly 
practical results. 
Mr. Minister, you have the floor. 
Mr. DESTREMAU (Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, Chair-
man-in-Office of the Council) (Translation). -
Mr. President, first of all I would like to thank 
you for your kind remarks. Coming as they do 
from a member of the Assembly who, before 
being called to higher office, was one of its most 
lively members, I appreciate them very greatly. 
'fhank you. 
Mr. President, L,adies and Gentlemen, I did 
indeed, for several years, take part in the work 
of your Assembly, and I am pleased for more 
reasons than one to appear before you once 
more as a member of the French Government and 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
By virtue of the latter office, to which I have 
just been appointed following the latest 
ministerial meeting of WEU in Brussels, I am 
privileged to c,ome here this morning to present 
the annual report of the Council on its activities 
during 1975. 
You have read this report ; i,t has been, I am 
glad to say, submitted to you in plenty of time 
this year as the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments and the General Affairs Com-
mittee appreciate. It is a paper familiar to you 
both in form and content. It describes the 
activities of the Council and of the other organs 
responsible for implementing the modified 
Brussels Treaty. 
Presenting it to you gives me the opportunity 
of reminding you, first of all, of the importance 
which the Council attaches to maintaining good 
relations with the Assembly. I notice in this 
respect that, with only a few reservations, your 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments has expressed its full satisfaction. 
The Council has indeed endeavoured over the 
past year to keep the promises it has made to 
you and to reply as quickly as posible to the 
recommendations adopted by your Assembly, 
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bearing in mind, in particular, the commitments 
entered into following Recommendation 249. Of 
course it may have happened that some replies 
are held up, but in their case the reason has 
been that they involved recommendations dealing 
with problems which were still evolving, and the 
Council was concerned to inform the Assembly 
of the latest developments. The Council is, at 
all events, particularly aware of the need to 
speed up as much as possible the replies to the 
recommendations ·and to the written questions of 
the Assembly. I think it would in any case be 
difficult, even illusory, to set time limits for 
such replies and I can assure you that the 
authorities, working parties and the Council have 
always endeavoured to answer your questions as 
quickly as possible. 
As for the content of these replies, which has 
been criticised by the Assembly, this is not a 
new problem and you appreciate how difficult 
it is sometimes to finalise a reply to certain 
recommendations or questions in view of the 
nature and complexity of the matters concerned. 
Especially as you know the Council is bound to 
observe the rule of unanimity in drafting its 
replies. 
At aH events, the Council takes a keen interest 
in the useful contribution made by the Assembly 
in examining certain questions. This has been 
particularly the case :for the issues of European 
security and integration raised in its Recom-
mendation 266. 
Your Assembly has repeatedly requested that 
it should be better informed of the positions of 
the vari<>us member governments. Accordingly, 
this year too several ministers have attended the 
sessions of the Assembly, to spell out the views 
of their governments. In addition, the informal 
meetings with the Presidential Committee and 
the General Affairs Committee in May 1975, 
and in May of this year with the Presidential 
C<>mmittee and with the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments, have enabled a :freer 
exch3inge of views than would have been possible 
in :formal meetings. 
Examination of p<>litical questions does of 
course continue to be one of the Council's 
principal activities. However, as recommended 
by the treaty, we have to avoid duplication. But 
a number of questions of interest to WEU are 
dealt with in other international bodies, e.g. the 
European Communities, the Atlantic Alliance, 
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OECD. In particular there is growing polirtical 
co-operation among the Nine - and the Council 
knows that the As,.<;embly is as pleased as itself 
at the prospects of the European union we all 
long to see. It has therefore not been thought 
appropriate to hold consultations in WEU on 
matters which member governments are examin-
ing quite satisfactorily elsewhere. 
However, the Council's competence in matters 
of foreign policy has never been challenged. 
Witness the fact that an exchange of views on 
East-West relations took place on the occasion 
of the ministerial meetings in L<mdon in 1975 
and in Brussels in May of this year, and that 
the Council has carefully examined the recom-
mendations of the Assembly on other in1portant 
aspect..<~ of international relations such as rela-
tions between Europe and the United States, 
the situ81tion in the Eastern Mediterranean, 
questions of energy or scientific, technological 
and aerospace questions. 
In these circumstances, it is not right to 
describe the way in which the Council has car-
ried out its resp<>nsibilities in respect of foreign 
affairs as "shirking its duties". 
As for defence matters, they are, as you know, 
one of the Council's major preoccupations. 
Let me remind you that on various occasions 
in 1975, notably the presentation of the 
twentieth annual report to the Council by Mr. 
V an Elslande and the commemorative session of 
the Assembly in May, the Council emphasised 
that defence problems were one of its main con-
cerns and that the modified Brussels Treaty 
was in its view "one of the keystones in the 
security of the signatory States". 
I think it not inappropriate at this time to 
affirm that the Council attaches the same 
imp<>rtance as heretofo11e to the applieation of 
the provisions of the treaty and its protocol on 
the level of forces and armaments of the member 
States. 
Hence it has continued to keep a close watch 
on their applicati<>n. The Council, with the help 
of the Agency :for the Control of Armaments, 
continued in 1975 to carry out its responsibilities 
under the modified Brussels Treaty and i,ts 
protocols. The activities of the Agency, which 
a8sists the Council in its task, have been set out 
in the fullest possible manner in the annual 
report. This shows that in the sectors open to its 
inspection, the Ag.ency has satisfactorily and 
efficiently fulfilled its task. 
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Finally, member governments have taken note 
of the resolutions adopted by the Presidential 
Committee of the Assembly on 11th September 
1976 and 1st March 1976 in respect of the 
Tindemans report on European union. 
The validity of the Brussels Treaty and its 
protocols and the responsibilities of the Council 
for their application, were reaffirmed in the 
reply given in April 1976 to Recommendation 
273 adopted in the context of that report. 
Regarding the activities of the Standing 
Armaments Committee of this organ of WEU, 
the Council of Ministers debated the matter at 
length at its meeting in London on 20th May 
1975 and the permanent representatives have 
subsequently exchanged views on the subject on 
numerous occasions. Lastly, the recent meeting of 
the Council of Ministers in Brussels on 31st May 
produced a new remit for the Standing Arma-
ments Committee about which I would like to 
S'ay a few words. 
As I mentioned a few moments ago, and 
bearing in mind the need to avoid any danger 
of duplication of effort or any interference with 
the work now being done in other organisations, 
the Council instructed the Standing Armaments 
Committee, as an immediate task, to submit a 
detailed plan for a study which, in the form of 
a descriptive analysis of the situation of the 
armaments industries in the member countries 
would contribute to a better knowledge of th~ 
industrial and economic implications of the 
standardisation of armaments. 
The Council will monitor the progress of work 
and instruct the Standing Armaments Commit-
tee, as may be appropriate. 
Finally, the representatives of the member 
countries have closely followed developments in 
other organisations in European co-operation 
and the standardisation of armaments. The 
creation of the European programme group in 
Rome on 2nd February 1976 is thus an appre-
ciable step forward and we have every reason 
to be glad that its activities have made an 
auspicious beginning. I also mention the setting 
up of a working group which has been given 
the task of studying, under the authority of the 
North Atlantic Council, questions of the inter-
operability of materials and equipment. 
That brings me to the end of the presentation 
of the twenty-first annual report of the Council 
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to the Assembly and now, Mr. President, Ladies 
and Gentlemen, I propose to say a few words 
on current topics in my capacity as Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs of the French 
Government. 
Since the last session France has, of course, 
taken part in the meeting of the Atlantic Council 
in Oslo. In addition, some further particulars on 
the French Government's ideas and policy con-
cerning defence have been given at the highest 
level. 
At Oslo, the French Delegation was gratified 
to note that its partners continued to accept the 
grounds for a policy based on the two-fold con-
cept of defence and detente. There is no anti-
thesis between the two, but a relation of 
complementarity. It was recognised that while 
the defence effort should be maintained or even 
increased, that was no reason for neglecting 
efforts towards detente, since only a combination 
of the two could bring about security and peace. 
We have also pointed out that, in the event 
of a displacement of political and military 
instability from north to south, specific a;ttempts 
must be made to mitigate the effect and avoid 
transposing outside Europe our continent's con-
frontations of eastern and western blocs. Noting 
globalising tendencies need not be any reason 
for globalising our response. 
Recent statements on military policy by the 
President of the French Republic and by the 
Chief-of-Staff of the armed forces prove once 
again, if it were needed, that France remains 
faithful to its alliances. These are set out more 
particularly in two treaties : that of the North 
Atlantic and that of Western European Union. 
If we examine the literal wording, we see that 
the WEU treaty is, in its main article much 
more binding than the North Atlantic Treaty. 
For, in Article 5 of the latter a clause w~ 
inserted, apparently at the request of the 
American Government, which is seldom singled 
out for mention. With reference to measures for 
mutual assistance between the alLies it is stipu-
lated that these should be taken "individually 
and in concert with the other parties". This 
phrase clearly means that there must be priorr 
consultation. It constitutes a kind of escape 
cla~e now~ere to be found in the WEU treaty, 
whiCh provides for an automatic obligation to 
assist. If France, as has sometimes been some-
what maliciously insinuated, had wished to go 
it alone, it would have had to denounce the WEU 
treaty as well as the North Atlantic Treaty. It 
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has not done so, and has of course no intention 
of doing so. 
But, much more than the literal text of the 
treaties, what counts is the spirit in which it 
is intended to apply them. There too, motives 
have been ascribed because France withdrew 
from the integrnted organisation created sub-
sequently to the treaty. 
It is true that France will not let itself be 
bound de facto by certain mechanisms. It wishes 
to retain its freedom of decision in the event of 
a conflict breaking out through bungling or as 
a result of provocation or for the sake of inter-
ests alien to Europe's own. 
But caution does not mean detachment, and 
the best proof of our spirit of solidarity is given 
once again in recent statements by the President 
of the Republic. Mr. Giscard d'Estaing has just 
said that in the hypothesis of a conflict and 
because of the speed of transport and com-
munications media, especially by air, there was 
liable to be only one air space, and France's 
air space would from the outset be brought into 
the battle, which would be general. 
While there is still no question of our under-
taking to man a sector under plans which, as is 
well-known, are often set at naught by events, 
we do not rule out participation with all our 
tactical arms in the front line of battle, once we 
have freely taken our own decision. 
This does not signify at all that we attac-h 
less impol'ltance to the role and the effectiveness 
of our strategic nuclear forces. Recently we 
brought into service the first thermonuclear mis-
sile on our submarines and our development 
priorities are now concentrated on multiple 
warheads. France's nuclear deterrent, whose 
mere existence gives the adversary an extra 
problem for his strategic thinking, remains the 
undivided pillar of our defence. But we consider 
that the credibility of massive retaliation will 
be strengthened by the variety of the available 
strike capabilities. Instead of all or nothing, 
which simplifies things for the aggressor as well 
as the defender, we shall confront him with a 
greater number of uncertainties. 
Gentlemen, I am sure it has not escaped your 
notice that the French plans are directed 
towards the establishment of a defence system 
of which the Europeans would gradually take 
ov·er control. 
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Although, in sound logic, there cannot be a 
unified European operational defence without 
there being a European unified political power, 
there is no reason why, to save time, we should 
not conceptualise here and now the conditions 
for establishing such a defence. In this area and 
until such time as the strategic concept takes 
shape, the setting up of a programme group for 
the standardisation of armaments designed and 
manufactured by Europeans might prove the 
desired trigger for developing a European 
armaments industry. In the same prospect may 
be viewed the Council of Ministers' remit to the 
Standing Armaments Committee of WEU to 
conduct an in-depth survey of Olllr countries' 
armament industries. This is being done at 
Belgium's instigation, firmly backed by our-
selves. Moreover it was your .Assembly which, 
on a report I had the honour to submit to it 
on 8th November 1972, advocated reactivating 
the Standing Armaments Committee. 
As regards European defence, the existence of 
conventional French forces comparable to those 
of the Germans will introduce a new factor 
making for equilibrium that will facilitate 
negotiations by shifting the debate away from 
the formula of French nuclear forces and 
German conventional ones. 
I should add that, as far as I am concerned, 
it seems to me unrealistic to blueprint a Euro-
pean defence system in a spirit of cussedness or 
sniping at our American allies. Besides, it would 
be contrary to the Alliance. 
National defence, European defence, Atl•antic 
defence - these ought to be the different 
components we need to haw at our disposal 
to meet any given situation. 
Agreeing to indulge in the intellectual satis-
faction of drawing up plans has never been any 
proof of a will to defend oneself. But, just as 
solidarity does not signify submission, refusal to 
commit oneself does not mean an intention to 
stamd aloof and independence of decision-making 
does not mean neutrality. Being neutral, with-
drawing one's stake at other people's expense, 
in other words being downright selfish, has never 
been a tradition of the French nation. 
The will to defend oneself is in times of peace 
mainly demonstrated by the financial sacrifices 
a nation is prepared to make. In this connection, 
I have to inform the Assembly that the French 
(J-overnment has a planning programme which, 
in a few years' time, will involve devoting 20 % 
of its budget to defence. 
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The will to defend oneself is also in the case 
of France demonstrated by retaining conscrip-
tion, so much do we consider security demands 
a commitment of the whole nation. 
Faithful to our alliances, but determined to 
adapt our means of action to the political and 
military circumstances of today, we would 
remind our allies that, although France has not 
always accepted a priori their ideas in the 
organisation of defence, it has always been at 
their side at the dangerous moments of history. 
I£ the need should arise tomorrow, we shall be 
there again. Our solidarity will not be found 
wanting. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The ap-
plause you have just been given tells you how 
interested the .Assembly has been in what you 
have had to say, especially as you have made 
a number of points that richly deserved your 
very valuable comments. 
Please accept our unanimous thanks, Mr. 
Minister, and I will now ask you kindly to 
submit to the crossfire of questions and answers. 
I call Mr. de Bruyne. 
Mr. de BRUYNE (Belgium) (Translation).-
I should first like to say how pleased we are 
to see Mr. Destremau has not disowned his 
origins, and tha;t he still holds our Assembly in 
high esteem, thus setting an example for all those 
whose benevolence towards our Assembly is 
sometimes less apparent. 
Here are my three questions : First, is the 
Standing Armaments Committee's remit of 
which you have just spoken one of information 
only ? Second, does it solely cover the economic 
aspects of armaments production, or certain 
military aspeets too? Third, what is the relaJtion-
ship between the tasks of the Rome group and 
that of the Standing Armaments Committee ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Do you 
wish, Mr. Minister, to answer the questions one 
at a time or all together 1 
Mr. DESTREMAU (Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, Chair-
man-in-Office of the Council) (Translation). -
I might perhaps answer the first three, and deal 
later with any others that might be asked. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Sieglerschmidt. 
Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (Federal Republic 
of Germany) (Translation).- You have spoken, 
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Mr. Minister, of the possibilitties for improved 
co-operation between France and its allies and 
the authorities of the Alliance. 
On the other hand, you have stated once again 
that France's decision not to join the military 
organs of NATO remains unchanged. 
I wonder whether, while France's co-operation 
wi,th the allies and the authorities of the Alliance 
is in practice being extended, France's decision 
not to participate in the military organs is to 
be regarded irreversible ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Warren. 
Mr. WARREN (United Kingdom). - I 
should like to ask the French Foreign Minister 
whether, in the light of the speech which Presi-
dent Giscard d'Estaing made rut Verdun on 
Sunday, we are entering a difficult phase of 
relationships between France and Western Euro-
pean Union. This morning the French Foreign 
Minister said that France remains faithful to 
its alliances and, lruter on, that independent 
decisions do not mean neutrality. 
Will France come to the aid of each and all 
of its allies of Western European Union if they 
are attacked ? Doe..<~ France expect each rund all 
of its allies of Western European Union to come 
to its aid if it is attacked ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Kliesing. 
Mr. KLIESING (F'ederal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - When the Minister 
was dealing with the question of a common 
European armaments policy he made a reference 
to the Tindemans report. Now that report makes 
a second point in connection with defence policy, 
in the form of a proposal that there should in 
future be regular meetings of the nine Ministers 
of Defence. I would like to know whether the 
French Government consider that this would 
help to strengthen a uniform European defence 
policy? 
Mr. DESTREMAU (Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, Chair-
man-in-Office of the Council) (Translation). -
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should 
like first of all to answer Mr. de Bruyne and to 
tell him that the remit of the Standing Arma-
ments Committee is not solely one of information, 
but also includes analyses of the armaments 
industries, and not only in each individual coun-
try, for the Standing Armaments Committee 
ought also to make a kind of in-depth survey 
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of whatever links there may be between the dif-
ferent European armaments industries. There is 
no such thing as total independence in this area, 
and we are all perfectly aware that the develop-
ment of a given industry sometimes depends on 
industrial development in a neighbouring coun-
try. 
The difference between the Committee and the 
Rome group is very clear-cUlt: the latter is 
responsible for programming and is an ad hoc 
group, whereas the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee is, as I said just now, charged with 
analyses of the armaments industries. 
Mr. Sieglerschmidt asked me a question about 
my country's frame of mind. I must say I think 
this Assembly has come to understand thaJt 
everything does not depend on integrated 
organisation, which was established after the 
treaty precisely to correct what was unclear in 
Article 5. This clause on prior consultation had 
to be inserted to pass the United States Congress. 
However, let me tell you, Mr. Sieglerschmidt, 
thalt all this depends on the state of mind and, 
as you are well aware, the strength of alliances 
does not lie so much in texts or forms of words. 
I seem to recall that we have, si,nce France left 
the integrated organisation, forged a number of 
links that meet our partners' entire satisfaction. 
Mr. Warren asked me a question about the 
French Government's intentions regarding assi~t­
ance to its partners. I believe we take the WEU 
treaty in the same attitude as the United King-
dom. If I remember rightly, the United Kingdom 
Government of the day played a preponderant 
part in the conclusion of this treaty, since it 
was the first time it ever committed itself to 
maintaining troops on the continent. 
I am bound to say that the French Govern-
ment, as I remarked at the rostrum, is wholly 
loyal to its alliances ; and I see nothing in what 
President Giscard d'Estaing said at V erdun that 
can contradict that decision. 
In answer to Mr. Kliesing, I would say that 
contacts between the Ministers of Defence can 
only facilitate the setting up, that will be long 
and difficult, of a European defence organisa-
tion. 
I think we should not split too many hairs 
in this matter ; we must not necessarily give one 
operation priority over another ; every study, 
every piece of thinking on the subject can help 
to advance a solution of this difficuLt problem. 
(Applause) 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you for your forthright answer, Mr. Minister. 
Mr. Leynen wishes to ask a question. 
Mr. LEYNEN (Belgium) (Translation).- In 
the second part of Mr. Destremau's speech, in 
which he was speaking in the name of France, 
I was struck by two sentences, and I am going 
to ask whether I understood them correctly. The 
first was the one in which he spoke of the 
establishment of a defence system of which the 
Europeans would gradually take over control : 
does that mean that, as France sees it, as soon 
as the European union is made responsible for 
defence matters, France's nuclear strike force as 
well as the United Kingdom's will pass under 
European authority ? 
The second sentence, a little further on, ran 
as follows : "... conceptualise here and now the 
conditions for establishing such a defence 
{policy]." Have I understood correctly ? Does 
this mean that France is immediately ready to 
enter into talks, to arrive at a European defence 
policy? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Mattick. 
Mr. MATTICK (Federal Republic of Ger-
many) (Translation). - The Minister made 
three points in connection with the decision on 
what France would do in case of a conflict. One 
point was that there might be escalation outside 
Europe, in which case France maintains a right 
of decision. The second point was that there 
might be escalation due to negligence - I think 
I understood him correctly. Who would decide 
what constituted negligence if there were to be 
a conflict involving one or more members of 
NATO? Is the decision on this question entirely 
a maJtter for the French Government, or does 
the Alliance have a say? 
The PRESIDENT (Transl·ation). - I call 
Mr. Valleix. 
Mr. VALLEIX (France) (Translation).- We 
have all, I think, been interested by the Min-
ister's communication, and I personally would 
like to thank him very cordially for his words. 
I should like to revert to the two questions 
which have just been raised, with specific 
reference to the role of France, in order to try 
and widen the scope of our debate by putting 
to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council the 
following question : as he has affirmed that 
defence questions are a vital concern of the 
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Council - which is true - where can we find 
some definition of defence policy ? Cou1d you, 
Mr. Minister, clarify it somewhat ? You have 
given us a very broad outline of it ; would you 
give us some further details ? I think it will 
be the right moment, too, to clarify Framce's 
l'ole and that of an overall policy. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Cermolacce. 
Mr. CERMOLACCE (France) (Translation). 
-Mr. Minister, you have been good enough to 
state some views on French foreign policy in 
the defence field, and thus confirmed that after 
the statements made by the President of the 
Republic, Mr. Valery Giscard d'Estaing, ·and by 
fieneral Mery, Chief of the General Staff, the 
French Army was being invited to discard the 
concept of France as a national sanctuary to be 
defended against all corners, and take up station 
with the outposts of the Bundeswehr on the 
Federal Republic's eastern frontier with the 
GDR and Czechoslovakia. 
Ten years after General de Gaulle pulled the 
French forces out of NATO, can you dispute the 
fact that this new defence concept amounts to a 
de facto reintegration of the French forces into 
the NATO system? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Tanghe. 
Mr. TANGHE (Belgium) (Translation). -
Mr. Minister, you have spoken to us of the 
impressive effort France is making to increase 
its own defence potential and at the same time, 
as we all trust, the defence potential of Europe 
as a whole. 
Could you tell us in somewhat more detail 
how this effort is broken down between the 
nuclear strike force and conventional forces ? 
As we all know, we are for the time being 
fairly strong in terms of strike capability but 
weaker in terms of conventional forces. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. D€stremau. 
Mr. DESTREMAU (Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, Chair-
man-in-Office of the Council) (Translation). -
May I congratulate Senator Leynen on being able 
to see far ahead? Actually, it is too soon to enquire 
what an intra-European defence organisation 
could do with nuclear weaponry. But it is quite 
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obvious that in the nature of things the nuclear 
arm must remain essentially national, so long 
as that is where the onus of decision lies. If I 
spoke of European defence, it is because the 
fact that we camnot make it operational before 
a European authority comes into being does not 
prevent us from giving thought to the organisa-
tion of such a defence capability. 
Moreover, it is a1so possible to argue the case 
that political union can be partly fashioned out 
of similar derence concepts. It is a subject to 
which we must give immediate thought and I 
trust you will make your able contribution to 
the task. 
Mr. Mattick talked of escalation and the 
reasons that had induced France to have reserva-
tions on its commitments at one time or another. 
The fact was, it feared that some ill-advised 
move in extra-European theatres of operation, 
far away, might drag us all into an armed 
conflict. 
I would say to Mr. V alleix that in fact a 
very full description of French defence policy is 
given in the planning documentation just tabled 
in parliament - the National Assembly and 
Senate - and it indicates, as he is aware, an 
additional effort in conventional arms which in 
no way detracts from our nuclear effort. 
My reply to Mr. Cermolacce is that he must 
not let his imagination run riot, and that what 
I have said today in no way signifies that 
France intends to rejoin the integrated organisa-
tion of the Atlantic Alliance. 
Let me say to Mr. Tanghe that he has raised 
a topical problem. It is perfectly true that, in 
the nuclear area - perhaps just as much in the 
United States as in France- the Level reached 
is practically adequate to ensure the required 
degree of protection, but it is in fact in con-
ventional armaments that a special effort needs 
to be made ; such an effort had been envisaged 
in France for some time past, but we shall be 
including it in our planning figures and budget 
as of now. 
The PRESIDEN'r (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. Minister. I think that the questions 
have been sufficiently varied for the answers 
to cover the whole field. AB you know this 
Assembly so well, you have given it all the 
details it could desire. On behalf of every one 
of us here, let me give you my very warm and 
sincere thanks. (Applause) 
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I call Mr. Haase, Rapporteur of the Com-
mittee on Defe-nce Questions and Armaments, to 
present the report on the application of the 
Brussels Treaty, Document 700. 
Mr. HAASE (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, the twenty-first annual report of the 
Council, covering the year 1975, follows the 
familiar pattern. As the activities of WEU have 
changed but little for a number of years, there 
is no need for the Rapporteur to go into each 
item contained in the report. I would however 
like to thank the Secretariat-General for the 
speed with which it produced the report. 
There are in fact only a few points on which 
we need dwell. First, the seven member States 
of WEU have not always reached a uniform 
position. It seems, however, that they are now 
making greater efforts to find a joint stance, 
and this change was to be seen in what Mr. 
Destremau has just been telling the Assembly. 
It is undoubtedly •a political matter, which is 
also brought out in the report submitted to the 
Assembly. In particular it seems to be becoming 
clear that for political reasons greater stress is 
to be laid on WEU. 
There are signs of this when we compare the 
tasks giv·en to the Rome group and the mandate 
of the Standing Armaments Committee. In the 
light of what Mr. Destremau said just now, the 
Rome group is colli!idered in France - and we 
shall need to put questions on this matter -
to be an ad hoc group. It is a point which has 
so far not been made in the report. We shall 
need to know just what the tasks of the Rome 
group are. 
The Standing Armaments Committee has, in 
addition to its operational research mandate and 
apart from the sub-group on uniform evaluation 
of military equipment, no other functions. In 
this connection, however, it is interesting to note 
the French moves of 29th/30th January to put 
:fresh life into the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee, and the steps taken by the Belgialli! in 
May 1975. 
It remai!lB to be seen - and this is a matter 
with which the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments will have specially to concern 
itself - what details still have to be cleared 
up and just how the work will be defined. One 
question here is assessment of armaments fund-
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ing, another is the question of compensation in 
respect of ·armaments and armaments produc-
tion, and yet another the problem of reciprocal 
arrangements for the use of patents ; but there 
will, too, undoubtedly have to be an examination 
of present forms of co-operation, in order to 
find out how much co-operation there actually 
is and what recommendatiolli! should be made. 
These tasks will have to be taken on either by 
the WEU Standing Armaments Committee or 
by the Rome group - and which is to do it 
i<~ a point that needs to be cleared up. 
The Defence Committee has therefore offered 
the Assembly in paragraph 41 a formula on the 
Rome group in which the establishment of the 
independent programme group is welcomed but 
which says that the Assembly now hopes for 
early progress in this field and requests the 
Council - and this is important - to state 
its views on the division of work between the 
Standing Armaments Committee of WEU and 
the independent programme group, the Rome 
group. 
A second point to be touched on here is the 
problem of maintaining British troops on the 
continent. The report before us shows that we 
could not help noting that the reported strength 
of 60,066 men - a figure based on the informa-
tion reported to the Committee on 30th November 
1975 - did not tally with the figures given in 
the United Kingdom's white papers. Although 
the discrepancies are only minor, it was neces-
sary to make a further check. An alli!Wer to 
Question 170, given by the Council, does not 
fully clear up the situation, which is why this 
additional point has been made in the report. 
Having made the foregoing observations, your 
Rapporteur need only add that the Defence 
Committee is unanimous in recommending that 
the report be adopted. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Tra!lBlation). - I call 
Mr. Peridier, Rapporteur of the General Affairs 
Committee, to present the report on the political 
activities of the Council, Document 702. 
Mr. PERIDIER (France) (Tralli!lation). -
The report which I have the honour to present 
to you on behalf of the General Affairs Com-
mittee was adopted unanimously by that Com-
mittee. In other words, at least in its essentials, 
it reflects the lines along which the Committee 
was thinking. 
In fact, if we turn again to the report presented 
on behalf of this same Committee by Mr. de 
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Bruyne at the session in June 1975, and to that 
presented by the same Rapporteur to the Presi-
dential Committee in February 1976, we observe 
that this text, which was adopted by the General 
Affairs Committee, follows a line of thought 
which has remained consistent, even if the 
circumstances have markedly changed since June 
1975. 
Indeed, confining ourselves to the broad 
outlines of political development over the past 
few months, clearly account must be taken of 
the status of deliberations among the Nine on 
European union, notably in respect of defence. 
We are aware that both the report presented 
by the Commission of the European Communities 
in July 1975 and that presented by Mr. Tinde-
mans in .January 1976 take the view that defence 
forms part of the "potential comp-etence" of 
the European union. But each points out that it 
can hardly be envisaged as becoming immediately 
part of its actual competence. 
Our Assembly has, for its part, always asserted 
the need to avoid duplication of effort among 
the European institutions so long as WEU's 
present powers have not been transferred to the 
European union by a proper legal instrument. 
WEU must retain all its powers, even if some 
have to be exercised in another framework. 
Our Assembly has also always stressed that 
the institution of WEU, under the modified 
Brussels Treaty, could not be transformed 
without a revision of the treaty. Thus the prospect 
of a European union clearly makes it essential 
for permanent contacts to be established between 
WEU and the Nine, and we can only regret that 
the twenty-first annual report of the Council 
makes no mention of the matter. 
Secondly, uncertainties still subsist, not 
perhaps about the future of the Atlantic Alliance, 
but about the part which the organisation that 
emerged from it will be able to play in the 
coming years. These uncertainties c,an mainly be 
ascribed to the evolution of American public 
opinion over the past few years, particularly 
during the present election campaign. 
On the one hand, there has been since the 
end of the war in Vietnam, a revival of certain 
isolationist tendencies. On the other, the parlia-
mentarians - of whom I was one - who visited 
the United States last April, were able to note 
that the prospect of government coalitions includ-
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ing communist parties in some Western European 
countries was rousing considerable anxiety, and 
that the successive threats by General Haig, 
Mr. Kissinger and President Ford of a review 
of American policy in the Atlantic Alliance were 
being taken quite seriously boch by the admin-
istration and by many United States parlia-
mentarians. 
It is therefore expedient to consider carefully 
what place Western Europe might hold in the 
Atlantic Alliance in the event of any changes in 
the forms of United States participation in joint 
defence. 
Two new events have occurred since the 
General Affairs Committee adopted this report. 
The first is that the Council has, after an 
interval of twelve weeks, at last replied to the 
written question put by Mr. Radius on 8th March 
last. I would remind you that this written 
question raised a problem which, on the eve of 
the Italian elections next week, is clearly 
absolutely vital. The question sought to elicit 
whether "the application of the modified Brussels 
Treaty would also be jeopardised if communist 
party members were to join the government of 
a WEU member country". 
Now while the Council's reply follows the 
lead of common sense and legality, it is far from 
being as clearcut as might have been expected. 
Indeed, after two and a half months of what 
we may hope was profound consideration, the 
Council came up with nothing better than : 
"The modified Brussels Treaty is based on 
principles and is directed to purposes set forth 
by the signatory parties in the preamble to the 
treaty. 
It is the duty of the Council to consider 
matters concerning the execution of the treaty 
and its protocols and to ensure that they are 
implemented in such manner that the sover-
eignty and independence of each of the member 
States is respected." 
This reply in itself prompts no particular com-
ments and is entirely in conformity with the 
treaty. Yet the Council does not state clearly, as 
we expected it to do, that insofar as signatory 
countries respect the princip-les and aims set 
forth in the preamble to the treaty, the applica-
tion of the treaty in no way depends on the 
composition of governments in the member 
States. In short, there is every indication that 
the Council was unwilling to give a forthright 
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reply to a question so vital for the future, not 
only of WEU but also of the functioning of 
democracy in Western Europe. 
The second question which could not be tackled 
in this report concerns the decision by the 
Council of WEU of 31st May 1976 to reactivate 
the Standing Armaments Committee. Admittedly, 
this issue is one more pertinent to the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments, 
and one on which the information coming my way 
so far is too vague and incomplete to enable 
me really to deal with it. I should merely like 
to stress that it seems to me absolutely wrong 
that a matter of this importance should be settled 
in such an almost underhand manner. Did the 
Council issue a press release ? I did not see any 
mention of it. The information I have got reached 
me more or less by word of mouth, with all 
the margins for error and tendentious inter-
pretations that this implies. 
In setting up a WEU parliamentary assembly, 
the signatories of the modified Brussels Treaty 
wi'3hed to found Western Europe's defence on a 
genuinely popular consensus reflected in real 
parliamentary control. But nowadays you would 
think the Council were seeking to dissemble its 
proceedings which obviously leaves room for 
every supposition as to the real intentions of 
this or that group. 
It is not enough for a Minister or a Secretary 
of State to come here and hand out information 
and soothing phrases. Even a luncheon with the 
Presidential Committee, a talk between the 
Chairman-in-Office and the Chairman of the 
General Affairs Committee, or indeed a private 
meeting with the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments, do not suit our requirements. 
They are measures of appeasement and not 
normal actions by a governmental organ towards 
a responsible assembly. 
In the erase of the Council's activities we could 
pronounce a very swift judgment. It met only 
once at ministerial level during 1975 and, even 
then, the meeting was particularly short. The 
Council has, however, met frequently at the level 
of the permanent representatives. But all goes 
to show that at these meetings it did not take 
up any political question on its own initiative, 
and dealt only with the replies it was going 
to give to recommendations or written questions 
by the Assembly. 
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In his reply to the twentieth annual report of 
the Council, l\Ir. de Bruyne called upon the 
Council to take the initiative of deciding which 
political questions concerned it, and the Council 
recalled, in its reply to the recommendation 
adopted by the Assembly, that the Brussels 
Treaty made no distinction between the Council 
of WEU meeting at ministerial level and meeting 
at permanent representative level, the latter being 
fully empowered to exercise the rights and duties 
ascribed to it under the treaty. 
This reply, therefore, fully vindicates the 
position of the General Affairs Committee, so it 
has been seen fit to remind the Council that it 
should give a precise reply to paragraph 3 of 
Recommendation 266. 
Here I should like to stress the importance 
of this question. Indeed, although it now appears 
to be accepted that the Council should not meet 
more than once a year at ministerial level -
and we have seen, once again, from its meeting 
of 31st May that such meetings are still very 
short - it is essential for the Permanent Council 
to carry out at least part of the duties hitherto 
performed by the Council of Ministers. 
In its reply to the Assembly's recommenda-
tion, the Council confirms that it is empowered 
to do so. That is excellent news. But it must also 
do so in fact, for otherwise the WEU Council's 
only function would be to answer parlia-
mentarians' questions. And even so it would 
perform that function very badly, as is already 
very often the case, for unless it took up on its 
own initiative questions concerning the applica-
tion of the modified Brussels Treaty, the sole 
concern of the officials composing the Council 
would remain the drafting of texts to be as 
vague and cryptic as possible. 
That brings us to the chapter on relations 
between the Council and the Assembly. 
In this respect, it is pointed out that in 1975 
the Council was unwilling to hold the joint 
meeting requested by the General Affairs Com-
mittee. On that occasion, it proposed instead that 
the members of that Committee should attend a 
luncheon to which the Council had invited the 
Presidential Committee. I believe I am right in 
saying that in 1976 it replied in a similar way to 
a request addressed to it by the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments. Obviously, 
a luncheon at which the Chairman-in-Office of 
the Council, and possibly one or two of his 
colleagues, answer questions not submitted to 
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them in advance and not having been discussed 
in the Council, is no substitute for a joint 
meeting. 
Indeed, it should be remembered that at joint 
meetings questions which have been commun-
icated several weeks beforehand by the Committee 
concerned :receive a reply from the Chairman-
in-Office of the Council which has been agreed 
by all member countries. In that case a genuinely 
official position of WEU is conveyed to the 
parliamentarians, whereas, however useful 
informal meetings can sometimes be, they do 
not enable any such positions to be defined. 
Everything goes to show that, on the contrary, 
they allow the Council to shirk its responsibilities, 
and we may wonder to what extent that is not 
the :real motive for rejecting the Assembly's later 
requests for joint meetings. It demonstrates the 
value the General Affairs Committee would 
attach to being able to hold a joint meeting with 
the Council in the reasonably near future. 
Although we suspect a downright shirking of 
responsibilities in this affair, we find another 
case in a passage in the twenty-first annual 
report, in which the Council invokes the right 
to decline to reply to whatever question may be 
asked by the parliamentarians. According to 
the report: 
" ... members of the Assembly are at liberty to 
question their governments whenever they 
want a more detailed consideration of various 
policy matters of particular concern to WEU ... " 
Now, it has been noticeable on at least two 
occasions, that the national governments have 
sheltered behind the fact that the questions had 
been put to the WEU Council, in order not to 
answer questions addressed to themselves. Any 
one member government of WEU can hardly 
answer questions addressed to the organisation 
as a whole. 
Secondly, the Council has declined to answer 
a number of written questions, notwithstanding 
the fact that they had a quite obvious bearing 
on problems coming within WEU's competence. 
Lastly, there is a question raised in Mr. de 
Bruyne's report last year and not taken up 
again in the present report : that of the organ-
isation's Secretary-General. As we know, for the 
past two years, no one has been appointed to 
succeed Ambassador Heisbourg, who relinquished 
his appointment in September 1974. Since then, 
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the duties have been fulfilled by the Deputy 
Secretary-General, Mr. von Plehwe, in a manner 
affording, I may say, full satisfaction to the 
Assembly. 
The General Affairs Committee decided not to 
raise the problem of the Secretary-General in 
the p11esent report just because of Mr. von 
Plehwe's outstanding qualities so that it was 
unanimously decided not to introduce any com-
ment that might have been construed as a reflec-
tion on the acting Secretary-General. Indeed, the 
General Affairs Committee is in no way con-
cerned with personalities, nor is there any conflict 
between it and the acting Secretary-General. 
In 1975, the Assembly had asked the govern-
ments to put an end to these provisional arrange-
ments, whose obvious effect was to weaken the 
authority of the Sec11etariat-General vis-a-vis the 
members of the Permanent Council of which, it 
should be remembered, the Secretary-General is 
Chairman. 
Several of our colleagues have asked their 
governments in their respective parliaments 
whether they intended to put an end to this 
situation soon, and all the governments have 
replied that such was indeed their intention. So 
far, however, nothing has been done, and 
although the report adopted by the General 
Affairs Committee does not refer to the matter, 
this in no way infers abandonment of the position 
it took up last year. 
This consideration, when added to the others, 
justifies describing the attitude of the Council, 
i.e. the governments of our seven countries, both 
towards the modified Brussels Treaty and 
towards the Assembly, as "shirking" duties. We 
may well wonder whether, behind this shirking, 
we should not, despite all the pious declarations 
made by the seven governments in praise of 
European union, discern a deeper will to void 
the future union of all substance, at any rate in 
the political and defence areas. Hence, we should 
emphatically record that the Council's failure to 
fulfil the role assigned to it by the Brussels 
Treaty, far from strengthening the future Euro-
pean union, serves, on the contrary, to weaken it, 
if not endanger it still more seriously. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. Peridier. 
I call Mr. Richter, Rapporteur of the Com-
mittee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions. 
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(Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions has for 
years been trying to intensify European col-
laboration in many fields of advanced technology. 
I can only say in response to Mr. Destremau that 
we are glad to know of the Council's interest 
in our work. The Committee, like the Council, is 
convinced that the concept of security is wider 
than that of defence. The capacity of Europe's 
industries must, however, be maintained as a 
basis for our defence effort. If Europe does 
not ensure the continuance of those areas of 
prime importance where inventions and new ideas 
originate, e.g. in space research or nuclear power, 
the civil and military potential of our industries 
will wither away. 
On behalf of the Committee, I must again 
point out that it is a matter of continued regret 
that the countries of Western Europe are needing 
so much time to find a common stance in the 
ehief fields of advanced technology. In report 
after report the Assembly's Committee covering 
this field has drawn attention to the fact that 
the absence of any suitable decision-taking 
machinery presents a major problem. Because of 
this, the Committee has frequently referred to 
the need for a systematic, multilateral and, in 
the final analysis, integrated European approach 
to these problems. Advances in European co-
operation in research and technology can be 
achieved only by means of a more rational policy. 
As Rapporteur to the Assembly, my view is 
that the activities of the Council should include 
the formulation of a medium-term and long-
term policy for the most varied fields of science 
and technology. In doing this, the Council has 
the advantage of being able to rely on the 
experience and knowledge of the ministries of 
member States. Europe continues to depend 
far more heavily on the export of its technologies 
than, for instance, the United States and Canada, 
who have abundant and comparatively well-
balanced sources of raw materials at their 
disposal. Nor will Europe be in a position in the 
future to acquire a high degree of independence 
in respect of its sources <>f energy and minerals. 
We must therefore be able to compensate this 
dependence by offering the products of advanced 
technologies. Only in this way can we, acting 
purposefully together, maintain our place in 
world trade and co-operation. 
In its report, the Council dwells particularly 
on the aviation and space industries. The Chair-
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man of our Committee, Mr. Pierre de Montes-
quiou, referred at the start of the Toulouse 
colloquy on the position of these European 
industries to the fact that it was the Com-
mittee's aim to improve their position through 
increased co-operation between WEU member 
States. In this connection, members of the Com-
mittee would welcome more active measures by 
the Council to encourage consultation and co-
operation of this kind. The Committee accord-
ingly recommends that in its twenty-second 
annual report, i.e. next year, the Council lay 
down guidelines for a long-term European policy 
covering the various advanced technologies, 
particularly space aeronautics, aviation, nuclear 
power, computers and electronics taking both 
the civil and military aspects into consideration, 
and indicating what form an effective West 
European decision-making machinery might 
take. 
We parliamentarians find that at present there 
are too many open questions. \V e know all about 
our industries' productive capacity. But where 
is discussion taking place about our technological 
future ? Who is discussing the successor to 
Concorde, or the successor to the Airbus ? \Vho 
is today giving sufficient attention to studying 
and defining future generations of aircraft in the 
military sector? What is to come after Jaguar, 
MRCA and the Alpha-Jet? \Vho is seriously 
investigating the question, for example, of quality 
in military transport ? The existing systems, for 
instance those of the Americans, such as the 
Galaxy 5A, are quite inadequate and are being 
prematurely run down. 
Here the joint efforts being made today at 
government level - that is how I see it, Mr. 
Destremau - look as though they are paralysed. 
We parliamentarians would like to take it that 
on this point, too, we shall next year have 
guidelines from the Council. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Transl·ation).- The joint 
debate is open. 
I call Mr. de Montesquiou, Chairman of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions. 
Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (France) (Transla-
tion). -Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, 
whenever we have before us a report by Mr. 
Richter, we feel highly gratified. I agree with 
Mr. Richter when he deplores the absence of a 
medium- and long-term policy for European 
advanced technology programmes. The Committee 
has often expressed a wish for the Council to 
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take an initiative in this area that might be 
of use to high technology industries in Western 
Europe and European security. Obviously, 
Europe should preserve a genuine civil wd 
military production capability in leading 
technologies such as metallurgy, computers, 
space and aeronautics. 
In its twenty-first annual report, the Council 
specifically mentions aeronautics and space. We 
shall be talking about aeronautics one of these 
days. Today I want to speak mainly about the 
European Space Agency, which has suddenly 
entered a critical phase. In paragraph 10 of his 
report, Mr. Richter points out that the European 
Space Agency has made a successful start and 
that, at least here, Europe had provided itself 
with an instrument capable of gaining its rightful 
place in this sector. Since then, the European 
Space Agency has run into difficulties. When 
it was set up, it seemed to be agreed that, in 
order to gain time and avoid waste, existing 
national facilities would be co-ordinated and 
used in the European framework. Thanks to an 
additional French contribution this condition has 
now been fulfilled for the Kourou centre. But 
the activities of the Toulouse centre are not 
guaranteed beyond the end of this year by any 
long-term planning arrangements making use 
of the abilities of its teams. 
Another conflict is brewing about the failure 
to use the existing operational capabilities in 
Germany and France for the placing in position 
of geostationary satellites like GEOS, METEO-
SAT, OTS and l\fAROTS. The other countries 
belonging to the agency are disinclined to carry 
out such work, for lack of money and because 
they prefer to use the same type of satellite that 
is launched and operated by the United States. 
It is essential that this sort of behaviour should 
be analysed at the highest level, that of the 
ministers responsible for space research in the 
member States of the agency. 
To avoid the difficulties I have just mentioned, 
I believe it to be absolutely necessary, as is 
stated in the draft recommendation, for the 
Council to include in the twenty-second annual 
report on its activities guidelines for a long-term 
European policy in sectors of advanced 
technology, taking both civil and military aspects 
into consideration and indicating how effective 
decision-making machinery could be set up in 
Western Europe. (Applause) 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. de Bruyne. 
Mr. de BRUYNE (Belgium) (Translation).-
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, as every 
year, we have a dear picture, when we look 
carefully at the annual report from the Council 
of Ministers and the reply made to it by the 
Assembly, of the situation Western European 
Union finds itself in and - more particularly 
- of the difficulties it is facing. All this 
culminates in a number of recommendations 
which, as in previous years, are being submitted 
by the C"reneral Affairs Committee and which 
need to be seen against the recommendations 
from earlier years. Taken together, they form a 
fairly logical whole ; and in all their vague 
benevolence there is even a measure of "Euro-
pean" wisdom. In this respect, the report from 
Mr. Peridier, and the verbal introduction of it 
we have just heard, provide us with an excellent 
document on which I would like to offer him 
my congratulations. 
This year, again, the Assembly is trying to 
drag the Council out of the state of torpor it 
has been sunk in for some years past. I would 
recommend the newer members of this Assembly 
to read Paul Borcier's booklet "The Assembly of 
·western European Union". Page 18 gives a 
clear picture of the loss of substance that WEU 
has suffered. To quote from the text : 
"The regularity of ministerial meetings has 
varied according to the tasks allotted to WEU 
by the member governments. The Council first 
met every three months and then less 
frequently, hut resumed quarterly meetings 
after a decision reached in July 1963 after 
difficulties in intra-European relations. Again, 
since the United Kingdom joined the European 
Economic Community the Council has been 
meeting less often. For instance, in 1973 and 
1974 it met only once." 
I have no illusions about what is achievable, 
Mr. President, but as a matter of principle 
Mr. Peridier deserves the Assembly's full support 
when he urges that in the years to come the 
Council of Ministers should show more than a 
token activity. 
It might well be, Mr. President, that the 
situation of a number of European and Atlantic 
institutions will before long develop in such 
a way that the existence of Western European 
Union will be seen more clearly than it is today 
to offer an advantage for tackling effectively 
a whole range of shared defence problems. 
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The fourth paragraph of the recommendation 
sets out a task for the Council of Ministers, 
saying: 
"Consider, together with the other powers 
concerned, how it might follow the political 
consultations between the nine member coun-
tries of the EEC on the one hand and on the 
other, in view of the study it is undertaking 
on 'the possibility that WEU might undertake 
additional work connected with the standard-
isation of armaments in Europe', the activities 
of the European programme group;" 
These cannot surely be just empty words, Mr. 
President ; this morning the Secretary of State, 
Mr. Destremau, put all the authority of his office 
into supporting this idea, at least in principle. 
It is gratifying to see that Mr. Peridier's report 
and the recommendation resulting from it leave 
110 doubt about the powers legally vested in the 
permanent representatives. The wording used 
here is important, more especially because it 
comes from the Council of Ministers itself. To 
quote: 
"Noting with satisfaction that the Council 
'makes no distinction between the Council 
of Western European Union meeting at 
ministerial level and the same Council meeting 
at the level of permanent :representatives' ;" 
This is undeniably interesting, and we shaH 
have need to refer to it on occasion. 
To breathe more life into WEU, the Council 
of Ministers ought to undertake a constant and 
more intense activity through the permanent 
representatives. 
To end, I would comment that Mr. Peridier's 
report and the accompanying recommendaMon 
deserve our support. To anyone who can under-
stand, they show all the concern there is among 
those who hope that Western European Union 
will manage to avoid getting sclerosis of all its 
joints. We can see what advantages there are 
to be had from full activity by WEU in general 
and this Assembly in particular, so long as it 
cannot hand over its responsibilities to one or 
other of the European bodies, something thlllt is 
described in the report as being in the future 
and uncertain. Let us not get rid of organisations 
that exist and that work, de jure, and de facto, 
while there is still no certainty that we shall 
hand on our powers to some other, at present 
non-existent, European institution. 
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We are bound by the revised Brussels Treaty, 
Ladies and Gentlemen - and pacta sunt 
servanda. (Applause) 
(Mr. de Niet, Vice-President of the Assembly, 
took the Chair in place of Mr. Nessler) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Riviere. 
Mr. RIVIERE (France) (Translation). -
IJadies and Gentlemen, as the Rapporteur of the 
General Affairs Committee quite rightly 
remarked, it is impossible to judge the annual 
report of the Council without taking account of 
events in the first months of 1976. 
Although the report deals with a year during 
which nothing much may be said to have 
happened at WEU, what we have heard about 
the meeting of the Council of WEU at Brussels 
on 31st May last would suggest that, through 
its Standing Armaments Committee, the role of 
WEU in the defence of the West and in the 
future European union has become clearer in 
recent weeks. 
I must point out the extent to which the semi-
secrecy which has so far enshrouded the decisions 
taken on 31st May has prevented members of 
the Assembly from fulfilling their duty as 
parliamentarians, which is to assess the policy 
pursued by governments in the Cormcil of WEU. 
We cannot in such a sensitive area speak off the 
cuff on the sole basis of the indications given in 
the course of the debate, without having been 
able to have prior knowledge of the decisions 
taken by the Council. 
However, it seems to me essential to raise here 
certain questions I consider necessary albeit in 
the absence of sufficient background information, 
with no pretention at solving them. Thus, our 
Assembly still does not know what the terms of 
reference given to the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee were. You will recall that reactivation 
of the Standing Armaments Committee was 
the subject of several proposals. The first ones, 
at least chronologically, were those of the French 
Government and were presented by Michel 
Debre, then French Minister of National Defence, 
and later by Michel Jobert, the then Minister 
for Foreign Affairs. They date from December 
1972 in the case of Mr. Debre and, in the case 
of Michel Jobert, from a speech to this Assembly 
in November 1973. 
It was clearly, as far as the French Govern-
ment was concerned, not merely a tactical move 
against the Eurogroup of NATO as too often 
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claimed in those circles which systematically 
condemn every F'rench initiative. The Europa 
Archiv in its issue of 25th May provides further 
evidence of this. While the French Government 
has never considered joining the club, it has 
never undertaken anything directed against 
Eurogroup any more than against NATO itself. 
Moreover, Mr. Debre's and Mr. Jobert's pro-
posals were aimed at something which had 
nothing whatever to do with the activities of 
NATO's Eurogroup. Mr. Jobert, may I remind 
you, requested before this Assembly that WEU 
should be the framework in which a dialogue 
should be attempted and thought given to the 
problems affecting European defence. In a book 
which he published very recently entitled 
L'autre regard, Mr. Jobert devoted a dozen 
pages to the initiative which he had taken at 
WEU and re-emphasised its importance in his 
view. He writes : 
"I am glad to have had the time during my 
brief stay at the Quai d'Orsay to make this 
statement. The analysis which it makes and 
the guidelines traced seem to me as sound 
today a.<~ they were yesterday, and nobody yet 
has ventured to utter these self-evident truths 
and the need for a common resolve by the 
Europeans to defend themselves." 
It seems therefore quite clear that the French 
proposals aimed at making WEU the nucleus 
of a policy of European defence by Europeans, 
and the joint manufacture of armaments in such 
a prospect constituted only one element of a 
more ambitiou.s policy. The object was not to 
weaken NATO in any way or to attach armed 
forces to an organisation like WEU, but to 
induce the countries of ·west ern Europe to a_pply 
the modified Brussels Treaty by examining 
together the requirements of European defence. 
The decisioo which the Council of WEU has 
just taken originated direc.tly in Mr. Van 
Elslande's proposals. We know about them 
because the Belgian. Minister for Foreign Affairs 
was good enough to come and expound them 
to our As."!embly in December 197 4. At the time 
he proposed an organisation of the European 
armaments industries within the framework of 
the future European union, the Standing Arma-
ments Committee being charged with a 
preliminary survey, covering not at all defence 
questions but only industrial problems. 
4- 11 
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If we examine Mr. Van Elslande's proposals 
in the light of the report presented in January 
] 976 by Mr. Tindemans to his partners in the 
Nine, we may infer that the Belgian Govern-
ment's proposals were primarily aimed at making 
WEU act for a transitional period as the 
organising body for the armaments industry and 
the arms trade with a view to the future union. 
Neither the Tindemans project nor Van 
Elslande's proposals to our knowledge consider 
which defence policy European union or WEU 
will have to implement. Everything seems to 
indicate that in their view it is a question of 
the policy applied by NATO, and we all know 
who frames that. 
It was common knowledge that some member 
countries of WEU were originally opposed to 
hoth Mr. Jobert's and Mr. Van Elslande's pro-
posals and we may wonder what their reasons 
were for accepting the latter, and to what extent 
the fact of having subscribed to them implies 
that, somehow or other, these countries were 
agreeable to the Europeans discussing the Euro-
pean defence policy amongst themselves, in the 
framework of WEU. That is the first question 
I think this sudden decision to resuscitate the 
Standing Armaments Commi,ttee seems to raise. 
But if we examine this decision in the light 
of what has happened in other organisations, 
notably the setting up of the European pro-
gramme group in Rome at the beginning of 
] 976 and the NATO working party on the inter-
operability of armaments we may wonder to 
what extent this purported reactivation of the 
Standing Armaments Committee of WEU does 
not in fact constitute a further advance along the 
path which seems to have been consistently 
followed by Framce's partners in WEU and 
which would induce it by means of new institu-
tions, to return to integration in NATO, which 
General de Gaulle decided to leave once and for 
all in 1966. 
You must see that, in such case, 1t would 
not be a question of France alone but that such 
a decision would aim at steering the future of 
the European union-to-be. The report submitted 
by the Brussels Commission last August referred 
to defence as a potential competence of the union. 
The Tindemans report was less clear on the 
point, whereas the advances which NATO seems 
to want to make in the field of armaments seem 
to proceed in a fairly obvious direction. 
In the end the sole object, the sole possibility 
and the sole function of European union would 
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1J:e to indu~e the ~uropeans, by means of integra-
tJOn, to umte their forces in support of a policy 
they would have no means of determining since 
they have at their disposal no instrument for 
decision-making; we would be up against all the 
defects which caused the French Parliament in 
the old days to reject the European Defence 
Community project. 
Nor is it any use telling us that it is a question 
of avoiding situations such as that crea.ted by 
the famous deal of the century when a number 
of European countries preferred to buy an 
American plane rather than a European one. 
Indeed, what guarantee should we have that 
the same thing will not happen again the next 
time Y Especially as the efforts in NATO to 
promote trade between both sides of the Atlantic 
have in recent months been given a tremendous 
boost : the organisation in present circumstances 
of some form of European armaments market 
would probably not make the NATO countries 
buy more European equipment but might enable 
them to prevent one or other of their members 
- and here again France seems to be the one they 
have in mind - from selling armaments to non-
member countries of NATO. 
We may well wonder therefore whether 
reactivation of the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee, as now proposed, runs counter to the 
objectives apparently assigned to it and will not, 
unless it is matched by a definition of European 
defence policy, end by ruining the existing arma-
ments industries in some of our countries. 
Let us note in passing that the modified 
Brussels Treaty plainly subordinates economic 
co-op~ration, which it advocates, to the defence 
functions of WEU, whereas all the indications 
that ~e have on the decisions taken by the 
Council would seem to suggest that it has been 
the other way round. The motivations of our 
seven countries are unlikely to have been the 
same in this matter. But in that case we should 
want to know who are entertaining dangerous 
illusions as to the benefits they might derive 
from organising European production and trade 
in armaments. The divergence between the views 
of France and those of its partners is such as to 
make it difficult to believe that behind a decision 
of this type there is any real consensus on the 
objectives of the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee. 
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If ~his were not so, if there had been any 
effective concordance of underlying motives, 
then let us know on what basis this has been 
achieved. 
I should not be the only one to find it 
intolerable that WEU should once again be the 
tool of a policy which France has rejected over 
and over again. 
Such are the main questions which occur to 
me on hearing of the initiative of the WEU 
Council on 31st May last. If it were a real 
reactivation of WEU, with the Standing Arma-
ments Committee considered as only one 
constituent part of it, I would regard this as 
wholly advantageous in that I should see in it the 
attainment of what ha.s consistently been France's 
~im ever since 1958, Europe taking charge of 
Its own defence. But should such reactivation 
only form part of an attempt to reintegrate 
France into NATO, the effect would be to tie the 
future European union, even before it was 
properly started, to the defence policy defined 
by the United States and applied by NATO, and 
before very long condemn it to the fate which 
befell the European Defence Community. 
The Rapporteur of the General Affairs Com-
mittee mentions the problem which any future 
participation of the communist party in the 
government of member countries of WEU would 
raise for the organisation. The American 
authorities ~ve let it be known fairly clearly, 
a8 was confirmed to the General Affairs Com-
mittee when it met in the United States last 
April, that in that event American participation 
in the Atlantic Alliance would be jeopardised. 
I regret that the Council of WEU was not 
able to give a clearer reply to the question put 
by Mr. Radius on the repercussions of such 
participation on the working of WElL I am not 
certain, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen 
whether the optimistic interpretation which :M:r: 
Peridier gave us was the right one, but I would 
like to ask him if he thinks that a reactivation 
of the Standing Armaments Committee in favour 
of a defence policy controlled by NATO and 
effectively resulting in France being fully 
integrated in that organisation, would be accept-
able to his party and his allie8. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. Riviere. 
Do any of the Rapporteurs or Chairmen of 
Committees wish to reply to the speakers L 
I call Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Chairman of the 
General Affairs Committee. 
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of Germany) (Transla;tion). - Mr. President, 
Ladies and Gentlemen, as the Rapporteur of the 
General Mfairs Committee, Mr. Peridier, is not 
present, and as the discussion has turned largely 
on matters affecting this Committee, I feel it 
would be right to make a few brief observations 
in conclusion; in doing this I can of course only 
try to present the views of the Committee. How-
ever, I hope that I shall be on the right wave-
length. 
When we consider the twenty years of mar-
riage between Western Europe and WEU, the 
position is similar to that where after twenty 
years of matrimony one sometimes says that 
one's wife, one's marriage partner, is reliable and 
to be trusted. This at any rate is how it should 
be after twenty years of marriage. But it is also 
frequently said that one's wife is no longer quite 
as attractive as she was at the start of the mar-
riage. And this is what is happening with the 
good old WEU as welL In my view we should 
not at each session moan and complain that this 
is so. I do not mean to say that anyone here 
has actually been doing so. We should, instead, 
be glad and happy that it is such a faithful 
marriage partner for Europe in all its important 
functions - with regard to the obligations of 
members as allies, for example, to the presence 
of the British Army of the Rhine on the main-
land of Europe and to other points that have 
been mentioned here. 
The defence of Europe, which we talk about 
as a special task within the framework of the 
Atlantic Alliance, cannot be limited to WEU 
alone. It simply must be recognised that those 
members of NA '1'0 in Europe who do not belong 
to WEU have a part to play. And this is where 
we encounter the problems that Mr. Riviere 
referred to at the end of his speech. I am very 
pleased at what the Secretary of State Mr. 
Destremau had to say today in his remarks and 
especially in what he has said in his replies to 
questions. These showed a keen feeling for 
clarity, but showed too that with him clarity 
did not mean orthodoxy. We all of us have, 
o:f course, to accept France's desire to mark out 
its special position within the Atlantic Alliance. 
Om French friends and the French Government 
naturally expect us not to be dogmatic about 
this, not to keep on saying "Now you really 
must get back into the integrated organisation 
of NATO as soon as possible". But I would in 
turn urge my French friends and Mr. Riviere 
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for their part not to be dogmatic if the present 
French Government takes certain steps for 
practical collaboration within the framework of 
the Atlantic Alliance. If it does, this should not 
be condemned as heresy against some holy 
dogma. I am speaking frankly because we are 
in a parliamentary assembly and I am speaking 
here as a parliamentarian a;nd need not observe 
a diplomatic discretion. 
Another important group of problems already 
mentioned in our debate in which this Assembly 
has, in my opinion, special tasks to carry out, 
is that of the relations between the European 
Community, with its own functions, and 
w· estern European Union. These we are only 
just beginning to tackle, and the rather sweeping 
cryptic remark made by Mr. Tindemans as a 
footnote to his report certainly shows that much 
thought stHl has to be given to how these two 
institutions can complement each other in the 
circumstances of today and not only when we 
have already reached the ideal stage of Euro-
pean union, as well as to how in our work we 
can - if I may put it this way - move towards 
the European Community in the fieid of defence. 
Here the Assembly has the important job of 
developing initiatives and producing ideas. For 
there can be no doubt about it - if the Euro-
pean Community is to develop into a European 
union, it will have more and more to bring 
defence policy matters into its thinking. 
Which brings me back to where I started. 
When discussing the Council's report, all the 
speakers have, quite logically, brought up the 
matter of relations between the CouncH and the 
Assembly, and between the Council and the 
individual Committees of the Assembly. I should 
most certainly support those speakers who in 
their contributions haye called upon the Council 
to show flexibility in this connection as well. 
It does not matter what hat one happens to be 
wearing or what label one happens to be carry-
ing when discussions are held between Council 
and Assembly, what does matter is that the 
discussions should be effective and that informa-
tion should be exchanged. This seems to me to 
be the decisive factor, and is what we look to 
the Council for in the year ahead. (Applause) 
(Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, 
resumed the Chai·r) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- The joint 
debate is closed. 
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We shall now proceed to consider the draft 
recommendation on the application of the Brus-
sels Treaty, Document 700. 
Mr. Haase has tabled Amendment No. 1 to 
add a new paragraph at the end of the preamble 
as follows: 
"Welcoming the Council's replies to Recom-
mendation 281 and to Written Question 167, 
and the assignment to the Standing Arma-
ments Committee of a study of the situation 
of the armaments industry in the member 
countries ;". 
I put this amendment to the vote by sitting 
and standing. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and stand-
ing) 
The amendment is agreed to. 
Mr. Haase has tabled Amendment No. 2 to 
insert in paragraph 2 of the draft recommenda-
tion proper, before sub-paragraph (i), a new 
sub-paragraph as follows: 
"(i) Include in annual reports, in addition to 
the present statement of the total level 
of British forces on the continent at 
31st December, a statement of the level of 
British forces on the mainland on that 
date, established in accordance with the 
Council's definition of the approved 
level ;". 
Sub-paragraphs (i), (ii) and (iii) become sub-
paragraphs (ii), (iii) am.d (iv). 
I shall put this amendment to the vote by 
sitting and standing. 
I call Mr. de Bruyne. 
Mr. de BRUYNE (Belgium) (Translation). -
This amendment is so precise, on a more than 
technical subject, that I have no idea of which 
way I am going to vote. Could Mr. Haase give 
us some details about the meaning and scope of 
this amendment ? Otherwise, I shall be forced 
to abstain. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - As a mat-
ter qf fact, I share your uncertainties, and I 
will ask the sponsor of the amendment to give 
us some clarification about its wording. 
I call Mr. Richter. 
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Mr. RICHTER (Federal Republic of Ger-
many) (Translation). -Mr. President, I would 
have thought ,that this amendment had been 
dealt with in Mr. Haase's speech, and that Mr. 
Haase has fully substantiated it. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Critchley. 
Mr. CRITCHLEY (United Kingdom). - I 
think I can give an explanation of this amend-
ment. In the past, the British Government has 
been obliged to station 55,000 troops in Germany 
or, more correctly, to assign them to SACEUR. 
Whenever the question of numbers has been 
raised in the House of Commons and elsewhere, 
Ministers have repLied that we have about 
60,000 soldiers stationed in Germany. 
We wish to point out that the number is 
54,700 and that the difference between that and 
the figure given by Mr. Mason is accounted for 
by the Berlin brigade, which does not come 
under the conditions of the Brussels Treaty, and 
our garrison in Gibraltar. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - It would, 
in fact, be useful to clarify matters for the 
Assembly by inserting this additional piece of 
information. I believe thU~t this should satisfy 
Mr. de Bruyne: in the light of the explanations 
provided, the amendment becomes reasonably 
clear. 
I put Amendment No. 2 to the vote by sitting 
and standing. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and stand-
ing) 
Amendment No. 2 is agreed to. 
Rules 34 and 35 of the Rules of Procedure 
require the vote on a draft recommendation 
taken as a whole to be by roll-call, the majority 
required being an absolute majority of the votes 
cast. However, it the Assembly is unanimous 
and there are no objections to the draft recom-
mendation and no abstentions, we can save the 
time needed for a vote by roll-call. 
Are there any objections to the draft recom-
mendation in Document 700, as amended L. 
Al'e there any abstentions L. 
I note that the Assembly is unanimous. 
The amended draft recommendation is agreed 
to ttnanimously 1 • 
1. See page 24. 
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We shall now proceed to vote on the draft 
recommendation on the political activities of the 
Council, Document 702. 
The vote on the draft recommendation as a 
whole will be by roll-call if the Assembly is not 
unanimous. 
Are there any objections to the draft recom-
mendation in Document 702 ?... 
Are there any abstentions L 
I note that the Assembly is unanimous. 
The draft recommendation is agreed to 
unanimously 1 • 
We shall now proceed to vote on the draft 
recommendation on scientific, technological and 
aerospace questions, Document 705. 
The vote on the draft recommendation as a 
whole will be by roll-call if the Assembly is not 
unanimous. 
Are there any objections to the draft recom-
mendation in Document 705 L 
Are there any abstentions L. 
I note that the Assembly is unanimous. 
The draft recommendation is agreed to 
unanimously 2• 
1. See page 25. 
2. See page 26. 
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5. Date, time and Orders of the Day 
of the next Sitting 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- I propose 
that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting 
this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following 
Orders of the Day : 
1. European aeronautical policy - Guidelines 
emerging from the Colloquy on 2nd and 
3rd February 1976 (Presentation of the 
Report of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions ; 
Address by Mr. Chabert, Minister of Com-
munications of Belgium ; Debate and Vote 
on the draft Recommendation, Document 
704). 
2. Detente and security in Europe (Resumed 
Debate on the Report of the General 
Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft 
Recommendation, Document 703 and 
Amendments). 
3. Relations with Parliaments (Presentation 
of and Debate on the Report of the Com-
mittee for Relations with Parliaments, 
Document 706). 
Are there any objections L 
The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak L 
The Sitting is closed. 
(The Sitting was closed at 12.50 p.m.) 
TIDRD SITTING 
Tuesday, 15th June 1976 
SuMMARY 
1. Adoption of the Minutes. 
2. Attendance Register. 
3. European aeronautical policy - Guidelines emerging 
from the Colloquy on 2nd and 3rd February 1976 
(Pre8entation of the Report of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions ; Addre8s by 
Mr. Chabert, Minister of Communications of Belgium; 
Debate and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doe. 704). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Richter, Mr. Valleix and 
Mr. Warren (Rapporteurs), the President, Mr. Chabert 
(Minister of Communications of Belgium). 
Reply by Mr. Chabert to qUIJ8tions put by: Mr. Valleix, 
Mr. de Bruyne. 
Speakers: The President, Mr. de Montesquiou (Chairman 
of the Committee), Mr. Portheine, Mr. de Bruyne, 
Mr. Schlingema.nn, Mr. VaJleix and Mr. Warren (Rap-
porteurs), Mr. de Montesquiou (Chairman of the Com-
mittee). 
4. Detente and security in Europe (Resumed Debate on 
the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote 
on the draft Recommendation, Doe. 703 and Amend-
ments). 
Speakers : The President, Sir Frederic Bennett (Rap-
porteur), Mr. Sieglerschmidt (Chairman of the Committee), 
Mr. Dankert, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Radius, Sir 
Frederic Bennett, Mr. Radius. 
5. Relations with Parliaments (Pre8entation of and Debate 
on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Par-
liaments, Doe. 706). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Delorme (Rapporteur), 
Mr. Radius (Chairman of the Committee). 
6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting. 
The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Tanghe, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The Sit-
ting is open. 
1. Adoption of the Minutes 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- In accord-
ance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, 
the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sit-
ting have been distributed. 
Are there any comments ?... 
The Minutes are agreed to. 
2. Attendance Register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The 
names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting 
which have been notified to the President will 
be published with the list of Representatives 
appended to the Minutes of Proceedings 1 • 
3. European aeronautical policy -Guidelines 
emerging from the Colloquy on 2nd and 3rd 
February 1976 
(Presentation of the Report of the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions ; 
Address by Mr. Chabert, Minister of Communications 
of Belgium ; Debate and Vote on the draft 
Recommendation, Doe. 704) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
Order of the Day is the presentation of and 
1. See page 30. 
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debate on the report of the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Ques-
tions on a European aeronautical policy -
guidelines emerging from the colloquy on 2nd 
and 3rd February 1976, and vote on the draft 
recommendation, Document 704. 
I shall give the floor, one after the other, to 
the three Rapporteurs of the Committee on 
Scientific, 'fechnological and Aerospace Ques-
tions. 
I call Mr. Richter. 
Mr. RICHTER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, I should like to start by referring to 
a very topical matter ; since the attendance in 
this House is not yet all that large, I may 
perhaps mention something I recently heard in 
the German Parliament on a point of topical 
interest. On 26th April, members of the German 
Parliament's Defence Committee were rtold that 
the partners producing the MRCA weapons 
system, or Tornado as it has recently come to 
be called, intend to begin sel'lies production of 
the system from 1st July 1976. Under a three-
nation agreement between governments, the 
partners have undertaken to carry the whole 
programme through. Britain will build 385 air-
craft, West Germany 322 and Italy 100. Up to 
the present, overal!l spending by the three partner 
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countries on the joint development stage has 
been in the order of DM 8,000 million. During 
this stage, the partners succeeded in surmount-
ing difficulties of the most varied kind. The 
highly-advanced engineering design of this air-
craft has been proved sound. 
May I take this opportunity of saying how 
proud we are that it has now been shown that 
Europe has been able to produce a modern 
weapons system, if not the most modern of all. 
The continuing threat from the Warsaw Pact 
has been mentioned several times in the Assem-
bly. The latest information available suggests 
that the MRCA is making a decisive contri- . 
bution towards improving the Alliance's defence 
strength. 
I would remind you that at our previous ses-
sion we dealt, amongst other things, with the 
importance of the Franoo-German joint Alpha-
Jet programme. 
While explaining to you just what equipping 
the air forces of Europe as a whole with these 
two systems means for Europe's defence strength, 
it is a particular pleasure to me to welcome to 
this Assembly one of the manufacturers who 
accepted the heavy risks involved, namely Mr. 
Dornier. I believe the reason he is here is that 
he has recognised how much the Assembly is 
doing to co-ordinate what Europe is doing in the 
air force sector, in armaments for our air forces. 
I hope we shall succeed in broadening the 
existing programmes. Bearing in mind the gen-
eral position of the Alliance, I should like to 
express the hope that our NATO partner 
Turkey, for example, can also be included in 
these efforts, which have already proved suc-
cessful in the Franco-German sphere with Alpha-
Jet. 
The Assembly has also welcomed the decision 
of several European countries which have opted 
for an American programme as a successor to 
the F-104. I am glad that we can confirm this 
in the presence of a Belgian lVIinister. I believe 
that Belgium, together with other countries of 
Europe, has made an important contribution to 
the equipment of our air forces and thereby to 
the security of the Alliance. 
Our WEU colloquy at Toulouse has again con-
firmed that it is still in the aircraft and space 
industries that we will find innovation in very 
many of the technologies of tomorrow. These 
103 
THIRD SITTING 
industries constitute a technological sector which 
has called for - and will still call for - an 
extraordinarily high level of effort if it is to do 
what is expected of it. This means that in the 
future, too, it will provide considerable impetus 
to technical progress. 
I must further point out that at our colloquy 
we came to recognise that despite the energy 
crisis and a world-wide recession, the airline 
companies and manufacturers are basing their 
forecasts on the average annual growth rate of 
air traffic remaining at 6% to 8 %. As far as 
our industries are concerned, this would mean 
in the short term that the European aviation 
industry will have to make special efforts to 
overcome the present world-wide economic 
depression. We must also realise that the aviation 
industry in Europe belongs to those sectors of 
the economy where - and on this we are all 
agreed - independent effort on a national basis 
is no longer a viable solution. 
I should like to say here, echoing the con-
clusions reached at the Toulouse colloquy, that 
the European aviation programme is technically 
and financially realisable only if it is backed 
up by a range of measures on both sides, that is, 
by the governments and by the companies. We 
parliamentarians therefore proposed at Toulouse 
in consultation with the industrial represen-
tatives that the national bodies for aviation and 
space research that are to be found in one 
form or another in practically every country 
should be invited to set up a European council 
for aviation and space research. We can legiti-
mately point to the success enjoyed by ESA in 
Europe in the space field. I think no one will 
dispute that it was in fact this Assembly which 
time and again came forward with fresh ideas 
in order to get ESA off the ground. Mr. Gibson 
attended meetings of our Committee on several 
occasions, and has confirmed that it is thanks to 
the Committee that we were able to arrive at a 
co-ordinated programme in the space research 
field. 
Military and civil requirements must be co-
ordinated at European level and in future, to 
the extent that this is worth while, at Atlantic 
level too, by extending co-operation on arma-
ments with a view to making the most of the 
security and economic advantages of weapons 
standardisation through arrangements with the 
United States on opening up the two-way street 
that will be necessary. We have objected time 
and again that, in the past, this has been very 
much a one-sided affair. Above all else, a two-
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way street must be opened up in connection with 
co-operation on armaments, through increased 
collaboration between the European airline com-
panies and European manufacturers when new 
civil projects are to be implemented. 
I feel I must tell you what I felt as I flew to 
Paris on the way to this meeting. It was the first 
time I had the opportunity of flying from 
Frankfurt to Paris on an .Airbus, and I am, 
myself, now convinced that this is certainly the 
most modern and the best aircraft of all the 
jumbo family, and proof of what we in Europe 
are capable of producing. With Alpha-Jet, 
MRCA, Jaguar and other Mirage systems in 
mind, I must say that we can produce the goods, 
and WEU must do all it can to ensure, through 
the proposals it made in Toulouse, that co-
ordination will be possible. (.Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Valleix. 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). -
Ladies and Gentlemen, for the second time in 
three years, your Committee on Scientific, Tech-
nological and Aerospace Questions, in accordance 
with an order of our Assembly, convened a col-
loquy on a European aeronautical policy - at 
Toulouse on 2nd and 3rd February last. 
It was an entirely new idea the first time in 
1973, and had lost nothing of its originality in 
1976, because in the meantime oil prices had 
completely upset the initial premises. 
The task of WEU is a military and defence 
one. Hence, its mission in the scientific and 
technological fields has gone from strength to 
strength. Aeronautics is both a civil and a mili-
tary sector. Modern aeronautics presupposes a 
high technological content and a powerful 
industry. Both for civil and military purposes it 
is essential for the defence of our western coun-
tries. The fact was established in 1973, and 
remains just as true today. It was confirmed at 
Toulouse. But in 1973 the whole outlook for 
aeronautics and every forecast were based on 
an annual growth rate of air transport of 15 % 
to 18 %. Today, the figure has fallen to between 
3% and 4%. 
Suffering as it was from a latent crisis of over-
equipment, which could already be discerned in 
1973, the aeronautical industry was, by its very 
nature, completely vulnerable to the direct 
effects of the oil crisis. For example, the airport 
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of Roissy-Charles de Gaulle opened at the very 
height of the crisis and Concorde made its 
appearance upon the market in a climate 
rendered all the more difficult by the fact that 
even the Boeing 747s represented a heavy burden 
on the capital costs of all the major world airline 
companies. 
In the current economic situation, the renewal 
of aircraft fleets will often have to wait until 
the 1980s and, by the same token, technological 
improvements are marking time. 
It was in this sort of atmosphere that the 
partners in the Toulouse colloquy assembled in 
response to the initiative of your Committee and 
the Assembly. The heavy task of acting as 
General Rapporteur of this colloquy fell to Mr. 
V ergnaud, and it was he who, in a particularly 
remarkable summing up, reviewed the main 
findings of the two days' proceedings. 
These were: 
First : there is no future for the individual 
national aviation industries of each of our coun-
tries, nor will there be any future for the Euro-
pean aeronautical and air transport industries 
without a genuine European political purpose. 
Second : the civil and military aviation indus-
tries are closely linked. Mr. Richter reminded us 
just now that military orders often account for 
between 60 % and 70 % of total output - hence, 
of course, the size of military budgets. 
Third : in the present economic situation, State 
aid for the aircraft industry and for the airlines 
is tending to increase. This should induce our 
governments to look for increased co-operation 
in order to ensure that public funds are put to 
the most profitable use. 
These three comments, as you will observe, all 
converge on the need for increased political 
awareness. 
Fourth : aeronautical Europe should increas-
ingly rely on quality and not succumb to the 
temptation of tariff protection for its markets. 
Not wanting to be a "closed" market, its products 
should impose themselves by their technology, 
industrial effidency and the quality of after-
sales servjces. 
But - and this is a fifth conclusion - we 
must also have stronger and more coherent 
structures. Stronger structures : I will take the 
example of Airbus, a thoroughly sound venture, 
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which has proved its lasting worth. By ensuring 
its own continuity, Airbus should also be able 
to ensure continuity in the service and main-
tenance of this European family of aircraft. But 
we must also, above all, have coherent structures. 
Just as at Bonn, a year ago, you were good 
enough to support your Rapporteur's advocacy 
of an advance in European civil aviation, at 
Toulouse the idea was canvassed of a European 
aeronautical council, backed up by national 
aeronautical councils that should facilitate its 
advent. 
Lastly, the sixth conclusion : Mr. Vergnaud 
was able to note a fresh approach at Toulouse, 
as compared with 1973 : the idea of co-operation 
with the United States emerged as a possibility 
to be explored, in that it would be based on 
equality and reciprocity, not tagging along as 
sUJbcontraCJtors. 
I should like to dwell, in a few brief words, 
on these two last points. 
'fhe idea of a national aeronautical council in 
each country : there exist in fact, in each of our 
countries, structures for monitoring, promoting 
and safeguarding civil or military aeronautics. 
Often, there are two separate governmental 
structures involved. These already constitute an 
element of dispersion, not necessarily of inter-
ests, but sometimes of guidelines. Moreover, the 
responsible body may sometimes be a depart-
mental structure in one country and a 
secretariat-general in others. Let us not forget 
either that there are private structures too. 
In short, our countries' aeronautics, whether it be 
aircraft manufacture, air transport or all the 
ancillary activities, often depends on various 
structures. What is important therefore is not 
so much the term "national aeronautical coun-
cil'' as the fact that these structures, would, 
within each of our governments, be more 
coherent and better consolidated, so that there 
would genuinely be a governmental organisation 
or authority able to deal with the whole range 
of aeronautics in each country. 
As for the European aeronautical council, 
which harks back to the idea of European 
advancement developed a year ago at Bonn, it is 
defined in the recommendation which we propose 
you should adopt, and would be designed to cope 
with the following problems : consultations with 
the European Communities, which, as you know, 
are concerned with this issue, although the 
4* - 11 
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governments have not followed up the proposals 
of the Brussels Commission : consultations with 
a view to improved production, more competitive 
prices and marketing arrangements for large 
civil aircraft. Another aim of the European 
aeronautical council would be to arrange finance 
for marketing European aircraft through, say, 
a kind of European export-import bank. 
The third aim is to keep Concorde in pro-
duction so that Europe retains its technological 
lead. 
The fourth concern is the establishment of a 
civil aviation agency for Western Europe. This 
concerns the everlasting problem of European 
airworthiness certificates. As you know, a plane 
can fly in France, but not necessarily in the 
United Kingdom - and, why not, vice-versa, 
although I do not know of such a case. 
Fifth, the aim is finally to develop, with the 
European Civil Aviation Conference, a joint 
policy for air transport. This would cover land-
ing rights and recognition of European airspace. 
Another remark concerns co-operation with the 
United States. As envisaged at Toulouse, this 
represents a new collective attitude whereas so 
far there have only been moves by individual 
countries, or private industrial sectors. Such co-
operation must, however, be subject to strict 
conditions and requirements of equality and 
reciprocity, such as rejection of subcontracting 
by European firms. 
On this subject, I have two comments : the 
need to keep up high scientific and technological 
standards in Europe. This is no time, just when 
we are becoming reconciled to the idea of a 
dialogue with our big American partner, to let 
ourselves be disqualified in this respect, for I 
believe the facts speak for themselves. The 
dialogue would become one in which Europe 
would play second fiddle to the United States 
if American technology ruled the roost. 
I think, too, another obligation arises : taking 
into account the vital share of military 
aeronautics in this context, it is imperative - I 
was going to say, a prerequisite - that there 
should be increased consultation in defining 
military requirements. For that reason, we are 
proposing a study group - the third point in 
the recommendation - for determining member 
countries' military aircraft requirements in 
liaison with the Standing Armaments Committee. 
This is a particularly difficult debate. I 
believe, however, that our proceedings this 
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morning, following the statement by the Chair-
man of the Council of Ministers, lend even 
greater justification, if that were needed, to this 
proposal. 
The establishment of the European programme 
group last February and the role devolving upon 
the Standing Armaments Committee of carrying 
out an industrial analysis in our countries are 
all approaches compatible with this point in the 
proposed recommendation. 
I listened carefully this morning to the 
remarks of Mr. Riviere. Of course, like him, I 
should hope and trust "reactivation" of the 
Standing Armaments Committee may proceed 
along European lines and not under the aegis 
of another, even of a great ally. That is indeed 
what our proposal has in mind. 
Let me say again, however, that while co-
operation with our great United States partners 
may be contemplated, we should not sacrifice the 
high technological standards achieved by Europe. 
That is indeed the first prerequisite. 
The second - equally, or doubtless even more 
important - is that we must be able to express 
our views with one voice and not confusedly, 
which would justify setting up these high-level 
national aeronautieal oouncils or a European 
aeronautical council whose duty it would also be 
to perfect our cohesion in the military sphere, 
industrially so important but politically so dif-
ficult. In this respect WEU is, in my view, 
assuming a very special responsibility, which 
enhances anew, for any who still doubt it, the 
unique value of its mission. 
I shall conclude, Mr. President, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, by simply stressing how pretentious 
and overweening some aspects of this recom-
mendation may appear, bearing in mind the 
action taken by the Council of Ministers follow-
ing the Assembly's recommendations. That is 
why, in the case of a subject fully in keeping 
with WEU's traditions, these aeronautical prob-
lems bearing on Europe's defence, independence, 
technology and, let us never forget, the employ-
ment prospects for 400,000 European workers, 
wage-earners, supervisors and engineers, we are 
so very anxious that a recommendation like the 
one we are putting before you, in the hopes that 
you will agree to adopt it, may be given a speedy 
and, I hope, as constructive as possible response. 
(Applause) 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Warren. 
Mr. WARREN (United Kingdom).- I am the 
third Rapporteur and perhaps after two polite 
gentlemen it might be valuable to insert a note 
of contention which could be taken up in discus-
sion, and to pose some questions that are not yet 
answered in terms of European aerospace. 
I listened very carefully this morning to 
Mr. Destremau and I came to the conclusion that 
for him Europe was still a dream ; there was no 
Europe of the kind that we in Western Euro-
pean Union, the seven nations, have cherished; 
there was not the Europe of the nine of the 
European Community and there was not the 
Europe of the eighteen nations of the Council 
of Europe. He told us that France remained 
faithful to its alliances. I, as the third Rap-
porteur, might be allowed to question this. 
But first perhaps I could state the facts as I 
see them arising out of these very valuable col-
loquies that we have had and the great colla-
boration and help that we have received from 
the European aircraft industry and from the 
aircraft industry of the United States of 
America. Political initiatives create projects. A 
political initiative created Concorde. It created 
the multi-role combat aircraft. It created the 
Airbus. Political initiatives have not yet been 
used effectively to create the markets for the 
European industry. The political initiatives that 
are needed can be created only by members of 
Western European Union. 
It is true that in 1975 politicians in Western 
Europe created a magnificent market. It was 
the market of Norway, Denmark, Holland and 
Belgium for the F-16. We created that market. 
We did it carefully and with calculation. In 1976 
we are creating another market for the Boeing 
E-3 A airborne warning and command system. 
The F-16 was but of small value for the 
Americans compared with that which we are now 
undertaking by our own direct action. The Amer-
icans are looking forward to receiving from all of 
us here 4,000 miLlion diohlars of our taxpayers' 
money in order to buy an aeroplane. 
I must ask you, gentlemen - I hope you will 
allow me to pose this question, Mr. President, to 
my fellow parliamentarians - have we not 
learned from last year ? Are we to go forward 
this year and next year building markets for 
the Americans ? They have fine aircraft, but our 
problem is that we have the political capability 
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to create the markets in which our own industry 
will also participate. There is no equality of 
participation. There was none last year. 
The French aircraft, the F-1 E, was used as 
what the Americans would call "the fall guy" 
so that the F-16 could succeed. This year there 
is no "fall guy". NATO has studied only the 
Boeing E-3 A, but nobody has got to the point 
- and this is the question today - of how 
much money we need to pay for this aeroplane. 
They are talking about how much we should pay. 
I would question the philosophy of whether we 
need it at all. 
These are the prime questions that we as 
politicians should be asking in allowing ourselves 
to subcontract to the military the question of 
which aircraft they should fly. They should put 
to us recommendations. We do not have to accept 
those recommendations. In Western European 
Union we are interested in defence, and I give 
this as one instance where there is no means of 
questioning that which the military propose. My 
fear is that we shall get to a point where we 
shall be talking so fast that we cannot even hear 
what is being said. 
The next point I would make about markets is 
that political initiatives have not been used to 
create a unified air transport market in 
Western Europe. I am told by civil servants in 
the United Kingdom that I do not need to worry 
about this, but we must worry about it. We are 
the only nation group in the world that is 
burdened with the antiquated 1946 Bermuda 
agreements, which mean that all air transport 
between separate European countries is regu-
lated. We are a market as big as the United 
States. We may be fifteen or twenty years 
behind the United States in terms of passenger 
demand for air transport, but we are as big and 
we need the same kind of development. 
It is time we looked to the reasons why that 
development is not taking place. It now costs 
me more than £60 to fly from London to Paris 
and back. To fly the same distance in the United 
States costs me only a quarter of that sum. There 
must be something wrong, and the responsibility 
lies with the politicians rather than the airlines. 
We as politicians must ask ourselves why this is 
happening to us. 
I move now to an area of probably greater 
contention. Mr. Destremau left me wirth the same 
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fear as I have after hearing Mr. Valleix speaking 
about France. France has gone to the United 
States. In all my time at Western European 
Union I have been told that I must collaborate 
with France, that I must work with France, that 
I must support Concorde. But when the moment 
comes when there is something else which should 
be done, France goes to America. Why is this ? 
France must answer this question. 
I can only pose these questions. I have asked 
so many questions that I now know the real 
questions to ask. Why has France gone to the 
United States of America after so many forms 
of co-operation with the United Kingdom and 
with Western Germany? Does the Alpha-Jet 
with Western Germany mean nothing, or the 
Airbus with Western Germany, or the Jaguar 1 
Does the Concorde mean nothing Y Out of all that 
has gone on since 1962 with the signing of the 
Concorde agreement, I would hope that France 
wouJ.d ally itself in this way, but it seems that 
my own statement is true and that Europe is still 
a dream. 
I am worried about this. Like most British 
politicians, I have many problems, such as the 
problem of nationalisation to which I shall turn 
in a moment or two. I have problems about what 
is to happen to Franoo if it allows itself to be 
swallowed by the "Jaws" of the United States. 
There is this serious danger that the French air 
industry will go to the United States thinking 
that the Americans are talking politics. The 
Americans are not talking politics : they are 
talking business. 
The people at Booing, at McDonnell DougLas 
and at Lockheed with whom I have been talking 
during the last four weeks have told me that 
they regard France as only a contractor. There 
is no indication coming out of France either with 
the 7-N 7, the Dassault 600 or the 7 X 7 that 
there have been any opportunities of design 
leadership for France. The Americans still hold 
this to their hearts. 
We must not believe that there is some rapport 
which can be taken at political level with 
America. It is not looked at in that form by 
the United States purely as a commercial arrange-
ment. It is a mistake on the part of France to 
think that there is some political relationship in 
terms of the "Spirit of 1776". 
What is this co-operation in Europe Y We have 
nearly failed over the years and we should now 
try to realise it. We have tried to work together. 
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It has been hard to work together, we have dif-
ferent languages, but we have worked together, 
and we should try to maintain the solidarity that 
has been created. 
I said in Toulouse that we must not "invent 
the wheel". In this commercial world of civil 
aviation the Americans have already made the 
rules. We cannot change those rules and I hope 
that we are not led astray as Western European 
Union politicians. We may want to change them 
and, with success, we probably can change them 
in five or ten years' time but at the moment the 
market which is Europe is being used not by the 
Europeans but by the Americans. We must once 
more restate the premises on which aircraft can 
be sold when they are built. 
Let us take the civil aircraft situation, which 
is of such interest to Marcel Dassault and General 
Mitterrand. There is only one way to go to the 
next generation of jet transports in Europe. All 
we have to do is firnd two airlines thaJt will buy 
a minimum of fifty aeroplanes. These are not 
my rules but the American rules, and we must 
learn that lesson. We may not like those rules, 
but if we do not accept them we lose as we 
have lost in the past. We must look for two 
airlines that will buy a minimum of fifty civil 
aircraft. 
Where are they to be found Y They are here 
in Europe. There are Lufthansa, Air France, 
British Airways, the KSSU group. They are 
here, and if members do not believe that this 
is the way to do it, I must say that from Boeing 
comes the one message "That is what Boeing is 
going to do". It is going to take Lufthansa or 
Air France or KSSU or British Airways. I have 
great admiration for Boeing. That is what it 
intends to do. 
The fact is that with all our power in Europe 
we cannot protect our aircraft manufacturers 
from the import of American airliners, but if 
I tried to sell European aircraft in the United 
States, I should meet a tariff barrier. We put 
no tariff barrier against the Americans. One 
must keep on telling the same story that I now 
seek to tell. There is no other story. That is 
what it is all about. It is not a small story. It 
is worth billions and billions and billions of 
dollars, of pounds, of Deutschmarks, of francs, 
of Dutch guilders. 
The last thing to which I must refer is the 
nationalisation situation in the United Kingdom. 
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I am a dedicated conservative who does not 
believe in nationalisation. I am more than sorry 
that my socialist comrades are not here to share 
in our deliberations, but that is their decision. 
But one must be aware that whether or not 
nationalisation takes place in the United King-
dom, there is 50 % of Europe's aerospace indus-
try power and we must not by nationalisation 
undo our capability but recognise where it is. 
As a last word I pose one more question. When 
will Europe act 1 When will Europe learn to use 
to its advantage, its market, its capability, its 
financial resources 1 When will it show the will 1 
It is a question not just of talking as Europeans 
but of acting as Europeans and being one people 
together. (Applause) 
(Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, took 
the Chair in place of Mr. Tanghe, Vice-President 
of the Assembly) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The 
debate is open. 
We are particularly happy, Mr. Minister, to 
welcome you in this Assembly which has its 
origins in the Brussels Treaty and was set up as 
a result of Belgian initiative. I realise how much 
we are indebted to you for having found the 
time, in spite of your many commitments, to 
come and address the Assembly. 
Mr. Chabert, you are the Belgian Minister of 
Communications. Allow me to add that you are 
the white hope of Belgian politics and that, as 
we are so very security-minded, communications 
and logistics are to our way of thinking 
as decisive and as important as armaments 
themselves. So we have both personal and 
technical reasons for attaching the greatest 
importance to what you have to say. We shall 
therefore be hanging on your lips. As is 
customary, you will be subjected to the cut and 
thrust of questions and replies. 
Without wishing to anticipate too much, I am 
quite sure that the debate which will now take 
place will be of the highest interest. 
Mr. Minister, would you please come to the 
speaker's rostrum and give your address 1 
Mr. CHABERT (Minister of Communications 
of Belgium) (Translation). - I look on it as a 
privilege, Mr. President, to be able to address 
this distinguished assembly on the twofold policy 
matter of the expediency of, and the prospects 
for, European co-operation in the aircraft 
industry and civil aviation. For some long time 
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past the future of the European aircraft industry 
and European air transport have been a subject 
of concern to both industry and government 
circles in various countries and in the European 
Community. Some very remarkable papers were 
presented at the colloquy on this topic at Tou-
louse on 2nd and 3rd February this year, all of 
which helped to throw light on the many and 
complex aspects of the problems arising in this 
subject area. My brief contribution here will 
therefore also help towards sketching the broad 
outlines of what a common policy might be in 
the European context. 
Although the futures of aircraft building in 
Europe and air transport in Europe are un-
doubtedly connected, we cannot get away from 
the fact that both the historical background to 
the development of these two sectors of aviation, 
and the motivation underlying this development, 
have been totally different. Wishing to be objec-
tive, I shall therefore deal separately with the 
problems affecting each sector so as to try to 
see what influence developments in each sector 
can have upon the other. 
In the postwar years the building of civil 
transport aircraft developed mainly in the United 
States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France. 
It was a development marked, among other 
things, by a de facto dividing-up of the markets. 
It should be noted that France and Britain 
never managed a real breakthrough with their 
civil aircraft, and were unable to dominate even 
their own domestic markets ; that the Soviet 
Union has managed to supply its aircraft only 
on its own home market - albeit a very large 
one - and to the closely-associated countries of 
the eastern bloc ; and that the United States, 
on the other hand, of course found a wide outlet 
for sales in America but also sold its aircraft 
in most other countries apart from the eastern 
bloc, and thus dominates the majority of the 
world market. The important thing is that this 
state of affairs, once it came about, has con-
tinued over successive periods during which most 
airlines were rebuilding - and later modernising 
- their fleets. 
(The speaker continued in French) 
In the building of civil air fleets we have 
therefore seen a marked preference for American 
products, a situation which has not altered much, 
if at all. American manufacturers start from a 
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position of strength backed up by the decisive 
magnitude of domestic market requirements in 
respect of air transport and by a sales philosophy 
which has always been based on intensive 
marketing research among the airlines of the 
whole world. 
Being able to rely on a large home market, 
allied with a marketing system which adapted 
as much as possible the product offered to what 
the airlines demanded, has given American 
manufacturers a firm and enviable market. 
This market position has been bolstered up by 
the Export-Import Bank finance facilities thanks 
to which the high selling prices of ever more 
advanced aircraft with ever larger capacities 
have remained acceptable to foreign buyers 
thanks to ingenious back-stop clauses in the 
supply contracts. Another trump card that must 
not be overlooked is a reliable supply of spare 
parts and accessories, together with trade-in 
guarantees. 
What is rather remarkable is that some manu-
facturers have in such circumstances managed to 
make their production programmes pay off by 
capturing the American market, as in the case 
of the Vickers Viscount, the Sud-Aviation's Cara-
velle and the Fokker F-27. 
It is noteworthy that this was achieved in the 
case of the Viscount and the Caravelle mainly 
by development of an advanced technology which 
answered commercial requirements more rapidly 
than the technology the American manufacturers 
were able to offer. This breakthrough could not 
be enlarged because of the rapid powers of 
adaptation of the American competitors who 
very soon put some highly competitive products 
on the market which they had already captured. 
At the moment aircraft production has 
developed to such an extent that the break-even 
point at which amortisation of research and 
development costs is assured is about 400 units, 
whereas as models become larger the difficulties 
of reaching this threshold increase corespond-
ingly. 
This seems likely to have been the immediate 
cause of a definite move towards co-operation 
among manufacturers. The British and the 
French were the first to resort to co-operation 
as well as going on collaborating with other Euro-
pean manufacturers. And, one can say, with some 
measure of success. 
The question is whether such limited collabora-
tion offers any real possibility of a favourable 
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change in the European manufacturers' relative 
share of the market. 
Apart from the countrioes of the eastern bloc, 
the ratio at the moment is nine to one. Everybody 
seems convinced that the European aircraft 
industry is not lacking in know-how : quite the 
contrary. 
Moreover, Europe's total production capacity 
is comparable to that of America. Yet it does 
not show the same results and remains mostly 
unused because the finished product finds it 
difficult to penetrate the market. There is there-
fore a complete disproportion between sales and 
costs of existing capacity. 
In this connection I refer to the excellent 
report by Mr. Richter, Mr. Valleix and Mr. War-
ren, in particular the following passage : 
"So far Europe has had the necessary techno-
logical expertise. Its capacity for imagination, 
high standard of engineering, its production 
potential and its highly skilled 400,000-strong 
work furce have not yet however achieved the 
same credibility as American manufacturers 
have in the world and especially the United 
States market. More effort must therefore be 
concentrated on the standards of after-sales 
support. This, too, presupposes that Europe's 
industry must not disperse its financial and 
technical resources but must concentrate its 
efforts on judiciously-selected programmes 
involving whole families of aircraft." 
In present circumstances therefore we must 
turn towards other formulae which may in the 
medium term make existing production capacity 
profitable by adapting to the needs of the market 
and by rationalisation and lowering costs by 
means of financial aid to support sales, and by 
creating competitive conditions for the supply 
and trade-in of accessories and spares. 
Adaptation of products to market require-
ments calls for proper marketing techniques 
involving a radical break with the existing link-
up in certain countries between aircraft manu-
facturers and the national airlines. 
The question also arises as to whether the 
European industry would not be better advised 
to envisage a certain amount of collaboration 
with American industry in order to encourage 
opportunities for a rapid improvement in its 
share of the market, at least in future expansion. 
110 
THIRD SITTING 
The present system of offset production, 
usually negotiated by the European governments 
on the occasion of large orders in favour of the 
American aeronautical industry and economy, 
should in any case be reviewed and more firmly 
based on true reciprocity. Such reciprocity can 
and should be found in closer co-operation 
between comparable American and European 
aeronautical industries in balanced partnership. 
The future development of European air trans-
port and the associated potential growth of the 
European fleet may play a big role in this, 
on the understanding that the airlines are offered 
types of planes which meet their needs on compe-
titive terms and which do not present insur-
mountable obstacles to a coherent build-up of 
existing fleets. 
May I now quote Mr. Claudius Dornier Jr. 
in his speech at the Toulouse colloquy last 
February: 
"I believe that the success enjoyed by the 
Airbus and other well-known European air-
craft - and, let us hope, by Concorde too -
will enable our European aircraft industry 
to gain more and more ground over the United 
States so as to establish the conditions that 
are indispensable if we want the United States 
to consider co-operation on an equal basis with 
Europe in the aviation field to be worthwhile. 
However, the interest aroused in the United 
States by these successes should in no case 
deceive us. We shall achieve collaboration on 
a basis of true equality with this great partner 
only after we have succeeded in getting Europe 
to hold indivisible views on a 'European' 
solution for our aircraft industry. 
Unless we get our house in order without 
delay, I do not believe the United States will 
recognise us as true partners. 
It is the immense importance of this process 
of European integration in relation to the 
United States, and the opportunities which 
the necessarily synchronised political interests 
of the 'free world' would provide and which 
we should be wasting if we hesitated any 
longer, that calls for a reappraisal of our 
common attitude in the military and economic 
spheres. 
In reality the point has already been reached 
when it is no longer possible to divide the 
world of aviation into an American aircraft 
industry and a European aircraft industry ; 
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indeed this fact should be central to all future 
planning: western aviation versus eastern 
aviation." 
This brings me to the second part of my 
speech : the advisability and the chances of closer 
collaboration between the European airlines. 
Like most air transport companies, they are 
confronted most of the time with a situation 
of over-capacity which is a direct result of 
clinging to over-narrow nationalist ideas in a 
pre-eminently international market whose expan-
sion has in recent years been too slow to keep 
pace with steeply climbing production costs. 
Both on a world scale and in Europe, this 
situation has led to ruinous competitive relations 
likely to undermine any sound commercial opera-
tion. 
In many cases the situation has been aggra-
vated by overt or covert government intervention, 
whereby competitive conditions are falsified 
even more. 
In recent years, the trend has quickened and 
become even more acute because of the inter-
national energy crisis, widespread inflation and 
economic recession. 
Certain changes in operating conditions, in 
particular steep price increases in energy pro-
ducts, very high investment costs of hardware 
coupled with very high finance costs and steadily 
rising labour costs, all constitute additional and 
continuing elements of distortion in a market 
which is too limited and fractionated to allow 
of profitable operating. 
The inevitable result is that the disproportion 
between revenue and expenditure has become 
more and more acute. To cope with this the 
European companies have collaborated techni-
cally by setting up consortia such as the KSSU 
and ATLAS which have undeniably produced 
savings in operating expenditures of the airline 
fleets but which are not by a long way suf-
ficient in themselves to restore the situation. 
Efforts to achieve collaboration in operating 
airlines have not so far succeeded, because the 
political will has been lacking. The only excep-
tion is the SAS consortium which has resulted 
in a better economic sharing among airlines, a 
stronger international position, and better use 
of equipment, with considerable cost economies. 
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Many experts would support me in my con-
tention that this system could be a possible 
answer to the problems facing civil aviation 
in Europe. 
Moreover, the situation is such that around 
62 % of the activities of all the European air-
lines is concentrated on intercontinental flights. 
This has the effect of producing cut-throat 
competition in a fraction of the market where 
the European companies not only face one 
another but also non-European companies in 
the framework of an exceedingly costly sales 
organisation and a policy of prestige covering 
practically all the major cities of the world. 
In the present state of affairs, it is essential 
to cut out irrational mutual competition, make 
drastic reductions in expenditure and consolidate 
market positions. 
Clearly this can only be done by means of 
very close collaboration sensibly carried out 
between companies which are to a degree com-
plementary and by avoiding concentrations 
leading to hypertrophy which is often an obstacle 
to efficient management. 
What European civil aviation needs is in my 
opinion not another mammoth organisation, but 
to be split up into operating units small enough 
to be more profitable, and offer reasonable con-
ditions for striking a new and better balance 
for sharing the market. This could well streng-
then their position vis-a-vis the aircraft industry 
and give them a better starting position to cope 
with the enormous financial problems inherent 
in modern air transport. 
I have already drawn your attention to the 
fact that the European airlines are, and will 
remain for some time to come, big customers of 
American industry and the American economy 
in general. 
Between 1966 and 1970 the European com-
panies' total expenditure rose by 250 % for 
operating costs in respoot of activities and 
interest repayments in America, whilst capital 
expenditure on aircraft and equipment rose by 
514% in the same period. 
There is no doubt that the smaller European 
companies have every interest in achieving, by 
means of adequate concentration, better negotia-
ting positions as regards steadily rising invest-
ment costs whose repercussion on fares will raise 
almost insurmountable problems. 
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The present situation, as I have tried to show, 
can hardly be called favourable. Whereas the 
number of passengers carried has risen by more 
than half since the seoond world war, the profit-
ability of the airlines has fallen by about 50%. 
One of the major causes is certainly, I repeat, 
the irrational competition between the aircraft 
industries in Europe. The price paid for this 
by the taxpayer in certain countries is very high, 
and the question is whether those who are the 
real losers will not condemn this state of affairs, 
possibly through their representatives in the 
European Parliament elected by universal suf-
frage. 
It is my opinion that the time is approaching 
when we ought to put a stop to investments 
which, while serving national prestige, are in 
socio-economic terms unproductive. 
If we wish to improve the situation we must 
finish with attempts to outbid each other by 
the various national States and, taking a Euro-
pean view, urgently seek new forms of collabora-
tion. This should be located in the field of air-
craft manufacture and the operation of the 
airlines, and based on an in-depth study of 
medium- and long-term needs, control of capacity 
and a rational organisation of the market keep-
ing competition within reasonable bounds. In 
Europe, aeronautical policy is not European 
enough and the result is a fragmentation of 
opportunities and a waste of financial means. 
Rationalisation by collaboration instead of 
battling against the stream appears the only 
formula that can bring salvation. The example 
of SAS should be an example for us to reflect 
upon and act upon. 
On those privileged occasions when we take 
a piercing look at Europe's aeronautical prob-
lems, as we did at Toulouse, and as we are doing 
again in this Assembly, nobody can seriously 
doubt the potential possibilities of European 
aeronautics. We are unanimous in our belief 
in these. 
In the last resort, however, the political will 
is lacking for setting in motion the machinery 
of collaboration. But such a political will is 
indispensable since we shall have to give up a 
part of our national sovereignty. 
In looking to the future I am not entirely 
pessimistic. Interest in the problems which we 
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have been discussing here today is growing. It 
is not only in political circles that people are 
working on new forms of collaboration. The 
airlines are also carefully reconnoitring the ter-
rain, as seen from the ongoing informal contacts 
with the European authorities. That is an encour-
aging development. I am therefore convinced 
that the airlines in Europe will be given a fresh 
opportunity if they can agree on less costly new 
forms of collaboration through adequate concen-
tration. In the longer prospect, such a develop-
ment will open the way to joint refurbishing 
of aeronautical construction and policy in 
Europe. This is an essentiai sine qua non for a 
dialogue with the United States of America and 
the other continents, not only for aircraft 
construction but also for improved organisation 
and sharing of intercontinental air traffic. 
Thank you for your attention. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. Minister. Before calling members of the 
Assembly who wish to put questions, I should 
like to welcome the presence in the public gallery 
of a certain number of prominent participants 
at the Toulouse colloquy organised by WEU, 
and particularly by the Chairman of the Com-
mittee on Scientific, Technological and Aero-
space Questions, our friend Mr. Pierre de Mon-
tesquiou. They are - forgive me if I miss any-
body out - Mr. Dornier, Mr. Iserland, Sir 
Richal'd Smeeton, Mr. Sisson, Mr. Scherer and 
Mr. Jourdet. 
Their presence here underlines the great inter-
est they took in the colloquy, and the healthy 
collaboration which will, I trust, grow up between 
politicians and top industrialists. Thank you, 
Gentlemen, for coming here. (Applause) 
I call Mr. Valleix. 
Mr. VALLEIX (France) (Translation). -It 
is for us both a pleasure and an honour to meet 
again those who gave us so much enlightenment 
at Toulouse three months ago. I would like, too, 
to welcome Mr. Lucien who is also with us 
today. 
Mr. President, I should like to confirm what 
you have already said, and say how greatly we 
appreciated the address by the Belgian Minister 
of Communications, and what a pleasure it is to 
find that he shares our opinions. 
I should now like to refer to the sine qua non 
he mentioned at the end of his remarks, to the 
effect that if we turn towards not research but 
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an open dialogue with our American partners, 
we must do so with a minimum of discipline 
among ourselves : otherwise there would be no 
point in laying down any conditions at all and 
this debate would be scuppered from the start. 
You pointed out the difficulties of the Euro-
pean airlines in meeting twofold competition, 
worldwide and overseas, among themselves and 
with the big American companies. It is on this 
last point that I should like to ask you a few 
questions. 
The American companies have in their time 
engaged in cut-throat 'competition. I have been led 
to believe that the monopoly ac.t is only valid 
within the United States, and that the major 
American airlines, Pan Am and TW A in partir 
cular, now have zoning arrangements and have 
put an end to such competition. But, totting up 
the draw-backls, they pushed competition to such 
lengths BJS operating at a loss, so we should be 
very badly pLaced for trying to undercut them. In 
any case they have now given up such competi-
tion and so frozen the situation in comparatively 
monopolistic positions worldwide. 
My first question is : how can we start a Euro-
pean dialogue when faced by such strong 
American competitors seeing that they are pro-
tected by agreements between themselves which 
place us at a double disadvantage ? 
My second question concerns the proposed 
agreement between KLM, Sabena and Luxair. 
You, Mr. Minister, are something of a prophet, 
or at least an expert in the matter. You have, 
very rightly, proclaimed the merits of the pro-
posed regrouping of SAS. Can you tell us how 
the plan to merge the three companies I men-
tioned is getting along ? 
A third question : since you are here, I would 
kick myself if I missed the opportunity : the 
European Communities have made proposals in 
aeronautical matters and we are waiting for the 
reply of the Council of Ministers in Brussels. 
I do not wish to involve you personally, Mr. 
Minister, but I think that, if only because you 
come from the same place and share the same 
interests, you may have a few reliable items of 
information to give us. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Chabert. 
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Mr. CHABERT (Minister of Commttnications 
of Belgium) (Translation). - Thank you, Sir, 
for your remarks. 
As for your first question, clearly if there 
is ever a dialogue with the United States on some 
regulating of capacity on, say, the North Atlantic 
route it will have to be done on an absolutely 
' . equal footing between the two partners. It IS 
not a question of monopolistic policy in the 
United States, which would be at the expense 
of our policy here at home in Europe. I believe 
that it ought to be possible, in the near future, 
to talk over with the Americans this problem 
of regulating capacity, for both continents have 
every interest in doing so. 
I personally am convinced that, when the whole 
world is poverty-stricken and surrounded by 
difficult problems, the time has come to try and 
find solutions. One of the reasons, if I have been 
well informed, of the failures of the meetings 
at the time was precisely that when they were 
due to be held, things were picking up, and some 
people considered there was no more need for 
getting together and coming to an understanding. 
Things are not going well in civil aviation, 
as you know, and that is the reason why, if we 
do succeed in coming to an agreement in Europe, 
there must be some means of starting this global 
dialogue with the United States under normal 
conditions. That answers your first question. 
The second question is rather a tricky one. 
It concerns the collaboration we advocated in 
my country with two small neighbouring coun-
tries. You know that a study has been carried 
out on this matter by a firm of American con-
sultants, MacKinsey, whose conclusions we are 
currently examining in all three countries. 
I am not making a value judgment about 
these conclusions ; you know one of them is that 
if we effect a certain rationalisation, if we create 
a consortium of the SAS type with the three 
airlines, it should be possible, according to this 
study, to achieve by 1980 a significantly higher 
profitability than today. 
But I think it is too early to express an opinion 
on the political results and the decisions that 
will result from this study. The three govern-
ments and the three companies are currently 
studying the report, and we shall see towards 
the end of the year what will be done about it. 
Finally, you have suggested, quite rightly I 
think, some form of European initiative possibly 
by a Council of Ministers. I think we must be 
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realists : we can only progress where there are 
the means of doing so. For years nothing moved 
except the collaboration at technical level to 
which I referred a little while ago. I understand 
things are now beginning to move a little and 
that, for example, the Vice-President of the 
European Commission, Mr. Scarascia Mugnozza, 
has already initiated moves to explore the pos-
sibilities of collaboration between the various 
European companies. 
In view of the framework within which we 
are working, it is not necessary to tell you that 
we must begin with the Nine. I understand that 
informal contacts are being made in this matter 
and that all the companies are being somewhat 
guarded in their attitude : that is normal. There 
are still the governments that have to be con-
vinced that such collaboration will not be at the 
expense of the national flag : you know how 
sensitive these things are, for many politicians 
say things but when it comes to putting them 
into practice begin to hesitate. I think that is 
the way things are in reality and we have to 
admit it. But I do not despair of seeing these 
strange get-togethers resulting in something more 
solid : we hope so, like yourselves, and I thank 
you for the questions you have put to me. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. de Bruyne. 
Mr. de BRUYNE (Belgium) (Translation).-
During the Toulouse colloquy there was, accord-
ing to the report by Mr. Richter, Mr. Valleix 
and Mr. Warren whose recommendation we are 
now debating, a call to set up one or more 
specialised European institutions in the field of 
civil aviation and aircraft construction, includ-
ing a European aeronautics council and subse-
quently a West European civil aviation agency, 
which would grant European airworthiness cer-
tificates. 
I would like to know from the Minister whether 
he foresees the possibility, at institUJtional level, 
of one or more such initiatives being taken or 
promoted in the short term ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Chabert. 
Mr. CHABERT (Minister of Communications 
of Belgium) (Translatioo). - I am grateful 
to Mr. de Bruyne for asking this question. 
He will always find me on his side when it is 
a matter of taking effective initiatives towards 
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co-operation. I know that various recommenda-
tions have been made, but before giving a firm 
opinion on these, I would like to get a better 
idea of the way the new proposals and structures 
are to work. 
I am a little hesitant, because I wonder whether 
it is really necessary - with all the European 
institutions we have already - to set up new, 
specific machinery just to deal with aviation. 
We have at the present time in the European 
Commission a Commissioner who is Vice-
President and who is specially concerned with 
transport and the integration of transport policy. 
Before I offer an opinion on what has been 
suggested here it seems to me best to see first 
of all what official EEC circles think about this. 
I repeat, that if anyone can give me proof that 
this would bring about a smoother co-operation 
than we have today, I shall not hesitate for one 
moment to give it my support. While waiting for 
that, I would like to delay answering. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does 
anyone else wish to speak L 
I would thank you once again on behalf of the 
whole Assembly, Mr Minister, for your substan-
tial speech from the rostrum, and also for your 
very constructive answers ; subject to the full 
limits of what any of us can do in the current 
status of the complexity of our problems, your 
presence here once again adds consistence to the 
Assembly and enhances its influence and pres-
tige. (Applause) 
We will resume the debate on European aero-
nautical policy. I call the Chairman of the Com-
mittee. 
Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (France) (Transla-
tion). - I apologise for taking the place of a 
great liberal, Mr. Portheine; you can see the 
liberalism that unites us. Since the Minister is 
still among us, I am glad to emulate yourself, 
Mr. President, and in my capacity of Chairman 
of the Committee, tell him how pleased we were 
to hear him review a situation of concern to us 
all, and in particular the members of this Com-
mittee, following the colloquy held at Toulouse. 
The words spoken by Mr. Chabert were, I think, 
first of all very objective and realistic, and at 
the same time, without showing any great opti-
mism, they give us grounds for hope. 
As Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions, I would 
say that it is very seldom you get three Rapo 
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porteurs of different nationalities agreeing on 
a conclusion which, despite some variants intro-
duced by Mr. Warren, as is only proper for an 
Englishman, is, in sum, the same, which is rather 
comforting. 
True, in Mr. Vergnaud we had a man with 
a talent for synthesising, who managed to syn-
thesise the three reports ; and I think he strongly 
influenced Mr. Richter, Mr. Valleix and, what-
ever he may say, even Mr. Warren. You are a 
European, Mr. Warren. 
Mr. WARREN (United Kingdom) (Transla-
tion).- You are a European, too. 
Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (France) (Transla-
tion). -All right then, I believe Mr. Vergnaud 
had a great deal to do with it, and I pay tribute 
to him for it - he is sitting in the gallery 
with the gentlemen mentioned just now by Mr. 
Nessler. It is my pleasant duty to tell him how 
much we owe to him for the success of a col-
loquy, which was no small undertaking and 
which, following on the Paris colloquy, had a 
very great influence on this question of coherency 
in European aviation, precisely because the 
manufacturers came too as well as the promoters 
and everybody who has used and is using aircraft 
produced by the European aviation industries. 
I believe the colloquy was a great success, and 
should like to draw one or two conclusions in 
the light of what I heard just now from the three 
Rapporteurs. 
The most important question about the aero-
nautical industry is that of employment. 
We wonder what will be the future of those 
who work for it. Can the necessary decisions be 
taken to ensure the employment of the workers 
in this industry ? Adding up the numbers of 
persons employed - be they manual workers, 
technicians or engineers - we arrive at the 
impressive total of over 400,000 workers in the 
aviation industries of the United Kingdom, 
France and the Federal Republic of Germany. 
In France, a restricted ministerial council 
on aeronautics is to be held in the next few 
weeks, and we await its decision, which is bound 
to be important, since a choice is shortly to be 
made that will determine French or European 
poliey in this field for the next fifteen years or 
so. 
We may regret this mutation in the mind of 
a man who held great responsibilities in the EEC, 
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Mr. Spinelli, who will now certainly prod the 
European aeronautical industry towards that 
of the Soviet Union, since he has become one of 
the leaders of the communist party in Italy. 
In the draft recommendation, we expressed 
regret that the EEC member governments should 
not yet have adopted a position on the action 
programme for the European aeronautical sector 
proposed by the Commission of the European 
Communities on 3rd October 1975. 
The best solution for Europe will be to draw 
up a common strategy of co-operation and 
together confront the problem of co-operating 
with the Americans. But if the Community, as 
such, cannot act in this way, what else can be 
done other than to arrange bilateral conversa-
tions on the joint implementation of a new civil 
programme? 
Certainly, the European countries cannot 
individually speak to the Americans on an equal 
footing. But the overriding need is to assure the 
future security of the people working for the 
aeronautical industry. That is both a humane 
and a moral duty. We get the impression that 
there are countries which do not want to commit 
themselves and which are now, for domestic 
political reasons, engaged on delaying tactics. 
What we may regret today is the lack of 
faith, and I think that the draft recommenda-
tion, in the form in which it was adopted by 
our Committee, gives all the member countries 
eoncerned a last chance of initiating a European 
aeronautical policy. I do not think a European 
failure can be contemplated in this area. 
I hope that the Council will seriously examine 
the proposals, which are not only those· of our 
Committee, but which also take into account the 
main guidelines emerging from the colloquy of 
2nd and 3rd February 1976, and the opinions 
of the representatives of national airlines and the 
aeronautical trade unions, all of whom are given 
their due place. They are at one in defending 
the European aeronautical industry and its users, 
in order to ensure the survival of the clerical 
grades and technicians who are the salt of Euro-
pean technology. I believe that if they all have 
faith, as they should, we can still save European 
aeronautics, all its labour force and all who 
gain their livelihood from it, to the great honour 
of European technology. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. Chairman. 
I call Mr. Portheine. 
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tion). - Mr. President, one needs a certain 
amount of courage to follow the excellent 
speeches by the Belgian Minister of Communica-
tions, the Chairman of the Committee and the 
three Rapporteurs in speaking on aviation policy. 
I shall, however, gladly do so, and I shall try 
to go rather more into the details of the problem 
we are discussing. 
I have followed the work of the Committee 
on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Ques-
tions with the greatest interest. After a first 
colloquy in 1973, we now have the results from 
the second, held in 1976, and besides this an 
account of the Committee's other activities such 
as a recent visit to the Dornier factory in 
southern Germany, near Lake Constance. These 
works are still run by the owner and managing 
director of that name, and I am pleased to see 
that Mr. Dornier is present here. I would thank 
him for the hospitality shown to the Committee 
and myself. During the visit I became aware 
yet again of the many and varied activities of 
an aircraft company which draws on all aspects 
of up-to-date technology. This made it clear 
that, as Mr. Dornier explained, no single Euro-
pean country - not even the Federal Republic 
- is able on its own to undertake the necessary 
research and development work. Mr. Dornier 
believed that because of this there must be an 
agency set up in Europe to arrive at a joint 
research and development programme. 
I agree with the Committee's Rapporteurs that 
before such a programme is set up there needs 
to be national consultation on aviation matters. 
There need to be special committees for this. I 
think, however, that the idea ought to be pur-
sued first at national level, and a policy subse-
quently mapped out at international level. This 
has already been referred to a number of times. 
It seems to be an extremely difficult process, 
despite the fact that - as the colloquy showed 
- everyone is convinced that it must come. 
We heard this from representatives of the air-
lines, of the aircraft industry and of the govern-
ments, as well as from independent experts. 
There have, indeed, always been problems in 
the aircraft industry, but these have now been 
exacerbated by the economic crisis and by the 
very substantial rises in the cost of aviation fuel. 
The airline companies, most of whom published 
in the spring their results for the last financial 
year, are in dire financial straits, and are there-
fore far from inclined to enter into aircraft 
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purchasing programmes. They do not want to 
commit themselves to a long-term programme, 
nor do they want to define their future aircraft 
requirements very closely, since they have no 
clear picture of the future pattern of air trans-
port in the shorter or the longer term. 
The aircraft manufacturers have fully appre-
ciated this fact, and as a result are - both in 
Europe and in the United States - directing 
their design studies towards the further develop-
ment of existing aircraft types rather than the 
designing of new types. The intention is to 
produce improved versions of existing types, 
with special emphasis on fuel consumption, 
maintenance costs and environmental protection 
- and the latter is, of course, a very topical 
issue. They have postponed design and develop-
ment work on new aircraft to a later date, when 
a new generation of aircraft will make its 
appearance. This halt on further design work 
has naturally had a major effect on job pros-
pects for designers, draughtsmen and the like, 
who consequently have little or no new work 
to do. And on top of this there is, as with all 
areas of new technology, the fact that research 
and development costs have risen so sharply that 
a cutback was necessary. 
These problems are arising on both sides of 
the Atlantic, though not in the same way. The 
American industry intends very firmly to stay 
number one in the world, though inclined to 
co-operate with European countries and by doing 
so to win part of the European market even 
though this is dominated by national govern-
ment policies. On the other hand, the industry 
in Europe is suffering from excess production 
capacity and has insufficient orders to keep its 
available work force busy, though giving these 
workers the sack is difficult in Europe at the 
present time. At the same time the European 
industry is afraid of becoming subordinate to 
American firms, which seek only to use it as sub-
contractors. 
Unfortunately the various countries take dif-
fering attitudes to these problems. Britain is now 
regretting having opted out of the Airbus project 
and would gladly get back in on it, without 
however being willing to shoulder part of the 
original research and development costs. As Sir 
Kenneth Keith, the chairman of Rolls-Royce, 
said at the colloquy, "the Airbus development to 
a 200-seat aircraft, with the RB-211 engine, 
could take a considerable share of a very 
lucrative market ... ". Britain is, furthermore, still 
involved in a debate on nationalisation - which 
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Mr. Warren has mentioned - which seems for 
the moment to have been postponed once again; 
at all events, no final stage has been reached, 
and so uncertainty continues in the industry. 
Aeritalia - helped with money from the 
Italian Government - is joining with Boeing in 
a study of the 7 X 7 programme, a direct com-
petitor for the Airbus as it was described by Sir 
Kenneth Keith. Bearing in mind the size and 
importance of the two firms, it is clear that this 
is a case of subordination far more than col-
laboration. 
The German Government is supporting the 
Airbus programme, but it is obvious from the 
report prepared by Mr. Griiner, the Secretary 
of State for Economic Affairs and co-ordinator 
for the German aircraft and space industry, that 
no thought need be given to any expansion of 
these aviation activities. The current program-
mes do, it is true, cost a great deal of money, 
but the disadvantages that go with calling a halt 
are so major that they cannot be offset by the 
financial advantages they bring. 
The Dutch and Belgian Governments favour 
discussions on future aircraft-building program-
mes within the EEC, but are not prepared to 
invest a lot of taxpayers' money in these. \Vhere 
the Netherlands is concerned, the German/Dutch 
firm Fokker-VFW is going to design a new 
aircraft leading on from the Fokker F-27 and 
F-28 series (a short-haul lOO-seater aircraft) and 
27 million guilders have been earmarked for 
launching the project. 
The French Secretary of State for Transport, 
Mr. Cavaille, has already said, during the col-
loquy, that France is seeking co-operation with 
America. It is no secret that among the French 
especially there is great disappointment that the 
products of European co-operation are bought 
only in small numbers by European governments 
where military aircraft are concerned and by the 
airlines in the case of civil aircraft. There has 
been a deal of hard feeling on a number of 
occasions, but I must say that France - even 
though it may be quite justified - tends very 
readily to stick a European label on something 
that is wholly or very largely a French product. 
Dassault and Aerospatiale, with the backing of 
the French Government, are currently nego-
tiating with Boeing and McDonnell Douglas 
about a variety of aircraft types. These talks 
with Boeing and McDonnell Douglas are well 
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advanced, and could culminate in a passenger 
aircraft programme for the 1980s and beyond. 
In the coming months the French Government 
will have to decide which of the two programmes 
it wants to give development finance to. 
Dassault is negotiating with McDonnell 
Douglas on a new version of the Mercure, the 
Mercure 200, to which Douglas is to contribute 
some of its most up-to-date engineering. The 
plane would be built in France and Douglas 
would handle marketing worldwide. 
Aerospatiale is discussing two projects with 
Hoeing, the first a short- and medium-haul air-
craft derived from the existing Boeing 737, 
equipped with new engines and a new wing 
structure and typenamed the 7-N7. The Ame-
ricans would take on the leadership of this 
project. In the second Aerospatiale project, for 
an aircraft in the Airbus family, the French 
would act as project-leader while Boeing would 
deal with the sales organisation. It is known as 
the B-10, and involves a medium-haul aircraft 
providing 210 seats. 
It is fairly obvious that solutions are being 
sought in a variety of directions, but that it is 
possible for the preferred solution to be a Euro-
pean one. It will be possible, too, after so many 
years of research and development work, to reap 
the benefits and at the same time find an answer 
to the problems of employment and the dif-
ficulties of finding a market. Other people, 
however, believe that co-operation with the 
Americans provides the only answer to the prob-
lems of European aviation. The European Com-
mission in Brussels feels that these two view-
points need not be mutually exclusive, and has 
therefore suggested that the European govern-
ments should draw up a medium- and long-term 
plan and approach together the Americans to 
seek fruitful negotiations. It was plain from the 
colloquy in Toulouse that it is impossible to 
put a large civil aircraft on the market if 
potential sales are not created in the United 
States which, when it comes down to it, repre-
sents and dominates half the world market. It 
must however be remembered here that in 
contacts between European firms and one or 
more American firms, the latter are so much 
bigger than the former that even without it 
being intentional the European firm will end 
up as a subcontractor to the American com-
pany. 
I believe, Mr. President, that the solution put 
forward by the European Commission is the 
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most logical and the most promising, though I 
do realise what difficulties it entails. In the large 
countries especially it will be hard to get the 
departments concerned to give up some of their 
powers of decision to Brussels. 
Looking at the broader aspect of technology, 
too, one can but come to the conclusion that if 
Europe cannot or will not work together in the 
areas of telecommunications, nuclear energy, 
computers and metallurgy, then American 
industrial supremacy will be unshakably estab-
lished in the world. That in itself would not 
worry me ; but this Assembly, which strives for 
European co-operation, should surely explore 
all the opportunities there are for European co-
operation in this field. 
So I agree with the Rapporteurs' recommen-
dations that, working from national bases, there 
should be a European aeronautical council. The 
Minister has just told us that he was certainly 
not yet convinced to this extent. I do appeal to 
him, and other members of governments, since 
in my opinion there is, alongside all the other 
bodies, a need for a separate organ that can 
have an overview of this sector. 
We all know that national authorities and 
powers in this sphere are so substantial that 
they cannot be ignored, and I am glad that this 
occupies an important place in the recommen-
dation. 
Finally, Mr. President, I do not share Mr. 
Warren's view that making rthis council 
answerable to this Assembly could have a great 
influence. We have known too many disappoint-
ments, not only in technology but also in the 
defence and political contexts. 
'rhank you, Mr. President. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. de Bruyne. 
Mr. de BRUYNE (Belgium) (Translation).-
Mr. President, the report and the draft recom-
mendation that accompanies it have a very wide 
scope. I support them entirely, and I hope that 
they will have the Assembly's unqualified 
approval. We must not, however, blind ourselves 
to certain aspects of the report and recommen-
dation that could lead to our trying to set up 
too many European institutions in areas where 
other institutions - like the ECAC, for instance 
- already exist. It was this concern that led me 
to put a question to Mr. Chabert, and I rather 
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believe that the answer he gave strengthens my 
feelings. 
The large number of suggestions put forward 
in the report and recommendation come, in fact, 
from the wealth and widrth of Sl1bject matter at 
the Toulouse colloquy. One must hope that Tou-
louse will not all be wasted effort, and that 
concrete follow-up will be given to the desires 
expressed and resolutions formulated. This can-
not of course happen simultaneously and at all 
the various levels. It is difficult to tell in what 
sequence that might happen. It strikes me as not 
entirely out of the question that the new 
mandate given to the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee, on which Mr. Destremau spoke so 
positively this morning, should be able to con-
tribute towards rapid implementation of some of 
the initiatives mentioned in our recommen-
dations. The job the SAC has been given to do 
covers, it is true, more than the building of 
European military aircraft, but one can expect 
military aircraft to form a central feature of 
that Committee's work. 
Special importance must attach to that passage 
of the recommendation that expresses a desire 
for a European financial institution along the 
lines of the American Export-Import Bank. This 
is a bold suggestion, but one that cannot be 
dismissed. It is, however, one of the points in 
our recommendation whose practical value will 
depend on the way Western European Union 
manages to achieve collaboration with other 
important European bodies in this field. This is 
why it is so crucial that the EEC Commission 
should tackle the task it set itself in an official 
document dated 9th October 1975. It is a great 
pity that there seems so far to have been a 
standstill in doing anything about this initiative 
at EEC Commission level. That explains the 
cautious hopes expressed by Mr. Chabert. I 
expect that the WEU Assembly and its Com-
mittees will be keeping a close watch, and in the 
meantime I think the paragraphs of the preamble 
and recommendation that have a bearing on this 
are wholly justified. 
Equally important is sub-paragraph (e) of the 
second paragraph of the recommendation, which 
emphasises the desirability of working with the 
ECAC towards a European policy on landing 
rights and the recognition of European airspace. 
Monday of next week will see the start of the 
three-yearly meeting of ECAC in Strasbourg, 
and this would seem to me to provide an excel-
lent opportunity to make a start on giving 
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concrete form to the wishes expressed in para-
graph 2 (e) of the draft recommendation. Some 
of the members of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions will be 
at the Strasbourg meeting. It would be well for 
our Committee in future to deal with this 
question on the basis of decisions reached in 
Strasbourg. 
(The speaker continued in French) 
I hope, Mr. President, that this subject will be 
considered in depth by our Committee in the 
very near future, which, under your renewed 
presidency, is accustomed to make a parti-
cularly favourable contribution to the proceed-
ings of our Assembly, for which I congratulate 
you once more. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Schlingemann. 
Mr. SCHLINGEMANN (Netherlands) (Trans-
lation). - I was very pleased to see the reply 
from the Council of Ministers to Recommen-
dation 274 which accompanied Mr. Warren's 
report adopted by this Assembly on 4th Decem-
ber 1975. In its reply, the Council says it "would 
welcome any efforts designed to create in Europe 
a single military market which would benefit 
manufacturers and users equally". It goes on to 
say that "such a development would improve 
the prospects of the European aeronautical 
industry". A study must of course be made of 
whether setting up new agencies will necessitate 
alterations in the tasks of existing agencies. 
Moreover, a European programme group was set 
up on 2nd February 1976 in Rome, with the job 
of dealing with co-operation in the armaments 
sector in general. At its meeting in May of this 
year the Council of Ministers decided that 
WED's Standing Armaments Committee should 
deal rather more particularly with a study of 
the armaments industries in the WEU coun-
tries, and should try to bring about the neces-
sary contacts between them. 
I am pleased to see that the Council of 
Ministers has now given a number of directives 
on military aircraft production, and is begin-
ning to define the various tasks of existing 
organisations. I hope that the European pro-
gramme group will in the end lead to a separate 
agency for the procurement of military aircraft. 
These small forward steps the Council of 
Ministers has now taken must not make us lose 
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sight of our final goal, for we all know that 
one swallow does not make a summer. 
So much for the military aspects, Mr. Pre-
sident. Turning now to the civil aspects of a 
European policy for the aviation and space 
industry, I must, alas, use a different imagery. 
Despite the work done by our Committee and 
by many other bodies inside and outside the 
Community, what we have here is a pair of 
partridges that have just had a charge of shot 
fired at them ; each flies off in a different 
direction. Each of these European partridges is 
trying to cross the Atlantic ocean under its own 
power to form a new brace with an American 
bird. One may wonder what the future holds for 
the space and aviation industry in Europe. 
Which way ought it to go ~ The European Com-
missioner whose responsibility this is, Mr. Spi-
nelli - who is, in any case, tending for the 
moment to look towards Moscow rather than 
towards Washington - saia not long ago that 
he was in despair and wondered whether a 
European space and aviation industry would 
ever come about. It had been found plainly 
impossible within the Nine to set up even an 
informal European programme. The industry in 
Britain does not know how and, in particular, 
when it is to be nationalised, nor who will be 
affected by this measure. French firms are at 
present taking up contacts with American com-
panies without paying a great deal of attention 
to their partners' wishes, in particular those of 
the British. From the French point of view, the 
industry in Britain is, because of its surplus 
manpower and out-of-date equipment, even 
looked on as a hindrance to negotiations with the 
Americans. Moreover it is felt that far too 
cumbersome a procedure is involved in under-
taking co-operation with more than two coun-
tries and two firms. Rolls-Royce, in particular, 
will have nothing to do with this attitude 
because it would be very glad to see its engines 
fitted to the new Airbus family of aircraft. The 
French are however using this matter of engines 
as a bait for co-operation with the Americans. 
And, besides, everyone is now well aware that 
- cost what it may - sales opportunities will 
have to be created in America if the Airbus 
family of aircraft is to be soLd in large enough 
numbers to allow a reasonable level of production 
and financial return. 
In Germany, where the aviation and space 
industry is a good deal smaller than in the other 
two countries, there are hopes that the Airbus 
will sell. At the same time, people are trying to 
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get the Americans to agree to a bilateral flow of 
trade in armaments, thinking particularly of 
sales of the Leopard tank to the American forces. 
Bearing in mind all the interests of the various 
European countries and the reluctance there is 
to subordinate national interests it will be 
extremely difficult to arrive at any common and 
overall solution. I believe therefore that the idea 
put forward in the draft recommendation, that 
of giving national aeronautical councils an 
important job of work to do, is a very sound one. 
I believe too that these national councils could 
together form a European aeronautical counci! 
Since the ministries involved in this council 
would exert great influence, an attempt could 
be made to map out together certain limited 
European objectives. Efforts towards finding a 
certain degree of unity should be concentrated 
initially on two fundamental points. First of 
rull there would have to be, as the recommenda-
tion suggests, a European agency for issuing 
airworthiness certificates, and secondly there 
would have to be an organisation for selling 
European-built aircraft on the world market. 
This point, too, has been brought out in the 
recommendation. I am, incidentally, well aware 
that it will probably not be possible to give one 
single organisation the job of selling civil and 
military aircraft. The national councils and the 
European aeronautical council will, I believe, 
be up to the task of finding a solution to this 
problem. 
Finally, Mr. President, I would like to sound 
a warning against setting up too close a business 
relationship with American firms. We must not 
forget that although the American industry is 
in a considerably better position than it was 
some time ago, the overall economy of the United 
States is still rather fragile. For the moment, the 
prices of European aircraft and equipment are 
higher than American prices, which are showing 
a measure of stability. One can only conclude 
that this could change very quickly. Let us not 
forget that the Americans still have a very 
substantial budget deficit, which even for the 
United States of America amounts to a quite 
inconceivable amount of money. What surety 
do we have when making the costly investment 
of tax-payers' money essential for new civil air-
craft ? Ought we not to fear that - as has 
happened in the past - the Americans would 
choose first to scrap projects of a bilateral or a 
multilateral nature, which are much less signi-
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ficant for the American employment market or 
American trade than purely national projects 1 
It is because of this that I hope that Europe 
can manage to find acceptable alternative solu-
tions. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- I call the 
Chairman of the Committee. 
Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (France) (Transla-
tion). - I understand that Mr. Valleix has 
agreed with Mr. Warren and Mr. Richter that 
he will reply to the different speakers and I 
should like him to speak first. I shall say a few 
words at the end. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. V alleix. 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation).- In 
reply to Mr. Schlingemann I will say that, taking 
his speech as a whole, I did not find anything 
with which I disagreed, and I thank him for 
what he said and the support I feel he gives to 
the draft recommendation. 
I will also say to Mr. de Bruyne that I agree 
with him about the somewhat awe-inspiring 
number of proposed new organisations and that 
we must avoid this danger, which we have, I 
believe, minimised. The national councils of aero-
nautics we were talking about this morning 
with Mr. Warren are intended to secure a greater 
coherence within our respective countries. But 
we have no patented rights in the name. 
Anything that helps towards greater coherence 
must facilitate the advent of that European 
council which is our final aim, a European 
council or agency, the aim being to work 
effectively in concert. 
I would also like to say to Mr. de Bruyne that 
as far as the EEC is concerned we do refer to 
it, for we have no intention of ignoring, much 
less opposing, the work of the European Econo-
mic Community in this area, and look to our 
fellow member when he takes his seat in the 
near future in the ECAC to help us to ensure 
that the need to concert the efforts of WEU and 
ECAC is always properly understood. Not only 
do we not misunderstand the role of ECAC but 
we refer to it so as to make it quite clear that 
the reference to the organisation was intended 
more to emphasise its role than to encroach 
on it. 
In reply to Mr. Portheine, I should like to say 
how much we appreciated his very detailed 
speech. In my capacity of French Rapporteur 
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I listened with great interest to the projects 
attributed to France in aeronautical matters. But 
I should like to make a general point. If all these 
projects of equal-sided representation - i.e. 
for my country's sake provided they are actually 
projects of equal-sided representation - i.e. 
handled on the basis of equal negotiating rights 
such as we want in Europe. I should also like 
all currently bilateral negotiations, which ought 
to be pursued, I repeat, with a European 
objective in view, to be carried out as :in the 
case of SNECMA and General Electric, that is, 
with SNECMA exercising European leadership. 
What is necessary in such matters is that the 
search for contacts should yield possibilities of 
European co-operation. All of which shows us 
how careful we must be in our search for 
bilateral contacts. I would go further : in order 
that these contacts give tangible results along 
the lines that we have marked out today, full 
use should be made of all the possibilities for 
operating on a European scale, and I entirely 
agree with the position taken by Mr. Chabert a 
few moments ago. 
As for the Airbus, I will not go into details 
of the information supplied by Mr. Portheine. If 
our English friends should take a larger share 
in the Airbus, we regretted TriStar too much not 
to be delighted at increased British participation 
in Airbus. And so we should like to hope that 
all that - and I call my English friends to 
witness - is only a pledge of a wider European 
eo-operation. 
Finally, Mr. Portheine spoke of the import-
ance he attaches, if I understood him rightly, to 
aeronautical research. Personally, though I think 
I can speak on behalf of my Rapporteur col-
leagues, we have ourselves been alive to this 
aspect of the matter. The current relative stagna-
tion of technological advance which is both 
related to and a demonstration of the crisis or 
a slowing~down in purchases of aircraft, should 
not completely obstruct and sterilise the pro-
gramme of our planning offices. It is a serious 
and costly problem. Mr. Portheine rightly 
reminded us of it. Insofar as we voluntarily sup-
port these research units, and that means the 
will of our governments to pursue research, 
without any guarantee that we shall tomorrow 
be able to reap the fruits of it, such aid by cor-
responding industrial developments may be very 
costly. But I am one of those who think - I 
think we can all agree on the point - that it 
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is a matter of budget priority that has to be 
given, since otherwise any acceptance of co-
operation with our American partners would 
ipso facto result in co-operation by way of 
subcontracting. 
If we are to hope for equality and reciprocity, 
it will be by a will towards co-operation and 
political understanding, by demonstrating our 
technological capability. That is why I thank 
you for having raised this point. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Warren. 
Mr. WARREN (United Kingdom). - I 
merely wish to thank everybody who has taken 
part in the debate and apologise if I introduced 
a note of contention, but I think Pierre de 
Montesquiou, in his wisdom, has been able to 
look after three Rapporteurs in a way which 
should commend itself to the whole of the Assem-
bly. If we did not all arrive with exactly the 
same story, that is perhaps a matter of inability 
to rehearse the situation, but perhaps one or 
two of us had our own individual points of view 
which we could not allow to be dimmed by 
debate. I would hope that by putting forward 
different ideas and the idea of contention itself 
we have lent quality to the debate. 
Our Dutch colleague talked of the antiquated 
British industry, which I shall be delighted to 
show him at any time, and also the exports we 
have been able to achieve in competition with 
American manufacturers in their own nation 
with engines, aircraft and equipment. 
To my dear colleague Jean Valleix and his 
Airbus, which I am sure British Airways would 
love to buy but of which it cannot afford the 
American engines, I would say that we look 
forward to the time when General Mitterrand 
has the opportunity to sell the aircraft to United 
States airlines. 
Let us look forward together to the ability to 
recognise that, with 400,000 people at a spear-
head of technology in Europe, it is right and 
proper that we should be debating their affairs, 
employment and future, because it is our future. 
If we are not able to master technology to 
achieve all we have talked about, the future 
of Europe will not be theirs to enjoy. (Appla1tse) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. de Montesquiou, Chairman of the Com-
mittee. 
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tion). - In my capacity as Chairman of the 
Committee I should like to say how glad we are 
today, at the close of this debate, to come 
together with those who took the first steps, at 
Toulouse, towards achieving a favourable con-
clusion as regards European aviation. I, too, 
would like to thank them, and the three Rap-
porteurs who, as Mr. Warren said with his 
typical English humour, consider that any shades 
of difference between us only serve to reinforce 
the cohesion and solidarity of European aviation. 
I should also like to thank Mr. V ergnaud and 
all those who helped us to make such a success 
of the second colloquy at Toulouse and so helped 
to give added vigour to WEU as an institution. 
Mr. Warren has invited us to Farnborough at 
the beginning of September. I think we shall 
there see everything that we have wanted to 
do on behalf of European aviation. He will be 
our guide that day, one who is more European 
than English. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The 
debate is closed. 
Rules 34 and 35 of the Rules of Procedure 
require the vote on a draft recommendation 
taken as a whole to be by roll-call, the majority 
required being an absolute majority of the votes 
cast. However, if the Assembly is unanimous 
and there are no objections to the draft recom-
mendation and no abstentions, we can save the 
time needed for a vote by roll-call. 
Mr. CERMOLACCE (France) (Translation). 
- I call for a vote by rohl.-eall. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- The regu-
lations which are very strict on this point insist 
on a vote by roll-call if there is not unanimity. 
But in view of the fact that there is not a 
quorum, I propose to the Assembly that the vote 
be adjourned to the Thursday sitting, along with 
the votes on the other draft recommendations 
not previously adopted. 
Mr. CERMOLACCE (France) (Translation). 
-Thank you. 
4. Detente and security in Europe 
(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General 
Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recom-
mendation, Doe. 703 and Amendments) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- We shall 
resume the debate, which was adjourned this 
morning, on detente and security in Europe, 
Document 703 and Amendments. 
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I call Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur of the 
General Affairs Committee. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom). 
- I assume from your last remarks, Mr. Pre-
sident, in connection with another series of 
reports that this evening I shall reply to the 
debate as Rapporteur and then the Chairman 
of my Committee will speak, but that detailed 
consideration and votes will take place on 
another day. On that assumption, I shall content 
myself with quite a brief response. 
I do not think that I need feel surprised that 
the wording of my memorandum has not met 
with unanimous consent, as I made it quite clear 
in my opening that it was no part of the job of 
a Rapporteur to seek a consensus in regard to 
what must essentially be his own responsibility. 
I have made no pretence, nor do I make any 
pretence now that I expected, that what I put 
forward as my own appreciation would receive 
universal consent, although I have been gratified 
by some of the tributes that have been paid. 
I should like to deal with one or two remarks 
that have been made by those taking an approach 
rather different from my own towards our 
problems. Some of those have said that I have 
laid an undue emphasis on defence, but I must 
remind the Assembly that this is an Assembly 
created for the very purpose of defence. It is the 
parliamentary defence body of Western Euro-
pean Union and it would indeed be strange if 
such a body, established and maintained as a 
parliamentary body concerned with the defence 
of the West, did not concentrate its reports on 
that very basis of its being. 
I was delighted when Lord Peddie pointed 
to something I had tried to put forward earlier 
and which I now wish to amplify in regard to 
the present threat to the western world. Needless 
to add, we, like most members here, are poli-
tically opposed to communism and at successive 
elections we all, including socialist members, 
stand against communism, but the threat that I 
have mentioned and that we are considering is 
not a reaction of those who are not communists 
against those who are but a reaction against an 
imperialist threat by another power which would 
still be the same whatever party might be 
established there at any given time. 
That I am setting the record straight here, as 
I believe, is shown only too clearly when one 
refers again to the attitude adopted to this very 
problem by, for example, the Chinese at the 
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present time. No one can suggest that China is 
a capitalist power but, as I said somewhat flip-
pantly in opening, there is not the slightest 
doubt that if Mao Tse-tung and his cohorts were 
here and we were talking in terms of the threat 
of Soviet aggression, I should be able to gain 
some more votes on my side. Yet no one can 
suggest that China is other than a communist 
power. 
We must therefore free ourselves of accu-
sations of party ideological thinking, which has 
certainly not guided my report. On the contrary, 
in every paragraph I have made it clear that 
it is the Soviet interpretation of communism 
which worries us and not the communist ideology 
which will be fought on such different battle-
grounds as the social and economic, and all the 
factors that decide current elections throughout 
the western world. 
I do not accept that the basis of our fears has 
anything to do with communism as a political 
ideology. It has more to do with a power among 
whose weapons is the use of an ideology in the 
same way, but much less efficiently, as Hitler 
used to try to get a fifth column of sympathisers 
in other countries. The communist authorities in 
the Kremlin as opposed to those in China or 
Yugoslavia have developed this method con-
siderably, as I have understood from at least 
one speech to this Assembly. 
I also share Mr. Niet's view of totalitarianism, 
whether of the right or of the left. At times it 
seems that we have either a totalitarian State, 
where freedom is denied, or not. The colour of 
one's shirt or the flag one waves has always 
seemed quite irrelevant to me. 
I was asked, perhaps a little aggressively - or 
abrasively, which is the phrase used about my 
own remarks - about what I had seen in Berlin. 
It is true that I went to West Berlin and to East 
Berlin. I consulted the Berlin authorities, and 
the paragraphs in my memorandum with regard 
to what is going on in Berlin, I can say without 
betraying confidences, do not differ from the 
views of the present Federal Government. 
These are not my own personal inventions. 
Where tensions have eased in Berlin, I have 
referred to them, and where they have worsened, 
I have mentioned them, but these views have not 
just been gathered by myself and are not only 
the result of visits but are the result of con-
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suiting those who are in a position to know 
because they live there and know what they are 
talking about. 
The only other direct suggestion I cannot 
accept is that the figures I have given are either 
false or irresponsible. By a curious coincidence 
I have been able to rely on only two sets of 
figures given in my report, one set being that 
of the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, which others have mentioned - the 
latest set being dated 1975-76 - and the other 
is drawn, word for word, letter for letter, figure 
by figure, from the defence white paper pub-
lished by the present Socialist Government in 
Great Britain and accepted as being accurate by 
all the NATO powers. 
There is one other figure I have given which I 
have had to put in as a note. This figure is 
given by a Socialist Defence Minister in Great 
Britain who has said that my figure of 10.6 % 
was too optimistic and that in :fact the Russians 
have been spending between 11 and 12 %. It is 
a British Defence Minister, not Sir Frederic 
Bennett, who has produced this additional exam-
ple of how the Soviet Union is spending 
increased sums. 
However the debate goes on, please do not let 
us hear any more about the figures being a 
reactionary's nightmare. They are taken from 
the most official sources, including the British 
Government - with whom I do not normally 
agree. 
When I spoke at the start of this debate, I 
expressed the hope that someone would be able 
to tell me why, if the Soviet military build-up 
was only defensive, the Russians were approach-
ing a 3:1 ratio against us in Central Europe. 
We admit that our whole NATO strategy is 
based on the fact that, providing we can keep 
a ratio of 1:3, our defence capability is reason-
ably preserved. 
No speaker has yet informed me why it is that, 
when we are content with a 1:3 ratio for our 
defence, the Soviet Union insists on a 3:1 ratio 
in its favour. I have taken careful notes and 
read the official reports of the debate and I 
have not yet been told what is the purpose of a 
buiLd-up which not only exceeds parity, but 
approaches 3:1. 
Throughout the Committee stage of this paper 
I agreed to the insertion of a whole range of 
amendments and alterations to fit in more closely 
with the views of my Committee colleagues -
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even though I did not necessarily agree with 
them. I did so because I feel passionately that 
in a report like this it would be tragic if, when 
considering the defence of countries with demo-
cratic governments of every hue, we started to 
divide on traditional left and right lines. The 
question of defence is surely one on which we 
should be able to base a reasonable foundation 
for consensus. 
I believe that we no longer deploy sufficient 
defences to guarantee our security. It is our 
obligation to re-establish a balance that will do 
that, but I appreciate that in this Assembly, as 
in the Committee, some do not share my view. 
That is why I have tabled, on my own respons-
ibility as a Rapporteur, a new paper of recom-
mendations and conclusions that precisely 
embody the amendments tabled separately by 
other distinguished delegates, although I could 
not agree to the total omission of paragraph 7. 
In. every other respect, having consulted 
everybody I could, I think we have reached a 
consensus. It means that I am agreeing to some-
thing which I do not really feel is correct 
according to my calculations. However, I have 
to accept that, while the paper and the memo-
randum are mine, the conclusions are for all of 
you. 
For that reason alone, I am prepared to accept 
almost the letter of the amendments. I am ready 
to come to a compromise on the recommendations 
because I feel that there should go forth from 
the Assembly, if not a unanimous opinion, at 
least a clear majority view on what Lord Peddie 
called the warning that all may not be well. We 
must maintain our guard. 
If I have contributed to that, I shall feel that 
the sacrifices I have made by giving way against 
my better judgment have been justified and 
that I have fulfilled and performed my task as 
Rapporteur. I hope to earn the confidence of the 
Assembly if there should be a vote on these 
matters. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
the Chairman of the Committee. 
Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (Federal Republic 
of Germany ) (Translation). - Mr. President, 
Ladies and Gentlemen, before turning to discus-
sion of the actual report, I should like to offer 
a brief word of thanks to the two observers, our 
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Canadian and Danish colleagues, who spoke 
during the debate. The fact that they have been 
here, and what they had to say, have, I believe, 
been a source of great satisfaction to us. I am 
all the more pleased to say so, Mr. President, 
since I see in it a continuation of the dialogue 
carried on by the General Affairs Committee 
when it visited Scandinavia in autumn last year 
and Canada and the United States in April this 
year. I hope this dialogue will continue and will 
be intensified, for it is important for WED's 
position in the Atlantic Alliance. 
Discussion on Sir Frederic Bennett's report 
has confirmed what was already said in the debate. 
With his report, Sir Frederic has managed to 
unleash a discussion of a vigour not often seen 
in this chamber in recent times. This, I think 
is a first point in its favour ; for what have we 
to gain, Mr. President, from reports that are so 
well tuned and so well balanced that no one 
really feels any particular urge to say anything 
about them here 1 I feel that on this score our 
thanks are due to the Rapporteur. 
Secondly, I should like to thank him for the 
way in which he co-operated with the Committee 
and with its Chairman. I can say quite frankly 
that it is a little difficult when the Chairman 
and the Rapporteur hold differing views on 
certain fundamental aspects. But this problem 
was overcome - I hope by myself, but certainly, 
I would stress, by Sir Frederic - with great 
fairness. I would like expressly to confirm that 
Sir Frederic did make additions to the explan-
atory memorandum on a number of points. 
This in no way alters the fact that there are 
certain points where we are concerned not with 
facts but with judgments based on these facts and 
where, as the Rapporteur himself has just said, 
fundamental differences of opinion still exist. 
I will illustrate this with an example in a field 
where I feel myself to be particularly well 
informed, namely, Berlin. The Rapporteur has 
added to his explanatory memorandum on this 
point after something I had said. Yet we still 
differ in our assessments both of the importance 
of the advantages accruing to Berlin from Ost-
politik, and of the difficulties involved. From my 
very intimate knowledge of the situation I see 
the advantages in a far more positive light, while 
he is more impressed with the difficulties and 
the dangers and has stressed them more than 
I would do. 
By and large, this is the one point left 
outstanding after Sir Frederic's redraft of his 
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recommendation. I have the impression that we 
can now look forward to general agreement on 
the draft recommendation, perhaps with the very 
minor exception that Sir Frederic has men-
tioned. 
May I add a few further comments on the 
debate ~ In the debate, a comparison was once 
again drawn between the situation in Europe 
in 1938-39 and that existing today. I want to 
take this comparison to show where the assess-
ments we make here differ fundamentally. Some 
of my friends - and I share their opinion - feel 
that such a comparison is simply unacceptable. 
Others - and not just the Rapporteur - feel 
that such a comparison can be made. 
Mr. Kliesing has quoted the Tass statement 
and the definition of the policy of detente con-
tained in it. I must say to Mr. Kliesing I did not 
find these statements in the least sensational, 
since anyone familiar with the fundamental views 
of the Soviet leadership on this point knows that 
these are the basic principles they have always 
defended. The only question that must of course 
be asked is how far these principles coincide with 
the policies adopted in practice. 
Loc me give you an example to illustrate what 
I mean. It is surely a basic tenet of everyone in 
this chamber - or, to be a little less sweeping, 
of nearly everyone - that we should very much 
like to see democratic parliamentary govern-
ments in other European States, in Eastern 
and in Central Europe. But no one could 
seriously take this to mean that we would use 
every means, including force if necessary, to 
impose this view on these other countries. I hope 
that I have made clear what I consider to be the 
difference between fundamental attitudes and 
practical politics in this connection. 
Now, a word on the comments by Mr. Miiller 
on the subject of the European security con-
ference. When he agreed with the Rapporteur 
and said that in his opinion action here had been 
too rapid and over-hasty, we must realise that he 
was levelling this reproach at twenty-two of the 
signatory States - leaving out Spain and 
certain others and counting only the democracies 
on the western side at Helsinki. Everyone can 
draw his own conclusions on how matters should 
be judged in the light of this fact. 
Then a comment on the statement by Mr. 
Dankert who feels that the General Affairs 
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Committee has, in a way, been grazing in foreign 
pastures, that is, has been concerning itself too 
much with defence policy. I would reply to Mr. 
Dankert that this point has been raised time and 
again in the Presidential Committee for years, 
and I think we would all agree that no clear-
cut division is possible. Anyone concerned with 
defence matters from the military aspects will 
always have to trespass on the political aspects, 
and anyone who has to deal with the political 
aspects in this House will be unable to leave the 
military factors out of account. 
I agree however that we should not abandon 
our attempts to draw what could be a clearer 
dividing line in this matter. By way of example, 
I should like to show you how this looks from 
the viewpoint of the Defence Committee. Discus-
sion on Portugal and Spain was certainly not 
confined to technical and military matters but 
also had a thoroughly political content. Mr. Pre-
sident, perhaps we should all in future see to 
it, on the Presidential Committee, that these 
two Committees complement each other in 
dealing with the matters before them and do not 
overlap too much. 
May I end, in view of the coming vote, with 
a comment on the relationship between a recom-
mendation and an explanatory memorandum. It 
is true, as Sir Frederic has said, that the draft 
recommendation of course takes absolute pre-
cedence. But if I recall our rules of procedure 
correctly, the ultimate position on this much 
debated question is that in cases like this not 
just the recommendation and that alone forms 
the basis for assessment, but that it must be 
permissible, is perfectly proper and is held by 
many to be desirable, for account to be taken of 
the explanatory memorandum also, when mem-
bers decide on which way to vote - particularly 
if there are very provocative statements in it. 
All in all, however, Mr. President, I should 
like to express my satisfaction on the fact that 
we have found it possible to achieve such far-
reaching agreement on the recommendation 
which, as I have already said, takes absolute 
precedence. I think that this agreement can 
perhaps hardly be better summarised in the 
present instance than in the recognition by all 
of us that the SHAPE motto is right - Vigilance 
is the price of liberty. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- The Rap-
porteur has tabled a revised recommendation 
- Amendment No. 4- as follows : 
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"The Assembly, 
Affirming that true East-West detente can be 
achieved only through substantial mutual, 
balanced and controlled reductions in armaments 
by both blocs ; 
Considering the growing preponderance of 
troops and weapons on the side of the Soviet 
Union and its allies in Central and Northern 
Europe; 
Noting that the Soviet Union has up to now 
interpreted the commitments entered into in the 
final act of the CSCE in a restrictive manner ; 
Regretting that no recent progress has been 
made in the SALT and MBFR negotiations ; 
Condemning the Soviet Union's policy to take 
advantage of crises outside Europe to strengthen 
its political position by direct or indirect military 
means; 
Concerned that in face of increasingly power-
ful Warsaw Pact forces the members of the 
Atlantic Alliance will no longer deploy sufficient 
strength to guarantee their continuing collective 
security; 
Noting that while the Soviet Union and its 
allies fail to accept the main implications of 
detente, as this concept is interpreted in the 
West, a relative reduction of military strength 
in Western Europe has occurred vis-a-vis the 
Soviet military threat ; 
Satisfied that matters emerging from the 
CSCE have played a large part in the Council's 
discussions in 1975 ; 
Considering that the application of the provi-
sions of the final act of the CSCE on the move-
ment of persons is one of the vital elements by 
which one can judge the Soviet Union's desire 
for detente ; 
Considering that there is still some uncertainty 
about the operation of NATO in the event of 
some members of the Atlantic Alliance falling 
prey to subversion directly or indirectly 
sustained by external military intervention ; 
Regretting that South Mrica's widely con-
demned racial policies and intervention provided 
a pretext, although unjustified, for massive 
Soviet and Cuban military intervention in 
Angola, 
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RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Examine regularly the consequences of the 
CSCE; 
2. Inform the Assembly of any reported infringe-
ments of the provisions of the final act of the 
CSCE; 
3. Examine how great an effort each member 
country has to make to maintain a continuing 
adequate balance to ensure peace with security ; 
4. Ensure that its members concert their views 
in the appropriate framework on any crisis 
arising outside Europe in order : 
(a) to avoid hasty action which might serve 
as a pretext for interference by the Soviet 
Union or its allies ; 
(b) to deter any further Soviet interference ; 
5. Report to the Assembly on any implications 
for Western Europe of developments in the 
political, economic and military balance in 
Europe and the world ; 
6. Give timely consideration to the conditions in 
which the modified Brussels Treaty could be 
applied should one of the member countries fall 
prey to direct or indirect military intervention 
from outside." 
The new text proposed by the Rapporteur 
seems to cover the points raised by all the amend-
ments tabled except paragraph 4 of Amendment 
No. 1 by Mr. Dankert, Mr. Richter and Lord 
Peddie, and Amendment No. 3 by Mr. Radius. 
Mr. Dankert proposes that the seventh para-
graph of the preamble be left out. 
I call Mr. Dankert. 
Mr. DANKERT (Netherlands). The 
modified recommendation meets, in either spirit 
or exact wording, nearly all of the objections I 
had in mind in proposing the amendment. There 
remains one element, that covered by the para-
graph in the preamble which says : 
"Noting that while the Soviet Union and its 
allies fail to accept the main implications of 
detente, as this concept is interpreted in the 
West, a reduction of military strength in 
Western Europe has occurred without a les-
sening in the Soviet military threat ;" 
The substance of this paragraph, that the Soviet 
Union enjoys a relative superiority, is contained 
in two earlier ones. We are committing ourselves 
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to one paragraph and I have accepted the second; 
to say the same thing three times seems too much. 
There is another problem in this same para-
graph in the words : 
"Noting that while the Soviet Union and its 
allies fail to accept the main implications of 
detente, as this concept is interpreted in the 
West ... " 
Why should the Soviet Union have a concept of 
detente as it is interpreted in the West Y We 
should know what the Soviet Union is doing, and 
it should know what we are doing, and we should 
come to concrete results together. By the dele-
tion of this paragraph this resolution will become 
clear and acceptable even if there still remains 
the problem of the explanatory memorandum, 
which the Chairman pointed out. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur of the Com-
mittee. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom). 
- I must say in response to the last suggestion 
that I do not think that the two preceding 
paragraphs convey what I and my fellow mem-
bers of the Committee were trying to assert. I 
have not suggested that the Soviet Union should 
accept the implications of detente as we do. I 
have simply implied that I do not - and I 
know of no responsible person who does -
believe that it accepts detente in the same way 
as we do. This is not a criticism - it is noting 
a fact which I think important. I have agreed 
with all the other suggestions put forward -
including the loss of some of my most cherished 
points - but this is one point which my col-
leagues and I feel is an important matter of 
principle which should be included. 
I would hope that Mr. Dankert remembers 
that I have dropped my two main points about 
re-establishing. He denies the need for this, and 
I have dropped the phrase we "no longer 
deploy", saying we "wi11 no longer deploy" if 
the present build-up accrues on one side and not 
the other. I am making no criticisins, but simply 
noting that the Soviet Union and its allies do 
not accept the main implications of detente. That 
is a fact which perhaps few people realise. It is 
the main theme of the explanatory memorandum. 
It is a fact of life that the Soviet Union does not 
accept the implications of detente. Because of 
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this I hope that Mr. Dankert will not press this 
point. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Dankert. 
Mr. DANKERT (Netherlands). - I now 
understand what Sir Frederic meant. He wants 
to note in this paragraph that the Soviet Union 
and its allies failed to accept the main impli-
cations of detente as this concept is interpreted 
in the West. I think that statement is correct, 
and I am quite ready to accept it. My problem 
is that he ties it up with the relative reduction 
of military strength, which is mentioned twice 
in earlier paragraphs. If that last reference were 
deleted, I should find the resolution more 
acceptable. It is a minor point, because I think 
that the sense of the resolution is already 
changed. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- I call the 
Rapporteur. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom). 
- If I could be toLd where else we hav,e said that 
a relative reduction of military strength has 
occurred, I mi~ht be more willing to respond. 
But now that we have deleted the first three 
lines of that paragraph, I am not myself aware 
of a reference in the other paragraphs since I 
changed them to meet Mr. Dankert's views. There 
were references to the fact that we no longer 
possessed the same relative strength as before, 
but I have removed those references to please 
Mr. Dankert and his friends and now say that 
we no longer seek to re-establish it. I agree that 
this was referred to two or three times, but these 
references have been deleted at Mr. Dankert's 
request, and I would ask him at this late hour 
not to press the matter. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Dankert. 
Mr. DANKERT (Netherlands). - I still 
cannot see the difference between a relative 
reduction of military strength in Western 
Europe and a growing preponderance of troops 
and weapons on the part of the Soviet Union and 
its allies in Eastern Europe. However, if it is 
really important, I shall be ready to withdraw 
my objection. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom). 
-I am grateful. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- We have 
reached common ground. I feel duly gratified 
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and would congratulate both the Rapporteur 
and Mr. Dankert. 
Mr. Radius has tabled an amendment to delete 
the words "direct or indirect" at the end of 
paragraph 6 of the operative text of the draft 
recommendation. 
I call Mr. Radius. 
Mr. RADIUS (France) (Translation).- Allow 
me to thank the Rapporteur for having accepted 
both parts, albeit, in the case of the second, in 
another form. 
I avail myself of the opportunity to call atten-
tion to what he said. This is not only a question 
of form, but also of a substantive shade of 
meaning, and I am doubly grateful to him for 
kindly recognising this. But I shall press for the 
acceptance of my Amendment No. 3 to leave out 
the words "direct or indirect" at the end of 
paragraph 6. If you do not accept it, I shall not 
be very upset. 
Nevertheless, it seems to me that the words: 
"military intervention from outside" are enough. 
Indeed, we must not always insist so much on 
all the problems ; I am afraid that if we use 
the phrase "direct or indirect", some people may 
think we mean to allude to the possibility of the 
left coming to power in Italy. If this were fol-
lowed by the Assembly, such an idea might 
justify an accusation of serious interference in 
Italy's internal affairs. However, if we are able 
to remain true to the principle of respect for 
the independence of the European nations, the 
Assembly ,$ould in my view as far as possible 
avoid any illusion to a change, whether imaginary 
or hypothetical, in the internal policy of one of the 
WEU member States. Stated more simply, I fear 
that if we labour the point unduly, we shall 
only be killing our friends with good intentions 
- I meaJil, those who, in the boot of Italy, are 
trying to defend genuine democracy. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- I call the 
Rapporteur. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom). 
- As Mr. Radius has been good enough to 
mention, where there is a question of substance 
I have met both his other points. In this instance, 
I must recall - as the minutes of the Committee 
show - that this question was raised, and, as 
I am sure the Chairman will confirm in a moment 
- I have already altered my views regarding 
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any kind of intervention on those lines - the 
reference is now to intervention "from outside". 
We were unanimous in Committee that it was 
inappropriate to neglect the instances that have 
taken place in the case of .Angola of a great 
power using other forces from outside. It was 
for that reason we altered the text to meet the 
point- and I am sure that the Chairman will 
back me up, because it was his point that we 
took. In fact, I think we wanted here to cover 
the instance of a power using military interven-
tion indirectly because by so doing it might 
avoid responsibility of doing so directly. There 
was general agreement about this and I do not 
think that I can now go back, even if I wished 
to do so, and reverse a unanimous decision of 
the Committee. I hope that Mr. Radius will not 
press this point when all other members of the 
Committee have acceded to what we had in 
mind. 
Mr. RADIUS (France) (Translation). - I 
might say that the explanation given by Sir 
Frederic Bennett confirms what I said : I think 
the words : "military intervention from outside" 
would suffice, and that the words "direct or 
indirect" could be left out. But I do not want 
to be a bad loser, and I withdraw my amend-
ment. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Amend-
ment No. 3 by Mr. Radius is withdrawn. 
I thank the movers of the amendments, as 
well as the Rapporteur and the Chairman of 
the Committee, who have all made a very big 
effort to reconcile their views. 
The vote on the revised draft recommendation 
as a whole is deferred to a later date. 
5. Relations with Parliaments 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments, 
Doe. 706) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
Order of the Day is the presentation of and 
debate on the fourteenth half-yearly report of 
the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, 
Document 706. 
I call Mr. Delorme, the Rapporteur of the 
Committee. 
Mr. DELORME (France) (Translation). -
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should 
like first of all to say that our lady Chairman, 
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Mrs. Miotti Carli, has asked to be excused: she 
h1..s not been able to come because of electoral 
duties. I should like to welcome our new Chair-
man since this morning, Mr. Radius: may I 
remind you that this report covers the period 
from November 1975 to April1976. 
The texts of the interventions made in the 
various parliaments of member countries are 
given in Collected Texts 23, insofar as they have 
reached the secretariat of the Committee, and 
I have to inform you that the Committee, meet-
ing in Paris for the purpose of selecting, in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 42 bis 
of the Rules of Procedure of your Assembly, 
from the texts adopted by the Assembly those 
which in its opinion should be debated in the 
parliaments, selected Recommendation 273 on 
Western Europe and the evolrwtion of the 
Atlantic Alliance, Recommendation 274 on the 
European aeronautical industry and Recom-
mendation 276 on the conference on security and 
co-operation in Europe. 
The texts of these three recommendations have 
been officially sent to the Presidents of the 
various Houses of Parliament of the member 
countries, and our Committee always endeavours 
to draw the attention of the seven parliaments 
to the texts which it thinks likely to arouse their 
interest and stimulate debate. 
At this point in my introductory remarks, I 
should like to appeal once again to my oolJ.eagues, 
and with all due respect to the Presidents of 
our respective parliaments, regarding the import-
ance of giving the widest distribution to the 
recommendations adopted and to the work of our 
Assembly. 
We recently noted once more that, at the level 
of a conference of our Ministers of Defence, 
it might have been thought there was an Assem-
bly - this one - created especially to study 
and resolve, as far as possible, certain problems 
dealing notably with their armaments and their 
unification. 
This is the reason why we insist, and we note, 
over and over again, that the texts we have 
chosen for transmission to the parliaments do 
not always get the attention they deserve. Indeed 
you will see from the table which is given at 
Appendix 11 to my report that the texts selected 
in November 1973 elicited only four questions 
and replies; the two texts selected in June 1974 
5 - 11 
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produced only four questions and the single text 
chosen in December 1974 resulted in only one 
intervention. Such were the results which we 
noted in the case of certain interventions. 
I note that the WEU Assembly's last session 
in December roused an echo - I am very pleased 
to say - in both chambers of the French Parlia-
ment. Our report was mentioned in the French 
Senate at its sitting of 6th December 1975 and 
in the National Assembly in the official report 
of 9th December. It should be noted that both 
official reports were distributed to all members 
of parliament and anybody else who asked for 
them. 
We noted also that on 23rd October 1975, in 
a statement on his country's foreign affairs, Mr. 
Thorn, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the ~~a?d 
Duchy of Luxembourg, reviewed the actiVIties 
of this Assembly. 
Finally, in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
the government continued to submit its half-
yearly reports to parliament on the activities 
of WEU, and Bundestag document 7/4355 men-
tioned our activities from 1st April to 30th 
September 1975. The delegation tabled its report 
on the session and we were able to note, as in 
a previous report, that the response to the texts 
adopted by the Assembly was, reassuringly, fifty-
six parliamentary interventions during the cur-
rent half-year, which represents a very marked 
increase in the interest which members of parlia-
ment take in the texts we have adopted. So 
much for the interest which has been shown in 
our respective parliaments in the work of WEU. 
In this connection our Press Counsellor is to 
be congratulated on keeping specialist journalists 
informed of questions and replies likely to inter-
est the mass media. 
We have ob~erved during the last few months 
that people have been talking about WEU, 
discussing it and referring to some of the reports 
and, as I saw again in the German press this 
morning, a reference was made to the work of 
our current session and the interest being taken 
in the work of our Assembly. 
I believe it was worth while mentioning this, 
and we ought to encourage our Press Counsellor 
to continue his, so to say, precision work in 
publicising the work of our Assembly. 
I should mention that Resolution 55 has been 
the subject of questions in Belgium, France, 
Luxembourg and Italy. The Belgian reply said 
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the modified Brussels Treaty was important 
because it provides for automatic assistance in 
the event of armed attack. The Italian Govern-
ment considered that our Assembly has and will 
have an essential role to play because it offers 
instruments of co-operation which meet the needs 
of defence. That is what I was pointing out a 
moment ago. People in high places do not always 
know what our Assembly has to offer and we 
can only deplore the fact that there is no call 
for its services and co-operation, nor of course, 
Ladies and Gentlemen, your own. 
Finally, the Luxembourg Minister for Foreign 
Affairs indicated that the existing structures 
of our Assembly might play an important role 
in pooling our ideas about European defence. 
He welcomed the fact that the Assembly had 
raised these problems and tabled proposals 
through our President, Mr. Nessler, to Mr. 
Tindemans. 
As for Recommendation 262, our Netherlands 
colleagues have again been questioning their 
Minister about ratifying the conventions on third-
party liability in the field of nuclear energy. 
The reply was even vaguer than the one given 
in the past. 
The Italian Government in reply to a question 
by Senator Bonaldi, one of our most eminent 
and faithful fellow members, said that the 1960 
and 1963 conventions on third-party liability in 
the field of nuclear energy had been ratified 
and would shortly be implemented. 
I will not dwell on all the recommendations 
proposed by your Committee, including Recom-
mendation 263 and Recommendation 266. I 
should mention that Senator Grangier and our 
late lamented Mr. Legaret had also put down 
questions on the continuing failure to appoint 
a permanent Secretary-General of WEU. The 
Minister for Foreign Affairs wishes steps to be 
taken to put an end to this situation, and is 
doing what he can in this direction. 
Questions were put concerning all the other 
recommendations, which brings me at once to 
the particularly important one about interven-
tions apart from questions concerning resolu-
tions. It is this type of intervention we ought 
to be making and I appeal to members to do so 
whenever the occasion arises. I insist on this 
point because it is very important. We did it 
in the case of Mr. Nessler and Mr. Riviere, 
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when they seized the opportunity of the recent 
debate on the military programmes act tabled 
in the French Parliament three weeks ago. We 
expressed surprise that our own government did 
not take more account of the work of WEU and 
all that could be done through this instrument. 
While it is the Assembly's role under normal 
working conditions to discuss from time to time, 
pleasantly, and in a well-bred manner, amid a 
soothing murmur of voices in an air-conditioned 
hall, it has also a higher and more direct mission. 
It should be allowed to achieve what those who 
created it intended it for. That is why we 
intervened to point out that solutions could be 
found for a number of problems by making use 
of what already existed. As a humble lawyer, 
I notice that very often people hunt through 
the statute books for texts which already exist 
and only need to be modernised, or, to use a 
horrid word, revitalised. The treaty establishing 
this Assembly and assigning precise aiins for it 
is all too often forgotten. It is wrong not to take 
a look at texts which would precisely allow the 
Seven represented here to propose, in a demo-
cratic fashion, solutions that have already been 
studied. At all events this is the pious hope of 
your Rapporteur. 
I mentioned in my report that the French 
Minister for Foreign Affairs answered a question 
put by Mr. Radius on NATO's Eurogroup and 
the proposal to create a European secretariat, 
even though the Standing Armaments Committee 
of WEU already exists. The Minister replied 
that there was no question of France participat-
ing in the work of Eurogroup and that misgivings 
about the creation of an Atlantic organisation 
were unfounded. Senator Menard had put a 
question to the Minister of Defence on arma-
ments procurement, WEU and Eurogroup. So 
far there has been no reply. 
One way or another, every time you speak 
about WEU in your parliaments you will have 
contributed to revitalising it and demonstrating 
its usefulness. That is why we are pleased to 
note that Mr. Tanghe had put a question to his 
Defence Minister on the bodies of which Belgium 
was a member and had concerned himself with 
the quest for joint production of armaments 
and equipment. He said that while the WEU 
Assembly was not the body for this, and although 
the name of the organisation earcied some weight, 
in practice nationalism would always be a big 
obstacle. I was delighted with this reply, 
especially knowing how harm has been done by 
nationalism in certain respects, especially for 
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implementation of the treaties as we would like 
to see it. But since we have a treaty we must 
make use of it. The role of your Rapporteur and 
of the Committee is, in fact, to urge upon you, 
whenever you mention the Assembly, to demon-
strate its full usefulness. 
On 11th and 12th May last, as guests of the 
government of Luxembourg, in the course of a 
very pleasant visit, we were given a very inter-
esting commentary on parliamentary life by 
Mr. Wagener, Secretary-General of the Chamber 
of Deputies of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. 
It was brought home to us that we really were 
in a profoundly democratic and liberal country. 
Our Committee is desirous of continuing its 
visits to the parliaments represented here, to 
prove that, in our organisation, democracy is 
sovereign and not an empty word. 
In conclusion, besides our proceedings in Com-
mittee and in public sittings, another important 
job is making known what the Assembly has 
already accomplished. Relations with parliaments 
are, so to say, specially designed to promote 
publicity, public relations and propaganda in 
favour of the aims of WEU. We ought, when-
ever we can, to tell our fellow members in our 
own national assemblies what WEU stands for, 
explain to them what these initials mean, how 
it was born and in what ways it can be of service. 
It would be an excellent lesson in civics, and 
would enhance the reputation of our Assembly 
if everybody knew the exact terms of the treaty 
which established it. 
While this Committee is not called upon to 
study questions of grand strategy, armaments 
or groups of armaments, it does all the same have 
the mission of making known that, for its 
defence, Europe has at its disposal an instrument 
that simply demands to be fully wielded, 
deployed and used as a framework, and there is 
no need to look for it any further. 
When solutions are sought at international 
conferences, they could perhaps be found in 
this Assembly of seven nations. That is why the 
Committee decided at its last meeting in May 
1976 to take concerted and concentrated action 
to publicise Resolution 59 on European union 
and WEU without waiting for it to be ratified 
by the Assembly and form the subject of ques-
tions in parliaments. For the French Delegation 
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we did it in the case of Document 701 on a 
matter concerning the staff regulations and the 
pension scheme for our international civil 
servants. 
Such are the conclusions of my report. 
With a barometer in one hand, and a thermo-
meter in the other, we of WEU must continue 
the effort to make known in all organs or com-
mittees what contribution it can bring and what 
an invaluable instrument our Assembly is. 
(Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- No other 
speaker has put down his name for this debate. 
I call the Chairman of the Committee. 
Mr. RADIUS (France) (Translation).- This 
information report presented by Mr. Delorme 
does not contain any recommendation or resolu-
tion. He has presented it with burning eloquence. 
He is no humble lawyer as he claims to be, but 
a great jurist - and a man of conviction. I 
would ask those members still present and all 
the others, to follow the recommendations which 
he has made. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The 
Assembly takes note of the fourteenth half-
yearly report of the Committee for Relations 
with Parliaments. 
6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of 
the next Sitting 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- I propose 
that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting 
tomorrow morning, Wednesday, 16th June, at 
10 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day : 
1. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial 
organs of WEU for the financial year 1976 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report 
of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration and Votes on the draft 
Opinion and draft Recommendation, Docu-
ment 701). 
2. Address by Mr. Schmidt, Parliamentary 
Secretary of State for Defence of the 
Federal Republic of Germany. 
3. Security in the Mediterranean (Presenta-
tion of and Debate on the Report and 
supplementary Report of the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments and 
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Vote on the d.Taft Recommendation, Docu-
ments 708 and Amendments and 712). 
4. Reserve forces (Presentation of and Debate 
on the Report of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments, Document 707). 
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Are there any objections L 
The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting 
are therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak?... 
The Sitting is closed. 
(The Sitting was closed at 6.10 p.m.) 
FOURTH SITTING 
Wednesday, 16th June 1976 
SUMMARY 
1. Adoption of the Minutes. 
2. Attendance Register. 
3. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU 
for the financial year 1976 (Presentation of and Debate 
on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary AUairs and 
Administration and Votes on the draft Opinion and draft 
Recommendation, Doe. 701). 
Speakers : The President, Lord Selsdon (Rapporteur), 
Mr. de Bruyne, Mr. Page. 
4. Security in the Mediterranean (Presentation of and 
Debate on the Report and supplementary Report of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Does. 
708 and Amendments and 712). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Buck (Rapporteur), 
Mr. Bologna. 
5. Address by Mr. Schmidt, Parliamentary Secretary of 
State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Schmidt. 
Replies by Mr. Schmidt to questions put by: Mr. Critchley, 
Mr. Riviera, Mr. Richter, Mr. Mattick, Mr. Schwencke, 
Mr. Enders. 
6. Security in the Mediterranean (Resumed Debate on the 
Report and supplementary Report of the Committee on 
Defence Queationa and Armaments, Does. 708 and 
Amendments and 712). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Riviera, Mr. Vasco da 
Gama Fernandes (Observer from Portugal), Lord Peddie, 
Mr. Radius, Mr. Vedovato. 
7. Change in the Order of Business. 
Speakers : The President, Mr. Piket. 
8. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting. 
The Sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Mart, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT (Transl<ation). - The Sit-
ting is open. 
t. Adoption of the Minutes 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). In 
accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Pro-
cedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the 
previous Sitting have been distributed. 
Are there any comments ?... 
The Minutes are agreed to. 
2. Attendance Register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The 
names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting 
which have been notified to the President will 
he published with the list of Representatives 
appended to the Minutes of Proceedings 1 • 
I. See page 33. 
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3. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial 
organs of WEU for the financial year 1976 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
and Votes on the draft Opinion and draft 
Recommendation, Doe. 101) 
The PRESIDENT (Tl"anslation).- The next 
Order of the Day is the presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Committee on 
Budgetary Mfairs and Administration on the 
budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for 
the financial year 1976 and votes on the dl"aft 
opinion and draft l"ecommendation, Document 
701. 
I eaU the Rapporteur, Lord Selsdon. 
Lord SELSDON (United Kingdom).- I find 
myself today in danger of being as repetitive 
a..<J it is possible to be in that the contents of 
the report I have prepared are repetitions of 
previous reports, with one or two minor amend-
ments. I shall once again review the situation. 
The report deals essentially with the terms and 
conditions of employment of members of WEU 
hut it also looks at the overall problems of 
conditions of employment of the other ~ 
ordinated organisations. 
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I should like to call your attention to 
Appendices VIII and IX. We often forget that 
when we speak of the co-ordinated organisations 
we are speaking of some 12,724 civil servants to 
whom will be added shortly anoth-er 100 or so 
from the long- or medium-range weather fore-
casting unit and some 2,000 in connection with 
the patents office to be established in Brussels. 
Although they all work for separate organisa-
tions, they have one thing in common : they 
belong to the co-ordinated organisations and do 
n()t come under the administration of any single 
government or of the Commission. 
The problem lies in the fact that each organisa-
tion reports to a considerable number of govern-
ments, WEU being composed of only seven 
member countries whereas OECD is composed of 
about 24. WEU is the smallest organisation and 
perhaps the one whose staff are most inclined 
to wonder whether its long-term future is viable 
or how long it will continue after the treaty 
expires. All this creates some insecurity for its 
employees. Their number is small, only 105, and 
it has not been increased, so there can be no 
accusation that it is over-staffed. Nor has the 
overall budget itself been increased very much. 
Perhaps the most important element of this 
and previous reports is the question of a pension 
scheme. Whilst it was the declared intention in 
1974 to introduce a pension scheme for WEU 
and the co-ordinated organisations, nothing has 
happened so far. The various governments 
appointed a committee of fully qualified experts, 
which was faced with the task of putting forward 
and obtaining agreement on final proposals for 
such a scheme. ·whilst there has been much 
discussion and, I would suggest, considerable 
expense, nothing constructive has happened to 
date. I do not mean that the proposals them-
selves are not constructive but that there has 
been no action on them. It is important to 
remember that a subject such as pensions 
involves human feelings. Altho~h people believe 
in their hearts that a pension scheme will come, 
there is nevertheless an element of uncertainty 
which causes them considerable discomfort and 
nervousness and which may lead in certain cases 
to a lack of devotion to duty. 
There are two basic problems in the intro-
duction and co-ordination of the scheme in both 
this and the other organisations. The different 
organisations th('mselves were not sure whether 
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they actually wanted a common scheme. This 
may have been due to internal politics, 
jealousies, or concerns of one sort, or wars 
between one organisation and another. They 
have now agreed that a common scheme under 
common management would be not only econo-
mic and justified, but almost a necessity if one 
is to develop any common organisation for 
European civil servants outside the Commission. 
Most of the recommendations we have made 
represent attempts to draw procedures into line 
with those in the Community in order to avoid 
<>reating a different type of civil servant 80 that 
someone who works in the Community is no 
better or worse off than someone who works 
outside it. Since the member States of WEU 
are members of the Community, it seems logical 
that everything should fall into line with Com-
munity proposals. 
These deliberations about pensions have caused 
some suffering to those who have retired during 
the past two years because of this uncertainty. 
Then, not perhaps a blow, but something rather 
stupid happened - the system for reviewing 
salaries was suddenly dropped and nothing was 
put in its place. This added to the uncertainty 
about pensions and caused some unrest - not 
within WEU, but, as delegates will be aware, 
in other organisations such ·as NATO and the 
Council of Europe - and anxiety that there 
would be what might be called industrial 
disputes. 
This may seem odd to many of us, because we 
are aware that most European civil servants 
have quite good remuneration and a reasonable 
standard of living. But they have no permanent 
home and are to some extent international 
wanderers not tied to any one country. They 
need security and that security must come from 
regular reviews of salaries to keep them in line 
with inflation, and also the security of a pension. 
We understand that since this decision to 
suspend or drop the system of review, one or 
two things have happened. Within WEU, I 
understand, the lower grades have received a 
5 % increase and the higher grades about 4 % 
or less - which is reasonably modest in these 
inflationary times, but I think that it is accept-
able to them, provided the system of review is 
re-established. 
I ask colleagues today to do anything in th('ir 
power to urge the appropriate governments or 
authorities to pursue and conclude the intro-
duction of a pension scheme during this year. 
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If it is introduced by the end of this year, it 
will have to be b~k-dated for about two and 
a half years. 
It may often not be realised that, although 
there have been no pension schemes within 
WEU, there are various provident funds to 
which people contribute, and the pension scheme 
itself is scheduled to be a budgeted pension 
scheme. Therefore, past contributions and 
everything connected with provident funds will 
actually be paid back to governments when the 
schemes have been agreed. Naturally, this would 
start at a later date, but there is no immediate 
extra financial burden on governments in intro-
ducing these pension schemes at present. 
So I would ask our colleagues today to do 
everything possible to draw attention to this, 
remembering that if things are allowed to fester, 
they can cause very serious disruption within 
the European civil service and this can do the 
<>a use of Europe nothing but harm. (Applause) 
The PRESIDBNT (Translation). - In the 
debate, I call Mr. de Bruyne. 
Mr. de BRUYNE (Belgi1tm) (Translation).-
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we are 
lucky in having as Chairman of the Committee 
on Budgetary Affairs and Administration an 
experienced politician and financial expert like 
Mr. Dequae. He helps to strengthen the author-
ity of our Committee, an authority that indeed 
needs strengthening because, among other things, 
of the great personal and social responsibilities 
the Committee carries. I congratulate Mr. 
Dequae on his recent election to the chairman-
ship, and hope that this decision will be crowned 
with success. You will know what I mean, Mr. 
President, and what personal, social and human 
aspects are involved. 
This brings me to the recommendation and 
to Lord Selsdon's report. Lord Selsdon is an 
experienced Rapporteur, with a specially sound 
knowledge of the financial and administrative 
background to the WEU staff regulations. I 
hope that we shall long benefit from his skilled 
collaboration as Rapporteur. 
In conclusion, I would draw your attention 
to one aspect of the report that may have 
escaped you. The report looks highly technical 
where it deals with financial matters, and it 
may well be that it is understandable in all its 
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sections only to the initiated. I want to 
emphasise that it is the interests of the members 
of the staff of WEU, and their families, that are 
at stake here. These interests are no longer fully 
protected by the present staff regulations and 
pension arrangements. I would call attention, 
too, to the fact, that WEU, as an employer, is 
running the risk of being put in a situation 
where it would, for want of a sufficiently strong 
financial basis, no longer be able to fulfil its 
most elementary human and social obligations. 
We must avoid WEU ever being blamed for 
shortcomings in the social and human sphere. I 
hope, therefore, that Mr. Dequae will indeed 
have the real success he is seeking in the discus-
sions he is now having and which he will prob-
abl.y be pursuing to the very highest, ministerial 
summit level, in the days and weeks to come. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). I ~Call 
Mr. Page. 
Mr. PAGE (United Kingdom). - I should 
like to follow Mr. de Bruyne in congratulating 
Mr. Dequae on once again becoming Chairman 
of the Budget Committee. He has great experi-
ence. In nearly every speech I seem to make in 
any international organisation I have to start 
by congratulating Mr. Dequae. It gives one great 
comfort to have such a firm foundation for 
these bodies. I should also like to congratulate 
Ijord Selsdon on his ·election as Vice-Chairman, 
and Mr. Robert Schmitt, and wish them good 
luck in the coming year - particularly Lord 
Selsdon in his efforts to achieve final results 
in connection with some of the staff matters. 
I should like to underline two of the observa-
tions that J.Jord Selsdon has made in his speech 
and in his report. We must see that the staffs 
of Western European Union and other co-
ordinated organisations do not feel that they 
are second-cla.."'B citizens compared with those 
employed by the EEC. An organisation such as 
WEU depends very much on the efficiency, 
loyalty and quality of its staff, and it is essential 
that it continues to attract the highest calibre 
of employee. If such people feel that they are 
at too much of a disadvantage compared with 
the EEC, it would be an extremely damaging 
situation for WEU itself. 
Lord Selsdon was quite right to say that the 
international civil service has not the same home 
base as civil servants working for the civil 
service in their own member countries. They 
have their staff associations, their own civil 
service, their own national parliaments. The civil 
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servants who work in WEU and the Council of 
Europe and other of the co-ordinated organisa-
tions have only the assistance of those workers 
who can act in loco parentis. 
Therefore, it is important that we in this 
Assembly should accept the responsibility of 
being the only judges of the quality of emolu-
ments and terms of service of those who work 
for us. 
It is difficult for all national governments to 
find finance at this time for international 
organisations and it must be a great temptation 
in the cabinets of our different countries to 
think : "If we make an economy in the Council 
of Europe or WEU or NATO, or somewhere 
else like that, it will not show so much as making 
an economy in a home spending department." 
Therefore, I think I.JOrd Selsdon is right to point 
out that to get a decent and efficient pension 
scheme need not and should not be a burden 
on tax-payers and exchequers. The time has come 
for a step forward in the subject of pensions 
in the co-ordinated organisations. I hope that 
members of the Assembly will give Mr. Dequae 
and Lord Selsdon their full backing in negotia-
tions with the Council of Ministers on this 
important subject. (..cipplause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- There are 
no more speakers on the list. 
The debate is closed. 
In Document 701, the Committee presents a 
draft opinion and a draft recommendation. 
No amendment has been tabled to the draft 
opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs 
of Western European Union for the financial 
year 1976. 
Rules 34 and 35 of the Rules of Procedure 
require the vote on a draft recommendation or 
draft opinion taken as a whole to be by roll-
call, the majority required being an absolute 
majority of the votes cast. However, if the 
Assembly is unanimous and there are no objec-
tions to the draft recommendation or draft 
opinion and no abstentions, we can save the time 
needed for a vote by roll-call. 
Are there any objections to the draft 
opinion L 
Are there any abstentions L 
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The draft optnwn on the budget of the 
ministerial organs of Western European Union 
for the financial year 1976 is adopted 
unanimously 1 • 
No amendment has been tabled to the draft 
recommendation on improving the status of 
WEU staff. 
The vote on the dl"aft recommendation as a 
whole will be by roll-call if the Assembly is not 
unanimous. 
Are there any objections to the draft recom-
mendation L 
Are there any abstentions L 
The draft recommendation is therefore 
adopted unanimously 2 • 
4. Security in the Mediterranean 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report and 
supplementary Report of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments, Does. 708 and 
Amendments and 712) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - 'l'he next 
Order of the Day is the presentation of and 
debate on the report and supplementary report 
of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments on security in the Mediterranean 
and vote on the draft recommendation, Docu-
ments 708 and Amendments and 712. 
I call Mr. Buck, Rapporteur of the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armammts. 
Mr. BUCK (United Kingdom). - First, I 
should like to say what an honour it is to present 
a report to the Assembly of Western European 
Union. This is the first time I have had this 
honour and I trust that the Assembly will for-
give any inadequacies which there may be in 
my presentation and will attribute such inade-
quacies to my inexperience in operating in this 
distinguished international forum. 
I should like to thank the secretariat, which 
has been such an enormous help to me in the 
preparation of this report. In particular, I 
should like to thank Stuart Whyte and his hard-
working secretary for all their help in the 
compilation of this work. In the relatively few 
months during which I have had the privilege 
1. See page 34. 
2. See page 35. 
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of serving as a member of the parliamentary 
Assembly of WEU, I have learnt that we have 
indeed a very small secretariat, but my experi-
ence over these months leads me to the firm 
conclusion that what our secretariat may lack 
in numbers it makes up for fully in quality. 
I think we are sometimes, if I may respectfully 
say so, slightly inclined to take for granted all 
the enormous amount of hard work which our 
small secretariat does. I cannot speak highly 
enough of the help that I have had from Mr. 
Whyte and his secretary in the compilation of 
this report. 
Next I should like to thank the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments. This 
report, as set out in paragraph 152, was adopted 
by the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments by 11 votes to 2. I hope that I am 
not out of order if I point out to the Assembly 
that before that vote was taken I was glad to 
accept various amendments put forward by col-
leagues more experienced in the operation of this 
distingui<Jhed international forum than I and 
that I now recognise that I was wholly right to 
accept those amendments. I should like to 
express my gratitude to them for taking the 
trouble to put forward those amendments. Their 
inclusion in the draft report has made it a better 
report. I am grateful to the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments which was 
kind enough to adopt the report after I had been 
glad to meet some of the comments made in 
Committee. 
I should like to make one other remark before 
returning to the recommendations that I have 
the honour of putting before the Assembly. 
Whatever colleagues may think of the recom-
mendations, I hope that they will find the docu-
ment as a whole a useful working document. 
If my colleagues have been kind enough to look 
at the document, they will have noticed that it 
contains a great deal of information that I hope 
will be useful to our colleagues who have made 
a particular study of armament matters. There 
is a great deal of information and I hope that 
the material both within the body of the report 
and in the appendices will prove useful to my 
colleagues. Here again I reiterate the gratitude 
that I feel for the secretariat, which has enabled 
me to compile the information contained in the 
appendices, which, if nothing else, make it what 
might be described as a useful working docu-
ment. 
s•- n 
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In an introductory note, there is set out a 
fairly large number of people who have been 
consulted and who have given me the benefit 
of their great wisdom before I compiled the draft 
recommendations. There is set out all those by 
whom I have had the benefit of being briefed. 
Then we come to the draft recommendations. 
First, there i<J what I suppose must be regarded 
as the preamble. 
Paragraph (i) sets out that which we all know 
only too well - it draws attention again to 
the emergence of the Soviet Union as a world 
naval power. 
We are all familiar with this phenomenon. As 
a former Minister for the Royal Navy, I 
certainly am as familiar with· it as anyone else 
here. What has happened since Cuba has been 
a massive build-up of the Russian naval forces. 
The great Admiral Gorshkov had his task of 
persuading the Politburo to go ahead with mas-
sive naval expansion made easy by what hap-
pened in Cuba when the Russians had to turn 
back their ships. They now have a blue water 
fleet capable of deployment anywhere in the 
world. That former humiliation could not again 
be inflicted on Russia. The Russians now have 
a vast ocean-going fleet and the accumulation 
of their forces is well known to us all. 
We know that a new Russian nuclear sub-
marine is being built every month. We know 
about the aircraft carrier Kiev, which is built 
and to which I shall refer later, and we also 
know about the other aircraft carrier which is 
being built. This development has been stressed 
in other working documents of Western European 
Union, but I trust that the Assembly will agree 
that it is right to mention it again. 
There is a passing reference to the political 
uncertainties and disputes in the Mediterranean 
area. It is not appropriate in this paper, how-
ever, to go into that in detail. We are all familiar 
with the tremendous uncertainties, especially in 
the Eastern Mediterranean. 
Paragraph (iii) calls for "the broadening and 
strengthening of the Alliance, based on freely-
elected parliamentary democracies and the pre-
paration of NATO contingency plans designed 
to meet any crisis". In paragraph (iv) I make 
the suggestion that we should be "willing to 
see other appropriate countries such as Austra-
lia, New Zealand and, to the extent that it pro-
gresses to democracy, Iran associated with 
Alliance defence planning". 
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I call particular attention to this part of the 
preamble. This matter is dealt with further in 
paragraph 146 where it is pointed out that 
Australia and New Zealand have in recent times 
taken a closer interest in mutual defence plans. 
Australia has made available to the United 
Kingdom and United States wa.rships the 
enlarged Cockburn Sands naval base and there 
has been a continuation of the ANZUS defence 
pact and a greater degree of exercises between 
the Australian and New Zealand fleets and the 
fleets of the rest of the western world. I hope 
that the Assembly thinks it appropriate that 
passing reference should be made to closer 
association with Australia and New Zealand. It 
is not unduly influenced by the fact that I have 
an Aootralian wife, but perhaps that has had 
something to do with the recommendation. I 
know from having met the present commanders-
in-chief of the Au..'!tralian fleet and of the New 
Zealand fleet in an earlier role that they are 
keen, and we should be keen, on closer liaison 
with those countries. 
Iran is also mentioned as an emerging power 
and I believe it appropriate that we should have 
closer association with it. That is aLl that is 
called for, but it will be noted that I have been 
careful to refer to the extent that progress to 
democracy takes place in Iran when closer 
integration may be possible in the short term and 
defence planning at every level might be thought 
wholly appropriate. 
Paragraph ( v) welcomes "the advent of a 
freely-elected Parliament in Portugal and the 
announcement of free elections in Spain". This 
is a subject to which I propose to return when 
I get away from the preamble to the body of 
the recommendations. 
Paragraph (vi) refers to matters already con-
sidered by the Assembly. There is the Montreux 
Convention by which, in all fairness, I must say 
the USSR has, as far as I am aware, meticul-
ously abided. It will be interesting to observe 
what happens when the Russians wish the Kiev 
to emerge from the Black Sea into the Mediter-
ranean and how they deal with that, because, 
&'! we all know, there is a prohibition on the 
movement of aircraft carriers through the 
Turkish Straits. We may suddenly find that this 
aircraft carrier becomes an anti-submarine ves-
sel. ·we must watch that situation am.d do 
everything possible to maintain the Montreux 
Convention. 
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There is also a recommendation that the 
NATO Gibraltar command be transferred to the 
IBERLANT command. There is now a first-class 
communications link between Gibraltar and the 
IBERLANT headquarters, not yet entirely com-
pleted. I do not think that I am in contravention 
of the Official Secrets Act if I say that this 
substantial improvement in communications 
between Gibraltar and the IBERLANT com-
mand makes it appropriate that there should be 
this transfer. Whilst not quoting any military 
leaders, I can indicate that there is a very 
substantial body of opinion that the transfer 
should be made. If any of my distinguished col-
leagues wish to study this aspect further, they 
can refer to Appendix I. 
I turn now to recommendation 1(a), which 
relates to a matter on which I have already 
touched. I hope that colleagues will note the 
careful way in which, assisted by the secretariat, 
I have worded this paragraph. It calls for the 
North Atlantic Council to negotiate with the 
Government of Spain "that emerges from free 
elections the accession of that country to the 
North Atlantic Treaty, and an appropriate role 
for the Spanish armed forces in the integrated 
milit·ary structure". That is made contingent on 
there emerging a democratic government freely 
elected : I emphasise that. 
I hope that this attempt to hold out the hand 
of friendship will be seen as encouraging those 
in the Iberian peninsula who are striving so 
hard, as I have seen from visiting Madrid, to 
bring about a democratic society. I hope that 
those who are striving so hard with such dif-
ficulties facing them, after forty years or more 
of a totalitarian regime, will feel that it gives 
them some small help. If so, we shall have done 
something very worth while. But, as I say, this 
paragraph is carefully worded and made wholly 
dependent on there being free elections in that 
country, elections that are seen to be free. 
The value of a Spanish integration into our 
command structure in the Mediterranean is 
obvious, but let us for a moment put it into 
balance. It is clear that because of the difficulties 
in the Eastern Mediterranean resulting from the 
tragic dispute between Turkey and Greece, the 
free world's position there is weaker and less 
satisfactory than it has been. If we can offer 
this as a quid pro quo, as it were, the streng-
thening of the Alliance at the other end of the 
Mediterranean will have been achieved. 
Recomm~ndation 1 (b) reads : "by fostering 
the accessiOn of Malta to the North Atlantic 
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Treaty, should a Maltese Government so request, 
or the conclusion of bilaternl defence arrange-
ments between Malta and Italy." I have visited 
Malta. We all know the importance of its 
strategic position although, to be frank, it is not 
so great as in the past. It would be disastrous 
for the Alliance, however, if there were to be 
an occupation by any unfriendly power. This 
modest recommendation makes such proposed 
accession contingent and dependent on the 
desires of a Maltese Government. It would be 
inappropriate not to indicate that if a Maltese 
Government wants it, we should be glad to 
welcome M·alta within the body of the Alliance. 
I then suggest that we should recommend the 
value of military facilities being located on a 
basis of territorial diversity in the Mediter-
ranean area. This speaks for itself. It is an 
example of the old adage of not putting all one's 
eggs in one basket. This recommendation has 
been made before. There is a heartening 
diversity and number of bases. It is a matter 
which ha..c;; been referred to in earlier reports, 
and it is appropriate that it should be stressed 
here. 
Recommendation 1 (.d) calls for increased 
public identification by ·all the member countries 
and the Alliance as a whole with NATO defence 
arrangements in the Mediterranean area. This 
takes up a recommendation made in an earlier 
report by Mr. Oritchley, the present Chairman 
of our Defence Committee. We have reiterated 
that sensible recommendation. 
Recommendation 1 (e) is similarly self-
explanatory. Help should obviously be given to 
the Portuguese forces to become more effective 
in any NATO role. I know from my visits to 
Lisbon that the Portuguese are establishing true 
democracy there. They should play a more 
adequate and appropriate role within NATO as 
they emerge to proper democracy. We should 
give them every help and assistance, and it may 
be helpful for us to express that aim in the 
report. 
Recommendation 2 (a) calls on the North 
Atlantic Council to declare that the Alliance 
will take appropriate measures to resist any 
external political or military pressure designed 
to change the government or policy of Yugo-
lavia. 
No doubt we have all given considerable 
thought and attention to this matter. What is 
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needoo is a strong affirmation by the western 
world that when Marshal Tito dies, the Western 
Alliance will not tolerate outside intervention. 
The mere e.xpression of that will may be suf-
ficient to prevent such intervention. 
There follows an exhortation in recom-
mendation 2 (b) that we should make clear to 
the Soviet Union that changes in the status quo 
in the Mediterranean area by the taking up of 
new bases there by the USSR could be a 
dangerous course to pursue and will be met in 
a robust manner by the Alliance. 
Recommendation 2 (c) includes an exhortation 
that there should be contingency plans to deal 
with any of the eventualities to which I have 
referred, or any other matters. There is also a 
plea for no more secrecy than is required for 
the success of the plans. I am a great believer 
in open government and - although I may have 
been guilty when I was a Minister - I wonder 
whether governments do not often keep things 
under w:raps far more than is necessary. We 
should do all we can to get governments to be 
more outward-looking and approachable, to give 
more information and to have the minimum of 
secrecy about defence matters. An exhortation 
of that character seems appropri·aJte. 
There is now a European programme group 
and it would be a good idea for it to produce 
an annual defence white paper - as we have 
in Great Britain and many other countries -
setting out its progress in the previous year. 
I apologise for having taken so much time. I 
hope that the Assembly will find this a useful 
work and will look .favourably on it. It contains 
in a compact and easily digestible form a great 
deal of information about the situation in the 
Mediterranean and should be regarded as a 
working document. I hope that it will be thought 
that the recommendations make practical sug-
gestions about the efficient working of the 
defence structure in the Mediterranean and that 
it will give some encouragement to those striving 
to restore democracy to the troubloo Iberian 
peninsula. I hope that we shall give them a 
welcome when their efforts are crowned with 
success. 
I thank the Assembly for its patience in 
listening to what I have said and hope that 
members will be kind enough to adopt the report 
that I have presented. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. Rapporteur. 
The first speaker on the list is Mr. Bologna. 
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President, J.Jadies and Gentlemen. I have seen 
fit to address you on a more specific topic, so 
as not to find myself, as sometimes may occur, 
discussing in general, unduly philosophical 
terms. 
All I can say is that, as polling day draws 
21st June, for we should not in that case be 
here, making predictions and attempting fore-
casts. We should know what we are so anxious 
to learn - the way the Italian elections have 
gone, and whether or not the communists will 
be entering the government. But this is still one 
big question-mark, and there is no easy way of 
finding an answer. 
All I can say is that, as polling day draws 
nearer, the Italian electorate is more preoccupied 
with misgivings, or, if you like, fear of the 
unknown aspects of a political turning point 
- coinmunists in the cabinet- than with the 
desire and will for change at all costs. 
However, it has unfortunately to be said too, 
quite outspokenly, that if the communist party, 
together with the socialists and other left-wing 
minority groups, fails to achieve a majority, we 
shall not see the end of political instability in 
Italy. This stems from the crisis among the 
christian democrats, and the uncertainties and 
vacillations of the socialist party. 
But I believe I can, no less outspokenly, assert 
that the case of Italy, which rightly preoccupies 
our NATO friends and allies and the govern-
ments of the seven WEU member countries by 
reason of its adverse repercussions on the polit-
ical situation and on Western Europe's defensive 
alignments, especially in the Mediterranean 
sector, is only one of a set of other possible 
cases. I mean that- unfortunately, to my mind 
- communism is, or might be, about to gain a 
foothold in the governments of other West 
European countries. 
The precarious balance in the Mediterranean, 
which has become topical again with the reopen-
ing of the Suez Canal - I am summarising what 
was written in the latest Strategic Survey -
might be struck a shrewd blow by a communist 
presence in the government majorities of coun-
tries like Italy, France and Spain. 
Is there any justification for the concern 
expressed on all sides at the progress of the 
Italian communists towards government, or is 
it exaggerated, or may it even betray undemo-
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cratic sentiments? I disregard the latter accu.<m-
tion, which is unfounded. 
The concern is well-justified, for the following 
reasons: 
First, "Italy is", as we read in the report 
tabled by Mr. Buck, Document 708, "the most 
important single country to the Alliance on its 
southern flank". It has an effective navy of 
three cruisers, eight destroyers, ten frigates, 
seven corvettes and ten submarines, and has a 
fleet modernisation programme in hand. Apart 
from the submarines, Italy's surface fleet alone 
is, according to our Rapporteur Mr. Buck, more 
powerful than the mean size of the Soviet 
squadron in the Mediterranean. 
Still quoting 1\Ir. Buck, "The vital and loyal 
contribution of Italy to the mutual defence 
arrangements of the North Atl'IIJltic Treaty 
makes it natural that the political uncertainties 
of that country should be of concern to other 
members of the Alliance". 
Obviously the question whether Italy remains 
in or withdraws from NATO, or is left to wither 
on the stem, cannot be a matter of indifference 
to us. 
Second, once in the Italian Government, the 
communists could not - despite their constant 
repetitions, these days, that they will not seek 
Italy's withdrawal from the Atlantic Pact and 
its military organisation, NATO - objectively 
be expected to leave things as they are. There is 
no knowing whether they are sincere in what 
they are saying now or merely being oppor-
tunists. 
The incompatibility for the communists 
between membership of an alliance created and 
kept alive a.~ the answer to a hypothetical threat 
of Soviet aggression - and as a counterweight 
to Soviet military strength - and the con-
tinuing links to a party, the communist party 
of the Soviet Union, still referred to as fraternal, 
is glaringly obvious, and, as I said just now, 
an objective fact. Fair words ·and good inten-
tions would cut no ice, even if true. And 
another objective fact would be the shift in the 
political balance between East and West. 
Let us not forget either yet another pos-
sibility, far from remote or fanciful, of Y ugo-
slavia, after Tito's death, being once more wholly 
swallowed up, in one way or another - of its 
own choice, or through Soviet pressure - by 
the USSR. 
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So, when Berlinguer tells Time magazine that 
what happened to Dubcek in 1968 could not 
happen to him, because, as he says, "Who could 
prevent us in Italy from following our own 
Italian way 1 The national frontiers are the ones 
we have now", well, this disregards the pos-
sibility I haYe just mentioned. The latter would 
effectively give Italy a common frontier with 
the USSR and the Soviet Union immediate con-
trol of the eastern shores of the Adriatic : a 
convenient position, as you see, for dominion 
over the whole Mediterranean. 
Summing up, I can even believe the Italian 
communists would, i:f they entered the govern-
ment, honour the pacts, for a number of reasons. 
Meanwhile it would suit their book to await 
the ripening in France and Spain of favourable 
situations under the benefit of "Latin socialism", 
which is currently proclaimed to favour a re--hash 
of the popular fronts or left-wing alliances, and 
accepts without suspicion, indeed favourably, 
what is being called "Eurocommunism". 
Secondly, the honouring of alliances would be 
facilitated by the foreseeable substantially 
unchanged relation<~ between the United States 
and the USSR, so that Italian communists would 
not be immediately compelled to choose between 
these two. 
I think that on the strength of such a stance 
there will still be talk of authentic and ·essential 
diversitv between "F.urocommunism" and Soviet 
commu;;_ism. But nobody can prove this any more 
than, in the absence of decisive proof, it can be 
denied, but those who have denied so far the 
possibility of diversity can at least appeal to 
past history to support their argument. 
Why drag in all this, on the subject of security 
in the Mediterranean ~ Because, of course, to me 
security in the Mediterranean is only accessorily 
a military problem and even this, it will be 
realised, as I am well aware, is attributable to 
my having been for the past eighteen consecutive 
years a member of the Defence Committee of the 
Chamber of Deputies : primarily it is a political 
one. 
I understand then, the worries about the Italian 
elections on 20th June entertained by those among 
you who have tactfully alluded to them. I am, 
as I have told you, worried too, both as an 
Italian and as a Triestino, about what may 
happen in Yugoslavia when Tito dies, with 
possible effect8 on Italy and more generally on 
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the balance of defensiYe forces in the Mediterra-
nean. 
Let us not say anything else. I know full well 
that communism is spreading for objective 
reason8, and cannot be conquered by words alone 
but by exorcism, but I also know there is so 
much lip-service, especially among intellectuals, 
towards marxism ; that "Latin socialism" will in 
the event of communism coming to power in 
eertain ··west European countries, be a U8eful, 
necessary or even determining factor : it would 
only take a little rethinking on these kinds of 
sociaLism to avert the eventuality I have evoked 
but I know equally well that communism has 
"helped itself", overtly or covertly, by force in 
achieving or remaining in power - look at 
Eastern Europe. So Let us endeavour to remain 
vigilant and not let our guard slip, or ourselves 
be taken in ; above all, I will never tire of saying 
this, let us build a political united Europe. 
This may he the last time I address this 
Assembly. I shall be sorry to leave it, for I love 
Europe and want to see it united as a single 
country transcending the individual Stat€8. That 
is why I wanted to be so outspoken today. 
(Applause) 
(M1·. Nessler, President of the Assembly, took 
the Chair in place of Mr. "Afart, Vice-President 
of the Assembly) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). -We shall 
now interrupt the deba;te in order to hear the 
address by Mr. Hermann Schmidt, Parliament-
ary Secretary of State for Defence of the 
Federal Republic of Germany. 
5. Address by Mr. Schmidt, Parliamentary 
Secretary of State for Defence of the Federal 
Republic of Germany 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- We have 
the pleasure of welcoming Mr. Hermann 
Schmidt, Parliamentary Secretary of State for 
Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Mr. Schmidt is a former member of the 
Assembly of whom we have warm memories. 
You have kindly agreed, Mr. Secretary of 
State, to come and address us on the Govern-
ment of the Federal Republic's views on def·ence. 
I can assure you that your contribution to our 
di8Cussions will be followed with the utmost 
attention and the keenest interest. 
Will you please come to the rostrum ? 
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State for Defence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, 
Ladies and Gentlemen, it is for me both a signal 
honour and a pleasure to speak to you, as a 
representative of the Minister of Defence of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, about my country's 
policy on security and defence. AB you have 
already said, Mr. President, I was a member of 
this Assembly myself for seven years, and for 
ten also a member of the North Atlantic 
Assembly. That period still has very pleasant 
memories for me. Unfortunately, I then had to 
return to politics at national level, as I became 
chairman of our national defence committee and 
then Parliamentary Secretary of State for 
Defence, in which capacity I represent the 
Minister. 
If you ask me about the aims of the Federal 
Republic's policy on security - for this is both 
the problem we are discussing and the subject 
of my address - the answer can be short and 
simple : security for my, for our country. Since, 
however, security must be seen as the product of 
political, economic, social and also military 
factors, we cannot be satisfied with such an over-
simplified answer. Further, it would hold good 
for any State, irrespective of its political and 
social structure. 
The supreme aim of security policy in the 
Federal Republic of Germany is to safeguard 
the freedom and independence of our country 
against military threat and political pressure, and 
to ensure peace. The maintenance of external 
security is a major condition of our citizens being 
able to live in freedom and justice under our 
social laws. Life described in these words 
constitutes what, as defined by our highest court, 
the Federal Constitutional Court, is meant in 
our constitution by "human dignity". 
If for no other reason, the Federal Republic 
of Germany has a vital interest in the mainten-
ance of peace both in Europe and in other parts 
of the world. Maintenance of peace means in 
this case preventing both the threat and the use 
of force in international relations and eliminat-
ing any tension that might lead ,to military con-
flict. Security for our country is not possible 
without a credible deterrent against threats from 
any quarter. However, the Federal Republic is, 
for many reasons, not in a position to defend 
itself unaided. 
I need mention only our geo-strategic position 
in immediate proximity to the eastern bloc, with 
which we have our longest land frontier ; our 
lack of geographical depth ; and the high density 
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of the country's industries and population. It is, 
moreover, a significant fact that more than 30 % 
of the West German population lives within a 
lOO-kilometre-wide strip along the border with 
Warsaw Pact countries and that a quarter of 
all our industry is in the same area. 
I think that this clearly demonstrates the 
high risk to which our country is exposed. Even 
quite small loS~reS of territory would be a 
dangerous blow to the fabric of our country. This, 
too, is why, surely, we see potential dangers 
more clearly than some of our friends to the 
west of us do, and are bound to do. 
This lays on us a special obligation to deal 
with conflict situations before they develop. We 
cannot hope, in the event of an attack, to have 
our country liberated only after it has been 
occupied. The defence of the Federal Republic 
must be a forward one, that is, right up at 
Germany's internal border and at the Czecho-
slovak frontier. 
For this reason, the Federal Republic must 
cling to the principle of forward defence as a 
component of the Alliance's common strategy ; 
this will also be serving the interests of our 
'Vest European partners in the Alliance, since 
we all suffer both from the strategically 
unfavourable position around the edges of the 
Eurasian land mass and from a lack of 
geographical depth. 
Left to itcrelf, our nation could not organise 
its defence. It is not just the military potential 
which is lacking. In the negotiations for a Euro-
pean Defence Community, and later when we 
came into WEU and through WEU into NATO 
as well, we accepted certain upper limits to our 
armed force..<~. At the same time, we undertook 
not to manufacture or own any atomic, chemical 
or biological weapons, and we have signed and 
ratified the non-proliferation treaty. 
All this, coupled with our vital economic 
interests throughout the world, requires us to 
seek protection and security in an alliance. That 
is why we belong to WEU and to the North 
Atlantic Alliance. And that is why we make 
our contribution towards this Alliance. Without 
support from its allies, the Federal Republic 
could not maintain its territorial integrity -
and this includes the freedom of West Berlin. 
Only by joining the Alliance has the Federal 
Republic been able to cope with its own security 
problems. Only through the Alliance, which by 
virtue of its own constitution and the United 
Nations Charter is a purely defensive body, can 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Mr. Schmidt (continued) 
our country acquire a defence organisation able 
to deal with any threat from the East and to 
guarantee a credible deterrent against any 
aggressor. 
Finally, it is only thanks to the certainty that 
we have the Alliance behind us, and jointly with 
our partners in thi~ Alliance, that we can pursue 
a policy of detente intended to prevent military 
conflict and reduce tension. 
For this reason the Federal Republic's policy 
on security and defence is first and foremost a 
policy of alliance. With regard to this corner-
stone of our policy we have never left the govern-
ment, parliament or the public in any doubt. 
We do not, however, limit ourselves to giving 
the Alliance only what it requires. AB a powerful 
partner we also make our influence felt within 
the Alliance, so that in the daily round of 
detailed work we help to keep operational what 
must remain operational. 
Elections are to be held this autumn in the 
United States and in my own country. It is 
understandable that in America, as with us in 
the Federal Republic, the election campaign will 
l('ad to many questions being asked concerning 
the operational efficiency of NATO. As part of 
the campaign, doubts are inevitably being 
expressed, even pubLicly, as to the reliability of 
the Alliance - sometimes by people who really 
ought to know better. 'l'he doubts expressed about 
the defensive capacity of the Alliance and the 
events in Angola were the subject of a large-
scale publicity campaign which aroused fears 
that the West was in the last resort too weak 
to defend its freedom. 
A superficial glance at the ratio of forces in 
Central Europe would appear to confirm the 
views of the critics. Within this area, which is 
important to the security of my country, NATO 
maintains 27 divisions at combat strength. On 
the Warsaw Pact side, there are 58 divisions, 
amongst which the Soviet forces divisions have 
been strengthened so that now, in contrast to 
previous years, they have much the same combat 
strength as western divisions. On the other hand, 
the strength of the other Warsaw Pact divisions 
is substantially lower than that of the NATO 
divisions. Within the area, the Warsaw Pact has 
appreciably more armour than the Alliance. The 
number of operational aircraft, too, is greater on 
the eastern side than on the NATO side, although 
certain differences in the quality of equipment 
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and pilot training do something to offset the 
Warsaw Pact's numerical superiority. 
If we include in our calculations the principles 
of Soviet military strategy, which clearly favour 
the offensive, we obtain a fairly clear picture 
of the threat we are facing. 
The effect of the Warsaw Pact's superiority 
in cQnventional forces is further enhanced by the 
naval threat, by which I mean the Soviet navy's 
capacity to cause serious disruption to our vital 
sea links in the event of conflict. It may there-
fore justifiably be asked whether we are still 
strong enough to ensure our security both now 
and in the future. I would answer this with a 
clear "yes". There is no reason to play down 
the military strength of NATO, nor should we 
place any faith in those people who would have 
us believe that every Russian is a superman, a 
giant. 
Anyone who keeps on pointing to the 
disparities in the distribution of conventional 
forces should also say that the Atlantic Pact 
strategy takes these facts into account, that it is 
designed to take account of the forces on the 
eastern side. And to this I would add that during 
the many years in which the East has been 
growing, the West has not been getting weaker, 
but has been growing as well. I stress this point 
with complete conviction as far as Central Europe 
- the part of NATO which is particularly 
important to us - is concerned. Deterrence is 
working. The balance has been maintained. 
What we now have is enough to prevent war. 
We have a broad spectrum of modern defensive 
weaponry at our disposal. The Alliance possesses 
this defence spectrum as a triad of strategic 
nuclear, tactical nuclear and conventional 
weapons which, if we have to defend ourselves, 
will be applied in accordance with the agreed 
strategy of flexible response. 
As realists, we naturally appreciate the 
offensive military strength of the Warsaw Pact. 
In our opinion, it exceeds defence requirements, 
which are legitimate even there. It is not, there-
fore, so much the question "how" the Soviet side 
is arming that gives cause for concern, but the 
question "why". We have doubts as to whether 
the strength, the arms and the organisation of 
the Warsaw Pact armies serve exclusively 
defensive aims. 
We must, however, be careful not to over-
estimate the military strength of the East and 
to play down the strength of NATO. In a speech 
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at Boston in March 1976, Dr. Kissinger pointed 
out that the Soviet system, too, had its obvious 
weaknesses. It is therefore :factually wrong to 
picture the East as disciplined, productive and 
strong, while the West is decadent and in a state 
of disintegration. 
Anyone who continually draws an exaggerated 
picture of Soviet strength and NATO weakness 
does the Alliance no service. By doing so he 
makes expenditure on defence seem pointless in 
the eyes of the public and undermines their will 
to defend themselves. He wrongly encourages a 
feeling of inferiority and so unintentionally does 
the enemy's work :for them. The difficulties the 
Soviet Union is having over the supply of 
cereals and meat, :for example - the Soviet 
Government has just ordered one :fast-day each 
week - show that :for all their spectacular 
successes in space, in everyday matters they still 
have to come down to earth. My two sons, who 
have served in my country's armed :forces, and 
the hundreds and hundreds of thousands of young 
men in the Federal Republic do not :feel that they 
are inferior to the enemy in the East. 
Another thing we in the West must continue 
to ensure is that we keep pace with what we 
recognise to be the threat. We have what is 
needed to secure and protect ourselves adequately 
against threats of any kind. What is decisive 
is the will to do what is required :for the protec-
tion of our :freedom. It must continue to be 
seen without possibility of doubt that the 
deterrent is not a mere :facade or simply a minor 
hurdle to be taken in one's stride. Anyone 
attacking us must know that he must count with 
the West using all the weapons at its disposal. 
This is a principle of our defence accepted by the 
whole of the Alliance, and it constitutes the 
backbone of our deterrent. 
In connection with our defensive capability, 
I referred to the triad and the strategy of 
:flexible response. Of outstanding importance in 
this context is the presence in Europe of the 
United States forces. Only the stationing of 
American troops in Europe makes joint action by 
the Alliance politically credible. Militarily, it is 
the necessary complement to the conventional 
:fighting strength of America's Western European 
partners in the Alliance. Without the presence 
of North American conventional :forces, deter-
rence and the - for us - vital principle of 
forward defence would be jeopardised, despite 
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the considerably higher spending on conventional 
defence by the \V est Europeans. 
As the leading power in the West, with the 
largest nucLear deterrent potential at its disposal, 
the United States has a decisive :function in 
Europe. Its armed :forces epitomise a determina-
tion and capacity :for nuclear defence of the 
Alliance as well. They are the connecting link 
to the nuclear strategic weapons in the United 
States and on the oceans, the most powerful 
element in deterrence to avoid war. 
In view of the geo-strategic and military 
circumstances of Europe, this escalation link 
:from deterrence to defence is indispensable. It is 
in line with the particular security interests not 
only of our continent but with those of the 
United States as well. We Europeans cannot 
expect the United States to accept an unreason-
able nuclear risk simply because the Europeans 
are neglecting their conventional armaments. 
That my country takes the situation seriously 
is proved by the :fact that the Federal Republic 
of Germany raises the highest per capita amount 
of all the European allies :for defence. We must 
all, however, make sure that the accepted strategy 
of f1exible response is not changed into one of 
:flexible responsibility. 
If, however, attention to our conventional 
strength is necessary in order to keep the nuclear 
component of deterrence credible and to present 
the nuclear risk to the United States in such a 
way that it remains bearable and defensible :for 
the Americans, it is not only :for the Europeans 
but as much :for the Americans too to gauge the 
conventional balance correctly. We gl"ate:fully 
note signs that the United States Congress is 
prepared - and may I say quite openly, more 
ready than it has ever been before - to give 
high priority to the security tasks to be 
accomplished in Europe. I am convinced that 
responsible politicians in North America are 
aware that freedom will either be safeguarded 
:for all of us or be lost :for all of us. The events 
of the past :few years have brought home to us 
drastically, and tragically, the dangers we are 
:facing. There is no easy way of guaranteeing 
our :freedom, either :for us or :for America. In 
July 1975 President Ford, by signing at Helsinki, 
once again affirmed the responsibility of the 
United States :for peace and security in Europe. 
For this we are grateful to him. However, we 
also know that our community of interests 
requires each of us to do his duty, and none 
of us must expect others to bear excessive 
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burdens and risks. These are the most important 
of the conditions which must be fulfilled if free 
nations are to be able to rely on one another. 
The United States has built its units in Europe 
up to full strength. They are on the spot and, 
as I have found time and again when visiting 
them, in first-dass condition. The stationing of 
two further operational brigades in Western 
Germany will strengthen NATO's conventional 
strike power in this decisive area. The United 
States remains the cornerstone of the AtLantic 
Alliance. The dual function of providing a full 
counterweight to the Soviet Union in the sphere 
of nuclear strategy and of being the main con-
ventional power can be taken over by no other 
member of the Alliance, nor even by the Euro-
peans jointly. 
\V e have not got a choice between a European 
defence and the defence of Europe. In my view, 
the thesis put forward by the Frenchman, A1fred 
Grosser, has to be accepted. He said that either 
our system of defence is secure, in which case 
it cannot be purely European, or it is purely 
European, in which case it cannot be secure. 
One important addition should, however, be 
made to Grosser's thesis. The absence of a Euro-
pean defence structure or a European defence 
organisation cannot be equated with a lack of a 
I~uropean will to defend itself. On the contrary. 
That wa.'l made clear bv the comments of the 
French President, who~ I greatly respect, in 
November 1975. According to what he said, the 
French President regards any attack or pressure 
on the Federal R-epublic as an attack or pressure 
on France. ·we in Germany are grateful to him 
for this clear statement. 
I feel that we should stop doubting, because 
of France's special position in the Alliance, the 
declared French willingness to defend Europe. 
The announcement by the French Government 
that it wil.l be strengthening its conventional 
forces points in this direction. 
We are in the process of fully exploiting the 
possibilities of co-<>peration with France on 
defence matters, and in future too we shall 
endeavour to shape our relations with our French 
neighbours on as close a basis as possible in this 
field which is so important to all the countries 
of Western Europe. We shall also support 
practical steps along the road to the unification 
of Europe, through an intensification of work 
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on defence matters. Such co-operation can hardly, 
however, serve as pacemaker for the process of 
unification. It can only accompany such a process. 
Both now and in the future, our main task 
will be to ensure that in Central Europe the 
Alliance continues to be capable of warding off 
any attack. It must be so strong in that region 
that no one need yield to a military threat on 
the flanks either. The credible determination of 
NATO members to make an appropriate military 
response to attack in any form is demonstrated 
by the stationing of armed forces from six 
AHiance countries on the sool of the Federal 
Republic. This clear determination must not be 
undermined by relaxation of the defence effort 
for economic reasons. The l-evel of the defence 
effort must not depend on the ups and downs 
of the economic situation ; the yardstick for a 
responsible defence policy must be the scale of the 
known threat. 
The speed of the armaments race between East 
and West continues to be set by the Soviet Union 
and its allies. And the Warsaw Pact powers 
obtain, quite apart from the concentration of 
economic resources on armaments, more strike 
power than the West for much the same expend-
iture. This is made easier for them by, amongst 
other things, lower manpower costs and virtually 
complete standardisation. Expenditure on arma-
ments has absolute priority over all other State 
expenditure. This way of doing things is possible 
only in countries under an authoritarian govern-
ment. 
In democratically constituted societies, a 
defence policy that becomes too great a burden 
on the economy would lead to social stresses and 
political instability at home. It would be failing 
in its task and jeopardising what it sought to 
protect. Similarly wide of the mark, however, is 
a defence policy that does not relate defence 
expenditures to the military threat. 
The search for a middle road which on the 
one hand corresponds with the economic capacity 
of each of the countrie..'l concerned and, on the 
other, enables the armed forces to contribute to 
a credible deterrent is a continuing and important 
task in a defence community of democratic 
States. The fulfilment of this task will be success-
ful in the long run only if we manage to use 
the defence appropriations more rationally, in 
other words to co-operate more closely on arma-
ments. 
The first step on the right road was the 
initiative by the Eurogroup Ministers in 
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November 1975. They set up the European pro-
gramme group, which met for the first time at 
Secretary of State level in Rome in February 
1976. The programme group is of particular 
importance because of France's membership. If 
co-operation on armaments can be promoted in 
this way in the Alliance, it may be that military 
and industrial integration will have moved one 
step forward in Europe. The members of the 
European programme group are also quite aware, 
however, that the difficulties of the matter are 
such that it is of course not possible to expect 
rapid results. The success or failure of co-opera-
tion will depend largely on whether the declared 
pol<i.tical will of A11iance members to co-operate 
on armaments will ultimately be followed through 
with political determination. 
In this matter, the Alliance is by no means 
only just starting. There is hardly an important 
weapons system that has not already become a 
two- or three-country joint project. Examples 
include Milan, Hot, Roland and the FH-70 field 
howitzer, the MRCA - known in Germany as 
the "Tornado" -the Alpha-.Jet and the 148 fast 
motor launch. 
Rational utilisation of resources, however, 
requires that co-operation should be wider than 
the bi- or tri-national work undertaken so far. 
In this connection, three essential points must 
be observed. First, co-operation must increase the 
defence effectiveness of the A1li11;nce without 
over-burdening the western national economies. 
Secondly, it must prevent Europe from dropping 
behind technologically ; by combining the 
hitherto divergent national efforts on armaments 
it must raise Europe to the level of a partner 
who will be taken seriously by the United States. 
Thirdly, it must ensure that co-operation in 
Europe does not impede but rather encourages 
an American presence in Europe. In this way, it 
must contribute to the strengthening of our 
Alliance. And when we talk of Europe in this 
context, it is quite clear that it can only be a 
Europe which includes France. 
The people of the States within the North 
Atlantic Alliance have a right to insist that the 
funds raised for defence are applied as cost-
effectively as possible. This places an obligation 
on the governments of the member States. It is 
up to them to prove that even an Alliance of 
sovereign States has the strength to overcome 
national self-intere..'!t when the common interest 
of all is concerned. 
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As regards the many problems with which 
the Alliance is faced - and here of course I 
include the situation on the flanks of the Alliance 
- we must not forget that this is nothing unusual 
in an Alliance consisting of free, sovereign States. 
For members of the Alliance their sovereign 
freedom of decision is a cherished heritage to 
be defended by NATO but it is also, of course, 
a source of weakness with which the Alliance 
has time and again to cope. 
We should not therefore assess the value of 
the Alliance simply on the picture it presents 
at one given moment. Reliable constants exist, 
of greater weight than the problems I have 
enumerated. The Alliance represents two-thirds 
of all the world's democratic States. It is, Ladies 
and Gentlemen, the largest reservoir of economic, 
military and also moral strength. We in the 
'V est must become more conscious than we have 
been in the past of our own moral and human 
values, of our economic and also our military 
resources, which taken together make up our 
strength. We must draw on these sources so as 
to safeguard our liberty and solve the problems 
that beset us. 
This also means leaving the people of our 
countries in no doubt as to the sacrifices that 
will have to be made in order to secure peace 
for all. In the Federal Republic, the need for 
armed forces to maintain our external security 
is acknowledged by the great majority of our 
citizens. In pursuing its policy on security, 
the Federal Government can therefore rely 
entirely on popular support in Western Germany. 
This consent by the people is based on the 
universal desire for security ; but it is also 
encouraged by the openness with which informa-
tion can be obtained on everything to do with 
security and defence policy. 
First and foremost we explain to the public the 
defensive principles on which our armed forces 
have been built up. We have followed to the 
letter - that is, with the utmost seriousness -
the constitutional duty laid upon us by our basic 
law, which expressly provides that armed forces 
shall be for defence only. This is clear to all who 
have eyes and want to see, because of the way 
the Federal army is composed, equipped and 
armed. Hardly any other State has so clearly 
and exclusively geared its armed forces to the 
sole duty of self-defence. It would do a great 
deal for world peace if other nations, too, were 
to accept similar legal commitments. The same 
holds true for the self-imposed limitations, 
already referred to, which we undertook to 
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observe when we signed the WEU treaty. There 
is hardly any State in East or West that has 
accepted such advance commitments. 
No one in Europe need feel threatened by us. 
By renouncing an offensive capability, we are 
showing that we are prepared to follow a policy 
of conciliation. We also make it clear, however, 
that our love of peace is not based on fear, some-
thing which can only end in endangering peace. 
I would add - and this ties up closely with 
what I have just been saying - that we renounce 
the fostering of hate in any form. We want to 
educate and motivate our soldiers for peace and 
the defence of peace, and not against anything. 
This also includes explaining to the public in 
our country the connection between external 
security and the social content and free way of 
life of our country. The citizen must know 
what he stands to lose. He must aLso know that 
this country is worth all of us fighting for. We 
take very seriously in both our internal and our 
external dealings, the principle of an "armed 
democracy" ca1led for by the Federal Constitu-
tional Court. 
An important element in our defence policy is 
the Atlantic AHiance. We do everything we 
can to strengthen cohesion and collaboration 
within the Alliance. We pay particular attention 
to relations with our most important partner 
in the AIHance, the United States. 
In the armed forces, we have especially 
championed the cause of those doing their service 
in the Federal Republic. By reforming our 
educational and training methods, we have made 
our officers and NCOs better equipped to carry 
out their task of leading men. By openness in 
matters ·affecting careers, we have also given 
soLdiers unparalleled opportunities for promo. 
tion. By giving the lower ranks new opportunities 
of having their say, we have shown that we pay 
serious heed to what comes, as it were, from 
below. None of this is allowed to weaken the 
principle of obedience to orders ; but we are 
certain tha.t a soldier whose human dignity is 
respected will be a better soldier than one who 
is not allowed to think for himself. What we 
want is co-operation between superior and 
subordin&te, and not a rigidly hierarchical 
system. 
We do not regard the Bundeswehr soldier as 
"material" for the forces. Men and materials are 
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two fundamentally different things. The human 
being must always come first. And it is in this 
spirit that we have decisively improved the social 
status of our soldiers. 
'V e have done a great deal for the maintenance 
of our external security. This may often not 
be entirely evident, even in our own country, 
for we are now living through the longest period 
in this century during which there has been no 
war in Europe. It is however all too frequently 
forgotten, Ladies and Gentlemen, that this situa-
tion does not come about by dreaming of it or 
looking for it, but by continually watching over 
and fighting for it anew each day. I am reminded 
here of the words of the German philosopher, 
Kant ; he pointed out that peace was not a 
natural state, but must be continu.ally recreated. 
Thank you, Mr. President. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. Secretary of State, for your very full 
and very interesting statement. You have kindly 
agreed to answer any questions which the 
members of this Assembly might wish to ask 
you. 
I call Mr. Critchley, Chairman of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments. 
Mr. CRITCHLEY (United Kingdom). -
Would the Minister describe the new emphasis 
which France has placed on its defence policies 
as the adoption of a forward strategy or the 
adoption of a strategy of flexible response ? How 
does he distinguish between the two ~ 
The PRESIDENT (Transl&tion).- I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. SCHMIDT (Parliamentary Secretary of 
State for Defence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - It is quite obvious 
that in the past views have differed very widely 
as to the u8e of French troops in the event of 
tension or an incipient war. From what has been 
said by the French President and other 
responsible persons such as the Minister of 
Defence and the Chief-of-Staff of the French 
forces, it is now clearly established that attacks 
on the Alliance are also attacks on France and 
that any such attack would immediately evoke 
defensive action, in other words it is now 
absolutely certain that French troops too will 
undertake forward defence. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I eaU 
Mr. Riviere. 
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Mr. RIVIERE (France) (Translation).- Mr. 
Minister, yesterday Mr. Destremau talked to us 
about the reactivation of the Standing Arma-
ments Committee. Now I observe that today you 
have not said a word about it. Was it simply 
an oversight on your part, or do you attach no 
importance to reactivation 1 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I caH 
the Minister. 
Mr. SCHMIDT (Parliamentary Secretary of 
State for Defence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - I have made only 
brief comments on this committee. I have said 
that it wa.•:; formed on the initillltive of the 
Ministers in the Eurogroup, and consists of the 
Secretaries of State who held their first meeting 
in Rome. We want particularly to put iJt on 
record how pleased we are that France is pre-
sent. We hope for great things from this com-
mittee in the future. But it is, of course, a com-
mittee for the future ; it is not so far possible 
to say anything about its effectiveness. 
I have just been told that what was meant 
was WED's Standing Armaments Committee. I 
had assumed, on the basis of my address, that 
it was the committee of Secretaries of State. I 
did not mention the other committee since in my 
address I wa8 dealing primarily with the 
political matters that affect us in the Federal 
Republic in relation to the Alliance as a whole. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Richter. 
Mr. RICHTER (Federal Republic of Ger-
many) (Translation).- May I ask Mr. Schmidt, 
following up his last answer, how he sees the 
future of this ad hoc committee ? Would he say 
this ad hoc group set up in Rome was in a 
position to secure co-operation on armament..'! 
between the Eurogroup and the French Republic 
in the longer term ? 
I should like to add a second question. I got 
the impression that when dealing in the illst 
few days with our defence efforts, the Assembly 
has taken rather a defensive stance. He has 
described the situation of the ·armed forces of the 
Federal Republic of Germany. Is the Minister 
in a position to add a few comments about the 
areas in which he has been able to make improve-
ments in the armed forces ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- I call the 
Minister. 
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Mr. SCHl\HDT (Parliamentary Secretary of 
State for Defence of the Federal Republic of 
a ermany) (Translation). - I shall be very 
pleased to do so, Mr. Richter. First of all, on the 
aims and efforts of this committee which has had 
its first meeting in Rome. We set great store 
by this committee. I feel that the dearer weapons 
systems become as generation follows generation, 
the more shall we all be forced to co-opel"ate, 
to work elosely together. The subject is a very 
difficult one, since it will not be possible without 
further ado to convince countries that have their 
own armaments capabilities to let these capabil-
ities fade out. They will not in fact have to do 
so ; it will be possible to arrive at a division of 
labour, through grants of licences and through 
co-operation, as we have done with Great Britain 
and Italy in the case of Tornado in a way that 
takes much better care of national economic 
interests than seemed previously to be the case. 
I therefore feel that this committee of Secre-
taries of State will run into a large number 
of constraints. The subject is difficult, but we 
are simply being pushed by events towards com-
plPte co-operation. 
I do not regard the situation - and I say 
this most unequivocally - in the central sector, 
which I touched on at some length this morning, 
as negative. In that sector, we have done 
everything to improve our defensive strength. 
Jjet me only remind you, en passant, that my 
own country's armed forces at the end of the 
sixties mustered less than 450,000 men. Today, 
we have a. standing army of 495,000 highly 
trained troops. Of our own accord, we have con-
tinually been renewing and improving our 
weapons systems. I would mention only one 
figure, which I will not break down : since 1972, 
the German Parliament has unanimously voted 
more than DM 50,000 million to the Bundeswehr 
in the form of contracts for weapons systems 
and clearances for production runs, as is now 
the case with Tornado. We have introduced the 
a¥ai1ability reserve, which means that for one 
year after their release young men must remain 
available for military service. We note that the 
Canadians are bringing their brigade up to full 
strength, equipping it with very modern weapons 
and consequently increasing strike power in the 
central sector. I am who1ly optimistic : we are 
ready and we are able to undertake forward 
defence in the central sector. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I ca11 
l\Ir. Mattick. 
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many) (Translation). -Mr. President, I should 
like to ask the Minister one or two questions in 
connection with the debate that we have had 
in this House. In view of the comments he has 
made to us, would he share the fear that was 
expressed in one resolution, that when compared 
with the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact the 
military striking power of the Atlantic Alliance 
no longer suffices to guarantee the individual 
and joint security of the Alliance? 
Secondly, we have compared defence spending 
in the West in the Soviet bloc in relation to 
their respective gross national products. Could 
the Minister say whether we in the West are 
1-eally doing all that much less~ 
Thirdly, would he support the view put 
forward, in connection with the Helsinki final 
act and the policy of detente, that detente as 
now practised in the West has much in common 
with the policy of appeasement at the time of 
the Munich agreement ? Could he tell us what 
the main differences are between Munich in 1938 
and our situation today ? I am afraid that if 
this comes to be discussed outside, we may find 
ourselves in an uncomfortable position. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. SCHMIDT (Parliamentary Secretary of 
State for Defence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - I will deal first with 
Mr. Mattick's question about the fear that the 
other side's striking power is such that the 
Warsaw Pact States would be able, as it were, 
to drive right through the NATO forces. This 
fear has recently been mentioned in books and 
comment columns, and the Federal Minister of 
Defence, Mr. Leber, made the following com-
ment: " ... only if parts of NATO, perhaps 
including the West ('rerruan army, were to take 
over traffic control duties for the Warsaw Pact 
States." That is treating it as something 
of a joke, but, really, who can suggest such a 
thing ~ It must be realised that we have leiit 
entirely out of account in this assessment a 
whole range of factors that affect the other side. 
No one would dispute the fact that on the other 
side there is something in the natur.e of an occu-
pation regime, whether in Czechoslovakia, in 
Poland or in Eastern Germany - and this is 
something we no longer have in NATO, where 
we enjoy the relationship of friendly agreement. 
This means that the security even of the USSR's 
troops is seen rather differently there than that 
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of American troops in the Federal Republic or 
in other West European countries. I just do not 
accept that anyone could think that the striking 
power of the Warsaw Pact countries could be 
so high, and that we had not enough to pit 
against them. 
I would suggest that you read an article by 
a very well-known journalist which appeared 
yesterday in the Suddeutsche Zeitung. The 
article is about Soviet thinking about their own 
armour in the light of the continually increasing 
defensive strength of NATO. He says that we 
cannot for instance merely compare the 19,000 
tanks on one side and the 6,500 on the other. 
The way we fill the gap is with a large comple-
ment of anti-tank weapons which, firstly, are 
much cheaper than tanks; which secondly make 
it plain for all the world to see that our forces 
are prepared for defence and not for attack, and 
which thirdly are so effective that the tank has 
hardly any chance once it comes up against 
them and against other weapons which are still 
being developed but are virtually ready in the 
Federal Republic, in particular the saturntion 
effect rocket launcher. 
To compare percentages of gross national 
products is always a very facile trick. If a 
country has a low GNP and low defence 
expenditure, the latter will nonetheless very 
quickly amount to 10% or 20%. If a country 
like America or the Federal Republic, which are 
among the richest countries has as is natural 
a low percentage, we must be quite clear - and 
this is why I mentioned it in my speech - that 
what really matters here is the per capita figure. 
That, I think, is the essential thing. 
The comparison with Munich I think is most 
unfortunate, because in the Alliance as a whole 
we take as a principle that maximum prepared-
ness will also mean detente ; one does not nego-
tiate with weaklings, one dictates one's wishes to 
them. That is why we need maximum prepared-
ness and the largest possible forces armed with 
the most modern weapons. Only from such a 
position of strength can there be negotiations 
on detente. Only that can bring success. Between 
this and Munich there can be no comparison, 
and I think it is very bad that such an idea 
should have found expression at all. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Schwencke. 
Mr. SCHWENCKE (Federal Republic of Ger-
many) (Translation). - Mr. President, I am 
almost afraid that you and the Assembly will 
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take it amiss that for the third time a question 
is being asked by a German social democrat. I 
would, however, like to put two short questions 
to Mr. Schmidt, since I take it that the replies 
will be of great interest to the other members 
of the House as well. 
The Secretary of State clearly referred to the 
disparities in the armaments of East and West : 
he has spoken about the continuing offensive 
strategy of the Soviet Union in particular and 
stressed that the West and especially the Federal 
Republic of Germany have decided to pursue a 
defensive strategy. He explained - very con-
vincingly, I feel - that the moral strength of 
the West, with its parliamentary democracies, 
is also a cornerstone of our defence. I would 
now ask whether you feel that our moral position 
might be weakened by the West debating 
whether, for example, a non-democratically 
governed country could be brought into the 
Alliance. 
And now my second question. Mr. Schmidt 
referred to our flanks and hinted at the pos-
sibility that they might not be in as good heart 
as they ought to be. If I may put it more 
precisely, does the Minister see any danger in 
the possibility that Italy or Spain, for example, 
may within the foreseeable future have com-
munists in their governments ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. SCHMIDT (Parliamentary Secretary of 
State for Defence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Ladies and Gentle-
men, if I were to answer this we would be going 
beyond the world of grand policy and starting 
to gaze into a crystal ball. I would have to be 
a soothsayer, since Italy, which has just been 
referred to, has not yet had its elections. 
I will, however, say something on the first 
point. There can be no doubt that the production 
of weapons in Eastern Europe is higher than 
ours. 'V e have however already said elsewhere 
that if the West were to concentrate its united 
economic strength on arms production, the 
output would of course exceed what the East is 
able to produee. They do it by imposing con-
siderable restrictions on their citizens. I do not 
feel that discussing whether a non-democratic 
or a democratic country should in the future be 
a member of NATO is to the point at this time. 
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Why discuss the matter ? Surely the answer can 
only be that it is not possible - Portugal was 
a member of NATO for a long time as a non-
democratic country and caused us within NATO 
a great deal of difficulty - to bring other 
countries - and here the reference was 
apparently to Spain - into the Alliance if they 
do not meet the criteria that are now quite clear 
within NATO. So I do not see this as a matter 
for discussion. We can only say that it just 
does not arise now that we have finished with 
the very difficult problem of Portugal thanks to 
the way it has turned to democracy. 
As regards the security of our flanks. A great 
deal could be said on the subject. I have always 
been an optimist. In the past few years we have 
seen how the Portuguese, of whom it seemed 
possible to prophesy that they would become 
communist, have quite decisively found the right 
line, the way to democracy. We have had the 
difficulties with Greece and Turkey. Now Italy 
is faced with the decisive question as to what 
form the future government there will take. I 
am not a prophet and shall not say anything! 
now about what might happen if... Let us first 
wait for the results of next Sunday's elections. 
I am still betting on the national pride of our 
Italian friends and on Italian awareness of what 
this election means for them. So let us wait and 
see. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Enders. 
Mr. ENDERS (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, in the final act 
of the CSCE at Helsinki, reference was made 
to the fact that each side would inform the other 
of large-scale manoeuvres. Has Mr. Schmidt yet 
had any experience of this and has he been 
able to draw any conclusions on the results that 
have so far come to light ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- I cal1 the 
Minister. 
Mr. SCHMIDT (Parliamentary Secretary of 
State for Defence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Yes, we have of 
course already some experience in this connec-
tion. I personally have had the feeling, Ladies 
and Gentlemen, that after the West had reacted 
immediately after the signing of the final act 
and had notified its manoeuvres and issued 
invitations to attend them, the East, and the 
USSR in particular, was somewhat taken aback 
by the speed with which we managed to put 
this into effeet. For democrats this was a matter 
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of course. We then awaited developments. It has 
been established that manoeuvres on the other 
side have for the most part remained under the 
limit of 25,000. Two sets of manoeuvres have 
exceeded this. The evidence cohlected by tech-
nical means has confirmed that there were 
manoeuvres on the Turkish border, to which the 
Turks and the Greeks were invited. Manoeuvres 
are now being held in the north, to which 
Norway, Sweden and Finland have been invited. 
There is therefore a timorous move towards the 
system which for NATO has for quite some time 
past been a matter of course. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does 
anyone else wish to ask any questions L 
Mr. Secretary of State, it only remains for 
me to thank you ; and I am convinced that all 
the members of this Assembly have in the highest 
degree appreciated the explana;tions that you 
have given, even though some of them may have 
had a few reservations or different interpreta-
tion. In any case, your appearance at this 
rostrum will he recorded. with gratitude by an 
Assembly whose vitaLity is no longer 1n question. 
(Applause) 
6. Security in the Mediterranean 
(Resumed Debate on the Report and supplementary 
Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments, Does. 708 and Amendments and 712) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). -We shall 
now resume the debate on security in the 
Mediterranean. Since Mr. Paul Riviere has 
imperative reasons for absenting himself this 
afternoon, we have agreed to give him the floor 
as the first speaker, although he was not first 
on the list. 
Mr. RIVIERE (France) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, Ladies and Gentlemen, at the meet-
ings of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments of our Assembly, which were devoted 
to the report on security in the Mediterranean, 
I had occasion to make a number of comments 
and to express certain reservations. 
The latter do not detract from the remarkable 
quality of the documentation submitted to you 
by our Rapporteur, nor to his precise and lucid 
analysis of the situation in the Mediterranean. 
I entirely share his view of the disquieting 
character of increased Soviet strength in this 
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sector, and the Russians' diplomatic and military 
aggressiveness in this sector. Like him, too, I 
do not fail to recognise the positive aspect of 
the political situation in Spain and Portugal. 
Nevertheless, I cannot agree with certain lines 
of thought in the recommendation tabled whieh 
actually express the conclusions reached by the 
Committee. 
I do not believe that our policy for security 
in the Mediterranean can be whittled down to 
a strengthening of the integrated elements in 
NATO. 
'l'he challenge with which the eastern bloc 
confronts us is not primarily a military chal-
lenge. It is first of all a political challenge, 
which demands a joint political response. What 
is the use of integration of the means of defence 
if they serve unco-ordinated, not to say con-
flicting, foreign policies, and, in fact, only suit 
the game, to say the least, ill-defined and obscure, 
of one single power, the United States. 
Our Assembly should be the privileged forum 
in which the fundamentals of a European policy 
for striking a balance in the Mediterranean can 
be set forth, compared and harmonised. Before 
calling Australia and New Zealand in aid, let 
us have a look at what we can do for ourselves. 
In this respect, the balance sheet for the past 
year is, to say the least, partly disappointing. 
Consciously or unconsciously, Europe has 
allowed the political situation to deteriorate to 
the advantage of the Soviet Union alone. Three 
facts illustrate this state of affairs. 
The first is that relations between Greece and 
Turkey have become bogged down in a situation 
of permanent conflict. For the past three years, 
Europe has been impotent to find a solution to 
this conflict. That is particularly serious, for it 
means that one of the Western Mediterranean's 
two safety-links no longer exists except on paper. 
What is more, this conflict renders ineff.ectual 
all efforts to organise Mediterranean defence 
inside NATO. In the event of a crisis, what 
attitude will Greece or Turkey take towards the 
Alliance? They are liable to make up their 
minds not according to the solidarity with the 
West profes.."!ed by them, but according to their 
strictly national interests. 
Greece has already left the organisation, and 
it is impossible to believe that its close bilateral 
ties with the United States can take the place of 
a co-ordinated organisation. If ~t thinks that such 
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bilateral ties can disguise stress, Europe is 
playing a dangerous game for it.s own safety. 
It is abandoning the traditional role of a factor 
making for balance and union. 
Second, the same applies to the Middle East 
and, in particular, to the Lebanon crisis. How 
can we accept that a country with which 
Western Europe has always had privileged links 
should fall victim to an internecine war -
ostensibly a civil war, but one in which the 
individual strategies of the USSR and the 
United States are being furthered. Can we go 
on allowing the Lebanese people to be sacrificed 
to consolidation of the patient and rewarding 
expansion of the USSR or to indirect protection 
of the status quo for Israel 1 In the very short 
term, the solution arrived at will be anything 
but beneficial to Europe. I can only regret that 
all France's attempt.s at objective mediation, by 
countries having no direct interest in the con-
flict, should have met with downright scepticism 
in most of its European partners. 
Here again, the reversal of a threatening 
situation could only result from joint action, by, 
in the first instance, all the States of Western 
Europe. In the absence of a common European 
policy, there could not be any security worthy 
of the name. 
Third, the political situation on the southern 
flank. The domestic situation in Italy, as in 
Spain, continues to cause concern. It is easy 
to demonstrate that it affects the efficiency of 
European defence in the Mediterranean 
although it has far wider repercussions. 
Admittedly, we may congratulate ourselves on 
the way matters are evolving in Portugal and 
are taking shape in Spain. We may hope to see 
the emergence of genuine democracies, without 
any revolutionary clashes. 
By contrast, the situation in Italy is, to say 
the least, disquieting. Whllitever the outcome of 
the elections, disorder will persist for some time 
in a country severely affected by the economic 
crisis. Here again, action by Europe as such has 
been too little and too late to avert paralysis 
of one of the chief powers guardians of our 
security. 
It is of course as well to stress the Soviet 
effort and its potential dangers. But these would 
not exist if Europe were to master its internal 
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problems and appear more united and more 
determined in its political action. 
Hence the primary factor in Mediterranean 
defence is not of a military but of a political 
order. Without it, the stockpiling of weapons 
and development of sophisticated strategies and 
tactics will only prove a snare and a delusion. 
A co-ordinated European policy in the Medi-
terranean should first settle the structural prob-
lems, second, establish the element.s of a 
genuinely European defence thus enabling 
action to be taken at the international level, and 
third, polarise in this way the Mediterranean 
component of the Atlantic Alliance. 
I maintain that it is in the first instance for 
the countries of Europe acting in unison -
whether it be in the EEC, the Council of Europe 
or \VEU - to settle structural problems. 
We must induce Greece and Turkey to settle 
their disputes on a la..'!ting basis. By offering 
them a chance to do this in a European context, 
we enable them to escape from the selfish 
ascendancy of the two superpowers. We have 
the means to do this indirectly through their 
economic association and their membership of 
the Council of Europe. The existence of the EEC 
is today recognised by our adversaries, and its 
arbitration could be decisive. On the other hand, 
any intervention by NATO wHl provoke the 
eastern countries to try and outbid us. 
The Council of Europe played an important 
par.t in re-establishing democracy in Greece. 
With the support of our organisation and the 
European Community, it could restore a lasting 
peace between its two Mediterranean partners. 
The same goes for Spain, Portugal and, to 
some extent, Italy. If the European nations show 
solidarity with them at all political, economic 
and social levels, democracy can be installed or 
saved in these countries, and a dangerous 
adventure for Europe averted. Here, too, I 
believe that direct intervention by the United 
States could only provoke a violent reaction by 
our opponents. 
The second clement in the awakening 
political awareness of Europe must be that of 
a defence which is primarily promoted and 
assured by the Europeans. 
Far be it from me to underestimate the 
importance of the United States presence in this 
respect. I believe, however, I have pointed out 
the political weaknes.'l of this aspect. American 
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strength cannot at the same time counterbalance 
Soviet strength, paLliate the deficiencies of 
Turkey and Greece and make good the inade-
quacies resulting from the domestic situation in 
Spain and Italy. It is for all the countries of 
Europe, particularly those who are members of 
our union, to establish the elements of a military 
defence system in the Mediterranean. That calls 
for some heart-searching by certain countries. 
The Soviet threat squarely across the frontiers is 
not the only one. Do not let us forget that Lenin 
always advocated outflanking Europe from the 
south. It must accordingly be the first concern 
of Europeans, even of those who have no direct 
links with the region, to protect this southern 
flank. 
The sector-by-sector organisation of NATO is 
liable to be reflected in a 1ack of interest in 
Northern Europe regarding the military situa-
tion in Southern Europe. Working out a Euro-
pean defence policy would enable this situation 
to he avoided. 
A third factor is that on the basis of this 
common defence policy, Europe should regain 
the political role in the Mediterranean which it 
has lost since 1956, when, at the time of Suez, 
the Russians and Americans ousted France and 
the United Kingdom. But it is just such an 
imaginative European policy, by putting for-
ward realistic soliutions to current confLicts, 
which might have a chance of success since it 
would not be tainted with neo-imperialism. A 
chance of success, because it would offer the 
countries confronting each other the opportunity 
of taking a middle course, for which they are 
desperately seeking to escape from the daily 
more onerous tutelage of the two superpowers. 
If these conditions were fulfilled, the organisa-
tion of the Atlantic Alliance might be refur-
bished along the lines of greater justification 
and enhanced efficiency. 
Its justification, since it would legitimise the 
United States' complementary contribution to 
Europe's will for security and peace, and not, 
in default of a shared determination, purport 
to fill a political and military vacuum. Its 
efficiency, since, in the present state of affairs, 
intervention by NATO would be everywhere 
interpreted simply as direct intervention by the 
United States. Now, the latter is not ready, 
believe you me, to repeat the experience it 
underwent in South-Bast Asia. In the final 
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analysis, the Mediterranean would therefore be 
at the mercy of Russian expansion. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, the majority of us have 
lived through two world wars : we were born 
before the first and we contributed copiously 
in our flesh and blood to the second. I should 
not like to see our children and grandchildren 
compelled by our mistakes and failures to put 
up with a third one. 
Well, everything leads us to believe that, if 
we do not take care, we Western Europeans are 
going to find ourselves in the middle of the 
battlefield as a result of our allegiance to the 
United States, whereas we could, if we wanted, 
hold our destiny in our own hands, of course, 
with the help of the United States, but not under 
its tutelage. That is why I am voicing here my 
great anxiety at the turn which events are 
taking. 
Such are the thoughts provoked in my mind 
by the excellent report of our colleague, Mr. 
Buck. If I have sometimes appeared critical, 
it is because I have always been convinced that 
our Assembly should supply the driving force 
for establishing a European defence character-
ised by self-reliance, determination and effi-
ciency. 
Our freedoms are at stake ; yet their defence 
cannot be entrusted to a third party, however 
powerful and however friendly it may be. Our 
liberties are the very lifeblood of our nations, 
and their fate lies in our hands. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- I call the 
Portuguese observer, Mr. Vasco da Gama 
Fernandes, President of the Portuguese National 
Assembly, who wishes to make a short address. 
Mr. V ASCO DA GAMA FERNANDES 
(Observer from Portugal) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, Ladies and Gentlemen, two years ago 
I attended a sitting of the Assembly for the 
first time, just when the great events in Por-
tugal were starting. Portugal has emerged from 
forty-eight years of fascism and is about to 
begin the harsh and difficult life of a democracy. 
Two years have already gone by ! My friends, 
today I feel it my duty to say a few brief words 
about the situation in my country. 
We have passed through a period of grave 
political crisis, with great ideological confusion 
and serious and bewildering economic and social 
problems. We have lived through eighteen ter-
rible months, but the armed forces have re-
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established order and social equilibrium, and it 
has proved possible to hold elections for a 
constitutent assembly, followed by parliamentary 
elections. On the 27th of this month, the election 
for the President of the Republic will take place. 
Developments in Portugal have been full of 
interest but life has been very difficult. We have 
suffered under a terrible dictatorship which 
destroyed the country's economy and dislocated 
Portuguese social life, with an unjust war in 
Africa that robbed us of the flower of our 
youth. Our country is very impoverished. 
We have to contend with the very grave 
problem of nearly a million refugees from 
Angola. There is also the problem of 160,000 
unemployed, and that of emigrant workers in 
France and Germany, numbering nearl;y two 
mHlion, out of a population of ten million. Yes, 
my friends, I can assure you thtllt our life is 
very harsh and very difficult. 
Portugal is a European country that has 
natural historical links with the countries of 
Africa and those of the Portuguese-speaking 
third world with whom we have ,a common cul-
ture and historical spiritual links. But, we are 
Europeans, with an Atlantic vocation. And we 
are resolved to work with you and all those who 
"think European" towards the re-establishment 
of world peace, right sentiments and specific 
solutions to specific and important problems. 
In the name of little Portugal, I give you 
greetings and thanks. I do so with some emotion, 
as is natural since we are setting out on a new 
and inspiring way of living, with the restor111tion 
of public freedoms, thanks to the institution of 
political, economic and cultural democracy 
through the due process of parliamentary 
elections. 
I believe that once the President of the Repub-
lic has been elected, my country will have gained 
sufficient equilibrium and wi1l thus be able to 
be a good fellow-traveller to each of your coun-
tries, whom I salute with great emotion and 
great joy. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. President. 
I am sure that the Assembly shares the emo-
tions that I myself felt when I heard the stirring 
words you spoke to us. 'Ne have long been hop-
ing that Portugal would rediscover its proud 
past, under a regime of liberty and justice, thllit 
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is, democracy. Some of us had been anxious ; 
I personally am somewhat of an optimist by 
nature and I was convinced that sooner or later 
you would come back to the fold of the demo-
cratic nations which are the nucleus of our 
'Vestern European Union. 
I call I~rd Peddie. 
Lord PEDDlE (United Kingdom). - Before 
I begin my comments on Mr. Buck's paper, Mr. 
President, I want to join you in expressing 
appreciation of what we have just heard from 
our Portuguese friend. I make that reference 
because it indicates that politics and emotions 
are not far apart ; and what he has said has 
some bearing on Mr. Buck's paper and on my 
own comments. 
Mr. Buck has presented a most useful docu-
ment. It is useful in two areas. First, it focuses 
attention upon the serious and considerable 
growth of the Soviet naval presence in the 
Mediterranean ·and it has highlighted the quite 
justifiable concern that this has evoked among 
our allies. Secondly, there is an emphasis in his 
paper, probably not as great as I should have 
liked to see, on the aspects of a problem that i'l 
more political than anything else. I recognise 
the seriousness of the situation, ·and I am also 
appreciative of the fact that my country's 
decision to withdraw its own forces from Malta 
by April 1979 was an unavoidable decision, but 
one which will focus in the minds of our al1ies 
their greater collective responsibility. 
I have said that the situation in the Mediter-
ranean presents more problems, particularly of 
a political character, than the report itself 
identifies. At present the Spanish Government 
is not seeking full membership of NATO. I 
recognise that a number of governments, includ-
ing the Government of the United Kingdom, 
would welcome the presence of a free and demo-
cratic Spain in Western European defence. 
When that will be and how it will he achieved 
we cannot at present tell. Malta has not expres-
sed any interest in association with NATO. 
We therefore have a combination of political 
factors which add to the difficulties of NATO 
in dealing with this important question. I agree 
with a previous speaker that it is imperative 
that NATO itself should be able to deal with this 
question of the increased maritime threat of the 
Soviet, particularly to the Mediterranean, which 
is an area where we should be able to solve these 
European political problems which tend to 
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impede, or restrict, or restrain our adequate 
defence there. 
My colleagues, Mr. Dankert, Mr. Siegler-
schmidt and I have put down a number of 
amendments. I take this opportunity of assuring 
Mr. Buck that the amendments are not put down 
in a sense of expressing any violent opposition 
to the basic sentiments referred to in his report. 
We believe that we have sharpened the recom-
mendations and I hope that he and his col-
leagues will give serious consideration to our 
amendments and be able to accept them. 
I shall refer to two amendments. The first 
deletes recommendation 2 (a), because it would 
be quite wrong for the North Atlantic Council 
to make such a declaration. The reason is clear. 
NATO is a defensive organisation and its only 
commitments under the articles of the treaty 
would preclude the activity requested in the 
recommendation. 
The second amendment deletes recommenda-
tion 3. We believe that acceptance of the recom-
mendation would substantially decrease the 
responsibility of NATO while extending the 
responsibility of the European programme 
group. This is not a good idea and we consider 
that the deletion of these recommendations 
would strengthen the overall report. 
I am pleased to have had the opportunity to 
explain the purpose of the amendments. I 
wanted to emphasise that we support the con-
tentions in the report and are glad that it 
highlights the import·ant problems that NATO 
nations mm~t seek to solve. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Radius. 
Mr. RADIUS (France) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the report sub-
mitted by Mr. Buck seems to me to raise a whole 
range of problems. Before tackling these, how-
ever, I must heartily congratulate him on the 
very remarkable documentation he has assem-
bled. 
Much of what he says in his paper is based 
on information that is new and, as far as I 
know, unpublished, which gives his report a 
quite special value. I shall not therefore pick up 
any particular point he makes, but rather the 
general philosophy that can be read between the 
lines. Yet, in his second paragraph, Mr. Buck 
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sums up the general situation in the Mediter~ 
ranean area in what I consider admirable terms : 
"... Today, in many countries of the Mediter-
ranean littoral, significant political changes, 
or the imminence of political changes, have 
introduced many factors of uncertainty typ-
ical of the multipolar world. The uncertainties 
apply both to NATO countries and to non-
aligned countries ; to European countries as 
well as to those on the African shore. The 
uncertainties are a cause of anxiety as they 
appear to many to threaten changes of align-
ment." 
This appears to me to put its finger on the 
essential situation in the Mediterranean. 
Where I begin to disagree with the Rappor-
teur is when he considers these uncertainties as 
fatal or dangerous factors. The multifariousness 
of the world of today seems to me, on the con-
trary, to be an essential factor in freedom for 
the nations, and, finally, peace, for only in this 
way can the nations elude the hegemony of the 
two world superpowers : lasting peace can only 
be bui1lt on nations' freedom to determine their 
own destiny and not on permanent confronta-
tion between two military blocs. 
Quite possibly those elements of uncertainty 
that the report condemns may herald changes 
in alignment. But it all depends on what he 
means by "changes of alignment". If he means 
by this that a large part of the Mediterranean 
world is likely to escape the two-bloc system, 
he must excuse me if I do not join him in regret-
ting the fact. 
As to the uncertainty about the fate of one 
or other of them, it is, the way I see it, far less 
dangerous than to live with a number of 
certainties that may prove fallacious. 
As far as I can remember, what the Assembly 
has always condemned in the Brezhnev doctrine 
has been its basic search for an insurance against 
changes of alignment. Yet, Mr. Buck seems to 
me to be preaching some kind of western 
Brezhnev doctrine. Above all, as General 
Beaufre has so often emphasised in the past, 
a defensive strategy based essentially on nuclear 
deterrence would appear to carry with it a con-
siderable amount of uncertainties about the 
attitudes that may be adopted by one country 
or another in the event of cooflict. Certainties 
are what the aggressor requires, and uncer-
tainties operate in favour of the one whose 
strategy is defensive. In effect, uncertainty 
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means a very strong probability that those who 
are unsure will, when the time comes, take sides 
against the aggressor, who cannot ignore this 
fact. 
If all that was concerned was doctrinal 
disputation between the partisans of such and 
such a strategy, the matter would not be so 
serious. But it becomes serious as soon as Mr. 
Buck considers how to guard against those 
uncertainties and replace them with certainties. 
The whole of his report clearly says so. In his 
eyes, membership of and control by NATO are 
the only true cert·ainty by which the western 
world can stand when it comes to the Mediter-
ranean and the countries around its shores. 
What, then, does NATO mean to him? 
He states his position quite clearly in para-
graph 31 on the subject of the Italian communist 
party, which he accuses of drawing a spurious 
and dangerous distinction between NATO bases 
and American bases in Italy. There could be no 
clearer way of saying that, as Mr. Buck sees it, 
NATO and the United States are one and the 
same. This shows what the remainder of the 
paragraph means where he writes that the Com-
mittee calls for all member countries and the 
Alliance as a whole to be more publicly 
identified with NATO defence arrangements in 
the Mediterranean area. 
The thought behind a sentence at first sight 
very clear, seems equally clear to me. All 
members of the Alliance ought to identify 
themselves with the Mediterranean policy of the 
United States. Farther on in the report, we find 
more applications of this doctrine of identifying 
the Alliance with it..<~ member countries, for 
example in paragraph 48, concerning Cyprus. 
Mr. Buck says that although Cyprus has long 
been a base for potential British intervention 
in the Near and Middle East, the island is today 
more important for the defence of NATO inter-
ests, i.e. that NATO, and we have seen what 
NATO means to Mr. Buck, should now take over 
the defence of interests that hitherto were solely 
Britain's. 
In paragraph 56, Mr. Buck regrets that the 
military facilities in Malta are not on the 
sovereign territory of a NATO country and do 
not provide the territorial diversity that the 
Committee sees as an advantage in the case of 
Cyprus, unless of course Malta were to join 
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NATO or conclude a bilateral defence arrange-
ment with Italy. 
I wonder, first of all, what this "territorial 
diversity" may be, which would appear if Malta 
were to belong to NATO but in the contrary 
case would not exist. What I see in this above 
all is that Mr. Buck finds it intolerable that 
1\falta should retain an independent policy. 
The same reasoning crops up in paragraph 63, 
with reference to Gibraltar. In it, Mr. Buck 
mentions the possibility of Spain joining the 
Atlantic Alliance. In such an event, however, 
if we are to believe Mr. Buck the British forces 
and the NATO headquarters would have to 
remain in Gibraltar since "if Spanish bases 
should cease to be available to United States 
aircraft for any reason in the future, Gibraltar 
can provide facilities for maritime patrol air-
craft at a strategic point for surveillance of 
both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean". In 
other words, even if Spain were to become a 
member of NATO, it would not carry the same 
weight as the United Kingdom, since only the 
British presence can ensure the support facilities 
that NATO needs, while the handing back to 
Spain of this British colony would not provide 
equivalent guarantees, even if Spain were to 
join the Atlantic Alliance. 
More examples may be fonnd in the same vein. 
What is sought is a strengthening of American 
hegemony in the Mediterranean and finally plac-
ing NATO at the service of British colonial 
policy of a quite traditional kind. 
This is how Mr. Buck seems to see this 
identification of NATO and its member States, 
which he has made one of the recurrent themes 
of both his exp}anatory. memorandum and his 
recommendation. 
In paragraph 133, Mr. Buck refers to a pro-
posal already made by the Assembly, despite 
opposition from certain quarters, to send NATO 
political advisers to the various commands in 
the Mediterranean area. This would of course 
strengthen NATO's political influence so as to 
turn it into an instrument of a policy probably 
concocted between Great Britain and the United 
States. 
One might have thought that the problems at 
present confronting the United Kingdom would 
have induced our British friends to revise a little 
more thoroughly the concepts they have 
inherited from the nineteenth century and are 
trying to cling to in the teeth of all the realities 
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of our time. One may well wonder how far 
they will have to go before admitting what to 
me seems to be the fundamental reality of the 
present-day world. I do not believe that anything 
of l·asting value can be built up, particularly in 
the Mediterranean area, without the independ-
ence and recognition of the :full sovereignty of 
all national States. To import into this area a 
M·anichaean doctrine that everything which is 
not part of NATO or of the Warsaw Pact is a 
source of mischief, disorder or instability, and 
must be brought back to bipolar orthodoxy as 
soon as possible, is to pursue a policy that, one 
would like to have hoped, had been superseded 
long ago. 
The Atlantic Alliance as such perfectly defines 
what an alliance of independent sovereign States 
can be. They are committed to joint defence if 
one of them is the object of aggression, but they 
retain a wide measure of :freedom in their 
foreign policy and defence policy. 
As we see it, the way to strengthen the 
Atlantic Alliance, which I want just as much 
as Mr. Buck does, is to recognise such :freedom 
:for everyone. It i"' not a matter of wondering 
all the time how :far Soviet influence or NATO 
influence extends in the Middle East or in the 
eastern Mediterranean, but of leaving the coun-
tries of those regions to work out their own 
national destiny. Only to the extent that the 
Atlantic Alliance allows them this right can it 
count on them to :face up to Soviet imperialism, 
about which neither France nor any of the Near 
or Middle East countries has the slightest 
illusions. 
If we turn now to the draft recommendation 
submitted by Mr. Buck, I :find myself obliged 
to ask :for quite a few amendments before I can 
vote :for it. These amendments are required, 
:first of all, because of the rather unusual and 
obscure wording of several paragraphs, as a 
result of which no one knows exactly what they 
mean. 
It is therefore :for purely editorial reasons 
that I ask to delete the words "based on :freely-
elected parliamentary democracies" in para-
graph (iii) of the preamble, and I should be 
happy to support any suitable :form of wor~ 
expressing the idea that members of the Atlantic 
Alliance should have a democratic system of 
government. 
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Similarly, in paragraph (iv) of the preamble, 
I wonder what is meant by the phrase "other 
appropriate countries" ? Appropriate :for what ? 
Because of what ? I do not know. 
On the other hand, :for political reasons I ask 
:for the deletion in the same paragraph of the 
words "associated with Alliance defence 
planning". I would be quite prepared to vote 
for a sub-paragraph seeking the association of 
Australia, New Zealand or Iran with the Atlantic 
Alliance, but how can they be asked to associate 
themselves with Alliance defence planning if 
they are not yet members of the Alliance ? 
If, now, we consider the recommendation 
proper, I must say that the :form of words used 
in paragraph (c), where reference is made to 
"military :facilities being located on a basis of 
territorial diversity in the Mediterranean area", 
seems to me to be utterly incomprehensible. On 
purely linguistic grounds alone, I would there-
fore suggest writing "located in different 
countries in the Mediterranean", if that 
corresponds to what the writer intends ; if it 
does not, he ought to explain to us what he 
meant. 
On the other hand, in paragraph l(d), 
difficulties in comprehension combine with 
political difficulties to render it, to my mind, 
unacceptable. What is meant by "identifying all 
the member countries and the Alliance as a 
whole" with the arrangements in each of the 
member countries irrespective of the kind of 
conflict in which they are involved ? What, then, 
does this mean in the case of the recent conflict 
between Greece and Turkey ? The wording seems 
unacceptable to me, but I :fear that what I :find 
really unacceptable is the actual thought that the 
recommendation wishes to express. 
In paragraph 2(b), the change I propose seems 
logical to me in that the warnings the Assembly 
proposes to give the Soviet Union could be aimed 
at no country other than the USSR itself. What 
interests us is not, therefore, the granting of new 
bases to the Soviet :forces but the location of new 
bases whatever the means used by the Soviet Unio~ to move into them. The reason why I am 
asking you to change the wording in this way 
is therefore purely a question of logic. 
Paragraph 3 is totally unacceptable to me :for 
two reasons : :first, it has nothing to do with the 
subject matter of the report, which is security 
in the Mediterranean, but only with the Euro-
pean programme group, which has no particular 
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territorial competence and consequently in no 
way covers the Mediterranean area. 
Secondly, I cannot accept that an institution 
intended to promote European co-operation on 
armaments should, from the start, be diverted 
from the task that the governments have wished 
to assign to it. In fact, asking it to make an 
assessment of the threat and a joint statement of 
allied strategy is to require it to play a role 
for which it is in no way fitted and, therefore, 
to take the place of the NATO Council, or the 
WEU Council, or consultations between the 
Nine, whereas nothing qualifies it to undertake 
such a task. The institutions of Europe and the 
West are sufficient in number and their powers 
already sufficiently overlap without it being 
further suggested, without rhyme or reason, that 
each of them should enter on fields falling within 
the purview of several organisations, but 
certainly not their own. 
How I shall vote on the draft recommendation 
will depend on whether these amendments are 
accepted, but I must stress that if in the end 
I find this recommendation acceptable, the fact 
that I vote for it will in no way mean that I am 
of the same mind as the Rapporteur, and he 
must excuse me for this. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. V edovato. 
Mr. VEDOVATO (Italy) (Translation). -
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, allow me 
to begin by expressing my warm congratulations 
to the President upon his re-election, and begging 
him to excuse the many gaps, for reasons you 
will appreciate, in the ranks of the Italian 
Delegation. I also thank the President for allow-
ing me to speak this morning on this report, 
which I regard as, in a way, a supplement to 
and up-dating of the one I had the honour 
to submit, precisely devoted to the defence of 
our northern and southern flanks, in April 1972. 
When I had the honour, a for.tnight ago, of 
addressing the United States Congress at a 
working meeting with the Chairman of the Com-
mittee for Foreign Affairs of the Congress itself 
and authoritative members of the House of 
Representatives, I made a statement I would like 
to read to you now : 
4
'W estern Europe, lopped of its eastern 
territories now under Soviet domination, has 
ever since 1945 been in a state of siege. Today, 
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thirty years on, solidarity with the United 
States is as indispensable as ever. But this 
fact is also an essential safeguard for the 
security of the American nation. The United 
States and its liberties are the ultimate and 
real objective of Soviet expansion, and this 
objective Moscow means to achieve in Europe, 
along its frontiers from the Arctic to the 
Mediterranean, a focal point of worldwide and 
internal strategy for every nation that has to 
contend with Marxist subversion." 
A lot has been said here yesterday and today 
about Italy. I know that you are afraid for 
Italy, and that, through it, perils loom ahead for 
Europe and the whole western world. It would 
be a mistake to assign to the Halians alone the 
entire respomlibility for the events leading up to 
this crisis, or even the decisions which, according 
to the pes.."!imists I have met as well as listened 
to in this Assembly, the Italian electorate is 
preparing to take on 20th and 21st June. Having 
sat in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate 
for twenty-five years, I believe I know the 
Italian people well enough to say that it is 
fundamentally sound and devoted to freedom. It 
will probably not recognise the communist's right 
to govern in Rome. But the reason why the 
communi"'t option is liable to become reality is 
the postwar legacy that still burdens Italy. At 
the end of the war the victorious powers, for 
the sake of a compromise with Moscow, conceded 
that the left should be monopolised by an 
undemocratic party controlled by Russia. The 
christian democrats had to face a thankless task, 
rendered unnatural by the lack of a democratic 
alternative and consequently exposed to the 
dangers inherent in the wear and tear of office. 
The crux of the problem let me say, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, lies today in the mere fact that the 
Italian electorate is placed between the anvil 
of an often effete ruling class, and the hammer 
of a prospective abolition of every liberty. 
The Italian phenomenon reflects in particular 
ways a crisis besetting practically the whole 
western world, which has failed to carry freedom 
over into the age of technology. It is essentially 
a joint problem, one to be jointly tackled, 
courageously and with resolution. 
This brings us to the Meditermnean. Historic-
ally, the Mediterranean has always been recog-
nised by the European Strutes, as well as the 
United States Government and Congress, as a 
zone of special interest. It is so today more than 
ever in political and economic, even more than 
in military, terms. More than other parts of the 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Mr. VedtJvato (continued) 
world, the Mediterranean is the subject of a 
coherent Russian policy and strategy. The eastern 
Mediterranean is stiU one of the main objec;tives 
that are a determining factor for further expan-
sion by the Soviet Union, westwards with respect 
to peninsular Europe, and eastwards with respect 
to the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. Both 
objectives have, by the way, always been closely 
interwoven in the causes and effects of political 
and historical strategy and development. In the 
19th century, and at any rate up to the outbreak 
of the first world war, the "eastern question" 
formed one of the perennial aims of strategy 
and diplomacy in Europe. The persistence of the 
Ottoman Empire on the one hand, and the 
equilibrium of the Balkans on the other, 
constituted suitab1e instruments for averting the 
supremacy, though not the legitimate presence, 
of Russian power in the ea.stern Mediterranean. 
Events arising from the precarity of the status 
quo in the Middle East following the second 
world war enabled Russia to set up a state of 
permanent tension and impose its own direct 
presence, through its navy and air force, 
together with the establishment in certain Arab 
States of powerful land forces, armed and 
instructed, and where possible controlled, by 
itself. 
The latter element would have obviated, at 
least initially, direct intervention by the Russian 
armed forces, still compelled in the conte:lct of 
confrontation between East and West to stand 
firm on the Danube or north of the S.traits. 
The fruits of tension might, by definitely con-
solidating Russian supremacy in the Middle 
East, have altered the strategic situation to such 
an extent as to give Russia, without any risk 
to itself, a corresponding modification of the 
political status quo, both on the Danube and in 
the Straits. But Kissinger's peace efforts, sup-
ported by some of the major protagonists in the 
Middle East, might be thwarted in the event 
of flare-ups at certain critical points - men-
tioned by the way in our debate, such as Cyprns 
and Lebanon - or should Europe, with all due 
respect to Mr. Riviere, fail to abandon once 
and for all any aspirations towards illusory 
positions separate from the Americans', and, in 
the last resort, play into the hands of Soviet 
diplomacy. 
There exists today a common interest in keep-
ing the peace, both for Arabs and Israelis, Turks 
and Greeks, Europe even more than America. 
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It is however threatened in the Middle East 
and eastern Mediterranean. What is more, if 
Europe fails to restore full solidarity of western 
strategy and policy in the Mediterranean, the 
Kremlin might be tempted to add to its numerous 
naval and air forces scattered throughout the 
eastern Mediterranean the decisive advantages 
that can only be conferred by territorial con-
tinuity, that is, freedom of movement for the 
Soviet ground forces. These are, let us not forget, 
regardless of their scope for manoeuvring, con-
centrated along the Danube. Let us not forget 
that in 1878 the Czar sent his armies as far as 
the gates of Constantinople to force the Straits 
for Russia's might. But what counts today in 
this geographical area is not so much the strict 
deployment of forces as an intelligent and flexible 
doctrine of European policy for the western 
Mediterranean associating all countries aJong 
its littoral in unity of intereats, independence 
and progress. From such a doctrine would ensue 
security for all concerned and for the West. Let 
us be clear about it : there is no question of 
shutting Rus.c;;ia out, but of seeing its influence 
kept within bounds inside a vast framework 
ensuring guaranteed freedom and stability for 
one and all. Let our Western European Union, 
Mr. President, establish such a doctrine, in the 
service of a united Europe, the Atlantic idea and 
the peaceful progress of the Mediterranean 
peoples. 
These are my reasons for taking a favourable 
view of the draft recommendation by the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments, 
subject to a few amendments I also consider to 
be called for. For these reasons too, I welcome 
Mr. Buck's report adumbrating useful points for 
the political doctrine I postulate, for the 
independence, progress and security of the 
Mediterranean area. 
Lastly, for these same reasons, I have requested 
the Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments, for whose support in the matter I am 
grateful, to keep the topic of security in the 
Mediterranean permanently on its agenda. 
Thank you, Mr. President. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. Vedovato, for your very full statement. 
I hope that we shall have an opportunity in 
rather different circumstances to work together 
both on the independence of Europe and on peace 
in the world. 
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7. Change in the Order of Business 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- The Order 
of Business adopted by the Assembly provided 
that items outstanding today would be voted on 
at 11.30 a.m. tomorrow, Thursday. However, 
because of the absence of many members of the 
Assembly recalled tomorrow to their respective 
parliaments, I suggest that the .Assembly take 
these votes at this afternoon's Sitting, after the 
present debate. 
Are there any objections L. 
It is so decided. 
Mr. PIKET (Netherlands) (Translation). -
One small point, will there be no voting at all 
tomorrow morning ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- Yes, there 
will. To give you the full story, since these are 
texts that are open to disagreement, we are 
obliged by an extremely strict, not to say in my 
honest opinion, an absurd procedure, to have a 
quorum in order to be able to vote. As it happens, 
we shall not have a quorum tomorrow because 
the German DeLegation cannot be present. With 
the agreement of those opposing the motion, 
i,t has been arranged that a series of votes on 
the contested recommendations will be brought 
forward to this afternoon, so that we have a 
quorum. However, there will be more voting 
tomorrow morning on recommendations not 
subject to adverse votes or abstentions. 
Mr. PIKET (Netherlands) (Translation). 
Thank you. 
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8. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next 
Sitting 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- I propose 
that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting 
this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders 
of the Day: 
1. Security in the Mediterranean (Resumed 
Debate on the Report and supplementacy 
Report of the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments and Vote on the draft 
Recommendation, Documents 708 and 
Amendments and 712). 
2. European aeronautical policy - Guidelines 
emerging from the Colloquy on 2nd and 
3rd February 1976 (Vote on the draft 
Recommendation, Document 704). 
3. Detente and security in Europe (Vote on 
the revi<~ed draft Recommendation, Docu-
ment 703). 
4. Reserve forces (Presentation of and Debate 
on the Report of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments and Vote on the 
draft Recommendation, Document 707). 
5. Strategic mobility (Presentation of and 
Debate on the Report of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments and 
Vote on the draft Order, Document 709). 
Are there any objections ?... 
The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak ?... 
The Sitting is closed. 
(The Sitting was closed at 1.05 p.m.) 
FIFTH SITTING 
Wednesday, 16th June 1976 
SUMMARY 
1. Adoption of the Minutes. 
2. Attendance Register. 
3. Security in the Mediterranean (Resumed Debate on the 
Report and supplementary Report of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft 
Recommendation, Does. 708 and Amendments and 712). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. de Montesquiou, Mr. 
Thyness (Observer from Norway), Mr. Cermolacce, Mr. 
Papapolitis (Observer from Greece), Mr. Kliesing, Mr. 
Budtz (Observer from Denmark), Mr. Piket, Mr. Valleix 
(on a point of order), Mr. Buck (Rapporteur), Mr. 
Sieglerschmidt, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Piket, Mr. Buck, 
Mr. Kliesing, Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Lord Peddie, Mr. 
Buck, Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Lord Peddie, Mr. Buck, 
Mr. Piket, Mr. Buck, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Sieglerschmidt, 
Mr. Valleix, Mr. Buck, Mr. Valleix (on a point of order), 
Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Mr. Buck, Mr. Sieglerschmidt, 
Lord Peddie, Mr. Buck, Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Mr. Buck, 
Mr. Valleix, Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Mr. Buck. 
4. European aeronautical policy - Guidelines emerging 
from the Colloquy on 2nd and 3rd February 1976 
(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doe. 704). 
5. Detente and security in Europe (Vote on the revi8ed 
draft Recommendation, Doe. 703). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Cermolacce, Mr. Delorme, 
Mr. Richter, Sir Frederic Bennett (Rapporteur). 
6. Strategic mobility (Presentation of the Report of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and 
Vote on the draft Order, Doe. 709). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Duvieusa.rt (Rapporteur). 
7. Reserve forces (Presentation of the Report of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote 
on the draft Recommendation, Doe. 707). 
Speakers : The President, Mr. Delorme (Rapporteur). 
8. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting. 
The Sitting was opened at 3.10 p.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The Sit-
ting is open. 
1. Adoption of the Minutes 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - In accord-
ance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the 
Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting 
have been distributed. 
Are there any comments t .. 
The Minutes are agreed to. 
2. Attendance Register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The 
names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting 
which have been notified to the President will 
be published with the list of Representatives 
appended to the Minutes of Proceedings 1• 
3. Security in the Mediterranean 
(Resumed Debate on the Report and supplementary 
Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, 
Does. 108 and Amendments and 112) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- The first 
Order of i~,he Day is the resumed debate on the 
I. See page 39. 
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report and supplementary report of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments on 
security in the Mediterranean and vote on the 
draft recommendation, Documents 708 and 
Amendments and 712. 
I call Mr. de Montesquiou. 
Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (France) (Transla-
tion). - The report presented by Mr. Buck 
contains a great deal of detailed and valuable 
information on the balance of forces in the 
Mediterranean. He urges us to be fully mindful 
of the growing threat which the significant 
increase in Soviet naval power in the area 
represents to Europe's security. During the 
Middle East crises in 1956 an,d 1958 the Soviet 
Union had no military means of influencing the 
course of events. Today it has at its disposal the 
base of Latakia in Syria. The Algerian naval 
installations are open to it and, above all, its 
Mediterranean squadron comprises, as Mr. Buck 
states with precision, a total of 40 to 60 vessels. 
There is therefore a real threat. However, it 
should not, militarily speaking, be exaggerated. 
Mr. Buck told us that in the Mediterranean the 
Soviet fleet is very inferior both quantitatively 
and qualitatively to that of the countries of the 
Atlantic Alliance. 
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But misgivings at the Soviet military presence 
become more wcute if we consider the political 
instability of the Mediterranean region. That is 
where the real danger lies and Mr. Buck was 
quite right to emphasise it. 
This instability is due in the first place to a 
number of internal crises all taking place at the 
same time in nations whose unbalanced economic 
and social structures were ill adapted to the new 
development conditions. Spain, Italy, Greece, 
Yugoslavia and other countri{)S experienced, in 
different ways, profound difficulties affecting 
their will to resist armed aggression. The instabi-
lity of international relations in the Mediter-
ranean basin is also due to the continuing bitter 
conflicts in the eastern part of the region. In 
Cyprus and in the Middle East there are bloody 
confrontations at regular intervals which have an 
unsettling effect on the whole Meditermnean 
region. The situation is all the more serious in 
that it encourages the great powers to intervene 
constantly in order to support one or the other 
of the contending parties, all of which constitutes 
a permanent threat of generalised conflict. Thus, 
in Libya we see a Syrian intervention which, by 
giving the Soviet Union the means of strengthen-
ing its influence in part of the Middle East, will 
eventually not fail to alarm Israel and cause the 
United States to throw in all its weight in order 
to re-establish the balance of forces in the region. 
How can Europe, faced by such an unstable 
situation, guarantee its security, protect its vital 
lines of communications, and intervene actively 
to promote a policy answering its special needs, 
particularly in trade and energy ~ 
Mr. Buck replies to this question by proposing 
the integration of all the allied countries, includ-
ing France and Greece, in NATO's military set-
up, and asking for it to be expanded to include 
a number of other countries such as Malta and 
Spain. 
This is, in my opinion, ·a solution inadequate 
to meet the problems raised by current develop-
ments in the Mediterranean. True, the streng-
thening of Atlantic solidarity is indispensable in 
order to deter the Soviet Union from employing 
in the Mediterranean the considerable military 
fol'Ces which it has today at its disposal. But 
Atlantic solidarity should, in my opinion, pri-
marily aJSSUme a political form. It does not 
necessarily imply, at any rate for France, integra-
tion in a joint military alignment of forces. Such 
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integration would force my country to give up 
its freedom of decision in matters of defence. It 
would moreover not make sense unless it were 
necessary today to prepare, with maximum effi-
ciency, for conventional warfare. But we know 
that the nuclear deterrent which is the kingpin of 
France's defence in fact rules out the hypothesis 
of a conventional war. The nuclear deterrent, by 
holding over the head of any aggressor the threat 
of massive reprisals, makes it useless to set up an 
order of battle comparable in every respect with 
that of the adversary. 
The integration of France in NATO, contrary 
to what the Rapporteur claims, is not the real 
answer to the new challenge of Soviet military 
presence in the Mediterranean. 
Nor is an enlargement of the integrated military 
force to include other countries desirable. Such 
a proposal would result in the setting-up of a 
western military bloc, necessarily under Ameri-
crun hegemony, which would endeavour to act as 
a counterweight to the Soviet bloc. In such a 
situation Europe's freedom of action would be 
considerably restricted. Moreover, the risk of 
escalation of conventional outbreaks, which would 
be limited but violent and frequent, would 
significantly increase. American, British and 
French nuclear deterrence, which today forms 
the essential element of Europe's security, would 
not, in a scenario of limited confrontation, be able 
to come into play, and Europe would have to 
envisage the very real possibility of trials of 
strength liable to spell ruin and devastation for 
it. 
The strengthening and enlargement of the 
integrated military structure of NATO does not 
therefore represent the best means at Europe's 
disposal for guaranteeing its security in the 
Mediterranean. 
A strategy less oriented towards confrontation 
and based primarily on the nuclear deterrent 
would, in my opinion, be best suited to Europe's 
specific interests. 
Any trial of strength in the Mediterranean 
would be disastrous for our continent and we 
must therefore gather together all the means -
mainly nuclear - of avoiding war, instead of 
piling up the means of waging it. 
In parallel with such a strategy adapted to 
the interests of Europe it would be necessary to 
work out a joint foreign policy aimed at pro-
moting an active and independent European 
presence in the Mediterranean. In that way 
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Europe could, by its own intervention, contribute 
to the stabilisation of the situation in the 
Mediterranean basin by helping to strengthen 
internally the countries of the region and finally 
settle the conflicts which steep its history in 
bloodshed. A Mediterranean policy on trade has 
already been worked out by the European Com-
munities. An extension of this policy to financial, 
social and cultural affairs should enable us to 
strengthen the bonds which unite Europe to all 
the countries around the Mediterranean basin 
and restore to our continent a political influence 
whidh it has lost in this region since the end of 
the colonial era. 
The exrumple of Vietnam shows us that no 
nation, or group of nations, can leave it to foreign 
powers to ensure their security. Let us not there-
fore rely for our defence solely on our alliance 
with the United States and on a strengthening 
of NATO, but let us together work out the stra-
tegic principles and political guidelines most 
likely to safeguard our interests in the Mediter-
ranean basin and in other areas of the world. 
Only if all the countries of the Mediterranean 
littoral place their faith in us shall we be able 
to stand up to the dangers which threaten us. 
(Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- I call Mr. 
Thyness, member of the Norwegian Storting. 
Mr. THYNESS (Observer from Norway). -
Although I am always very proud to represent 
Norway and its parliament, I am here in my 
capacity as Chairman of the North Atlantic 
Assembly's Military Committee, which in the 
past few years has enjoyed a very relaxed and 
profita:ble co-operation with your Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments. I am grate-
ful for the invitation to attend this sitting of the 
parent body of NATO and the North Atlantic 
Assembly. 
I find the excellent report on security in the 
Mediterranean very interesting in view of the 
fact that the North Atlantic Assembly's Military 
Committee considered a similar report only last 
month. The conclusions of the two reports are 
rather similar, but in some respects I detect a 
subtle difference in emphasis. A case in point is 
the possible communist participation in govern-
ment in Italy. We all recognise that if this 
happens, we shall be confronted with some very 
awkward problems, and perhaps more than that. 
Nevertheless the perception of communism in 
6* • II 
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Europe differs from that in the United States, 
as clearly demonstrated in the North Atlantic 
Assembly by the ~nterventions in the debate of 
our United States colleagues, one of whom stated 
quite bluntly that it would be hard to explain to 
American voters the possible participation of 
communists in the Italian Government and to 
counteract the impression created thereby that 
NATO was becoming increasingly irrelevant. 
To the European mind, this is over-reacting. 
We tend to regard Secretary Kissinger's warning 
as counter-productive, perhaps in Italy and most 
certainly in the United States itself, where that 
kind of statement increases anxiety and doubt 
about developments in Europe over which the 
Americans basically have no control and with 
which the Americans will have to live if they 
eventually occur. The Italian electorate must 
decide who is to govern Italy. It is in no doubt 
about the risks inherent in electing communists. 
However, in Europe, untlike the United States, 
communist parties have been a political fact of 
life for a very long time - the European 
assessment of the risk has more nuances and is 
perhaps a little more realistic. 
I believe that communism is changing slowly 
and that communist allegiance to the Soviet 
Union is gradually being eroded. This does not 
make communism any more prulatable to me, but 
it suggests that it may be slowly declining as an 
external- and I stress external- security risk. 
What we have to contend with now is Kremlin 
imperialism, and indigenous communist parties 
may be less willing to serve as its instrument in 
future. Very few people nowadays believe that 
workers are closer to paradise in the East than 
in the West. Communism in the West today is 
more likely to be a belief in certain principles, 
which are nowhere more grossly distorted and 
perverted than in the USSR. 
Whatever happens in Italy, the Italians are 
our brothers. We want to work with them, to 
safeguard with them their national sovereignty 
as far as they will allow us to do so. We should 
guard against any deed or utterance that will 
make that co-operation unnecessarily difficult. 
Democracy is very fragile and the road to it is 
both long and tortuous. Not more than 20 out 
of the nearly 150 sovereign nations of the world 
qualify for the label. 
The developments in Portugal ,are very little 
short of miraculous. Up to now both the electorate 
and the politicians have acted as though fifty 
years of dictatorship was but a very short inter-
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lude in a long and gradual political and economic 
development. I find myself at a loss to explain 
where the Portuguese have found this political 
maturity which is denied to so many other, more 
highly-developed countries. I can only rejoice in 
its obvious existence. 
We should, however, not ask too much of a 
miracle. Democracy in Portugal will probably 
be in danger if the country does not experience 
a rapid economic development as we11. I should 
therefore like to stress the economic support of 
Portugal called for by the report. I should have 
liked to see it incorporated into the draft recom-
mendation. Portugal is important to the defence 
of Europe not primarily because of the military 
force it contributes, but because of its geographi-
cal position and because of the lessons the Por-
tuguese can teach us on internal security by 
national action and allied interaction. 
Economic development must now be of first 
priority and I hope most sincerely that no ally 
will object to Portugal's scaling down its military 
forces to a new level. As the Portuguese repre-
sentative has emphasised here, there must be 
a reorientation of Portugal's national interests 
and this must be reflected in the armed forces of 
Portugal, which must be trained and supplied 
for a new and meaningful role in the defence of 
the West. 
But we, as Portugal's allies, must not allow 
that reorientation to become an economic burden 
on the fledgling democracy in that country. So 
I would also hope that Pol"tugal's allies will join 
in giving massive economic aid to Portugal in 
the same spirit in which we ourselves received 
Marshall aid when our situation was not too 
dissimilar from the one in which Portugal finds 
itself today. That much, I think, we owe to a 
elose friend and a loyal 'ally - and also to our 
own ideal, which Portugal is now realising in a 
very impressive way. 
The security of the Mediterranean is not a 
military problem. The Russian fleet must be seen 
mainly as a politi0al weapon very effective in 
peacetime - devastatingly effective in peace-
time, sometimes - but in war not too important 
and it is less important if the situation should 
be a warlike one and the Arab nations should 
suddenly see the risks inherent in playing the 
East against the West, and the use of facilities 
in other countries as a sort of bargain chip. 
Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Italy, Spain, Portu-
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gal, Malta, Cyprus - it is all a political problem. 
If NATO is ever challenged militarily in that 
area, I feel confident that our adversaries are 
going to have some very bloody noses to show 
for their efforts - provided the cohesion of the 
Alliance and the political stability of the allies 
are maintained. 
Perhaps this is a signal of a more profound 
change taking place gradually in our whole 
security situation, a new kind of threat develop-
ment demanding a new kind of answer, a new 
set of opportunities and a new set of risks. I do 
not know - but I do think that we ought to be 
on our toes lest we let ourselves drift into a 
policy which is increasingly irrelevant. We will 
always need arms, we will always need a military 
defence for our sovereignty. But possibly the 
first order of the day in the years to come wi11 
be honest responsible government and political 
cohesiop., internally in the different countries, 
and within the Alliance. I think we may be in a 
situation when the relationships between the mili-
tary and the political means that one is pursued 
and the other not neglected. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I cal[ 
Mr. Cermolacce. 
Mr. CERMOLAOCE (France) (Translation). 
- Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the 
debate on the report on European security in the 
Mediterranean coincides with the end of the 
Italian election campaign. It might therefore 
have been hoped that Mr. Buck, who claims he 
sets great store by the rules of parliamentary 
democracy, would abstain, in the text of his 
report to the Assembly, from any unwarrantable 
interference in the Italian political debate. It is 
up to the Italian electorate to decide what course 
their country will take, and the .Assembly of 
Western European Union has no right to try and 
influence their choice. 
Unfortunately, Mr. Buck has not seen fit to 
adopt an attitude which fully respects the 
freedom of choice of the Italian people. In para-
graph 2 of the draft recommendation, the North 
Atlantic Council is called on to have "full poli-
tical and military contingency plans" prepared. 
Is not this with the intention of bringing pres-
sure to bear on Italy should it decide to elect 
a government representing the vast majority of 
its population ? 
Mr. Buck does not go into too much detail 
about these contingency plans. Would it be an 
economic boycott, diplomatic interference or a 
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show of force ? None of these hypotheses is ruled 
out by the Rapporteur, who goes to the length 
of proposing in paragraph 31 of the explanatory 
memorandum that naval and air contingents 
from countries in Northern Europe should parti-
cipate in exercises off the Italia,n coast, of course, 
after communists had entered the Italian Govern-
ment. 
If the Assembly were to endorse proposals of 
that kind, it would be showing a distrust for 
universal suffrage and a contempt for the 
independence of States that would be bound to 
bring it into disrepute. 
Such an attitude towards a possible democratic 
change in Italy is but the consequence of a more 
general political orientation, leading to advocacy 
of a strengthening and a considerable extension 
of NATO powers in Europe, under the aegis of 
the United States. For the Rapporteur there is 
no distinction to be dmwn- he says so clearly 
in paragraph 31 of the explanatory memorandum 
-between the United States and NATO. When 
he calls somewhat cryptically for "member coun-
tries ... to be more publicly identified with NATO 
defence arrangements in the Mediterranean 
area", what he is asking for is for Europe to 
align itself unconditionally on United States 
policy in the Mediterranean. In effect, this 
amounts to demanding an indirect strengthening 
of American hegemony in this region through 
strengthening NATO. 
Still according to the Rapporteur, this streng-
thening should be at one and the same time 
political, military and territorial. 
In the political sphere, the dispatch of NATO 
diplomatic advisers to the organisation's regional 
commands - in other words, to Greece, Italy 
and Portugal - is advocated. How can we fail 
to see in this proposal an attempt to encroach 
upon the independence of countries deemed "un-
reliable" by the United States 1 Nowadays we 
know all about the involvement of American 
diplomats and the CIA in the Greek coup d'etat 
of 1967 and in the Ohilean putsch of 1973. Do we 
want to see these tragic events repeated in other 
circumstances ? 
On the military plane, a strengthening of the 
NATO presence throughout the Mediterranean 
is ca:lled for. There is also a demand for the de 
facto integration of the Portuguese army in the 
Atlantic organisation's military set-up. The hope 
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is to see a reinforcement of the division into 
eastern and western blocs, and an aggravation 
of tensions on our continent, whereas there has 
been a swing of public opinion against this 
policy of confrontation, and the success of the 
Helsinki conference and the numerous treaties 
recently concluded between the socialist and 
capitalist countries hold out a hope that the 
process of detente may spread to the military 
sphere. 
Territorially, the Rapporteur calls, with, to be 
sure, certain qualifications, for the integrated 
military org·anisation of the North Atlantic 
'l'reaty to swallow up at the earliest opportunity 
Malta, Spain and even Iran. He also hopes to 
see France publicly and finally return to the 
ranks of NATO, thus renouncing the gestures of 
independence of which it has sometimes shown 
itself capable in the past. 
In the Middle East, although the situation in 
this Mediterranean sector is serious and disquiet-
ing, and demands speedy progress towards a fair 
and lasting settlement of the conflict, this is 
not the path on which the European Parliament, 
which I take as an example, has just embarked. 
Indeed, on the pretext of taking up a human-
itarian position, the latter only last Tuesday 
condoned the Syrian military intervention in 
Lebanon, by refusing to condemn the foreign 
aggression and recognise the Lebanese people's 
right to affirm its own destiny in complete in-
dependence, and urged the EEC member States 
"to co-ordinate their positions and their actions ... 
so as to put into immediate effect any measure 
which might prevent the conflict spreading". 
Such was the resolution passed by the European 
Parliament. It could, in our view, be used to 
cover a possible military opemtion : interference 
that would incur the general hostility of the 
Arab peoples and could only make it more dif-
ficult to find a peaceful solution and establish 
a just and lasting peace in this part of the world. 
We find this same bias in the report we are 
discussing. It does not speak of leaving the 
peoples of the Mediterranean basin free to live 
out their national destinies as they see fit. On 
the contmry, according to the Rapporteur, they 
must be voluntarily or forcibly integrated into 
the NATO military bloc and subjected to Ameri-
can hegemony. 
If the ~mbly were to vote in favour of this 
text, it would be proclaiming openly that, in its 
eyes the independence of the European peoples 
and respect for the courses which they have 
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:freely chosen :for themselves, carry little weight 
when the maintenance and strengthening o:f the 
Atlantic military bloc is at stake, biased towards 
the preservation o:f every possible means of a 
capitalist system o:f society which, in Europe 
today, is in the throes of one of the gravest crises 
o:f its history. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Papapolitis, a member o:f the Greek Chamber 
of Deputies. 
Mr. PAPAPOLI'L'IS (Observer from Greece). 
-Allow me, Mr. President, in the name o:f my 
colleague, Mr. Tavlarios, and myself to express 
to you our warm congratulations on your re-
election to the presidency o:f this Assembly. It 
confirms the high esteem in which the members 
o:f the Assembly o:f Western European Union 
hold you. 
On behalf o:f the Greek Delegation, I should 
like to convey to you, Mr. President, as well as 
to the distinguished members o:f this Assembly, 
the warmest thanks of the President of the Greek 
Parliament :for the invitation you have so cor-
dially once more extended to members o:f the 
Greek Parliament to :follow as observers the work 
o:f your Assembly. Contact with your members 
and study o:f the reports submitted to this 
Assembly are very instructive to us. 
You are already aware o:f the :fundamental 
view o:f almost all members of the Greek Parlia-
ment in :favour o:f European union. I want to 
reiterate our belief that :further economic, 
political and social progress o:f the European 
peoples can be achieved only through political 
union o:f the European countries. Hence the 
application o:f Greece to become a full member o:f 
the European Community. The realisation o:f the 
ideal of European union is o:f extreme import-
ance. It is an historical necessity. We should 
not hesitate to accept the necessary sacrifices. 
Greece, both now under its present status 
and as a full member o:f the European Com-
munity, will do its utmost towards that goal. 
Greece is a peace-loving country. The Greek 
people want to live in peace and security with 
their neighbours. The Greek Government has 
often proved its desire for peace •and co-opera-
tion. Let me mention only the initiative taken 
by Prime Minister Caramanlis to convene an 
intra-Balkan conference with a view to promot-
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ing the solution of some practical and technical 
aspects o:f the collaboration among Balkan States. 
It is important to say that the Greek Govern-
ment is convinced that the existing questions 
between Turkey and Greece could be solved 
peacefully. For the delimitation of the conti-
nental shelf, the Greek Government has proposed 
the submission of the matter to the International 
Court of The Hague. As far as the problem, 
raised by Turkey, of control o:f the air space 
above the Aegean Sea is concerned, represent-
atives o:f the two governments have initiated 
discussions, which are still continuing. 
Also, the Greek Prime Minister quite recently 
proposed to Turkey the conclusion o:f a treaty 
o:f non-recourse to violence and an agreement 
limiting the arms race. The :first of these pro-
posals is mentioned in the report on security in 
the Mediterranean. 
166 
However, I should like to point out that this 
report includes certain information which does 
not represent official positions and does' not 
emanate :from any official Greek source. I refer 
to the negotiations between NATO and Greece, 
as well as between the United States and Greece. 
On these important subjects discussions are being 
held at present. It is therefore inappropriate and 
premature for me to extend my remarks on these 
confidential negotiations. 
I shall refer to the statement by Prime 
Minister .Caramanlis on 16th October 1975 in the 
Greek Parliament concerning the position of 
Greece with regard to NATO. According to this 
statement, our relations will be guided by three 
principles. The first is that in time o:f peace the 
armed forces of Greece will be under national 
command. Secondly, in periods of war there will 
be full co-operation with the Alliance in matters 
of defence. Thirdly, methods rendering possible 
and effective co-operation in time of war will 
be devised beforehand. Finally, we are confident 
that the distinguished members o:f this Assembly 
will not fail to contribute towards a solution of 
the Cyprus problem in conformity with the 
United Nations Charter. Such a solution would 
constitute a fundamental element :for peace and 
security for the whole European continent and 
the E·astern Mediterranean. 
I thank you, Mr. President, for the opportun-
ity you have given the Greek Delegation to 
explain briefly some of the positions of Greece 
on important matters, and I thank the members 
of this Assembly for the attention given to my 
remarks. (Applause) 
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Mr. Kliesing. 
Mr. KLIESING (Federal Republic of Ger-
many) (Translation). -Mr. President, I should 
first like to congratulate the Rapporteur on his 
success in presenting in such detail and so 
objectively the problems that the Atlantic 
Alliance faces in the Mediterranean area. It is 
in the nature of things that, as Rapporteur for 
the Committee on Defence Questions, he should 
have paid particu1ar attention to the military 
aspects. Both the report and the present debate 
show however that, in this matter, the political 
cannot be separated from the military, but that 
the two are closely linked. 
Of course, on this or that point of detail, our 
views may differ from those of the Rapporteur. 
I might mention, for example, that I cannot share 
his optimism about what is happening with 
Malta. I am convinced that the political friends we 
have in the Arab world will be far more worried 
than we are as to the political road that Malta, 
with its great strategic importance, will follow. 
It may perhaps be for the Parliamentary Assem-
bly of the Council of Europe to which, after all, 
we all belong, to consider this question. 
I do not want to minimise any of the problems 
that Mr. Buck has raised with regard to the 
area between the Bosporus and Gibraltar. They 
are all very important and very difficult, and 
may one day be dangerous. I would however like 
to add just this. When we talk about the Mediter-
ranean area in connection with the problem of 
European security, then we must look on this 
area as a single whole. With all due respect and 
much as I agree with the report and the draft 
recommendation, I would none the less have 
liked to see greater prominence given in the draft 
recommendation to the questions dealt with in 
Chapter IV of the report under the title "Other 
countries". For without wishing to belittle the 
importance of any of the problems touched upon 
here, I consider that the greatest threat to Euro-
pean security in the Mediterranean area is still 
that of the Middle East, of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. 
In view of the civil war and of the hostilities 
not only in the Lebanon but also in the Maghreb 
countries, this may at the present time seem 
rather surprising. I feel, however, that these 
hostilities are evidence of nothing more than a 
far-reaching political instability which is in no 
way irreversible, and that they are not at any 
rate evidence of any absolute instability. It is 
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quite possible that when the present disputes are 
over a situation may arise in which the essential 
feature will be that a steel band will seem tn be 
drawn round Israel from Beirut through Amman 
to Akaba, and perhaps from there on to Gaza, 
and then the situation will be more dangerous 
than it ever was before. I say that this is not 
a total contradiction ; for even in the present 
situation you will, from Beirut to Nouakchott, 
get from all the Arab parties who are fighting 
amongst themselves only one reply to the question 
of what constitutes the centraJ problem behind 
the dispute. This answer is: "The Palestinian 
question." On that, everyone is agreed. But that 
is not a matter I wish to discuss today. 
I would, however, draw attention to one point. 
Two months ago, a well-known Arab statesman 
from an oil State in the Persian Gulf, a man 
whose European sympathies are well known, told 
us clearly and unambiguously that in any future 
war with Israel, the oil weapon would be far 
more rigorously and decisively used than in the 
Y om Kippur war. This would place us Europeans 
in a dilemma. In such a dispute, if we were to 
agree to Arab demands, it would, in view of the 
role played by the United States, rob the 
Alliance of its decisive base or at least decisively 
weaken the Alliance. If, on the oilier hand, we 
were to oppose Arab demands in the event of 
war, this would lead to an oil boycott which 
would within a few months cause a crisis of 
crucial proportions not only in our economic 
system but in our social system as well. 
For us Europeans this means that we must 
concentrate a maximum of political energy 
towards helping to ensure that no military 
catastrophe occurs in the Middle East of a kind 
that would spell disaster, not only for the nations 
concerned but for Europe as well. The area 
about which I have spoken is for Europe flash-
point number one of the present situation. It has 
played a decisive role in our history for 
thousands of years, but only rarely has the posi-
tion of Europe on such matters been as weak as 
today. 
When the Mediterranean area is being looked 
at in connection with European security, I 
should therefore be glad if the problems I have 
just discussed were also given priority treatment. 
(Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Budtz, member of the Danish Folketing. 
Mr. BUDTZ (Observer from Denmark). -
Allow me, first, Mr. President, to thank you and 
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this distinguished Assembly for the kind invita-
tion to observers from countries which are not 
members of this distinguished body. This is my 
second visit, and I find it very useful and helpful 
to listen to the debates. We leam quite a lot as 
observers and we are grateful to be allowed to 
make a few remarks. 
This is in many ways an interesting experience 
because I find myself sitting next to my old 
friend and colleague, Mr. Thyness, who, if I 
may say so, made a very good speech. I found 
myself sharing his views, which is interesting 
because he is a conservative and I am a socialist. 
I believe this to be quite a good sign of the 
atmosphere of this organisation. 
I find this an excellent report and I con-
gratulate Mr. Buck on his work. If I may say 
so, it is a much more balanced view than that 
which we had the other day from Sir Frederic 
Bennett. It is very important that we should try 
to balance our views on foreign affairs. The 
situation is grave, but if we do not try to balance 
our views, we might find ourselves in difficulties 
that we do not want. 
It is necessary for me to say that it is not the 
policy of the Danish Government, the Danish 
social democratic party, which I am honoured 
to represent here, and the majority of the Danish 
Parliament and people to participate in any 
kind of a rekindling of the cold war atmosphere. 
I think that Sir Frederic Bennett's report did in 
some ways reopen that period of tension. It is 
not a good idea. It does not get us anywhere. 
Having complimented Mr. Buck, I now have to 
admit that if I had the honour to be able to vote 
here, I should not be able to vote for the recom-
mendation, because I have to look at it from the 
Danish, or shall I say the Scandinavian point of 
view. The recommendation talks about co-
operation with Australia and New Zealand, and 
even Iran. I should like to ask the Rapporteur 
whether this is done with the idea of opening 
new areas of responsibility for the NATO coun-
tries. If so, a country like Denmark - and, I 
am sure, Norway- would not be able to follow 
that path 'a single step. 
It is only honest that I should say that. We 
are all aware that in Denmark there is a vast 
majority in the parliament and amongst the 
people in favour of Danish membership of 
NATO, and we do not want this to be changed. 
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If one wants to lose the backing for Denmark's 
membership of NATO, one should suggest a 
wider area of responsibility or the election of 
Spain to NATO. I know that that is not done 
in the report, which is why I back it. If we get 
too close to the idea of Spain's becoming a mem-
ber of NATO, the backing of the Danish people 
will disappear. We are not interested in that. We 
should probably not be able to keep Denmark in 
NATO if other members tried to force us to 
support the idea of Spain as a full member. It 
is impossible at this time, and I shall explain 
why. 
I am fully aware of declarations by the 
Spanish Government about movements towards 
democracy, but the average Dane regards demo-
cracy as indivisible. Either you have democracy, 
or you do not, and at the moment Spain does 
not have democracy. According to declarations 
from the Spanish Government, they are not going 
to allow communists to participate in the 
elections. My party, the Danish Government and 
the Danish people want to fight communism 
wherever it exists, whether in Denmark or in 
Spain. However, it is not democratic to say that 
communists will not be allowed to take part in 
the elections. In a democratic society they should 
be allowed to participate, and we believe that it 
would only increase their support if they were 
prevented from taking part. 
Comments have been made about the policy 
of Portugal and the United States towards 
Angola. My colleague from the German social 
democrat party, Mrs. von Bothmer, referred to 
NATO's policy towards Angola and said that 
nobody had done anything at the appropriate 
time. Denmark is only a very small country, but 
we protested against the Portuguese colonial war 
at a very early stage and offered help to all 
three resistance movements. The MPLA was able 
to pick up this help most effectively. It is my 
honest belief that if western democracies had 
helped the resistance movements in the right 
way during the fascist regime of Portugal, 
though not with weapons, which is against 
Danish law anyway, we should not have pushed 
Angola into the arms of the Soviet Union. 
History should have reminded us of what hap-
pened in Egypt and Cuba, but we did not learn 
its l€SSOnS. 
We have been discussing today and on many 
other occasions here and in the North Atlantic 
Assembly the situation on NATO's southern 
flank. The northern flank also makes an inter-
esting study and I had the honour in the Mili-
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tary Committee of the Assembly, of which Mr. 
Thyness is the head, to suggest a study of the 
situation on the northern flank. May I suggest 
that Western European Union could do the same 
thing~ (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Piket. 
Mr. PIKET (Netherlands) (Translation). -
Mr. President, first I should like to say how glad 
I am to see you in the chair again. 
(The speaker continued in English) 
I am pleased to be able to contratulate Mr. 
Buck on an excellent report which has been 
discussed in other places in Europe. 
(The speaker continued in French) 
(Translation). - I am going to speak to you 
in my own language since I have the possibility 
of doing so here. 
(The speaker continued in Dutch) 
I believe it is extremely valuable, Mr. President 
for us to be able to look at how the NATO com-
mand structure is made up and how the financial 
effurts of the various member countries of 
NATO relate to each other. All these facts hold 
I believe, a special interest, and are to be found 
in Mr. Buck's report. 
What Mr. Buck has to say about the Soviet 
navy is also extremely interesting. His wide 
k~owledge of the subject is not surprising, in 
VIew of the fact that he spent some time as 
Under-Secretary of State for the Navy in the 
British Ministry of Defence. I do not dare, 
therefore, cross swords with my friend Mr. Buck 
on technical and military facts or to question 
him on this subject, though I do feel obliged 
to make one or two comments on his political 
views as they appear from the report. These I 
am unable to subscribe to as they stand. 
I am sure Mr. Buck will not take it amiss if 
I say that I feel his report concentrates too much 
on United Kingdom interests, and those of 
yesterday's Common wealth, and not enough on 
the Europe of today and tomorrow. 
When he says, in pa11agraph 2, that not all 
changes in the Mediterranean have operated to 
the disadvantage of the western alliance, he is 
not saying something that is incorrect but he 
is, in my opinion, saying something that is not 
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entirely true either. The changes that have taken 
place recently came about without Europe hav-
ing played a role or having any role still to 
play. It is as if Europe did not exist. Even the 
United States has played only a very minor 
role. I for my part would have preferred changes 
in the Mediterranean to have been such that the 
United States would have been forced to take 
an active part. 
I believe that the operations that the United 
States carried out in Lebanon in 1958 did that 
country a deal of good, while today we see 
Lebanon suffering, because of the Syrian inter-
vention, 500 deaths a day on average instead 
of the previous 100 a day : in 1958 the 
Americans' intervention caused no deaths at all. 
Europe could have played a part in these 
events if it had been organised politically so as to 
be able to form a political will and undertake 
political action. But Europe is, alas too divided 
for this to be possible. 
This division can be seen, too, in the part 
played by the British Government in the Cyprus 
conflict. In my humble opinion, the Commons 
select committee was right to criticise the policy 
followed by the British Government. What is the 
point of offering guarantees and having military 
bases on Cyprus if they do nothing to keep the 
peace ~ If these bases had been European rather 
than solely British, the Greeks and Turks might 
have thought twice before starting military 
operations and before violating the independ-
ence of Cyprus. 
The paragraphs on Gibraltar, too, do not give 
enough attention to the Europe of tomorrow. 
Yet it is perfectly understandable that Spain 
- which one hopes will in the future become 
a member of NATO and the EEC- should find 
it hard to accept that a part of its territory, 
even as small a part as Gibraltar, has been and 
continues to be occupied by another country, 
even in the event of it joining the European and 
Atlantic organisations to which we all belong. 
What is more, the Treaty of Utrecht - which 
is in the middle of the Kingdom of the Nether-
lands - of 1713 stipulates that the territory of 
Gibmltar is to be returned to Spain when it 
no longer needs to be occupied for defence pur-
poses. A logical conclusion would have been for 
Mr. Buck to say in his report that Spain, once 
it has joined NATO and the EEC, would regain 
its sovereignty over Gibraltar. It is besides 
extremely doubtful whether, as Mr. Buck states 
in paragraph 63 of his report, Gibraltar would 
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be of any use to the United States if Spanish 
bases were to be no longer available. How could 
Gibraltar then provide a support point for mili-
tary action in the Mediterranean ~ I do not 
believe this is all that realistic, Mr. President. 
Where the southern Mediterranean is con-
cerned, relations there are still dominated by 
the tensions between Israel and the Arab coun-
tries. So long as Israel is not recognised by the 
Arab States, the state of war in this area will 
persist and American influence will remain pre-
dominant. 
I am in agreement with the draft recom-
mendation itself, though I am sorry that here 
again too little emphasis is given to the Euro-
pean point of view. 
I believe that the European Community will 
have to work out a policy for this area, one that 
gives expression to the great interest the Western 
European countries need to have in this region. 
If, as one hopes, Greece at one end of the 
Mediterranean and Spain and Portugal at the 
other join the European Communities, there 
will have to be a common European standpoint 
on security. If this does not come about, then 
the European Communities will, politically 
speaking, 'Simply fall apart. I should have liked 
to find this notion echoed somewhere in the 
recommendation. Naturally, the NATO side of 
things is very important ; more important for the 
future, however, is the working-out of a Euro-
pean policy for the Mediterranean. Because it 
is precisely now, Mr. President, and in Southern 
Europe, that we need to keep a watch on what 
Soviet policy is up to. Communism will - if 
you will forgive me the figure of speech -
always try to gain a fuothold on our continent 
from the waters of the Mediterranean. We must, 
therefore, be and remain aware of this. And this 
is why we need to have European unanimity 
in defending this region. And there I will close 
this brief contribution to the debate. 
Thank you for the opportunity to speak, 
Mr. President. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). I call 
Mr. Valleix on a point of order. 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). - I 
merely wanted to remind you of the following : 
the paper presented by Mr. Buck does not quite 
seem to conform to the Rules of Procedure. It 
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is a case of a recommendation which, under 
Rule 42 of the Rules of Procedure, can only 
be addressed to the Council of Ministers. How-
ever, the text, as drafted by Mr. Buck, is 
addressed to the Council and member govern-
ments. 
I suggest that, in order to bring the draft 
recommendation in line with the provisions of 
the Rules of Procedure and of the Charter, that 
the words "and member governments" be deleted 
from the text submitted to the Assembly. 
This minor change will not only enable us to 
conform to our Rules of Procedure but will also 
make it quite clear that our recommendations 
are not addressed to any individual States but 
to a collective body, the Council of Ministers, 
which, for my part, I would like to see m?re 
active in seeking a European policy of secunty 
independent of any external allegiance. 
Consequently, I think that, in this particular 
case, my view on the substance chimes with my 
view on the form, to which we should pay heed, 
both for the present text and because of the 
precedent we would be establishing. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
the Rapporteur. 
Mr. BUCK (United Kingdom).- May I first 
thank Mr. Valleix for his contribution. In deal-
ing with the various points which have been 
raised during the course of the debate - which 
I should now like to do - I intend to begin by 
dealing with this one because I have been 
informed that it is entirely valid. I therefore 
seek your leave, Mr. President, and that of the 
Assembly to include where it says : "recom-
mends that the Council and member govern-
ments ... " the words: "recommends that the 
Council and requests that the member govern-
ments". 
As far as I understand it, this meets the point 
of order which has just been raised. I am sorry 
that this technical point should have arisen but, 
thanks to Mr. Valleix and the advice I have 
received today, I hope that in this way we can 
set it right. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- Mr. Rap-
porteur, my understanding is that you fall in 
with Mr. Valleix's suggestion. Choice of proce-
dure is a matter for the Committee. If, for the 
sake of convenience, y>ou agree that we now 
take the amendments, I see no objection. We 
shall therefore begin the debate on the amend-
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ments, in the course o:f which you will be able 
to express your approval, reservations or even 
opposition. 
I have received several amendments to the 
draft recommendation. 
Mr. Rapporteur, do you wish to speak now t.. 
Mr. BUCK (United Kingdom).- I seek your 
advice, Mr. President. I£ you think it would be 
more convenient :for me to reply after the amend-
ments have been moved, I can do so. I£ not, 
I can deal briefly now with the substance o:f the 
debate, leaving some o:f the matters to be dealt 
with when I come to the amendments. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I think 
we can take the amendments now. 
Mr. BUCK (United Kingdom). - I shall 
reply then. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Amend-
ment No. 1 tabled by MM. Dankert, Siegler-
schmidt and Lord Peddie proposes that in para-
graph (i) o:f the preamble, the words "i:f the 
Atlantic Alliance weakened in its determination 
to defend its :freedom" be deleted. 
The Rapporteur has the :floor on the :first part 
o:f this amendment. 
Mr. BUCK (United Kingdom). - I support 
this amendment entirely. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The Rap-
porteur accepts the first part o:f your amend-
ment, Mr. Sieglerschmidt. I take it that meets 
your point. 
There is no amendment to the second para-
graph o:f the preamble. 
I put the two :first paragraphs o:f the pre-
amble to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and stand-
ing) 
These two paragraphs of the preamble are 
adopted. 
In paragraph (iii) o:f the preamble, Amendment 
No. 1 seeks to delete the words ":freely elected 
parliamentary democracies and the preparation 
o:f NATO contingency plans designed to meet 
any crisis" and insert "parliamentary democracy 
and human rights and the preparation o:f NATO 
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contingency p1ans designed to meet any crisis 
in the treaty area". 
I call Mr. Sieglerschmidt to defend the 
amendment. 
Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (Federal Republic 
of Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, 
Ladies and Gentlemen. The amendment has two 
aims, and these can be dealt with very briefly. 
First, we wish to make it clear that a :freely 
elected parliament is not the only important cri-
terion in this connection, but that there are also 
other essential democratic principles, one o:f 
them :for example being respect for human rights. 
It is perfectly conceivable that a country may 
have a :freely elected parliament and that human 
rights are nevertheless not respected ; it is some-
thing which, unfortunately, does happen. So 
much :for the :first amendment. 
Secondly, we want to prevent any misunder-
standing that the plans referred to in this para-
graph o:f the preamble could include not only 
plans relating exclusively to the NATO treaty 
territory, but also others o:f wider extent. This 
is the point o:f the amendment, and I believe that 
this is sensible. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- I 0all the 
Rapporteur. 
Mr. BUCK (United Kingdom). - I am very 
grateful for this further amendment. I£ my 
friend Mr. Sieglerschmidt were prepared to 
accept a small amendment to his amendment, 
I personally would advise the Assembly to 
accept his amendment. I am with him as to the 
:first part o:f what he said. It seems to me appro-
priate that there should be a mention here not 
only o:f parliamentary democracy - which I was 
careful to put in the report - but o:f human 
rights. I would have no quarrel with that, and 
I would respectfully advise that that part o:f 
the amendment be accepted. 
I would, however, ask that Mr. Sieglerschmidt 
should not press those last :few words of his 
amendment, "in the treaty area", because it seems 
to me - and here we may have a divergence 
of opinion which may need to be tested -
important that the Alliance should adopt a :firm 
atttitude in the Mediterranean. 
Technically, it would not be possible :for there 
to be contingency plans :for eventualities in 
Yugoslavia, because, having looked at the rather 
difficult question o:f the treaty area, Yugoslavia 
would be excluded. It seems appropriate that 
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planning staffs should think of what should, 
or may, happen after Marshal Tito's death, and 
I would suggest that it would not be appro-
priate for us to preclude plans to widen the 
margins of democracy if requested by a new 
Yugoslav Government. 
I hope I am acting in a spirit of reason-
ableness if I recommend to the Assembly that 
the first part of this amendment should be 
adopted, and I hope that Mr. Sieglerschmidt 
will meet me and delete from his amendment the 
last few words, "in the treaty area", because of 
the Yugoslav situation. I can assure the Assem-
bly that there is no nefarious purpose in putting 
this recommendation, but in a spirit of compro-
mise I hope that he will accept that amendment. 
I see that in the fashion of our House of Com-
mons there is a possibility of agreement from 
other supporters of the amendment, and indeed 
I see that my colleague, friend and political 
opponent, Lord Peddie, who is one of the signa-
tories of this amendment, is among them. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Sieglerschmidt. 
Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (Federal Republic 
of Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President 
to be fair, I should say that the movers of th~ 
amendment are not united. My friend Lord 
Peddie is prepared to accept this, but I must 
say to Mr. Buck that despite my wish to accom-
modate him, I am still very hesitant about 
accepting. My hesitations have to some extent 
actually been strengthened by what he has just 
said. With his sub-amendment we are of course 
back again on the subject of Yugoslavia. To 
the extent that the security of the Alliance in 
the Adriatic area might be threatened by events 
in Yugoslavia, I feel that there really can be no 
question about whether the Atlantic Alliance 
can plan for this. What the movers of the amend-
ment wanted was, in fact, to exclude the possi-
bility of corresponding plans being prepared 
in an area extending far beyond this. I am 
quite ready to meet Mr. Buck on another point 
and to withdraw part of the amendment but 
on this question I stand by my proposal,' and 
perhaps, Mr. President, it would not be such a 
bad thing if for once we were to vote on an 
amendment. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- Although 
it is not for the President to give his opinion 
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on this matter, this seems to be, so to speak, 
a matter of semantics. A contingency plan, 
Mr. Rapporteur, is only of use if it is kept 
secret. If we reveal it by making a recommenda-
tion either to the Council or to the various 
governments, we merely succeed in expressing 
a pious hope, and will not know at all whether 
the plan has been implemented or not since its 
value, forgive me for repeating this, depends 
on it being kept secret. 
We shall try to avoid a vote in the Assembly 
on a point which raises, all the same, a matter 
of principle on which, as far as I am concerned, 
I do not wish the Assembly to take a vote which 
is not unanimous. 
Mr. Rapporteur, I apologise for intruding in 
the debate but I do not wish to go along with 
Mr. Sieglerschmidt's proposal to take a vote. 
Do you maintain your text 1 
Mr. BUCK (Untited Kingdom). - I have 
already indicated that I . am wholly prepared 
to adopt a totally reasonable attitude. I accept 
the first paragraph in toto. I accept three-
quarters of the second amendment. It has been 
clear that the other signatory to this amendment 
agrees to the compromise I suggest. I trust that 
Mr. Sieglerschmidt will adopt the same spirit 
of compromise that Lord Peddie has adopted 
and that I am adopting. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does 
Mr. Valleix wish to speak ? 
Mr. VALLEIX (France) (Translation). -
Yes. I would not like to complicate the task of 
the Rapporteur nor to encroach on what members 
have said who have put forward amendments. 
Nor do I wish to make matters more difficult 
for the President, but I would like to draw his 
and your attention to Amendment No. 2, tabled 
by Mr. Radius and several of his colle~oues 
who, on the point at issue, quite simply want to 
delete the words "based on freely-elected parlia-
mentary democracies and the preparation of 
NATO contingency plans designed to meet any 
crisis". 
Consequently, the present motion to delete 
should be discussed first. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- In accord-
ance with the Rules of Procedure, I must first 
put to the vote the amendment which differs 
most from the original text. This is Amendment 
No. 2 tabled by Mr. Radius and presented by 
Mr. Valleix: I am therefore going to put to 
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the vote the deletion in toto of this part of the 
preamble. 
You have something to add, Mr. Valleix ~ 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). - A 
word about the amendment in question. Without 
wishing to repeat this morning's debate, since 
Mr. Radius has already explained matters clearly 
and at length to the Assembly, I would like to 
go back to the metaphor he himself used in his 
speech, that perhaps we should guard against 
finishing up with a kind of inverted western 
Brezhnev doctrine. That is more or less what 
the President was saying a moment ago : there 
is an element of incompatibility in presenting 
contingency plans or in asking for their discus-
sion whereas, I repeat, their urgency does not 
always allow of preparation a long time in 
advance and in some eases even less, if I may 
say so, of publicity. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). -I put to 
the vote part 1 of the amendment tabled by 
Mr. Radius, it being the one which differs most 
from the text of the Committee. If it is not 
adopted, I shall put Mr. Sieglerschmidt's amend-
ment to the vote. 
I put it to the vote by sitting and standing. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and stand-
ing) 
Part 1 of the amendment is negatived. 
I put to the vote the amendment tabled by 
Mr. Sieglerschmidt which proposes that only a 
part of the phrase referred to by Mr. Radius, 
namely that which concerns the contingency 
plan, be deleted. This amendment is endorsed 
by Mr. Tanghe and Lord Peddie. 
I put it to the vote by sitting and standing. 
Mr. PIKET (Netherlands) (Translation). -
Is Mr. Sieglerschmidt's amendment a sub-
amendment 1 Which amendment are we voting 
on now~ 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - On Mr. 
Sieglerschmidt's amendment which now differs 
most from the text. 
Mr. PIKET (Netherlands) (Translation). 
Has it not been amended by Mr. Buck ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - No, it 
has not. 
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Mr. BUCK (United Kingdom). - I am 
advised- perhaps this may not be right, because 
one is acting off the cuff, as it were - that my 
suggestion that Mr. Dankert's, Mr. Siegler-
schmidt's and Lord Peddie's amendment be 
carried with the deletion of the last four words, 
should be put first because if those last four 
words are deleted, in the spirit of compromise 
and good will which so often prevails here, I 
should be prepared to recommend that the 
Assembly accept the amendment. I am •advised 
that the appropriate course would he that my 
sub-amendment, which I understand has the sup-
port of one of the sponsors of the main amend-
ment, should be put first. I would seek your 
guidance as to that, Mr. President. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I 0all 
Mr. Kliesing. 
Mr. KLIESING (Federal Rep1tblic of Ger-
many) (Translation).- Mr. President, I believe 
it is politically irrelevant whether the words "in 
the treaty area" appear in the text or not, since 
we are all bound by the provisions of the North 
Atlantic Treaty. May I suggest that we re-word 
the treaty on this point 1 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mr. 
Sieglerschmidt, do you accept the proposal to 
delete the last four words in the preamble ? 
Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (Federal Republic 
of Germany) (Translation).- No, I cannot agree 
to that booause of the treaty. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Lord Peddie. 
Lord PEDDlE (United Kingdom). - There 
seems to be some confusion. I should like some 
guidance as to whether, Mr. President, you are 
taking Mr. Buck's part acceptance first. If you 
are not, those who hold my point of view are 
in considerable difficulty. Further, I should be 
interested to know at this point, as we are deal-
ing with it on these lines, Mr. Buck's reaction 
to our further amendment on p·aragraph 2, that 
is, on the subject of Yugoslavia, because that 
will have a bearing upon our attitude. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The sub-
amendment proposes deleting the words "in the 
treaty area". 
I put the sub-amendment to the vote by sit-
ting and standing. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and stand-
ing) 
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The sub-amendment is agreed to. 
I put to the vote, by sitting and standing, the 
amendment tabled by Mr. Dankert, Mr. Siegler-
schmidt and Lord Peddie, as amended. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and stand-
ing) 
The amendment, as amended, is agreed to. 
Consequently, in this paragraph of the pre-
amble, only the first part up to the words "based 
on parliamentary democracy and human rights" 
remains. 
Mr. BUCK (United Kingdom) (Translation). 
- This text stands. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - That goes 
without saying. 
We shall now turn to the fourth paragraph 
of the preamble. 
The amendment tabled by Mr. Dankert, 
Mr. Sieglerschmidt and Lord Peddie proposes 
that paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft 
recommendation should be deleted. This reads 
as follows : "Willing to see other appropriate 
countries such as Australia, New Zealand and, 
to the extent that it progresses to democracy, 
Iran associated with Alliance defence planning". 
I call the Rapporteur. 
Mr. BUCK (United Kingdom). - I cannot 
ask my colleagues to accept part 3 of Amend-
ment No. 1. I have long been aware that NATO 
must strengthen its position relative to other 
countries that are friendly with it. In paragraph 
146, I set out my reasons for making this 
recommendation. In that paragraph it will be 
seen that Australia and New Zealand have taken 
a closer interest in mutual defence plans. There 
is also a reference to a twelve-day naval exercise, 
Valiant Heritage, which has taken place. 
I know that the military staffs in NATO 
and, I suspect, in the majority of the coun-
tries here mentioned, are keen to have this 
closer ·association, and I hope that the Assembly 
will give further impetus to that feeling. It 
Se€ms to me to be a marginally restrictive atti-
tude to the Alliance that a question should be 
raised relative to this part of the recommenda-
tion, and I very much hope my colleagues will 
cause this part to remain in its carefully drafted 
form. 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation).- Mr. Rap-
porteur, allow me to point out that here we 
are not attending the Assembly of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation, but the parlia-
mentary Assembly of Western European Union, 
and that, bearing this in mind, we can in fact 
trespass very far beyond the field on which we 
are called upon to pronounce and about which, 
it may be remembered, we are often very 
intransigent in insisting that it be respected. It 
is, however, certain that, if we constantly 
wander beyond the scope of the problems that 
concern us, we shall get in a tangle. I understand 
that some of our colleagues are objecting to this 
text, at all events, this paragraph of the pre-
amble, which is going very far ; and that is why 
some of our European colleagues, like Mr. 
Sieglerschmidt and his friends, are asking us 
to get back to more humdrum realities. 
I call Mr. Sieglerschmidt. 
Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (Federal Republic 
of Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, 
Ladies and Gentlemen, if we were to accept this 
amendment I would propose moving forthwith 
a proposal that the name of the North Atlantic 
Treaty be changed to the "World Treaty". That 
would be right on the mark. 
On a more serious note, Mr. President, col-
laboration of this kind really cannot be just a 
one-way street. Logically, there really must be 
give and take. The consequence, that the North 
Atlantic Alliance is involved in problems 
between New Zealand, Japan, Australia and so 
on and so forth, is unacceptable, despite all the 
good intentions that may lie behind it. 
I would therefore ask that the deletion be 
adopted. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Lord Peddie. 
Lord PEDDlE (United Kingdom).- I hope 
that the Assembly will support the amendment 
and reject the point of view expressed by Mr. 
Buck. We have been exceedingly accommodating. 
Members will recollect that the tone of the 
majority of speeches we have heard on this sub-
ject have emphasised the political problems in the 
Mediterranean area. To bring in outside ele-
ments would do nothing to ease or settle those 
problems, but rather the reverse. Let us set about 
dealing with these problems as political prob-
lems on the spot before calling in elements from 
the furthermost parts of the globe which can 
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have no other effect than to exacerbate feelings 
and make the whole situation worse. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
the Rapporteur. 
Mr. BUCK (United Kingdom).- I am always 
very influenced by what my colleagues in this 
chamber say, and I want to keep up the spirit 
of compromise that has been shown. If one were 
to recommend acceptance of the amendment, 
perhaps compromise would come my way when 
we reached the amendment about Yugoslavia. 
If I may say so, Mr. President, I am aware 
that we are not in the NATO Assembly but in 
the Assembly of Western European Union. I 
am a new boy and bow to your great wisdom 
and great experience, but Article IV of our con-
firming statutes says that we should work in 
close co-operation with the North Atlantic 
'l'reaty Organisation. Looking through, as I have 
in my compilation of this report, many previous 
reports presented by Rapporteurs so much more 
distinguished than I, I find that they have just 
this character that I have put before the Assem-
bly. 
In view of what Lord Peddie has said and in 
order to try to maintain harmony and in the 
hope that a future compromise will go my way, 
I recommend that the amendment be accepted, 
as it seems to have such considerable backing. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. Rapporteur. I think it would serve no 
useful purpose to put this amendment to the 
vote, since the Rapporteur accepts it and the 
movers of the amendment have obtained satis-
faction. After all, that in no way detracts from 
the general intention of the recommendation, 
but it restricts its scope whilst at the same time 
strengthening it. 
Mr. PIKET (N etherla,nds) (Translation). -
I would request a vote on the amendment. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - It was 
my idea to spare you additional gymnastics, but 
since you request it, I put part 3 of Amend-
ment No. 1 to the vote by sitting and standing. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and stand-
ing) 
The amendment is agreed to. 
We apply the Rules of Procedure extremely 
strictly, but since there was general consent, I 
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wanted to set the official seal on this show of 
unanimity and on the good will of the Rappor-
teur, who is here making a concession which 
deserves to be recorded. 
We shall turn to part 4 of Amendment No. 1. 
This proposes that in paragraph (v) of the pre-
amble the words "announcement of free elections 
in Spain" be deleted, and the words "signs of 
democratic developments in Spain" be inserted. 
It is chiefly a matter of drafting. 
I call the Rapporteur. 
Mr. BUCK (United Kingdom). - This is a 
matter of drafting and I recommend the Assem-
bly to accept the amendment. The wording of 
the amendment is marginally preferable and I 
am grateful to the gentlemen who proposed it. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- Mr. Piket, 
you are not pressing for a vote Y The Rapporteur 
accepts the new wording, and it is only a 
question of form. 
The amendment is agreed to. 
In Amendment No. 3, before the words 
"Recommends that the Council and member 
governments", Mr. Valleix and Mr. de Bruyne 
propose to insert the following : 
"RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
(a) Examine regularly all questions relating 
to the security of Europe in the Mediterranean 
and thus foster a rapprochement of political 
and strategic concepts underlying the defence 
of the different member countries of Western 
European Union in the Mediterranean basin; 
(b) Follow the evolution of the situation in 
Spain and examine the conditions and possibil-
ities for that country joining Western Euro-
pean Union when its internal regime conforms 
with the principles on which the modified 
Brussels Treaty is based ;" 
I call Mr. Valleix. 
Mr. VALLEIX (France) (Translation).- We 
have therefore accepted the form of words to 
be used in presenting this recommendation to 
the Council and I am duly thankful to the Rap-
porteur; and the two sub-paragraphs that I 
shall introduce with my colleague, Mr. de Bruyne, 
are based on the following observations : 
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As at present drafted, Mr. Buck's draft 
recommendation is addressed to the Atlantic 
Council, and in this regard I share the anxieties 
of Mr. Sieglerschmidt. The main object of this 
draft recommendation is the strengthening and 
extension of the Alliance in the Mediterranean 
area, both through increased co-operation with 
States like Spain and Malta, and through con-
sultations among allies. Mindful as I am of 
Atlantic solidarity, I have no objections on 
principle to this part of Mr. Buck's report. 
It does seem to me, however, that although 
the Atlantic dimension of European security in 
the Mediterranean is given due weight, the report 
underestimates the contribution that a Europe 
more united and more conscious of its destiny 
could make to international stability in this 
region. Europe has an autonomous and inde-
pendent part to play in assuring its security in 
the Mediterranean basin and in helping to 
unravel certain crises and solve certain conflicts, 
which are aggravated by rivalry between the 
superpowers. 
It seems desirable that the recommendation 
proposed by Mr. Buck should include an addi-
tional paragraph, addressed solely to the WEU 
Council and inviting the governments of the 
European States to concert their action in the 
Mediterranean basin in order to ensure improved 
defence of our continent's specific interests. 
The second part of the amendment concerns 
Spain. We are watching developments in that 
country with interest. And that is exactly the 
form of words used in the recommendation itself 
and in the paragraphs of the preamble. At the 
present moment, legislation establishing a num-
ber of fundamental freedoms is in process of 
adoption in Spain, and it is our fervent hope that 
adoption of this text may be followed by practical 
measures of enforcement. It is our duty to 
encourage these efforts towards democratisation. 
We must remind Spain that, on the day when 
it fully adheres to democratic principles, it will 
be able to play its part, in WEU and perhaps 
also in the future European union, but I deli-
berately say expressly in WEU, in our endeav-
ours for the security of our continent. 
In this matter, I should like it to be clearly 
understood that it has been our foremost concern 
not to let the very close attention with which we 
are all following this discussion concerning the 
Atlantic Alliance slacken. There can be no 
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question, as you have clearly understood, of 
reopening in the proposal which we have put 
forward the issue regarding other points, and 
especially the developments included in sub-
paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of 
the recommendation proper. In other words, we 
are not going back on the proposals, particularly 
those designed to strengthen the basis of the 
Alliance. 
We have, however, also been concerned to 
address ourselves first and foremost to the WEU 
Council of Ministers, before calling on the 
Atlantic Council, since we must never forget that 
we are primarily and specifically, when all is 
said and done, the Assembly of WEU. I believe 
that in this way our Assembly would only be 
affirming its personality, which is essential. 
Moreover, I have been led to believe by the 
discussions of this afternoon and this morning, 
and by the thoughts voiced during the discussions 
on amendments, that our text goes some way to 
meet the anxieties expressed by several of our 
colleagues. I accordingly think, and would say 
once again, that it in no way detracts from the 
recommendation as a whole, but that on the 
contrary it adds something of advantage to WEU 
and hence to Europe. This can only serve to 
strengthen us in our relations and our co-
operation with the Atlantic Alliance. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Sieglerschmidt. 
Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (Federal Republic 
of Germany) (Translation). - I have nothing 
against the first part of Mr. Valleix's amend-
ment. I must say that I do not know whether 
there are any differences of opinion on this 
policy between WEU member States concerned. 
Essentially these could of course only be France 
and Italy. If that is the case, they must naturally 
see to settling such differences within the WEU 
framework. In principle, I have nothing against 
that. 
I do, however, have my doubts concerning the 
second part of Mr. Valleix's amendment, for the 
following reasons. In the Assembly, we have on 
a number of occasions considered the accession 
of other countries - including mainly NATO 
States - primarily, of course, with an eye to 
Denmark and Ireland, as members of the Euro-
pean Community who are not in WEU. Recently, 
we have been very reticent on that score, since 
we know that this just does not match up with 
reality. At any rate, neither of these countries is 
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interested in joining within the foreseeable 
future. 
When I recall that there is still another NATO 
country that might perhaps be considered in the 
foreseeable future, namely Portugal, I must say 
that Spain is more or less right at the bottom of 
my list for possible membership of WEU, and 
since this is, in my opinion, so far removed from 
the realm of reality, I am unable to offer my 
support. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Valleix. 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). - On 
a simple point of order. I would be the first to 
ask, subject to Mr. de Bruyne's consent, that the 
two paragraphs of the amendment should be 
taken separately or, at all events put to a 
separate vote. We might quite well hold different 
attitudes towards the two parts of the amend-
ment and so come to different conclusions about 
them. 
Just one comment directed to Mr. Siegler-
schmidt : this amendment does not go so far as 
the form of words we have just voted on for 
the preamble, that is, development along demo-
cratic lines, provided we refer to the WEU 
Charter. Consequently, if Spain were accepted 
into WEU, we should be respecting the terms 
of the Charter. Finally, the amendment is more 
specific in that it concerns Spain in relation to 
WEU. 
For all these reasons, and since there is never-
theless a difference in thinking 'and motivation 
between paragraphs (a) and (b), I should like the 
Assembly to decide on them separately. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Separa-
tion is in order, if it is requested. 
I call Mr. Buck. 
Mr. BUCK (United Kingdom).- I regret that 
the considerable spirit of compromise which has 
existed up to now has broken down on this 
matter. The first part of the amendment would 
be inappropriate because it duplicates work done 
by NATO. I see Mr. Sieglersclrmidt seems to 
agree with me. 
I am sorry that there should be such a funda-
mental objection to the first part of the amend-
ment, but perhaps I am expressing the feelings 
of a number of members. 
177 
FIFTH SITTING 
I hope that the Assembly will not accept 
amendment 3 (b). I have gone to some trouble 
to try to make clear the position in Spain so 
that encouragement can be given to those valiant 
people who are striving to create democracy 
where it has not existed for so long. To hedge 
it round in this way and to make this a condition 
of its becoming a member of WEU is unrealistic. 
Because of provisions about German rearma-
ment and for other historical reasons, our 
Scandinavian friends have not been prepared to 
become members of WEU, although we have been 
delighted to have them as guests and to listen 
to their valuable contributions to our debates. 
This attitude, though it makes me sad, is under-
standable. For us to suggest that before Spain 
comes forward into democratic society it should 
be made to do something which several of our 
other friends have not been prepared to do 
would blur the message that I should like to go 
out, loud and clear, from this Assembly - that 
if there is a steady progress towards parlia-
mentary democracy and the enjoyment by the 
Spanish people of human rights, rthey will be 
accepted. If this amendment were to be accepted, 
it would blur that issue. 
I ask my colleagues not to accept these two 
amendments for those reasons. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Valleix. 1 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). - I 
should like to draw your attention to the rules. 
I thought I heard Mr. Buck himself, just now, 
defining the role of WEU in relation to that of 
NATO and, under the provisions of the Charter, 
the relationship between that organisation and 
WEU. That being so, let me say just this. Mr. 
Buck mentioned a short while ago that every-
thing had been said in the recommendation and 
that it was the Assembly's continuing coneern 
to devote itself to what is set out in the first 
paragraph: "to examine regularly all questions 
relating" ... etc. 
Mr. Buck, I believe these are our continuing 
preoccupations with regard to NATO. But once 
again, I should like to say that we are in WEU 
now - I said so in Bonn a year ago, without 
any notice being taken. It must be that the time 
is not right - and that we must first tackle the 
existing matters among ourselves. Otherwise, 
Mr. Buck, I would go so far as to say that we 
must alter the definition of the report we are 
discussing. We would then no longer be con-
cerned with a "recommendation on security in 
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the Mediterranean" but with a "recommendation 
on security in the Mediterranean as ensured by 
NATO". I should like to enquire whether WEU 
is an organisation affiliated to NATO or if, when 
it meets, as we do today, it sits in judgment on 
NATO's actions and preferred organisational 
modes, but also takes the liberty of recalling -
this seems to me to be its prime right - its 
obligations towards members of the Council of 
Ministers 'and the seven governments associated 
with it. 
I do not believe that there should be any 
difficulty in that respect, Mr. Buck. I:f we can 
agree that our report should not ultimately 
degenerate into a kind of missive to NATO pure 
and simple, but should also state WEU's will 
to assert its own personality, I think we shall :find 
ourselves travelling in the same direction. But 
we would not be doing so i:f the position were 
otherwise, since, if WEU's need to assert itself 
is not properly stated, it will then merely tag 
along behind NATO and, I :fear, prove but a 
poor sort of partner :for it. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Buck. 
Mr. BUCK (United Kingdom). - I have 
nothing :further to say. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I put 
part (a) of Amendment No. 3 by Mr. Valleix 
and Mr. de Bruyne to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing) 
Part (a) of Amendment No. 3 is agreed to. 
We shall now vate on part (b) of Amendment 
No. 3 by Mr. Valleix and Mr. de Bruyne. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing) 
Part (b) of Amendment No. 3 is negatived. 
In the recommendation proper, Mr. Siegler-
schmidt's Amendment No. 1 proposes to replace 
paragraph 1 (a) with the following wording: 
"by negotiating in due time with a democratic 
Spain the accession of that country to the North 
Atlantic Treaty". 
I call Mr. Sieglerschmidt. 
Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (Federal Republic 
of Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, 
the point here is essentially the same as that 
behind the previous draft amendment. Since we 
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accepted the earlier amendment, we should also 
logically accept this one. 
The stress on a "government ... that emerges 
from free elections" is now somewhat modified 
in the direction we have already decided on. At 
the same time it has been made a little clearer 
that such negotiations will probably not take 
place today or even tomorrow, but at the earliest 
the day after. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Buck. 
Mr. BUCK (United Kingdom).- It is a good 
thing on a hot afternoon to continue in the spirit 
of co-operation that we have so far enjoyed. I 
would recommend that this amendment be 
accepted. I wonder whether I can persuade Mr. 
Sieglerschmidt to retain one further part of my 
draft - the reference in it to the place in the 
military structure. In this way he will be happy 
that I have accepted the first part of his proposal 
and I should have thought that the reference to 
"an appropriate role for the Spanish armed 
forces in the integrated military structure" could 
be retained. 
It seems that we have a happy accord. Perhaps 
we had better have confirmation of that. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- Mr. Buck, 
of course there are a great many amendments to 
your text, which complicates the task of the 
President but underlines the interest that the 
Assembly has shown in your report and recom-
mendation. It means that both have been :followed 
with much attention and even analysed in rather 
a finicky spirit. 
However, we have now come to the point where 
discussion is no longer on principles but on a 
drafting aspect. And this comes :from a direction 
you did not expect. The reference to integrated 
structures already places one of the seven WEU 
member States in a rather awkward posture 
since it does not belong to the integrated 
structure. I believe that to insist would belie 
your intentions, because you thereby demonstrate 
that there is a :fault in your system, and you 
emphasise its presence without taking precau-
tions. I think deletion of the phrase would be a 
good compromise. 
Mr. BUCK (United Kingdom).- I apologise 
:for the words "integrated structure". The phrase 
should be "appropriate role in the structure". 
This I think avoids the difficulty. They are the 
original words in the text. As I understand it, 
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that is agreeable to the supporters of the 'amend-
ment. I apologise for having used provocative 
words. I had no intention of doing so. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). -Mr. Sie-
glerschmidt, what about you who proposed the 
amendment Y 
Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (Federal Republic 
of Germany) (Translation). - In a spirit of 
compromise, Mr. President, let me say that I 
agree to Mr. Buck's proposals. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The text 
stops at "for the Spanish armed forces" ; the 
last phrase is deleted. Are there any objections 
to paragraph 1 (a) in this form Y 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing) 
Paragraph 1 (a) is agreed to. 
No amendment has been put forward to para-
graph 1 (b). 
I put it to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing) 
Paragraph 1 (b) is agreed to. 
Part 3 of Amendment No. 2 proposes to 
replace the words in paragraph 1 (c) "located on 
a basis of territorial diversity" by the words 
"located in several countries of". 
I think, Mr. Buck, that this is a question of 
form. Indeed, to simplify a sentence is always 
better than to complicate it. 
Mr. BUCK (United Kingdom).- I think that 
is so, but I am wondering whether there is any 
particular significance in the word "countries", 
in the phrase "located in several countries". I do 
not know whether this may refer to Cyprus or 
Gibraltar, for instance. If it does not, I should 
be happy to recommend that the amendment be 
accepted. As you so wisely said, Mr. President 
it is largely a matter of form. ' 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- Mr. Buck 
shows a fine spirit of conciliation and I should 
like to thank him. 
The text of the amendment therefore replaces 
the original text. 
We now have an amendment by Mr. Siegler-
schmidt and others to delete paragraph 1 (d) in 
its present form : "by more publicly identifying 
179 
FIFTH SITTING 
all the member countries and the Alliance as a 
whole with NATO defence arrangements in the 
Mediterranean area". 
Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (Federal Republic 
of Germany) (Translation). -It is an adage of 
German jurists that "a look at the Act simplifies 
the finding". When we put forward this amend-
ment we were not quite sure what the Rapporteur 
meant by this passage. 
We have in the meantime found the relevant 
passage in his report and now we know what 
was in his mind. I do not, however, want to 
discuss this at length in public. In the circum-
stances we shall not press the amendment. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Lord Peddie. 
Lord PEDDlE (United Kingdom).- I share 
my colleague's view, but I should be grateful if 
Mr. Buck would indicate why. 
Mr. BUCK (United Kingdom). - This matter 
has been resolved by referring Mr. Sieglerschmidt 
to paragraph 31 of the explanatory memorandum 
where I have set out my reasons for having 
made those recommendations and, at the request 
of my friend Lord Peddie, I should be very glad 
to read this out. This is the reason for this 
recommendation : 
"Far more serious is the attempt on the part 
of the Italian communist party to make a 
spurious and dangerous distinction between 
NATO bases and United States bases in Italy 
-which are present under NATO agreements 
and are an essential part of Alliance defence 
planning - and to call for the .dismantlement 
of the latter. In the draft recommendation the 
Committee calls for all member countries' and 
the Alliance as a whole to be more publicly 
identified with NATO defence arrangements 
in the Mediterranean area. Ministerial meet-
ings of the North Atlantic Council could be 
held more frequently in Italy, Greece and 
Turkey ; at permanent level, the ambassadors 
of all the NATO countries should publicly 
visit the headquarters and defence installations 
in Italy; naval and air contingents from 
northern countries should participate in 
exercises in the Mediterranean area as much 
as possible." 
That is what it is based on, and I am most 
grateful to the movers of the amendment for 
withdrawing it now that that matter has been 
drawn to their attention. 
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amendment is withdrawn. 
We now come to part 7 of Amendment No. 1. 
I call Mr. Sieglerschmidt. 
Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (Federal Republic 
of Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, I 
am sorry to say that I must now completely 
abandon the spirit of compromise that we have 
so often invoked and most urgently ask the 
Assembly to adopt the proposal. It goes without 
saying that neither WEU, to which I would now 
refer expressly, nor the Atlantic Alliance can 
fail to be affected if a crisis were to arise in 
Yugoslavia. But to define this crisis as it were 
here and now, in black and white, to announce 
everything that will then be done - so that 
other people are encouraged to embark on similar 
escalating considerations and make similar 
announcements - is to my mind not only wrong 
but downright dangerous. 
I therefore ask you most pressingly to adopt 
the amendment. There is in this case no room -
I should like to say this right away to Mr. Buck 
- for any change within this sentence. This 
sentence, this whole matter, must be entirely 
removed from the draft recommendation. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - As the 
Rapporteur does not accept this part of the 
amendment which deletes all reference to a pos-
sible crisis in Yugoslavia while Marshal Tito is 
still alive, I put the amendment to the vote by 
sitting and standing. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing) 
This part of the amendment is agreed to. 
Paragraph 2 (a) of the recommendation is 
accordingly deleted. 
Mr. Radius and others have proposed an 
amendment to paragraph 2 (b) of the recom-
mendation proper to leave out all the words 
after "detente" and insert "of any installation of 
new Soviet bases or similar facilities in the 
Mediterranean area". 
I call Mr. V alleix. 
Mr. VALLEIX (France) (Translation). -
This amendment should not cause any substan-
tive differences of opinion. In fact, warnings by 
the Assembly regarding the granting of new 
bases could not be aimed at any country other 
than the Soviet Union. The wording of the 
amendment is explicit. That being so, it is not 
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the granting of new bases that we are concerned 
about but the installation of new ones, whatever 
means the USSR may use to establish them. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - This 
change of form seems to have been accepted by 
Mr. Buck. I shall put it to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing) 
Part 4 of Amendment No. 2 is agreed to. 
The amendment by Mr. Dankert, Mr. Siegler-
schmidt and Lord Peddie is to delete paragraph 
3 of the recommendation proper, which reads : 
"Propose that the European programme group 
issue an annual defence white paper incorporat-
ing a joint assessment of the threat and statement 
of allied strategy, combined with separate chap-
ters on national defence programmes." 
I call Mr Sieglerschmidt. 
Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (Federal Republic 
of Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, 
now that our amendment on Yugoslavia has been 
accepted, I have put my kid gloves on again. 
The proposers' principal concern is that they 
consider the European programme group to be 
the wrong body for such a task. Having heard 
- a little bird whispered it in my ear - that the 
Rapporteur might be prepared to replace the 
words "European programme group" with the 
word "NATO", I can say that the proposers 
could agree to this version. 
Mr. BUCK (United Kingdom).- I have never 
heard my friend Lord Peddie called a little bird 
before, but it is certainly the case tha-t as a result 
of consultations with Lord Peddie, if the Assem-
bly were prepared to delete the words "European 
programme group" and insert instead "NATO", 
I should be content and I understand that the 
proposers of the amendment would be content. 
Whether everybody else would be, I do not know. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I eaU 
Mr. Sieglerschmidt. 
Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (Federal Republic 
of Germany) (Translation).- With this change 
I accept, Mr. President. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Nothing 
is deleted, then, but "European programme 
group" is replaced by "NATO". I think that is 
wise, particularly as the European programme 
group may no longer exist by next year, in view 
of its provisional character. It may possibly last 
for several years, but once having completed its 
job, will be ipso facto dissolved, as it is not based 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
The President (continued) 
on any treaty. Mr. Buck's comment is therefore 
Justified. 
We shall now vote on the draft recommenda-
tion as altered by the amendments that have been 
accepted. 
Is the Assembly unanimous L 
Mr. Cermolacce states that he is voting against 
the draft and asks that this be noted in the 
minutes ; in that case, he will not ask for a roll-
call vote. This is a concession on his part and I 
suggest that out of courtesy you note his dissent 
to the draft recommendation. 
Are there any objections to this manner of 
proceeding L 
Mr. Cermolacce, I thank you on behalf of us 
all. (Applause) 
The amended draft recommendation is there-
fore adopted 1 • 
4. European aeronautical policy -
Guidelines emerging from the Colloquy on 
2nd and 3rd February 1976 
(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doe. 704) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
Order of the Day is to vote on the draft texts not 
already voted upon by the Assembly. 
I shall now put to the vote these draft recom-
mendations in the same way as before so that 
we can arrive at favourable conclusions on the 
work of a session which has been at a very high 
level and conducted with exceptional patience 
and perseverance. 
I put to the vote the draft recommendation 
on a European aeronautical policy, presented by 
Mr. Richter, Mr. Valleix and Mr. Warren, Docu-
ment 704. 
Are there any objections L 
Note is taken of Mr. Cermolacce's objection. 
Are there any abstentions t.. 
The draft recommendation is adopted 2 • 
I. See page 40. 
2. See page 42. 
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5. Detente and security in Europe 
(Vote on the revised draft Recommendation, 
Doe. 703) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - As 
regards the draft recommendation oo detente 
and security in Europe, besides Mr. Cermolacce, 
Mr. Mattick and Mr. Richter are also opposed to 
the draft. 
Do they wish to follow Mr. Cermolacce's good 
example L 
Mr. CERMOLACCE (France) (Translation). 
- It is not a good example : I simply wanted to 
expedite proceedings because I was the only one 
against. But if I am no longer alone, I ask for 
a roll-call vote. 
Mr. DELORME (France) (Translation). -
This morning I was absent because I had to 
attend a Committee meeting at the Senate. It was 
formally agreed that voting would take place on 
Thursday at 11.30 a.m. We had made arrange-
ments to attend the sitting. I protest against this 
manner of proceeding. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Quite, but 
the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, since it must leave the Assembly, will not 
be here tomorrow morning ; consequently, it was 
no longer possible to count on having a quorum. 
If you were at the Senate this morning, that 
was your good right, but it is equally your duty 
to be here or to make arrangements to be 
represented. 
I call Mr. Richter. 
Mr. RICHTER (Federal Republic of Ger-
many) (Translation). - Mr. President, I should 
like to inform you that certain members of the 
German Delegation will definitely be present 
tomorrow. We would not want this report to fail 
for lack of a quorum. We are against the 
substance of the report, since we believe that it 
conflicts so sharply with other reports adopted 
by this Assembly that it is not credible. We 
would therefore vote with the "Noes", but per-
haps the vote can be postponed until tomorrow. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - If mem-
bers think that we should take the risk of 
presenting this text tomorrow ... I am there to see 
good order maintained and endeavour, following 
our work and discussions, to assemble some 
material for our future debates, thus demonstrat-
ing the genuine parliamentary function served 
by WEU. 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
The President (continued) 
I call Sir Frederic Bennett who is, so to speak, 
the father of one of these reports. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom). 
- As I have given way on my report, even more 
than did my predecessor on his, I had hoped, 
Mr. President, that your proposal that objections 
might be recorded would be accepted. If a roll-
call vote is insisted upon our proceedings will be 
stultified, because from inquiries I have made I 
am sure that there will be even fewer members 
present tomorrow morning than there are if a 
vote is taken today. 
Though, naturally, I shall stay over, there is 
no more chance of getting the full quorum of 
forty-five tomorrow than there is today. There 
is no suggestion of our adopting the wording or 
sentiments expressed in the report, but only the 
clauses that we accepted one by one without a 
single division. In those circumstances, I urge 
acceptance of your appeal that those who want to 
make strong objections should do so but that the 
procedure should go forward. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- Since it is 
not possible to use the entirely exceptional 
procedure which we adopted in the case of 
another report, and some members having asked 
for a vote by roll--call, which they are entitled 
to do under the rules of our Assembly, I am 
obliged to bow to their wishes and, since we have 
no quorum this evening, and we may have one 
tomorrow morning - for we are going to round 
up a number of members of the Assembly for 
the purpose - I think it only right and proper 
to postpone the vote till tomorrow in the case of 
your report. In spite of the fact that you have 
made some concessions, I acknowledge that, as a 
matter of principle, some members have not been 
able to fall in with you. 
I think in the case of our French colleagues 
there may have been a misunderstanding and 
they will be able to be present tomorrow morning, 
failing which we shall not have a quorum and 
your report will not be adopted. 
6. Strategic mobility 
(Presentation of the Report of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the 
draft Order, Doe. 709) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
Order of the Day is the presentation of and 
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debate on the report of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments on strategic mobility 
and vote on the draft order, Document 709. 
I call Mr. Duvieusart, Rapporteur of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments. 
Mr. DUVIEUSART (Belgium) (Translation). 
- Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the 
report which I have the honour to present will 
only take up a few moments of the Assembly's 
time and will not require the heated discussions 
engendered by the previous report. 
This is a preliminary report, since by assigning 
to the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments the report on strategic mobility, your 
Assembly set it a task whose magnitude increased 
as work proceeded. 
Preliminary studies called for a questionnaire 
which is still being drafted and could be sent to 
the various governments in order to find out 
exactly what the current situation is, of which 
there does not seem to have been any systematic 
study made as yet. 
The object of the report will be to cover 
numerous questions which have been debated at 
the conference on the law of the sea and on the 
occasion of changes in the rights which national 
States have accorded each other in this matter. 
The questionnaire will also deal with the 
problem of relations inside and outside NATO 
in respect of the rights of aircraft and ships to 
take on supplies in each State. It seems desirable 
that, as a result of such a study, the guidelines 
may be laid down inside NATO for a standard 
agreement on problems concerning the stationing 
and stop-over of ships and aircraft in NATO 
countries. 
This first step will also perhaps enable a 
standard form of negotiation between these coun-
tries and non-NATO countries to obtain the same 
facilities. The report will also have to examine, 
apart from material aspects, the question of 
securing freedom of movement in areas where 
the WEU countries might have to take action. 
We are thinking particularly of the Near and 
Middle East, the Indian ocean and continental 
Africa, in which interests may have to be 
defended. 
Lastly, the report will examine what mobility 
the armies of NATO will have to contend with 
in the case of the armies of the Soviet bloc. This 
will be the last part of the report. 
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In conclusion, the Committee and your Rap-
porteur propose that they be given an order to 
pursue this study which, as I said at the 
beginning, consists in drawing up a question-
naire, a statistical survey and, lastly, the drafting 
of a fuller order. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. Rapporteur. 
Nobody else is down to speak. 
In Document 709, the Committee proposes a 
draft order which I put to the vote by sitting and 
standing. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing) 
The draft order is adopted 1 • 
7. Reserve forces 
(Presentation of the Report of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on 
the draft Recommendation, Doe. 707) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- The next 
Order of the Day is the presentation of and 
debate on the report of the ·Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments on reserve forces and 
vote on the draft recommendation, Document 
707. 
I call Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur of the Com-
mittee. 
Mr. DELORME (France) (Translation). -
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, you all 
have in your possession the report and the draft 
recommendation which I have prepared on behalf 
of our Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments concerning reserve forces. 
I shall therefore confine myself to recalling 
the broad lines of our thinking on which, to my 
great gratification, there has been total consensus 
and a unanimous vote. 
In fact, we asked ourselves three questions : 
- Is it necessary for our Assembly to concern 
itself with the problem of reserves ~ - If so, 
why Y In the circumstances, what elements of a 
European policy on reserves could be put for-
ward for the attention of our governments 1 
Why is a report on reserve forces necessary Y 
1. See page 44. 
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The two world conflicts through which our 
generation has lived have left their imprint on 
our ideas and policies concerning defence. 
First, they were conflicts in which the 
reserves played an important part and, humanly 
speaking, bore the brunt of the fighting. 
Second, the emergence of new weapons, and 
the feeling that our peoples could not bear 
another holocaust, led to the idea that nuclear 
deterrence could take the place of the formation 
of "big armies". 
Although in the majority of WEU countries 
conscription is still the basis on which the con-
ventional armed forces of the regular services 
are constituted, the whole of their organisation 
presupposes a short engagement, a simple means 
of avoiding the immediate massive use of nuclear 
weapons. 
As the years go by, this widespread attitude, 
among those responsible for our military policies, 
has for a variety of reasons become increasingly 
unrealistic. Despite nuclear weapons, conven-
tional warfare has not disappeared. It can be 
prolonged. It assumes very varied forms : guer-
rilla warfare, raids and revolutionary wars. 
Moreover, atomic weapons are vulnerable. 
Their infrastructure can easily be damaged by 
conventional military acti.on, and their protec-
tion demands large numbers of trained personnel. 
Opposite Western Europe, the Warsaw Pact 
keeps under arms very big conventional forces, 
constantly growing in numbers and serving for 
long periods. In our democracies, however, for 
psychological and economic reasons, the trend is 
to shorten the length of national service for our 
citizens. The gap between the military strength 
of the eastern countries and our own is tending 
to grow wider both for armaments and conven-
tional forces. 
There is therefore a danger that Europe's field 
force might be whittled away very quickly in the 
event of conflict, and would have to be renewed 
if deterrence did not work. These are the cir-
cumstances in which we have come to believe 
that the reserve forces might play a novel and 
important rOle in the defence of Europe. It is 
accordingly for us to consider the rationale and 
operating modes of the role envisaged for them. 
Even more than the technical reasons, political 
and psychological reasons are, in our view, deter-
minant. Psychologically, ever since 1945 and 
apart from a few colonial-type conflicts, the 
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nations of Western Europe have been living at 
peace, as we thankfully appreciate. Of course, 
nobody would dream of complaining about that. 
Nevertheless, this situation affects our young 
people in ways we must take into account. 
Although peace is subject to the permanent 
threat of atomic war, it has become a basic 
factor in the psychology of the younger genera-
tions. The dangers, although real enough, grow 
dim. In a civilisation where social and cultural 
progress has become the driving force, the idea 
of external danger tends to seem somewhat 
unreal. Hence, in our countries, conscription, 
military organisation relying on good citizen-
ship, is increasingly grudgingly accepted. 
Furthermore, expenditure on conventional 
armed forces is contested, and the young con-
script gains the impression, all too often justi-
fied, that he is completely useless and is wasting 
his time. It is therefore necessary to give him 
back the civic sense of defence, appropriate to 
our civilisation. 
The constitution of reserve forces, essentially 
formed of citizens, is likely to stimulate mind-
fulness of the vital will to defence as a means 
of safeguarding peace and progress in each of 
our States. Service in the reserves keeps per-
manently alive what we can only describe as 
patriotism, which can moreover be a European 
patriotism. 
From the political standpoint, the sophistica-
tion of nuclear armaments and certain highly 
elaborate conventional weaponry requires, under 
sound management, that they be in charge of 
regular sold~ers. There is therefore a tendency 
for the permanent professional armed forces to 
increase. In these, the conscript often feels he 
is merely expendable, with a consequent sense 
of frustration among the population at large. 
What is more, the professional army, like any 
other technical body, tends to stand apart from 
the bulk of the nation it serves. A gulf then tends 
to grow between the nation and its army, with 
the former distrustful of the latter but at the 
same time relying blindly upon it for its defence. 
Now it is proved - and examples of this are 
given in my report - that no defence is possible, 
even on the basis of nuclear deterrence, without 
a will to resist among the entire nation. 
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Nuclear deterrence cannot replace popular 
deterrence. On the contrary, it can only operate 
provided the latter already exists. 
Hence the constitution of reserve forces as a 
link between the nation and the professional 
army, integrating the regular soldier in the 
population as a whole, is a basic factor in any 
defence policy. The examples I mention in my 
report, of Israel, Sweden, Switzerland, Vietnam 
and especially Yugoslavia, to my way of think-
ing speak volumes. And why should we not also 
mention the popular uprisings of the resistance 
movements on the home front during the war 
of 1939-1945 - in Italy, Belgium and the 
Netherlands, and lastly, our own French forces 
of the interior, who gave such effective support 
to the allied liberation armies. 
There are also military reasons. 
A policy in respect of the reserve forces is 
also militarily essential. Faced with a sudden 
aggression by conventional forces, which will 
always outnumber those that Europe can field, 
our continent should use its full human potential. 
In particular a ground defence combining direct 
action with guerrilla action may be a means of 
stopping an enemy break-through. 
A defence of this kind can only be put up 
by men determined to protect their homes, their 
home regions and towns, and militarily fit from 
their peacetime training. 
The formation and training of such forces 
would restore a meaning and efficiency to mili-
tary service and conscription. We must not close 
our eyes to the fact that they might increase 
the obligations imposed on citizens. The pur-
pose of throwing in the reserves is, however, not 
to lighten military obligations, but rather to 
render them militarily more efficient in the con-
text of our societies. 
Lastly, it would be wrong to believe that, 
although reserve forces are not the major 
concern of our governments, they are being 
completely neglected. You will find in my report 
the main basic facts about the existence and use 
of reserve forces in the WEU countries. 
On the basis of these examples, the recom-
mendation which our Committee proposes you 
should adopt is designed both to improve the 
system in each individual country and also to 
promote a reserve forces policy at European 
level 
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We consider that improvement of the existing 
arrangements in each of our nations might be 
based on : esta:blishment of a specific form of 
military service for the reserve forces - this 
could comprise a relatively short period of active 
service, bu.t a fairly prolonged period of service 
in the reserves interspersed with training 
periods ; organising reserve forces on a territo-
rial basis to further the ground defence of the 
territory ; reservist status, which would, in par-
ticular, guarantee appropriate rates of pay dur-
ing these periods of service. 
True, the problem of reserves seen in these 
terms is obviously a ootional one. We believe, 
however, that it can and should also be dealt 
with at the European level. 
As a first step, we consider the European 
countries should compare notes and jointly study 
certain problems of the use of SUICh forces in 
aesociation with regular officers and reserve 
officers. 
For that reason, we propose the setting up 
of a European defence college in which a 
doctrine for the use of reserve forces would be 
worked out. 
In conclusion, by taking up the problem of 
the reserves, your Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments may have had the 
impression of moving back in time. But I believe 
that, as its work proceeded, it came to feel, 
on the contrary, that it was rediscovering the 
underlying reasons for the existence of our 
Western European Union : the will to freedom, 
the need for self-respect and a refusal to accept 
any form of slavery, whatever its n.atUTe and 
origin might be. 
Such are the findings which I have the honour 
1io SUJbmit to your Assembly, requesting you to 
adopt the draft recommendation and the 
conclusions resulting from my endeavolH'S. 
(Applause) 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. Rapporteur. 
There are no more speakers on the list. 
In Document 707, the Committee proposes a 
draft recommendation which I now put to the 
vote. 
Are there any objections ? .. . 
Are there any abstentions ? .. . 
I note that the Assembly is unanimous. 
The draft recommendation is therefore 
adopted 1• 
8. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the 
next Sitting 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- I propose 
that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting 
tomorrow morning, Thursday, 17th June, at 
10 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day : 
1. Address by Mr. van der Stool, Minister for 
Foreign Mfairs of the Netherlands. 
2. ROle of the Atlantic Alliance in the world 
today (Presentation of and Debate on the 
Report of the General Affairs Committee 
and Vote on the draft Recommendation, 
Document 711). 
3. Detente and security in Europe (Vote on 
the revised draft Recommendation, Docu-
ment 703). 
Are there any objections Y ... 
The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting 
are therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak Y ... 
The Sitting is closed. 
(The Sitting was closed at 5.55 p.m.) 
1. See page 45. 
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SUMMAJ!.Y 
1. Adoption of the Minutes. 
2. Attendance Register. 
3. Address by Mr. van der Stoel, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands. 
Speakers : The President, Mr. van der Stoel. 
Replies by Mr. van der Stoel to questions put by: Mr. 
Leynen, Mr. de Montesquiou, Mr. Radius, Mr. de 
Bruyne, Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Mr. Mattick, Mr. Richter. 
4. Role of the Atlantic Alliance in the world today (Pre-
sentation of and Debate on the Report of the General 
Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommen-
dation, Doe. 711). 
SpMkerB: The President, Mr. de Niet (Rapporteur), Sir 
Frederic Bennett, Mr. Critchley, Mr. de Niet (Rappor· 
teur), Mr. Sieglerschmidt (Chairman of the Committee), 
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7. Adjournment of the Session. 
The Sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT (Transta.tion). - The Sit-
ting is open. 
1. Adoption of the Minutes 
The PRESIDENT (Trans1ation). - In accor-
dance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, 
the 1\Iinutes of Proceedings of the previous 
Sitting have been distributed. 
Are there any comments ?... 
The Minutes are agreed to. 
2. Attendance Register 
The PRESIDENT (TransLation). - The 
names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting 
which have been notified to the President will 
be published with the list of Representatives 
appended to the 1\Iinurtes of Proceedings 1 • 
3. Address by Mr. van d.er Stoel, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 
The PRESIDENT (Tran$1ation). - The first 
Order of the Day is the address by 1\Ir. van der 
Stool, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 
Netherlands. 
1. See page 48. 
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Mr. van der Stool, we know what your com-
mitments are, and appreciate it ahl. the more that 
you have found time to come and address the 
Assembly, of which you were until recently a 
distinguished Rapporteur. 
You came back to it in June 1973 as President 
of the Council of WEU. Your presence today 
marks the interest that you continue to show m 
the Assembly, and we are grateful to you for it. 
I call the 1\Iinister. 
1\Ir. van der STOEL (Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands) (Translation). -
1\Ir. President, I must first of aJl thank you for 
the kind words you have addressed to me. 
(The speaker continued in Dutch) 
It is a privilege and a pleasure for me to 
be allowed back among you again today a:liter 
an absence of some years. The Assembly of 
WEU is a unique parliamentary forum at Euro-
pean level in which political and military 
questions are regularly discussed, and close con-
tact between the Assembly and the Council has 
a stimulating effect in both directions. It is in 
this light that I view my presence among you 
this morning. 
I should like to explain this morning the 
security policy of the Netherlands in the light 
of the limits and possibilitiES of detente. 
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Let me begin with NATO. 
In view of the nature of East-West relations 
and their development during the past few 
decades, it is the view of the Netherlands 
Government that the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation is necessary as a counterbalance to 
the potential of the Soviet Union. 
I shall return to East-West relatioos later. 
As far as NATO is concerned I want to re-
state here that the strength of the Alliance is 
based not only on its military resources, how-
ever important these are for the balance of 
lJOwer. This strength is based just as much on 
the measure of credibility attaching to the 
Alliance as an organisation for the safeguarding 
of democracy, of respect for the rights of the 
individual, of justice and of social progress. We 
can rejoice in the fact thrut today all members 
of NATO profess democratic principles. It is 
enormously important that this should remain so. 
It is occasionally said that under present-day 
circumstances military blocs and alliances are 
obstacles to establishing even closer relations 
between the peoples of Europe, and that con-
sequently ·alternative arrangements should be 
sought. The idea of a European security system 
is often presented in this connection. Nowhere, 
however, has a convincing outline of such a 
system ever been put forward. Who, for 
example, would be responsible for guaranteeing 
the security of Europe under such a system ? 
How would the disputes that arise be resolved 1 
What restrictions would the countries in Europe 
have to observe in regard to each other 1 In 
short, the suggestion raises many questions to 
which no quick satisfactory answers can be 
given. 
It is a:1so occasionally asserted that Europe 
can no longer count on the American security 
guarantee, because of the risks that comd arise 
for the United States if it were called upon to 
honour this guarantee. According to this view 
of the situation, Western Europe would have to 
learn to stand entirely on its own two feet and 
even be prepared to bui1d up its own nuclear 
deterrent force. 
The Netherlands Government rejects this 
reasoning too, for it does have faith in the 
solidarity of the United States with the fate of 
Western Europe and because it also believes that 
the United States itself has an interest in the 
security of our part of the world. 
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Furthermore it believes that an independent 
\V estern European nuclear force would have a 
destabilising effect on both intra-European and 
extra-European relations. 
Nor is the Netherloods Government an 
advocate of armed neutrality such as we see 
in Switzerland or Sweden. A neutrality of this 
kind would place the NetherLands in a position 
of isolation, and would deprive us of the 
opportunity of working towards better and more 
stable relations in the world from the position 
of the common strength of the Alliance. 
The Netherlands is, and will therefore remain, 
a positive and loyal ally. At the same time it 
wishes to promote an active peace policy through 
the medium of a powerful alliance. In our view 
an unlimited arms race must be condemned, and 
every means must be employed to find a way 
of restricting and curbing such a race. This is 
why the Netherlands has for very many years 
been an advoca;te of concrete measures in the 
field of arms control and disarmament. 
A matter of the greatest concern to my govern-
ment is the nuclear danger. I am thinking of 
both the vertica;l and the horizontal proliferation 
of nuclear weapons, and of the enormous risks 
which are associated with the establishment of 
enrichment and reproc·essing plant without the 
protection of really sound guarantees. To con-
trol and lessen this danger it is essential to frame 
international rules for all the areas referred to. 
The Netherlands is therefore a convinced 
member of the Disarmament Committee in 
Geneva. Although results often fall short of 
expectations, it must be said that there have 
also been some very positive results from this 
consultation. I am thinking here in particular 
of the non-proliferation treaty. This treaty is 
now more timely than ever, and it pleases me 
that its effectiveness was recently strengthened 
by the accession of Japan. 
I also welcome the fact that a number of sup-
plier countries have made more precise arrange-
ments with regard to the export of nuclear 
materials, though thes-e are only a first step and 
will have to be tightened up so that the existing 
guarantees are improved and refined. 
It is from the same viewpoint that the Nether-
lands sees the efforts of the two superpowers 
to reach binding agreements on the nature and 
size of their respective nuclear forces. 
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The conclusion of agreements about under-
ground nuclear tests and nuclear explosions for 
peaceful purposes is in itself encouraging, 
although I will not conceal the fact that the 
Netherlands Government is concerned about 
where the threshold for underground nuclear 
tests is set. I wonder in this regard whether a 
significant contribution really is being made to 
curbing the nature of the weapons involved in 
the arms race. 
On the other hand, with regard to the carrying 
out of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes 
- the economic value of which the Netherlands 
Government incidentally continues to doubt -
the fact that at lea.."'t reciprocal inspection is 
permitted, should be fully apprecia;ted. 
The negotiations on the mutual reduction of 
forces and related measures in Central Europe 
now also contain an important nuclear element 
which was introduced in December last year by 
the western participants. 
I think that, certainly after this last adapta-
tion of our negotiating proposals, the position 
of the West is entirely reasonable. It is not only 
based on an exchange of concessions of equal 
value, but is aimed at establishing a situation 
of parity, which will benefit the security of both 
parties. 
The most recent developments at Vienna, 
modest as they are at the moment, give me the 
hope that our eastern negotiating partners are 
also perhaps gradually becoming convinced of 
the merits of the western offer. 
Both in the past and beyond the borders of 
our continent, Mr. President, thought has been 
given to the problems of vigilance and security. 
Before the beginning of our era, for example 
Confucius said that : ' 
"Danger arises when a man feels secure in 
his position. Destruction threatens when a man 
seeks to preserve his worldly estate. Confusion 
develops when a man has put everything in 
order. Therefore the superior man does not 
forget danger in his security, nor ruin when 
he is well established, nor confusion when his 
affairs are in order. In this way he gains 
personal safety and is able to protect the 
empire." 
However, it is not primarily the study of the 
words of Confucius that accounts for the marked 
188 
SIXTH SITTING 
trend which has recently arisen throughout the 
western press to pay attention not so much to 
the opportunities and promises of detente 
between East and West as to the limits that 
have been set to improving East-West rel,a;tions. 
In various national parliaments, too, noises are 
being heard which bear witness more to a certain 
scepticism, and also perhaps to a certain dis-
appointment regarding detente. 
One possible reason for this new current may 
lie in the fact that an election campaign is at 
present being waged in the United States, during 
which East-West policy, as conducted to date by 
the present government, is coming under attack 
from the President's opponents. It is unavoidable 
that emphasis is being p1aced on the negative 
sides of the policy of detente with the Soviet 
Union. 
I do not believe, however, that we in Europe 
are at present simply witnessing a new fashion 
which has blown over from the United States. 
After the expecta.tions raised by the confer-
ence on security and co-operation in Europe I 
believe that there was also good reason for Eu~­
peans themselves to take a sober look at what 
had actually been improved, and if this was 
disappointing, to consider the reasons why. 
Have developments lagged behind legitimate 
expectations ? Or were those expectations 
perhaps set too high ? 
Secretary of State Kissinger once described 
detente as a continuous process in which the 
West, having regard to existing realities, is 
seeking a more constructive relationship with the 
Soviet Union. By settling or limiting the disputes 
between them, the parties could ultimately 
progress from a competitive relationship to one 
of co-operation. 
The European countries particularly within 
the framework of the conference on security 
and co-operation in Europe, have p1aced quite 
some emphi!JSis on improving the quality and 
duration of the relationship to be bui,lt up with 
the USSR, by cultivating greater openness on 
both sides and also by removing the artificial 
barriers standing in the way of a freer inter-
change of people, ideas and information. 
All western countries have always agreed that 
detente is not a state but a gradually developing 
process whose tempo was dependent upon the 
degree of involvement of all the parties con-
cerned. 
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Now, in itself, it is not surprising that there 
are limits to this process of detente. If they did 
not exist, we would eventuaJJy reach a stage of 
such extensive co-operation that East and West 
would blend into one large, world-wide State 
framework ; a vision which does not appear 
likely to be realised very rapidly. The qu€Stion 
is, therefore, not whether there are limits to 
detente, but rather where they are. 
I should like to indicate some of these limits 
in my statement, together with an outline of the 
possibilities that, in my view, reaJJy do exist 
within detente. 
To start with, I believe it is important not to 
lose sight of the fact that we are talking about 
an interdependent whole. 
This means that progress in one sub-area can 
bring a positive influence to bear on the relaxa-
tion of tenBion as a whole. It aLso means that 
lack of progress in one given field can be 
injurious to other components of the process of 
detente. 
Then there is the fact that, in my view, 
detente touches upon every aspect of the 
relationship between East and W €St. I do not 
believe that a distinction can be made between 
areas that are relevant to detente and those that 
are not. 
Let me give you a few exampl€S. The con-
ference on security and co-operation in Europe 
played a part in giving a concrete shape to the 
process of detente, both by formulating a num-
ber of principles and by agreeing upon a num-
ber of measures. It must be said in passing, of 
course, that implementing the final act is of 
much greater importance than the mere signing 
of it. 
It must be said, however, that in the area of 
tangible measures for military security next to 
no progress has been made; not only in SALT, 
the negotiations between the two superpowers 
which we cannot know about in fuJ.l detail, but 
also in the MBFR negotiations, which have been 
at almost a total standstill for some time past. 
There has been scarcely any reaction to the 
new proposals advanced by the West in Vienna 
in December, unless we wish to describe as a 
reaction the Warsaw Pact proposal of February 
which again boils down to establishing by treaty 
7• - II 
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the imbalance of military forces in Central 
Europe in their present proportions. Let us hope 
it will be possible to note some progress. 
I feel that if this situation continues for too 
long it can only have a harmful effoot on 
detente. 
A further possible stumbling-block to the 
relaxation of tension in Europe is the fact that 
detente cannot be viewed in isolation from events 
elsewhere in the world. 
If attempts are made to extend the sphere 
of influence of the Warsaw Pact in Africa under 
the slogan of "proletarian internationalism", it 
is inevitable that this will have repercussionB on 
East-West relations in Europe. 
I must however mention in passing that, in my 
view, wester:n policy in current or potential crisis 
areas outside Europe cannot be based on joining 
with those forces which indeed feel threatened 
by, among others, the USSR but which in fact 
have themselves been the cause of the local 
tension. 
We shall have to gear our policy not so much 
to the symptoms as to the illBtigators of tension 
if we wish to prevent interference by the USSR 
in other parts of the world. Here, too, preven-
tion is better than cure. 
For Southern Africa this means a resolute and 
co-ordinated western policy with regard to 
Rhodesia and Namibia, and with regard to the 
apartheid problem in the Republic of South 
Africa. 
"Proletarian internationalism", put into prac-
tice in Africa, brings me to another factor which 
may have an adverse effect on detente. 
Particularly since Helsinki we have been con-
fronted with remarks from one side on what i~ 
termed there the "ideological battLe" ; a battle 
- and this is added in so many words - which 
must be continued with unabated intensity 
alongside the policy of detente. 
I find this rather a paradox. How is it pos-
sible at one and the same time to advocate 
detente and to pursue a violent ideological con-
frontation ? 
Naturally, there will be rivalry between the 
various ideas prevailing in the East and the 
West concerning the best ways of organising 
society and government. By no means do I wish 
to avoid rivalry of this nature. I believe that 
we have good reasons for preferring a pluralistic 
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democracy, and that we can face a battle in the 
ideological field with a healthy ration of self-
confidence. On the other side of the coin, I do 
not begrudge those of a different persuasion 
their convictions. Each nation must be able to 
decide in freedom on its own system, a right 
that was reconfirmed recently in the final act 
of Helsinki. 
I do believe, however, that this rivalry must 
be subject to moderation if we really do wish to 
see an improvement in relations between States. 
Rivalry must not degenerate into a struggle in 
which, short of war, anything goes. 
If one of two parties still insists on taking 
up arms, that is where I believe a clear Limit 
to detente exists ; and certainly if the battle is 
in fact nothing more than a cloak to disguise a 
country's efforts at extending its power. 
These are just a few examples of areas where 
I see difficulties in the way of the further pro-
gress of detente. I believe that these difficulties 
can also serve as an illustration of the interest 
that the West could have in developing its own 
philosophy of detente in joint consultation. The 
West could then advance this philosophy to 
counter the unattractive Soviet vision of an 
incomplete detente, incomplete since it will 
operate only in cer:tain areas of intergovern-
mental exchanges ; a detente which, moreover, 
proves to be fragmented, divided into political, 
military and economic compartments, proof of 
the latter being the USSR proposals for 
separate, pan-European conferences on economic 
topics and on the environment. 
In general the western attitude is more 
pragmatic than doctrinaire, but I would like to 
suggest to you that in this field we should for 
once risk an exchange of ideas about a sort of 
pragmatic doctrine which would provide a sum-
mary of our position with regard to detente. 
I would not have raised this idea of an 
exchange of views on detente by the West if 
I did not see, in addition to the limits of the 
process of relaxation in tension, real possibilities 
for its continuation. 
This is not just because in the present general 
situation with the build-up of armaments pro-
ceeding in parity there is no real; alternative in 
the search for a peaceful stable relationship 
between East and West. The alternative, a sharp 
political confrontation, is not only unattmctive, 
190 
SIXTH SITTING 
but is also more difficult to control and therefore 
potentially extremely dangerous. 
Leaving aside the lack of a sensible alterna-
tive, I see various areas in which further pro-
gress might be made, although it would not 
always be easy and it would not always be 
speedily achieved. 
First and foremost, I still do not wish to 
exclude in any way the possibility of reaching 
agreement with the eastern participants in the 
MBFR negotiations on reductions of forces in 
Central Europe, which would mean a real 
strengthening of security for both East and 
West. The position of the West in the negotia-
tions is now both reasonable and credible. 
It is not impossible that it will be mainly a 
question of time before the eastern participants 
formulate a constructive reply. Perhaps results 
will first have to be achieved in SALT. If that 
is the case, we can certainly exercise patience 
for some time yet. 
In addition, I believe that scope still exists 
for continuing the dialogue with the Eastern 
European States, in a muLtilateral context, too, 
concerning a strengthening of relations and a 
gradual increase in the role of the individual 
in East-West exchanges. 
The Helsinki final act provides good starting-
points for this : both the principles for relations 
between the States in general and more parti-
cularly the aims of their co-operation in the 
economic and humanitarian fields are formu-
lated in this document in a suitable manner, 
which leaves open the possibility of a positive 
development. 
I believe that the sensible application of the 
final act, which contains an important passage 
on respect for the rights of the individual, may 
at the same time help to bring about greater 
justice and equity even in those States which 
are not members of our organisation. This is 
something that my government regards as the 
basis for genuinely stable relations within each 
individual country and between East and West. 
You might suspect me of euphoria if I did 
not stress at this point that further progress in 
the relaxation of tension, as I have just outlined, 
will only be possible if certain conditions are 
satisfied. 
First of all, there must be present on the part 
of the Soviet Union too, the will to extend 
detente, and a willingness to make the necessary 
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sacrifices. This willingness can be measured, for 
example, by the extent to which also those parts 
of the final act that resulted from the initiative 
of other countries are really put into practice 
by the Soviet Union. It will be revealed too by 
the degree of moderation exercised in both 
offensive armaments and ideological rivalry. 
But the success of detente will not depend just 
on the attitude of the Soviet Union. A staunch 
western solidarity expressed in a joint policy 
and based on sound self-confidence is just as 
important for the continuation of this process. 
The self-confidence of the West must be rooted 
in a belief in the value of a pluralistic, demo-
cratic social order which gives the individual the 
opportunity of self-development in the manner 
that he himself chooses. 
The self-confidence will also have to spring 
from the lmowledge that the West is safe against 
political pressure and military aggression. An 
adequate, integrated western defence system 
remains vitally important, in particular for 
detente. 
The Netherlands is firmly resolved to con-
tribute everything in its power to this defence 
and to the continuation of the process of detente. 
(Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. van der Stoel, for this valuable con-
tribution to our work. You have been a member 
of the Assembly and are quite familiar with 
our traditional procedure. I shall now give the 
floor to those members of the Assembly who 
have indicated their desire to ask questions, to 
which you may wish to reply. 
I call Mr. Leynen. 
Mr. LEYNEN (Belgium) (Translation). - I 
am not surprised to l·earn that the Minister from 
the Netherlands is against what he calls a Euro-
pean nuclear force, but I would like to have 
a straightforward answer to a straightforward 
question. Does he - assuming that a European 
union fully competent on matters of defence 
comes into being - feel it is acceptable that 
two countries in this union - that is to say, 
the United Kingdom and France - should 
retain autonomous control over a nuclear 
capability ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- I call the 
Minister. 
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Mr. van der STOEL (Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands) (Tvanslation). -
Mr. President, reference has very rightly been 
made by Mr. Leynen - whose views on this 
point I am well aware of - to the discussion 
that is going on about European union. Indeed 
we must, when we give thought to a further 
development of the process of European integra-
tion, also think about the likelihood of this cover-
ing the area of common defence policy. I will 
however at once comment that in my opinion it 
is impossible to arrive at a common defence 
policy unless firm foundations have first been 
laid for a common foreign policy. As Mr. Leynen 
knows, a great deal of effort is still going to be 
needed before we achieve a common foreign 
policy, despite the many moves made within the 
Nine to harmonise foreign policies and despite 
the gratifying increase we are seeing in the 
number of instances where the countries of the 
Community do adopt the same standpoint. 
All this is not to say that I would seek to 
place a taboo, until such time as there is a com-
mon foreign policy, on all matters connected 
with defence within the framework of European 
co-operation. There are, for instance, the pos-
sibilities of co-operation in the area of defence 
production. But I do think that a full and com-
plete common defence policy will have to wait 
quite some whiLe yet, until common foreign 
policy is an established fact. No one knows what 
East-West relations would be like in these 
circumstances. A prime consideration will have 
to be that a developing European union with 
a common def·ence policy would have to avoid 
anything that could jeopardise East-West rela-
tions in any way. My view remains that in the 
situation we have today - and no one can Look 
into the future, no one can say with certainty 
what relations are going to be like ten to twenty 
years from now - setting up a European 
nuclear force would mean a serious blow to the 
possibilities of detente. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. de Montesquiou. 
Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (France) (Transla-
tion). - As Mr. Nessler has said, we are very 
happy and very proud to see you responsible for 
the foreign policy of one of the States that plays 
an important role in Western Europe. Allow me 
to ask you two questions. 
The Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions, of which I have the 
honour to be Chairman, deals as you can well 
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imagine with aviation matters and we greatly 
regretted the final decisions on the famous "deal 
of the century", though I have no wish to dwell 
on the past. 
During the latter part of 1976 you will be 
President of the Council of Ministers of the 
Common Market. Since you are more European 
than many other Ministers, could you not do 
something to improve the lot of the European 
aircraft industry whose civil and military pro-
duction schedules are, as you know, very run 
down and Liable to jeopardise the future welfare 
of more than four hundred thousand European 
workers? 
The second question is the one which you 
answered just now, though neither I nor some 
other of my colleagues quite understood your 
reply. Why do you say that the effect of an 
independent European nuclear force would be 
to cause imbalance within Europe, when the two 
existing nuclear forces, the British and the 
French, have already been recognised at Ottawa 
as an important asset to the Atlantic forces ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- I ooll the 
Miruster. 
Mr. van der STOEL (Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands) (Translation). -
Mr. President, first of all I would 118Sure Mr. de 
Montesquiou that I have every sympathy for 
the problems facing the aircraft industry in 
Europe. I am convinced, therefore, that there 
is every reason - and the European Commission 
too has been bending its mind to this - for 
greater and closer co-operation in this sphere. 
I hope that the vain attempts of the past will 
be replaced by more successful efforts. 
.AJJ to the Ottawa declaration, it will perhaps 
not have escaped Mr. de Montesquiou's notice 
that the Netherlands has slightly different ideas 
from other countries in the Alliance on the mat-
ter of the plurality of nuclear forces within the 
Alliance. The Netherlands showed this by record-
ing its reservations at Ottawa. 
For the rest, I would repeat what I said a 
moment ago when answering Mr. Leynen, that is 
to say that a European nuclear force, alongside 
the American one, could in my opinion give rise 
to serious tensions in relations between East and 
West. Let me, to avoid any misunderstanding, 
make it plain that I am in no way trying to 
say that the Alliance can do without a nuclear 
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deterrent in today's circumstances. What I think 
I can say, however, is that the nuclear deterrent 
already exists, and that there is good reason 
for asking ourselves whether the problems that 
are facing us in the field of joint defence are 
not in the conventional sphere rather than a 
matter of increasing further our nuclear defence. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
1\Ir. Radius. 
Mr. RADIUS (France) (Translation). - I 
should Hke to ask the Minister whether he does 
not think that the European programme group 
set up in Rome at the beginning of this year 
should prevent a recurrence of the kind of situa-
tion which led to four European countries pur-
chasing YF-16 aircraft when European aircraft 
were available. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. van der STOEL (Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands) (Translation).- In 
answering Mr. Radius, Mr. President, I want 
first of all. to emphasise how glad I am that 
this European group has been set up. We know 
that his country made a particular contribution 
towards creating this group. I hope that con-
sultation which goes on in it will be able to help 
towards developing much closer collaboration, in 
the defence production field, between the Euro-
pean countries. 
Mr. Radius reminded us of the choice, made 
some time ago by a number of countries in the 
Alliance, of a non-European akcraft. For the 
four countries concerned it was a matter of 
choosing between aircraft all of which had their 
points. Mter a very searching expert assessment, 
which led to a consensus between the four 
member countries in question, the final decision 
in this case was along the lines Mr. Radius will 
know. This in no way means that the Nether-
lands, the next time a choice of aircraft has to 
be made, would be against buying one made in 
Europe. I think it would be useful to start 
studying the various possibilities already. It will 
be evident that a choice like this depends on a 
great many factors, with price, quality and 
compensation facilities as major considerations. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I cal!l Mr. 
de Bruyne. 
Mr. de BRUYNE (Belgium) (Translation).-
There are two questions I would like to ask the 
Minister, Mr. President. 
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The first is about the future European nnion 
and its competence to deal with matters of 
defence. From his answer to Mr. Leynen, I 
gathered that Mr. van der Stool does indeed con-
sider that the future European union could look 
on questions of defence as being part of its remit. 
The second question is whether the Minister 
thinks that reactivation of the Standing .Arma-
ments Committee - I do not mean the Rome 
group, which Mr. Radius has just spoken about 
- can help on the one hand to strengthen WEU 
and on the other can provide an indication of 
the task that a future European union might 
eventually undertake ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. van der STOEL (Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands) (Translation). -
Where European union is concerned, I would 
first of all make it clear that this union is not 
a firm concept, but rather an idea that is being 
developed. I can very wel!l imagine that at a 
certain point in time the whole complex of 
existing relations between the member countries 
of the Community will be translated into what 
will then be caltled a union, but that then at a 
later stage this union will be given powers that 
it did not possess at the time it came into being. 
It does, indeed, seem to me to be a logical 
sequel to a constantly advancing process of 
European integration that ultimately defence, 
too, should be a matter for the union. I have 
come across a number of comments on this in 
the report by the Belgian Prime Minister, Mr. 
Tindemans. In answering Mr. I.J(lynen my view 
was, indeed, that I could not imagine how the 
European Communities could succeed, inside the 
union, in reaching a common defence policy so 
long as there was no common foreign policy. 
The common defence policy must, in the end, 
be based on a common foreign policy. 
I have just indicated what importance I attach 
to European groups for co-operation, and the 
questioner has just asked about the Standing 
Armaments Committee. You will: undoubtedly 
remember the answer given on this point by the 
WEU Council of Ministers. I think it would be 
interesting if we could, at the end of the year, 
and in the light of the progress made in the 
European programme group, show it to have 
given particularly valuable services, while the 
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Standing Armaments Committee in the WEU 
sphere made an inventory of industries dealing 
with armaments. I believe that these analyses 
and studies might contribute usefully to the 
continuing discussion on the building of Euro-
pean union. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Chairman of the General 
Affairs Committee. 
Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (Federal Republic 
of Germany) (Translation).- Mr. Minister, you 
have referred to the need for a steadfast and 
co-ordinated western policy on apartheid in the 
republics of southern Mrica. In what fields do 
you consider the WEU countries can act with 
this object in view ? In particular, do you think 
that all co-operation in the production of nuclear 
power should be stopped ? 
You also spoke of a necessary improvement 
of controls in this sector, particularly when 
nuclear reactors are bought and sold. Are the 
steps taken by the IAEA in Vienna adequate in 
this respect, or what possibilities are there for 
improvement? Will the Netherlands Government 
in due course take action along these lines ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. van der STOEL (Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands) (Translation). -
Mr. President, I am very glad that Mr. Siegler-
schmidt has brought up the question of southern 
Africa, because I feel sure that this is one of 
the main focuses of tension in the world. I saw 
from the press again this morning that tension 
there is constantly rising, and developments are 
threatening to take an ever more dramatic turn, 
all because in one leading State in southern 
Africa the equality of the various races is not 
recognised. 
I think it is most important that within the 
European Community, and among the WEU 
member countries, there should be the greatest 
possible consultation on a common policy 
towards southern Mrica. 
I am glad to be able to say that substantial 
progress has been made on this during recent 
months. There was, for example, a decision by 
the European Council in eal'lly April to apply 
the strongest possible sanctions against the 
illegal Smith regime in Rhodesia. There was 
also the meeting of Foreign Ministers of the 
European Communities in February, in which 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Mr. van der Stoel (continued) 
they issued a statement on the policy of 
apartheid, on the illegal Smith regime in Rh~ 
desia and commented on the unacceptability of 
the people of Namibia not being allowed the free 
right to self-determination. I hope that we shall 
go further in building on these foundations. 
Mr. Sieglerschmidt has now brought up a 
specific aspect of the problem, i.e. what is to 
be done about supplying nuclear equipment. I 
know that there has been a great deal of general 
consultation between the countries exporting 
nuclear technology about the line to be taken 
-- this has led to what is known as the London 
Club. These have arrived at agreements under 
which standard conditions are being applied to 
the risks - which I referred to in my speech -
of handling and processing nuclear materials 
that might be used for building up military 
capabilities. Where the nuclear power stations 
are concerned, there will be a strict observance 
of the guarantees provided by the system of the 
Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Mattick. 
Mr. MATTICK (Federal Republic of Ger-
many) (Translation). - Mr. President, may I 
put a delicate question ~ Since the conclusion 
of the conference on security and c~operation 
in Europe certain circles, finding that the agree-
ments in the third basket are not yet being 
implemented, have had the impression - which 
I do not share - that the West is being led up 
the garden path, showing a trust that is totally 
unjustified. It is frequently said in this con-
nection that there has been a corresponding 
s1ackening in defence preparedness, and at that 
point the first country to be mentioned -
forgive me for being so blunt - is always the 
Netherlands. People are worried that the Com-
munity's readiness to defend itself is no longer 
what it was. 
If he is in a position to do so, may I ask the 
Minister to dispel these worries ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. van der STOEL (Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands) (Translation). -
Mr. Mattick has raised the matter of develop-
ments in East-West relations. As he will have 
heard, I said when speaking about the final act 
of the Helsinki conference that application of 
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the Helsinki agreements was a great deal more 
important than the signing of the document. 
Practice matters more than theory. The theory 
of Helsinki is sound, but now it has also to be 
put into practice. I will make no bones about 
the fact that where the application of the 
Helsinki decisions is concerned - thinking par-
ticularly of the third basket - I am up to now 
not all that satisfied and optimistic. 
I am especially sad that a number of human-
itarian problems that still exist between the 
countries of the East and West have not yet 
been settled in the letter and spirit of Helsinki. 
I hope that the months ahead will see a few 
concrete examples of the principles that were 
subscribed to by all the countries being imple-
mented. 
Now, the question of Dutch defence efforts. 
I can give Mr. Mattick an assurance that the 
Netherlands is and remains wholly prepared to 
contribute its share to our shared defence. As 
I said in my speech, the Netherlands looks on 
the maintaining of a collective defence as an 
essential condition for a continuing policy of 
detente. 
Dutch defence policy has more than once given 
rise to comments, some of them from other WEU 
countries. Let me say that Dutch defence was 
undergoing a process of rationalisation, and that 
this has been completed during the past few 
years. As a result, the effectiveness of the Dutch 
contribution to the joint defence effort has 
certainly not decreased. I think I can say, too, 
that the Dutch defence effort will stand com-
parison with that of other member countries of 
Western European Union. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Richter. 
Mr. RICHTER (Federal Republic of Ger-
many) (Translation). -In his address the Min-
ister devotes a welcome amount of space to 
detente. His evaluation of the progress to date 
in the MBFR talks in Vienna was very cautious. 
He dealt in some detail with the situation in the 
nuclear sector, and bearing this situation and the 
MBFR negotiations in Vienna in mind, I should 
be interested to have his forecast on this field. 
If I remember correctly, an offer was made 
by the Americans to withdraw 1,000 nuclear 
warheads from Europe. The Soviet Union did 
not agree to this American proposal. On the 
other hand, the Soviet Union made offers which 
in turn were in substance an attempt to persuade 
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NATO - or the Americans - to undertake 
certain reductions with regard to Nike and 
Pershing guided missiles. The situation seems to 
have reached stalemate. Is the Minister able to 
foreshadow any lines of progress for the coming 
months? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. van der STOEL (Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands) (Translation). -
Perhaps, Mr. President, I cmn start with Mr. 
Richter's last comment. He voiced the fear that 
the negotiations in Vienna were running into the 
sand. I would not myself be so pessimistic. I 
will not hide the fact that there are obvious 
difficulties, and that there is a sizable dis-
crepancy between the negotiating positions of 
the eastern and western countries taking part. I 
do not however rule out the possibility of, for 
example, the conclusion of the SALT II agree-
ment - and here again I am not giving up 
hope - having a positive effect. 
Nor do I rule out the possibility of the eastern 
bloc, after a closer a.nalysis of the new proposals 
from the West as put forward last December, 
coming to the conclusion that - ta;lking in terms 
of readiness to make mutual reductions even 
though these may be made up of different things 
- they represent a reasonable offer. 
What I obviously regard as essential is that 
the eastern bloc should understand that the 
countries of the West could in no circumstances 
agree to a form of wording that would, as it 
were, mean setting a treaty-like seal on the 
unequal baJance of numbers between eastern and 
western troops in the areas of Central Europe 
where the reductions are to be made. Similarly 
the West cannot accept any national ceilings on 
force levels. On the other hand, I think it would 
be perfectly reasonable for the western nego-
tiators to say that there should be an overall 
parity of forces in the reduction areas, so that 
there would be a kind of common ceiling. This 
could help substantially to stabilise relations in 
Europe. 
Since on the western side, there is now 
readiness to combine this with a cutback in the 
number of nuclear weapons, it seems to be quite 
reasonable that the West's offer will meet with 
a positive response from the eastern bloc. I do 
know, of course, that nuclear problems do not 
come into these talks. 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does 
anyone else wish to speak L 
Mr. Minister, it only remains for me to thank 
you for having enriched the intel1ectual feast 
you have given us with an abundance of 
informatory comment in response to members' 
questions. I feel that all you have Slllid has been 
very instructive and we again unanimously 
express our thanks. (Applause) 
4. Role of the Atlantic Alliance in the world 
today 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the 
General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft 
Recommendation, Doe. 711) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
Order of the Day is the presentation of and 
debate on the report of the General Affairs Com-
mittee on the role of the Atlantic Alliance in 
the world today and vote on the draft recom-
mendation, Document 711. 
I call Mr. de Niet. 
Mr. de NIET (Netherlands). - The title of 
the report does not exactly cover the contents. 
I think perhaps it should be : "The impact of 
economic and political events and trends in the 
world on the Atlantic Alliance with special 
reference to the relationship of the United States 
and Western European members of NATO." It 
is impossible, in view of the small amount of 
time which is left to us in this meeting, for me 
to give an adequate survey of the contents of 
the report. However, I am strengthened by what 
I heard yesterday from the West German Under-
Secretary and from what I heard rtoday ·from the 
Netherlands Minister in my belief that the con-
tents of this report are not as revolutionary 
as some people had thought, although I have 
heard in the corridors that it is far from 
orthodox ; I hope that this is so. 
As I said on Tuesday, the amazing feature of 
an assembly such as this is that the fact that 
there are entirely different philosophies behind, 
for instance, Sir Frederic Bennett's report and 
mine does not mean a totally divided vote on the 
recommendations. This Assembly is and should 
remain a political assembly. Its members should 
respect each other's convictions and differences 
of opinion should never be hidden. 
The Minister today and the Under-Secretary 
yesterday made it absolutely clear that a mili-
tary alliance based on the defence of democratic 
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values had to show that it had those democratic 
values to defend, socially and politically. There-
fore it is always a balance to decide what part 
of the ·budgets have to be spent on military 
defence and what part on the social and econo-
mic progress of the electorate. Both of them said 
that. One of the main points of my paper is thaJt 
military defence is only one of the legs of a real 
and comprehensive policy. 
A military defence based on Western Europe 
together with NATO is absolutely necessary. I 
have never doubted the fundamental need for 
such an alliance. At the same time, I am more 
and more convinced that we should not seek to 
get others, and the younger generation especially, 
to accept that alliance only on military argu-
ment, only on the basis of what are described 
as threats. We should base it on facts and on 
the recognition that in this world there can never 
be securitv or peace as long as, for instance, the 
relationship between poor and rich countries is 
not basically changed in such a way that there 
is at least a future prospect for a11 to have a 
fair share of what this earth offers us in 
standards of living and other essentials for a 
full life. As we all know, that is not yet the 
case. 
There is a third factor and that is the need 
to extinguish all discrimination on the basis of 
colour, creed or what-have-you. It is not so many 
years since we had the Atlantic Charter and 
all the amazing initiatives of the United States 
of America. It is only a few years since that 
terrible war that demanded so many sacrifices 
and that was won only by the sacrifices of the 
allied powers with the aid of the USSR. The 
USSR lost twenty million people, compared with 
which the losses of al:l the other Western Euro-
pean countries were small. Much the same was 
true of Poland. What we must not forget is that 
three-quarters of all Jews living in our ter-
ritories were killed merely because they were 
Jews. We stili have not made up for that, or 
the basic attitudes underlying it. 
Then came victory. What has been the attitude 
of victors in the past 7 We had the Treaty of 
Versailles, which proved to be one of the seeds 
of the war that followed. Then, on American 
initiative, we had the ideal of the United 
Nations. The ideal of the Marsh.al1 plan, now 
OECD, was open for East and West, communist 
and non-communist, but it was rejected by the 
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USSR which coerced its sateUites into rejecting 
it, t~, even though they had all originally 
accepted the idea. 
In July 1946 there came the independence of 
the Philippines and a strict policy on the part 
of the United States of decolonisation every-
where. In 1947 we had the Truman doctrine, 
which has outlived its value but was necessary 
at the time because it said to the USSR after 
Czechoslovakia and other events "You will never 
again cross the border in our direction". That 
has never happened in our part of the world. 
Then, as I have said, we had the Marshall 
plan with, at almost the same time, the integra-
tion of Western Germany. It would have been 
the integration of r~rm.runy, but Eastern Ger-
many had to say "No", because it could not say 
anything else. I am convinced that never before 
has such a thing happened. The Russians have 
helped us to accept that position by coming 
nearer and nearer, but let us never forget that 
100 or more kilometres lie between the eastern 
and the western blocs. The Under-Secretary said 
yesterday that things looked the same from the 
other side and even our former Minister Luns 
when he visited the USSR for the first time was 
impressed by how alive the fear of being over-
run still remained. We know that it is not 
justified, but it is a fact of life - and under-
standably so after twenty million people dead. 
After the Marshal! plan we had Truman's 
point four in .January 1949 - an essential 
doctrine about solidarity. I do not say that it 
has been practised, but it was there. It was 
something unique, something never put forward 
before, certainly not by such a powerful nation. 
NATO is the logical consequence of the Truman 
doctrine. 
My paper tries to indicate what has been done 
with these initiatives and what has made it dif-
ficult, especially for our younger generation, to 
accept the vital need for something like NATO. 
For instance, we have seen apartheid, the events 
in Vietnam and Spain, the fact that there have 
been non-democratic members of NATO -
Greece and Portugal - and so on. This is a 
subjective list, but it is not complete. It would 
be easy to treble it. 
Many of us are agreed on the basic factors 
necessary for a comprehensive security policy. 
We need military, economic and social solidarity. 
We must fight and join with others who fight 
against discrimination. These factors are only 
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rarely present. The gap between rich and poor 
is increasing. At Last we are seeing that 
apartheid does not have a long future whatever 
we do. Now we are bold enough to make clear 
that we are against it. 
We are also against the new economic order. 
Dr. Kissinger has said that it is not needed and 
that the old order has served us well. Basically, 
he is right and it may be seen to have served 
us well. It has been the basis of the exploitation 
of raw materials and what the earth holds. It 
has been the stimulus for capital investment to 
exploit everything the world has to give. It has 
served us well up to now. 
We have to ask how we are to become people 
of solidarity, sharing everything possible in this 
world with everybody else. It will not be pos-
sible in one decade, but we should at least open 
the prospect. When shall we who have the know-
how and riches take the sort of initiatives that 
President Truman took in those few postwar 
years ? All the components of a genuine security 
policy were present in his policies. He was said 
to be a wash-out, but, fortunately, he was re-
elected. 
The relationship of the United States with 
many countries has been shadowed by Vietnam 
and the poisoning effects of McOarthyism. The 
civil servants in the United States have been 
so conservative that even progressive men such 
as President Kennedy found it impossible to 
switch to an anti-Vietnam war policy and carry 
it through. For many years the United States 
attempted to ignore the existence of the Republic 
of China. Action on such matters has often 
proved possible only under governments whose 
leaders are renowned for their pure conservat-
ism. They will not be calJed communists or men 
of the left. 
Willy Brandt is the only exception. Only 
Eisenhower could finish Korea and only Nixon 
could start the rapprochement between the 
United States and China and finish the Vietnam 
war. The fact that these actions are possible 
only under conservative leaders is one of the 
tragedies of our politics in the West. 
I have tried to make clear the philosophy 
behind this paper. I hope that the report will 
be accepted, but if there is a schism between 
those who are in favour and those who are not, 
we should have a vote. We should not attempt 
to manoeuvre a una.nimous decision. (Applause) 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you for your report, Mr. de Niet. 
In the debate, I call Sir Fredmc Bennett. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom). 
- At both the beginning and the end of his 
remarks, Mr. de Niet referred to the differences 
between the underlying philosophies of his 
report and my own. Our attitudes towards one 
another's reports are curiously similar. He and 
others went along with the conclusions and 
recommendations of my report, with amend-
ments on which I was prepared to yield, and it 
was generally agreed that there was no dispute 
on the conclusions and recommendations because 
I had given way to all the amendments put 
forward, some of which, I agree, improved the 
text. However, when Mr. de Niet spoke a couple 
of days ago he made it clear that he was bearing 
in mind what I said in my introductory speech 
and the contents and purport of my explanatory 
memorandum. 
I take precisely that attitude today. I have 
no particular objections to the conclusions and 
recommendations of Mr. de Niet's report. If I 
had, I should have put down amendments so 
that we could have voted on them. However, 
I do disapprove of many of the matters 
underlying his own explanatory memorandum. I 
shall not, at this late stage, elaborate on them, 
since it is not difficult for anyone to work out 
where the differences between our respective 
philosophies lie, but I mention only two 
examples. 
The explanatory memorandum contains a 
degree of anti-American political bias of a kind 
that is unacceptable to me. It is also critical of 
the continued possession of national nuclear 
forces by France and Great Britain.. I do not 
share Mr. de Niet's disapproval. The United 
Kingdom Government's official policy, with the 
complete support of the opposition, is to favour 
for an indefinite period the maintenance of our 
own nuclear deterrent in order that we need not 
wholly rely on a foreign power, however bene-
volent. The same attitude was expounded very 
clearly to us by the French Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs. 
That brings me to the difficulty in which I 
find myself. I am a fair-minded person. I do 
not engage in manoeuvres. However, the Polit-
ical Committee has produced two repol'1:8, and 
there are those who object to the themes mder-
lying each of the explanatory memoranda. In 
each case, as far as I know, there will be no 
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objection to either the conclusions or the recom-
mendations. In the case of my own report, this 
has already been shown to be so. I do not expect 
there to be any objection to Mr. de Niet's report. 
Since the recommendations and conclusions of 
both reports have already been approved, as in 
the case of mine, or are about to be approved, 
as in the case of Mr. de Niet's, the only reason 
for not letting both reports go ahead would be 
that one or more members took so much excep-
tion to the explanatory memoranda that a 
quorum would be called for, thus ensuring that 
the papers were deferred. 
As I understand the convention here, related 
to me by a number of senior people, when the 
Assembly approves or disapproves of a report, 
what it is judging is the resolutions and recom-
mendations, whilst the theme of the report must 
be that of the Rapporteur himself. To use an 
English proverb, what is sauce for the goose is 
sauce for the gander. As votes are shortly to be 
taken, I seek your help, Mr. President, in ensur-
ing that fair pLay is observed and that the same 
treatment is applied to both reports. If this is 
to happen, I shall be only too happy to send 
Mr. de Niet's report forward with a good wind. 
If, on the other hand, it is made clear that only 
one report is to be the subject of discrimination 
because the theme of its memorandum is unac-
ceptable, I in my turn will find the other equally 
unacceptable and will do my best to ensure that 
both reports, in that unhappy event, are defer-
red. (Applattse) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Critchley. 
Mr. CRITCHIJEY (United Kingdom). - If 
the Times is to be believed, Mr. Callaghan has 
taken umbrage with President Giscard d'Estaing 
because the latter has asserted that the world's 
third nuclear power is France and next week 
when President Giscard d'Estaing visits London 
Mr. Callaghan intends to point out that Great 
Britain is the world's third nuclear power. That 
seeins to me an extraordinary competition in 
virility as to whose missile is the bigger. I should 
have thought it wiser, even more fruitful, were 
President Giscard d'Estaing and Mr. Callaghan 
to discuss co-operation between France and 
Britain with a view to trying to solve the prob-
lem of what sort of weapons system ought to 
replace the British Polaris or the French nuclear 
deterrent. 
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Whilst there can be no European nuclear force 
until there is a European union, this does not 
mean that we should not think about the place 
that European nuclear weapons should occupy 
within the Alliance. We in Europe worry about 
the bomb, but prefer to let the Americans discuss 
it. We do so because we wish to mask the 
inconsistencies underlying our policies within 
Europe. On the one hand, we rely upon the 
uncertainty of a United States response; on the 
other, we are very careful to take out a nuclear 
insurance of our own in the form of four English 
Polaris submarines and five French nuclear ones. 
Through the adoption of the Schlesinger 
doctrine, the Americans emphasise the rational 
use of nuclear weapons against a conventional 
attack in Europe. On the other hand, the British 
and French emphasise the uncertainty that must 
always exist in the mind of the enemy. Britain 
- and I suppose this argument would apply to 
the French - has always justified the possession 
of an independent nuclear deterrent, in two 
ways. First, we wou}d assert that the possession 
of a nuclear force must prevent the first use 
of Soviet nuclear weapons against us, secondly, 
that the "uncertainty" argument would apply 
were the Russians to attack Europe or Great 
Britain and we then had the threat of using 
our nuclear weapons first. Of these two argu-
ments, the first is clearly stronger. 
However, the question that we in Britain 
should be asking ourselves is what, if anything, 
shouLd replace the four Polaris submarines in 
the 1990s, because the hull Life of the first vessel 
will be over at the end of the 1980s. The decision 
whether to replace should be high on the agenda 
of the British cabinet and of the Conservative 
shadow cabinet. 
The United Kingdom and French deterrents 
are minimal. That is why the British have 
decided not to match United States improve-
ments to their submarine-launched ba1listic mis-
sile system. We are not to buy Poseidon, even 
though it will mean that we shall be unable to 
fit our Polaris warheads with MIRVs, because 
our warheads are too small. Instead, we have 
gone in for a modest warhead improvement 
programme, operation Antelope. Were we to 
conclude that it is essential for Britain to stay 
nuclear - and I suspect that a Conservative 
administration wou1d reach that decision - it 
seems that it would be economically and 
technologically impossible unless we were pre-
pared to do so on a co-operative basis. 
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Therefore, the question is : with whom should 
a future British Government be prepared to 
co-operate 1 Secondly, are we to look again to 
the United States Y The question that we must 
ask ourselves now is whether the United States 
wou1d be prepared to make available the Trident 
system under the same convenient terms as they 
did Polaris, fifteen years ago. Washington might 
well be prepared to take the view that more 
than one nuclear decision-centre enhances deter-
rence which is Dr. Kissinger's view at the mom~nt. On the other hand, Washington might 
refuse to make the Trident available because 
the Americans believe that to do so would be 
to threaten and undermine United States/Soviet 
reLations - and clearly we have no idea over 
the next five years how much more difficult 
Congress might become in the United States. 
If, therefore, there is a big question mark 
over Ang1o-American co--operation for the suc-
cessor system to Polaris, why not look more 
seriously to the possibility of Anglo/French 
military co-operation, at least in the construction 
of the missile, warhead and delivery system, 
which could, in theory at lmst, be a combination 
of our warhead technology and the abiWi.ty of 
the French to produce the missile, such as the 
M-4? 
Also in the air is the question and nature of 
Anglo/French co-operation once the two forces 
become operational - satellite surveillance, how 
many bodies should be on patrol, joint targeting, 
and so on. At present the United Kingdom has 
four Polaris submarines, and I beJiieve that the 
French are to reduce their number from six to 
five. Would nine submarines make a credible 
force for Europe ? At the moment, the national 
nuclear forces are minimal deterrents ; that is, 
they have the capacity to destroy a few key 
cities, with little or no counterforce capacity to 
attack Soviet military forces. In essence, they 
rely upon the threat alone to deter. 
A European force would need to be somewhat 
more than minimaJl. It would have to be large 
enough to ensure assured destruction, that is, 
a force designed to destroy many cities, millions 
of people and much industrial capacity. Thus, 
for the United Kingdom, if we are still thinking 
of what should succeed the PoLaris system, we 
shall have to increase our four ships to nine, 
and the French will have to increase their five 
perhaps to eleven. The question one then asks 
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oneself is : would our German allies be prepared 
to pay part of the bi11 ? 
A Europe which remains allied to the United 
States in the years until the end of the century 
would not need to construct a force capable of 
making a realistic threat to the major elements 
of Soviet nuclear forces - such as the United 
States, of course, is capab1e of doing today. A 
relatively modest European nuclear deterrent 
could provide insurance against a Soviet first 
strike, and might conceivably deter a Soviet 
conventional attack. But a Europe no longer 
allied to the United States would, if it wished 
to preserve its independence, be obliged to 
construct the :full range of deterrents - that 
is, a nuclear war-winning capability. 
I wish the European-American alliance to 
endure. I believe that a united Europe shou1d be 
an end in itself, just as the unification of Italy 
was an end in itself, and indeed of the United 
States of America and Germany. But I do not 
believe that this means that a united Europe 
must be :formed in opposition to the United 
States. We in Western Europe should never 
be prepared to take the initiative in renouncing 
the United States alliance. Western Europe needs 
allies. We are obliged to share our continent 
with a superpower, the Soviet Union, and thus 
the alliance between Europe and the United 
States is the basis of the balance of power. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- I call the 
Rapporteur. 
Mr. de NIET (Netherlands). - I have heard 
what Sir Frederic Bennett said, and what Mr. 
Critchley said - and, as we know, Mr. Critchley 
is the Chairman of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. He questioned the 
German Under-Secretary yesterday in :five or six 
words, and he has made a speech today lasting 
twenty minutes. 
This is amazing, because he has subjected me 
to this long interrogation about matters which 
are no concern of my Committee. To be subjected 
to such continuous criticism is a threat to our 
safety, because he has said that we have enough 
to prevent a war. That is wrong, and it is bad 
propaganda, to overestimate the Warsaw Pact 
forces and underestimate NATO. That is what 
he said, and it will be found on the record. Now 
he says that I am "touched", even though he 
was not present. 
Mr. CRITCHLEY (United Kingdom). - A 
point of order. 
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Mr. de NIET (Netherlands). - But Mr. Critch-
ley was not present yesterday for the debate when 
Sir Frederic Bennett classified me 88 "an anti-
American biased man". AB Mr. Portheine said 
yesterday, it is not a question of fair-minded co-
operation between Western Europe and the 
United States. It might be said that we should 
co-operate not only militarily, but to defend our 
freedom in economic affairs, but it is wrong to 
attempt definitions in black and white and to 
classify us as having an anti-American political 
bias. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you for your c:Jarifications. 
I call the Chairman of the Committee. 
Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (Federal Republic 
of Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, 
Ladies and Gentlemen, may I make four brief 
points ? First of all, I feel we must be grateful 
to the Rapporteur, whatever one may think of 
his explanatory memorandum, for having given 
us a lesson concerning an observation by a 
German philosopher which I value greatly. This 
observation runs: "He who does not want to 
have a past can have no future". The Rapporteur 
has in fact made the interesting attempt to use 
events of the past, of history, in order to deter-
mine the needs of the present and those of the 
future. 
Secondly, I should like to refer to Sir Frederic 
Bennett's contribution. I shall do my best to 
speak with the objectivity demanded of the Chair-
man of the Committee. I, too, have been unable 
to discover any anti-American feeling in Mr. 
de Niet's explanatory memorandum. He pro-
nounced certain judgments on American polit-
ical events that one may ~ ·regard m one 
light or another, that one may or may not 
criticise. But various passages, and the report 
as a whole, seem to me imbued with a profound 
respect for the great American people, which I 
share. 
Thirdly, for reasons of solidarity amongst 
Committee Chairmen, I have sympathy for Mr. 
Critchley's contribution. He is, of course, in a 
difficult situation when he wants to talk about 
technical aspects of military affairs. When they 
come up, he is a Committee Chairman. He has 
now seized on the opportunity to speak for 
once about technical military matters close to his 
heart as a "freelance", if I may put it that way. 
This is how I interpreted his contribution. 
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A final observation in connection with what 
Sir Frederic had to say on the impending vote. 
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would 
simply like to remind you of our Rules of Pro-
cedure, where Rule 42(3) says: "Only the 
substantive text is voted on by the Assembly." 
Thank you, Mr. President. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. Sieglerschmidt. 
I call Mr. Richter, whom I would ask to be 
brief, since we are to hear Mr. Roseta, the 
Observer from Portugal, who is to make a state--
ment before the close of our debates. 
Mr. RICHTER (FederolRepublic of Germany) 
(Transliation). - Mr. President, I should just 
like to say one or two more words that may 
perhaps facilitate voting. You will recall the 
situation yesterday evening. For my part and 
on behalf of many of my social democrat 
friends, I must say that we are very grateful to 
Sir Frederie for accepting aN! the proposed 
amendments put forward in the .AP.sembl'Y 
yesterday. 
I must, however, quite clearly dissociate myself 
- again, speaking for many social democrats -
from his explanatory memorandum. We consider 
that this gives a picture that conflicts with other 
reports adopted by the .AP.sembly, with what 
Mr. Hermann Schmidt had to say here yester-
day, with official NATO views on the situation 
and, I am sure, also with his own government's 
official llSSOOSillent of the position in Europe. 
When, however, we base ourselves on what 
was expressly confirmed here once again 
yesterday by the Chairman of the Committee, 
namely, that the explanatory memorandum 
constitutes the subjective views of the Rapporteur, 
I am in a position to say that we shall reconsider 
our voting intentions as they were taking shape 
yesterday. We shall, then, vote for Sir Frederic's 
recommendation, and this may perhaps make 
things easier. 
The PRESIDENT {Translation). - I call Lord 
Peddie. 
Lord PEDDlE (United Kingdom). - I will 
not keep you for very long. I take this 
opportunity to support Mr. Richter's comments. 
AB one of the signatories to the amendments to 
Sir Frederic Bennett's paper, I W88 conscious 
that there was severe criticism, which I shared, 
of the explanatory memorandum. Therefore, as 
it is now suggested that Sir Frederic Bennett be 
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personally responsible for his explanatory 
memorandum and that we are concerned solely 
with the recommendations, I give complete sup-
port to Mr. Richter's attitude in this matter. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- Ladies and 
Gentlemen, you have introduced into our 
customary procedure an innovation which is 
difficult to accept. The Assembly only takes 
cognisance of the recommendation and the report 
belongs to the Committee - in other words, even 
if the Rapporteur were to stand down, the Com-
mittee would keep control of the text. 
Since unanimity has not been achieved - and 
I see signs of dissent in various quarters - the 
procedure calls for a ro1l-call vote. But since 
this morning we have counted and re-counted the 
number of those present, and there is no quorum, 
I am therefore forced, in this particular case, to 
defer the vote on Sir Frederic Bennett's proposal 
until a future sitting. 
I call Mr. Leynen. 
Mr. LEYNEN (Belgium) (Translation). - I 
propose that the Assembly should treat both 
reports by the General Affairs Committee in 
the same way. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mr. Ley-
nen, you would only have to speak your mind if 
your position on Mr. de Niet's report is the 
same as that of Mr. Richter, Mr. Cermolacce 
and Lord Peddie. Your proposal therefore only 
goes to confirm what is going to happen. I am 
going to put Mr. de Niet's report to the vote 
in the same way as that of Sir Frederic Bennett. 
If there are no objections, the report will be 
adopted unanimously. If there is a single objec-
tion - for that is the rule under our procedure 
-I shall be obliged to take a roll-ca1l! vote and 
at the same time declare there is no quorum. 
Mr. LEYNEN (Belgium) (Translation).- My 
proposal is slightly different ... 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I know, 
but it is irre:Jevant. 
Mr. LEYNEN (Belgium) (T.ranslation). - I 
move that Rule 34(3) of the Rules of Procedure 
be applied. I agree with Mr. de Niet's report, for 
which I voted in Committee and for which I am 
prepared to vote here. But if there is agreement 
on Sir Frederic Bennett's proposal, I request 
that Mr. de Niet's proposal be treated: in the same 
way under Rule 34:(3) of the Rules of Procedure. 
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THE PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Radius. 
Mr. RADIUS (France) (Translation).- In the 
1ight of what was said just now, we are consider-
ing the actual operative part, and perhaps we 
should make some qualification. But no provision 
is made for such qualification in the Rules of 
Procedure. I could vote for the recommendation 
proper, but I do not agree with the paragraphs 
of the preamble. In other words, I am obliged 
to abstain from voting. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Grieve. 
Mr. GRIEVE (United Kingdom).- I am in no 
way opposed to the recommendations in the report 
of Mr. de Niet. Indeed, I would support them. 
However, I cannot go aJong with all of the 
matters contained in the report. I wou1d go along 
with the recommendations but I entirely support 
Sir Frederic Bennett in saying that if there is 
no opposition at all to the report, the right 
course for the Assembly is that both reports 
should suffer the same fate and both be dealt 
with by roll-call. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mr. 
Grieve, that is what I have just said and we are 
bound - as far as I am concerned, I have said 
so many times outside this chamber and in 
Committee - by an exceptionaUy rigorous pro-
cedure. It is the historical result of the conditions 
under which the .Assembly was set up twenty-
two years ago. 
Having said that, I have put Sir Frederie 
Bennett's report to the vote. There has been some 
opposition. In the absence of ·a quorum, we have 
to defer the vote to a future sitting. In the same 
way, we put Mr. de Niet's report to the vote. 
There has been some opposition again, and we 
are obliged to apply the same procedure. 
To avoid this double setback there would have 
to have been a general coTIBensus between the 
various groups outside the chamber. There is no 
sign of this and I am therefore bound by the 
rules. I therefore find that the two reports must 
be deferred to the next session. 
I call Mr. Richter. 
Mr. RICHTER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, my understand-
ing of the position we are in is unclear on one 
point. As far as I can see, no objection has been 
raised so far. We can vote, since no roll-call vote 
has been asked for. 
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been one. There was Mr. Leynen's. 
Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (Federal Republic 
of Germany) (Translation). -1\Ir. President, the 
procedural position as I see it is that we must 
first find out whether a roll-caM vote is being 
asked for. If a roll-call vote is being demanded 
on the one report, it will probably be demanded 
on the other as well. We shall then have to 
accept the outcome of the rolil-call vote in each 
case. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Gentle-
men, let us not lose sight of the true issue of 
this discussion. In actual fact, the two reports 
have of course a different political slant. As 
soon as you fail to reach agreement someone or 
other on either side is certain to ask for a roll-
call vote, for a1l it takes is one single objection 
or one single abstention for it to be compulsory. 
Unfortunately, despite our efforts and even 
though we postponed yesterday's voting until 
today, there is no quorum and I am obliged to 
apply the procedure that applies in this case. 
I call Sir Frederic Bennett. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom). 
- As far as I know, Mr. President, no one called 
for a roll-call vote on my report. If I am wrong, 
I apologise, but I saw no indication of a wish 
for a roll-call vote. If it was called for, of 
course you are right, Mr. President, in assuming 
that I would immediately call for a roll-call vote 
on Mr. de Niet's report. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - That is 
the way the rules of the Assembly of Western 
European Union have been drafted: if there are 
no objections and no abstentions, i.e. if everyone 
is unanimous, the motion is carried. If there is 
but one objection or one abstention, a roll-call 
vote must be held and a quorum is required. I 
find that there have been one or more objections 
to both reports. Consequently, in both cases, I am 
bound to take a roll-call vote and, as there is 
no quorum, to postpone the votes to the next 
session. Those are the rule<'!. I repeat, I am one 
of those who consider this over-strict. We tried 
to have it changed in the Committee on Rules 
of Procedure, but objeetions were raised and we 
went back to first principles. 
5. .Detente and security in Europe 
(Vote on the revised draft Recommendation, Doe. 703) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- There not 
being a quorum, the vote on the revised draft 
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recommendation on detente and security in 
Europe, Document 703, is postponed until the 
next sitting. 
6. Address by Mr. Roseta, Observer from 
Portugal 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - This 
matter now being regrettably clooed, I callJ Mr. 
Roseta, member of the parliamentary Assembly 
of Portugal, who will tell us about the state of 
the Portuguese economy following on the ups and 
downs and the crisis that this friendly country 
has experienced, and I am sure that the Assembly 
will be interested to hear the first-hand informa-
tion that he is bringing us. (Applause) 
Mr. ROSETA (Observer from Portugal) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, friends, thank 
you for your applause. Yesterday, you had a 
brief address by the President of the National 
Assembly of the Portuguese Republiic, for many 
years a great fighter against dictatorship, who 
reviewed developments in the Portuguese political 
situation since the revolution. 
It is now my turn, with many thanks for 
your invitation, which has enabled me to follow 
the work of the Assembly of WEU as an observer, 
to have the honour of addressing you, at the risk 
of taking up a little of your time, on two funda-
mental matters. 
First of all, I would thank you for the attention 
that you have paid to my country in recent years 
and throughout the session now drawing to a 
close, and salute you as parliamentarians fight-
ing for national freedom. I add my personal 
agreement on the remarks made about Portugal 
in the report on security in the Mediterranean, 
the supplementary report and the text of the 
recommendation. 
What I also wish to do is to point out that 
what you have so rightly recorded here, the 
birth and consolidation of democracy in Portugal, 
is no reason for paying le<'IS attention to my 
country from now on. On the contrary, even 
more attention is required. 
You might say to me : We are far less worried 
about your country, and we have other irons 
in the fire. But is it not a fact that the political 
situation in Portugal will henceforward be s~ble, 
despite the possibility of a minority government 
being formed, that democratic politieal institu-
tions are beginning to operate after free elections, 
and that human rights have been enshrined in 
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the constitution, and ultimately respected 
throughout the country ? 
Yes, our democratic constitution, drafted by a 
constituent assembly which bore the brunt of the 
battle against totalitarian escalation, is now 
really beginning to be applied. 
Yes, elections for the Assembly of the Republic 
have produced a landslide majority for the three 
major democratic parties. 
Yes, the candidate of these parties, General 
Antonio Eanes, a man profoundly attached to 
the defence of democracy, will certainly be elected 
President of the Republic. 
Yes, the Portuguese people are deserving of 
your trust. A feat rare or even unique in history, 
they have, without the intervention of outside 
armies, overthrown two total.itarian regimes in 
two consecutive years. With the democratic sec-
tions of its armed forces, it overturned in 1974 
an old but inveterate dictatorship, and in 1975, 
last summer, a government totally controlled by 
the communist party, which had also taken a 
stranglehold on all the media, the trade unions, 
the machinery of state, local government, the 
banks and nationalised industry, structures which 
it had in many cases taken over by force. 
Your colleague, the Norwegian member of 
parliament, Mr. Thyness, quite rightly referred 
yesterday to the unprecedented nature of the 
achievement of the people to whom I have the 
honour to belong, an achievement that affords 
proof of their deep attachment to freedom and 
democracy. 
In spite of all this, Portugal demands and 
deserves your attention more than ever. I hope 
you will always be mindful of its admission to 
full membership of the European organisations 
from which it is still excluded, after, to be sure, 
suitable periods of adjustment whenever this may 
be rendered neces..<~ary for economic reasons. 
The very grave economic situation which Mr. 
Buck has not overlooked in his report in fact 
demands your immediate action, for the situa-
tion is such that it may endanger democracy 
itself. 
I can quickly sketch in a picture of what our 
new democratic institutions have inherited : over 
a million unemployed, nearly a million refugees 
from Angola and Mozambique, a drop in GNP 
in 1975 of 3 % according to the most optimistic 
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estimate and 10 % according to the most pes-
simistic, given the increase in population during 
that same year ; a figure of 4.5 % gives a drop 
in per capita product of from 7.5% to 14.5% ; 
inflation is running at over 20 % ; the deficit 
in the balance of payments is worsening, and 
the gold and currency reserves are dwindling 
day by day. 
The public enterprises and most private firms 
see their deficits increasing, there is practically 
no new investment. Of course, consumption of 
certain products will have to be reduced. In my 
view, however, the only solution wm be massive 
investment allowing either an increase in output 
or a reduction of unemployment by creating 
thousands of new jobs. 
Mr. Sa' Carneiro, Secretary-General of the 
popular democratic party, of which I am a 
member, suggested a few weeks ago the launch-
ing of a mini-MarshaU plan with the support of 
the developed countries of the West. I was 
pleased to hear the same idea ventilated here. 
Without a massive and co-ordinated investment 
programme in Portugal, there wi11 be no econo-
mic recovery. 
The great internal changes in our economy, 
and external aid, must be swiftly pressed into 
service of development, for the country cannot 
go on being "assisted" in respect of its consump-
tion. Given the European vocation of our country, 
notwithstanding what may be said by some 
"third world" partisans, who have no following 
among us, it is absolutely necessary for our 
economic and social development that the free 
trade agreement between Portugal and the EEC 
should be renegotiated to allow us access to 
Community schemes of aid for the development 
of trade, as in other sectors of regional policy, 
and the like. 
We must therefore also have recourse to the 
services of experts from the multilateral and 
European economic organisations, such as EEC, 
to renovate our commercial structure. 
Those are a few of the chief aspects that are 
vital to any solution of our economic crisis. We 
must speedily turn back to economic and social 
stability, create new jobs and reactivate the 
economy, for you are well aware that security 
in this part of Europe does not merely depend 
on political and military factors, but also on 
economic development, social justice and cultural 
advance. 
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in con-
cluding this brief outline, I look forward to 
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your collaboration, both here and in your parlia-
ments, for massive aid to Portugal, which is 
vital for the safeguard of democracy, which is 
your concern as much as ours, which is your 
democracy. Consequently, Portugal liberated 
from years of dictatorship and a long colonial 
war, intends to contribute, and will certainly 
contribute, .towards strengthening European and 
Atlantic defence. It will play a far more 
important part in the Atlantic Alliance, now 
that it has thrown off all its burdens and will 
have its own place in a future European union. 
With your lasting support, of which I am certain 
its people will never again l108e their freedom: 
believe me, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, 
because I have faith in democracy. (Loud 
applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. Roseta. You have heard say, or seen 
for yourself, that this Assembly has never 
faltered in its solicitude for the Portuguese 
people, especiaJ..1y now they have set an example 
of democratic will by ridding themselves of a 
harsh dictatorship that had set it apart from 
the European international institutions. In all 
our dealings and in all deal:ings of WEU, we 
shall continue to maintain a relationship of trust 
and friendship with you, and what is more, the 
mere fact that you are here proves that we have 
not forgotten you. 
7. Adjournment of the Session 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- We have 
come to the end of our labours. We have lengthily 
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discussed, made speeches and analysed texts, we 
have opened our hearts and girded our loins, 
our debates have at times become impassioned, 
which is additional proof - if any were needed 
- of the vitality of WEU. 
Ministers of the various member States parties 
to the treaty have spoken from this rostrum. 
I note that, despite the slowness of govern-
mental decision-making, this is the first oooasion 
for some time on which some progress has been 
made in implementation of the Brussels Treaty, 
notably as regards the remit given to the Standing 
Armaments Committee. Accordingly, our sitting 
closes, if not on an optimistic note, at least on 
a less pessimistic one than usual. 
An!how, let me thank you all for having taken 
part m these proceedings, very enthusiastically 
at times, very earnestly at others, and I look 
forward to seeing you at the next session not to 
mention, of course, that some of us will b~ seeing 
one another for our work in Committee which 
is always of a methodical, well-document~ kind 
and, thank heavens, we also have the extremely 
efficient co-operation of the staff of the Office 
of the Clerk and the Committee secretariats to 
whom I offer publicly our tribute of thanks: 
I declare the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session 
of the Assembly of Western European Union 
adjourned. 
The Sitting is closed. 
(The Sitting was closed at 12.15 p.m.) 
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